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In the light of the agency theory, this thesis examines the extent to which ACs/EEs can 
harness and comply with the global AML/CFT standards. Whilst appreciating the 
importance of cross-border AML/CFT regulation, it critiques the requirement for 
uniformly applicable standards, thereby exposing the parameters and paradoxes of such 
standards when applied to ACs/EEs. This is achieved by examining the displacement 
of ACs/EEs in the evolution of IFIs/FATF and resulting AML/CFT standards by 
IFIs/FATF, which do not consider the socio-economic and political uniqueness of 
ACs/EEs. It argues that ACs/EEs do not possess the pre-conditions for effective 
AML/CFT regulations, hence the behavioral impact of the FATF’s standards on 
ACs/EEs do not align with the IFIs/FATF’s expectations. This regulatory design flaw 
persists irrespective of the adopted RBA. Consequently, ACs/EEs engage strategically 
with IFIs/FATF to evade sanctions from non-compliance whilst facilitating their 
continued integration into the global economy. This is indicative of an unfavorable 
agency relationship between ACs/EEs and IFIs/FATF and an ingrained legitimacy 
crisis which are further undermined by ACs/EEs capacity challenges.  
 
Through multidisciplinary research on law and economics, this thesis examines the 
impact of uniform standards on ACs/EEs. This thesis assesses the agency theory, 
legislations, design of law, FATF and FSAP reports, and interviews. Consequently, this 
thesis gives a detailed analytical account of the compliance experiences of ACs/EEs, 
and identifies their sources of behaviour within the context of existing pre-conditions. 
Findings from the analysis of secondary data revealed that although ACs/EEs had 
similar socio-economic and political backgrounds, EEs were better able to comply with 
AML/CFT standards. A crucial factor was legitimacy as EEs had slightly more leverage 
in the re-formulation of AML/CFT standards.  
 
The main strength of this thesis is that it contributes to understanding the factors that 
influence ACs/EEs’ compliance, and therefore, the conditions under which the FATF 
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Compliance with the Global AML/CFT Regulation: Parameters and 
Paradoxes of Regulation in African Countries and Emerging 
Economies  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Whilst African Countries (ACs) struggle with compliance with the anti-money 
laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) regulations enunciated by the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), emerging economies (EEs) record better 
compliance levels. This is irrespective of the similar socio-economic and political 
challenges facing these countries. The difficulties faced by ACs in achieving 
meaningful AML/CFT compliance levels is unsettling, coming at a time when ACs are 
striving towards global financial integration demonstrably evidenced by their persistent 
economic growth.1 Surprisingly, the drive for improved AML/CFT compliance by ACs 
usually fosters a regulatory paradox.  For instance, the FATF’s standard on customer 
due diligence (CDD) compels financial institutions to ‘identify the customer and verify 
that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or 
information’.2 On its face value, this requirement appears logically framed, but in ACs 
a large percentage of the population are excluded from mainstream consumer banking 
due to lack of acceptable identification documentation largely driven by illiteracy, 
unemployment and poverty.3 Hence, the strict enforcement of CDD would only 
                                     
1 AfDB, ‘Africa’s Economic Performance Improves in 2017’ (AfDB, 12 October 2017)  < 
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africas-economic-performance-improves-in-2017-17424/  > 
accessed 10 January 2018. 
2 FATF, ‘Recommendation 10’ (FATF, 2012) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf > 
accessed 10 January 2018. 
3 The regulatory circular mandates that no formal identification is necessary for accounts with amounts 
below 200,000 naira (in Nigeria, for instance). In practice, this is hardly the case. See Central Bank of 
Nigeria, ‘Circular to All Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Implementation of Three-tiered Know 
Your Customer Requirements’ (Central Bank of Nigeria, 18 January 2013) < 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2013/ccd/3%20tiered%20kyc%20requirements.pdf > accessed 30 July 
2017; FATF, ‘FATF Guidance: Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial 
 - 2 - 
heighten financial exclusion,4 which is antithetical to the FATF’s financial integrity 
objective. 
 
More broadly, the FATF recommendations are expected to trigger regulatory law 
reforms even in jurisdictions where the legal structures are deemed inefficient. FATF 
recommendation 4 states that ‘Countries should adopt measures similar to those set 
forth in the Vienna and Palermo Convention, and the Terrorist Financing Convention, 
including legislative measures….’5 However, anecdotal evidence and statistical 
findings reveal that developing (especially African) countries struggle with harnessing 
these standards.6 This is attributable to weak legal structures underpinned by socio-
economic and political limitations peculiar to these states.  
 
The complexities involved in ACs’ attainment of compliance is further heightened by 
the FATF’s perception that the global financial system is only as strong as its weakest 
link and hence all countries should be equally subject to the FATF’s requirement.7 
Scholars have supported this assertion, arguing that it is paramount for all countries to 
inculcate the FATF’s  global standard for combatting illicit crimes8 particularly given 
                                     
Inclusion – With a Supplement on Customer Due Diligence’ (FATF Guidance, November 2017) < 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/Updated-2017-FATF-2013-Guidance.pdf > 
accessed 10 March 2018. 
4 FATF, ‘FATF Guidance: Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial 
Inclusion – With a Supplement on Customer Due Diligence’ (FATF Guidance, November 2017) < 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/Updated-2017-FATF-2013-Guidance.pdf > 
accessed 10 March 2018. 
5 FATF, ‘The FATF Recommendation: Recommendation 4’ (FATF, February 2012) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> accessed 10 July 
2015. 
6 Concepcion Verdugo Yepes, ‘Compliance with The AML/CFT International Standard: Lessons from 
A Cross-Country Analysis’ (2011) International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/11/177, 9 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899578 > accessed 19 April 2015. 
7 Paul Allan Schott, ‘Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism: Second Edition and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX’ (World Bank, 2016) < 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6977/350520Referenc1Money01OFFIC
IAL0USE1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y > accessed 10 December 2017.  
8 Ibid. 
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that the borderless nature of money laundering (ML)9 and terrorist financing (TF)10 
reinforces the need for an internationally coordinated response.11 Furthermore, scholars 
argue that the various methods by which illicit crimes are carried out remain shrouded 
in secrecy, therefore un-curtailed liberalization of ACs/EEs’12 market economies can 
give rise to adverse socioeconomic effects,13 given that these crimes pose a threat to the 
stability of the financial system.14 However, requiring that all countries meet the same 
AML/CFT standard douses regulatory effectiveness and creates a paradox.  Moreover, 
this approach is blindsided to the threat posed to the sovereignty of countries.15 
 
A background to the coordinated response to illicit crimes provides a synopsis to the 
quagmire faced by ACs, and indeed EEs, in attaining desirable compliance levels. The 
AML/CFT regulation was inculcated in the financial sector reform which involved 
various global, continental and regional financial institutions.16 Most prominent of the 
institutions are the FATF, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
These institutions recognized the dire consequences that ML/TF can have on the 
                                     
9 FATF, ‘What is money Laundering?’ < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/> accessed 10 
February 2015.; Nicholas Ryder, Financial Crime In The 21st Century, Law and Policy (Edward 
Publishing Limited 2011) 10.; Eleni Tsingou, ‘Global Financial Governance and the Developing Anti-
Money Laundering Regime: What Lessons for International Political Economy’ (2005) Centre for the 
Study of Globalization and Regionalization (CSGR) Working Paper No 161/05 
<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1959/1/WRAP_Tsingou_wp16105.pdf> accessed 11 February 2015. 
10 Ilias Bantekas, ‘The International Law of Terrorist Financing’ [2003] 97 AJIL 315, 315. 
11 Barnett,Michael and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics (Cornell University Press 2004) 9. 
12 Laundering poses significant threats to global financial integrity and national security. See Eleni 
Tsingou, ‘Global Financial Governance and the Developing Anti-Money Laundering Regime: What 
Lessons for International Political Economy’ (2005) Centre for The Study of Globalization and 
Regionalization (CSGR) Working Paper No 161/05 
<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1959/1/WRAP_Tsingou_wp16105.pdf> accessed 11 February 2015  
13 Paul Ashin, ‘Dirty Money, Real Pain’ [2012] 49 (2) Finance and Development 38, 38.; Raul 
Hernández-Coss, Chinyere Egwuagu, Jennifer Isern and David Porteus, ‘AML/CFT Regulation: 
Implications for Financial Service Providers that Serve Low-income People’ (2005) The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank, 14 < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/497161468140979952/pdf/361690AML0CFT0regulation0
1PUBLIC1.pdf > accessed June 12 2012.;  See the web site of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) < www.odccp.org > accessed 10 January 2015.  
14 Saby Ghoshray, ‘Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict Between Agency 
Capture and Soft Law’ [2014-2015] 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 521, 533. 
15 Herbert V. Morais, ‘The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs. Sovereignty’ 
[2001] 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 779, 779.  
16 See Kevin Davis, ‘Regulatory Reform Post the Global Financial Crisis: An Overview 2’ [2011] Report 
for Melbourne APEC Financial Centre, Australasian APEC Study. Centre at RMIT University <   
http://www.apec.org.au/docs/11_CON_GFC/Regulatory%20Reform%20Post%20GFC-
%20Overview%20Paper.pdf > accessed 10 July 2015. 
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integrity of the international financial market and its likely contribution to financial 
crises.17 Hence, the institutional reactions were directed at setting, disseminating and 
continually assessing AML/CFT standards. The FATF, strengthened by the IMF and 
the World Bank, was established to advance standards and ensure compliance with 
AML/CFT regulation. The standards set by the FATF impose restraints on the 
supervisory approach of regulatory bodies with the goal of determining how they 
regulate financial institutions (FIs).18 
 
However, an examination of the structure and processes involved in regulating and 
disseminating the AML/CFT standards has exposed the institutions to criticisms of 
legitimacy deficiency. This is particularly due to the fact that ACs/EEs were sidelined 
from contributing to the standards which they are now subjected to. As can be imagined, 
these standards, mainly created by the G7 countries are unreflective of the ACs/EEs’ 
peculiarities. This can further be illuminated by an inquiry into the behavioral impact 
of the FATF’s provisions and the significant relationship between international 
regulatory standards and state behavior. To correct this perceived anomaly, the FATF 
introduced the risk-based approach (RBA) in 2012 to harness the peculiarities of 
individual countries and ease the assimilation of the AML/CFT standards.19 The 
effectiveness is however debatable.  
 
Against this backdrop, central to this thesis is the argument that there is an unfavorable 
agency relationship between ACs/EEs and the international community. The 
international financial institutions (IFIs)/FATF, as principals, mandate compliance by 
ACs/EEs to the FATF’s standards and sanction non-compliance. This facilitates a 
situation where ACs/EEs face a heightened degree of exclusion from the international 
financial market. The sanctions do not consider the unique challenges of these countries 
in meeting the demands of compliance with AML/CFT standards. This argument 
                                     
17 See generally, FATF, ‘Global Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment’ (FATF, 
July 2010),< https://www.imolin.org/pdf/imolin/Global_Threat_assessment.pdf > accessed 20 July 
2015.  
18 Ibid.  
19 FATF, ‘The FATF Recommendation: Recommendation 1’ (FATF, February 2012) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> accessed 10 July 
2015. 
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exposes a design flaw in AML/CFT standards and processes for benchmarking 
compliance, irrespective of the adoption of the RBA to compliance.20 Hence, the 
current standards and processes have to be re-evaluated to adequately take account of 
the peculiarities of ACs/EEs21 with the aim of facilitating actual and proactive 
compliance.  
 
Examining the varying legal structures underpinned by dire socio-economic and 
political circumstances reveals that uniform standards, even where supported by the 
RBA, is antithetical to proactive compliance. Thus, uniform standards may be setting 
too high a bar for ACs/EEs, which may continually fail to meet the expected 
compliance standards. This underscores a regulatory paradox, where regulations 
achieve effects contrary to their intention, which undermines compliance prospects and 
hinders financial integration of ACs/EEs due to sanctions.  
 
Consequently, this thesis advances these questions: 
1. Has the evolution of IFIs/FATF facilitated an agency slack between these 
international institutions and ACs/EEs with resulting legitimacy crises?  
2. Do the compliance drivers and level of compliance attained in ACs/EEs indicate 
a misalignment of incentives between these countries and IFIs/FATF? 
3. What factors exacerbate information asymmetry between IFIs/FATF and 
ACs/EEs? Can the agency slack that arises from countries acting in their self-
interest to hinder information sharing with other countries be resolved?  
4. Does the risk-based approach sufficiently take into consideration the 
peculiarities of countries and facilitate increased legitimacy of the FATF? 
 
                                     
20 Abdullahi Usman Bello and Jackie Harvey, ‘From a Risk-based Approach to an Uncertainty Based 
Approach to Anti-Money Laundering’ [2017] 30 (1) Security Journal 
21 This refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
 - 6 - 
 1.1 Scope of Thesis  
 
This thesis focuses on the interrelationship between IFIs/FATF and ACs/EEs, and how 
this relationship affects the compliance of these countries to the FATF standards. This 
encompasses an examination of the evolution and legal status of the key actors in the 
global regulation of AML/CFT: the IMF and the World Bank, the FATF and its regional 
affiliates. Such examination unveils unfavorable agency and legitimacy concerns, 
thereby challenging the perspective that AML/CFT measures can be implemented 
uniformly across ACs/EEs.22 Central to this would be the recognition of socio-
economic and political differences within ACs/EEs23coupled with the capacity deficit 
in these blocs of countries that hinder their ability to harness the AML/CFT regime. 
Consequently, it assesses the pre-conditions for effective AML/CFT regulation and the 
factors that engineer compliance within these bloc of countries. It concludes that the 
unsuitability of the current global AML/CFT regime which has not been remedied by 
the adoption of the RBA necessitates amendments to ensure proactive compliance.  
 
1.1.1 The Financial Action Task Force 
 
As one of the first collaborative international efforts towards the elimination of 
financial frameworks that support terrorism and money laundering, the FATF promoted 
40 recommendations on money laundering and terrorist financing.24 Countries are 
required to adopt these through national laws and effective implementation of 
recommendations.25 Non-compliant jurisdictions are coerced into compliance by soft 
law mechanisms employed by the FATF. This has led scholars to argue that FATF 
                                     
22 Emerging Economies include the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa); African 
Countries – mainly restricted to Nigeria, examples of which are applicable to other African countries.  
23 For instance – unsophisticated legal system, lack or absence of skilled financial institution staff, 
ineffective regulatory bodies, prevalence of corruption and financial crimes, unemployment and conflict. 
24 See FATF, ‘FATF Steps Up the Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing’ (FATF, 16 
February 2012) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatfstepsupthefightagainstmoneylaunderingandterrorist
financing.html > accessed 12 March 2015.  
25 Nicholas Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century – Law and Policy (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited 2011). 
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impacts hard law into jurisdictions.26 Backed by interpretative guidance and periodic 
updates, the FATF recommendations form the backbone of the AML/CFT regime. Its 
AML regime is distinguished on two fronts: prevention and enforcement.27 Prevention 
is focused on regulation, supervision, reporting,28 consumer due diligence29 and 
sanctions. The FATF recommendations also illustrate that prevention includes risk 
assessment and financial terrorism laws. Enforcement is however based on the 
methodology of deterrence and retribution and thus centered on investigation, 
confiscation, prosecution and punishment.  
 
Adherence to the FATF requirements is assumed to be key to curbing ML/FT, though 
its effectiveness is however uncertain. Tsiongou recognizes the role of states in 
harnessing the AML/CFT regime.30 Yepes however expresses reservations on the 
possibility of uniform development.31 These reservations are revealed in difficulties 
experienced by ACs adhering to these requirements given their lack of infrastructure 
and skilled manpower.32 Paradoxically, these requirements have the undesirable effect 
of undermining attempts to curb financial exclusion, thus perpetuating illicit financial 
transfers via the unbanked.33 The unbanked side of the economy is the reverse side of 
                                     
26 Saby Ghoshray, Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict between Agency 
Capture and Soft Law 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev (2014–2015) 521, 521. 
27 Eleni Tsingou, ‘Global Financial Governance and the Developing Anti-Money Laundering Regime: 
What Lessons for International Political Economy’ (2005) Centre for the Study of Globalization and 
Regionalization (CSGR) Working Paper No 161/05 
<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1959/1/WRAP_Tsingou_wp16105.pdf> accessed 11 February 2015 
28 FATF, ‘The FATF Recommendation: Recommendation 20’ (FATF, February 2012) < 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> 
accessed 10 July 2015. 
29 FATF , ‘The FATF Recommendations: Recommendation 5 - 12 and 22’ (FATF, 2012) < 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf > 
accessed 10 July 2015. 
30 Eleni Tsingou, ‘Global Financial Governance and the Developing Anti-Money Laundering Regime: 
What Lessons for International Political Economy’ (2005) Centre for the Study of Globalization and 
Regionalization (CSGR) Working Paper No 161/05 
<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1959/1/WRAP_Tsingou_wp16105.pdf> accessed 11 February 2015. 
31 Concepcion Verdugo-Yepes, ‘Compliance with the AML/CFT International Standard: Lessons from 
a Cross-Country Analysis’ (2011) International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/11/177, 9 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899578 > accessed 19 April 2015.  
32Skilled manpower in this context refers to staff of regulatory bodies, as well as those of Financial and 
Non-Financial Institutions required to ensure compliance; Ronald H Mynhardt and Johan Marx, ‘Anti 
Money Laundering Recommendations for Cash Based Economies in West Africa’   Corporate Ownership 
and Control 1, 2. 
33 See the European Commission, ‘The EU Steps up its Response to Fight Money Laundering and Drug 
Trafficking in West Africa’ European Commission Press Release – 18 March 2013 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-230_en.htm> accessed 10 July 2015.  The implementation 
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the banked, the boundary between which is drawn by legislation and regulation. In 
contrast, EEs are assumed to be better skilled at implementing the FATF’s 
recommendation.34  The FATF requires that all member countries be ‘strategically 
important’.35 To attain this bar, FATF countries are not just mandated to be effective in 
combatting ML/TF, their global financial prominence is also crucial.36 This rigorous 
two-step process has seen all EEs classified as members, a feat no AC has attained. 
Verdugo Yepes attributes the position of EEs to their economic growth and the quality 
of their domestic regulatory framework which he agrees is correlated to improved 
compliance to AML/CFT standards37 that allows for membership.  
 
McNeil and Ravell argue that the FATF’s membership requirements and structure 
which evidence its politicized nature can however be counterproductive;38 pushing 
developing countries to work sturdily towards the attainment of position of relative 
importance within a limited timeframe. Such pressure and time constraints motivate 
states to give some semblance of compliance to recommendations via changes in form 
- changes which are not necessarily effective. 
 
Regardless of these criticisms, powerful institutional allies – the IMF and the World 
Bank have been praised for addressing some of the membership shortcomings of the 
FATF. The membership of the IMF/World Bank covers about 189 countries, which 
                                     
of AML/CFT requirements especially through the financial institutions can lead to increased 
requirements in opening bank accounts, which deters unqualified persons from utilizing the banks. FATF 
Guidance, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial Inclusion’ 2011 
available at <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf
> accessed 10 May 2015  
34 See FATF,  ‘Process and Criteria for Becoming a Member’ (FATF, 2012) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/membershipprocessandcriteria.html> accessed 4 July 
2015. 
35FATF, ‘Membership Policy’ (FATF, 2012)  <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/fatfmembershippolicy.html> accessed 4 July 2015. 
36Ibid. 
37 Concepcion Verdugo-Yepes, ‘Compliance with the AML/CFT International Standard: Lessons from 
a Cross-Country Analysis’ (2011) International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/11/177, 9 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899578 > accessed 19 April 2015. 
38 Chris McNeil and Stephen Ravell, ‘International Anti-Money Laundering Initiatives’ in Gwendoline 
Godfrey, Neate and Godfrey: Bank Confidentiality (Bloomsbury Professional 2011). 
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include both ACs/EEs.39 However, membership does not necessarily translate to equal 
participatory power. Scholarly critiques accede to this, noting that the voting quota in 
the IMF hinders effective participation.40 Woods argues that the current voting and 
board membership structure reinforces the fears of under-representation of ACs  in 
contrast to EEs as it breeds inequality in the formulation and dissemination of policies.41 
Consequently, ACs have been unable to assimilate the formulated AML/CFT 
recommendations due to unsophisticated legal systems and certain socio-political 
peculiarities42 inter alia,  corruption and democratic deficit.  
 
This has led to greater intrusion by international institutions and more powerful 
countries through the FATF’s soft law enforcement mechanisms. The FATF however 
claims to address these issues by monitoring the progression of each country in 
implementing the necessary measures and carrying out periodic reviews of their 
techniques43 and most importantly, through FATF’s styled regional bodies (FSRB).44 
However, the independence of these bodies is not guaranteed due to the observatory 
status granted to certain ‘powerful’ countries.45 
 
                                     
39 IMF, ‘IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors’< 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx> accessed 14 January 2015. 
40 Leech Dennis and Leech Robert, ‘A new Analysis of a priori Voting Power in the IMF: Recent Quota 
Reforms Give Little Cause for Celebration’  (2012) Warwick Economics Research Paper Series 
(TWERPS)<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2012/twerp_1001.
pdf > accessed 10 May 2015.; Mark J Wolff, ‘Failure of the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank to Achieve Integral Development: a Critical Historical Assessment of Bretton Woods Institutions, 
Policies, Structures & Governance’ [2013)]41 Syracuse j. Int’l L. & Com.71, 73, 84, 87, 111- 114. Some 
emerging countries like China and Russia have seats on the board. 21 African countries are represented 
by 1 Executive Director and 22 by an Executive Director at the World Bank 
41 Ngaire Woods, ‘The Challenges of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank themselves’ 
[2000] 28 (5) World Development 823. 
42 Andrea Lenshow, Duncan Liefferink and Sietske Veenman, ‘When Birds Sing: A Framework for 
Analyzing Domestic Factors Behind Policy Convergence’ 12 (5) [2005] Journal of European Public 
Policy 797-816. 
43 IMF, ‘The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism’ March 27, 
2015 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm>accessed 5 May 2015.; FATF, ‘FATF Mutual 
Evaluations’  < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/ > accessed 22 January 2015  
44 For a List of regional bodies see, APG, ‘Financial Action Task Force & FATF Styled Regional Bodies’ 
(APG)  < http://www.apgml.org/fatf-and-fsrb/page.aspx?p=94065425-e6aa-479f-8701-5ca5d07ccfe8 > 
accessed 14 May 2015.  
45 See Inter Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), Observer 
status is granted to, inter alia, the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) 
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1.1.2 The International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
 
As stated, the FATF also works in collaboration with the IMF and World Bank to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The IMF was originally designed to 
promote international monetary cooperation, and ensure exchange stability and 
economic growth.46 Its sister organization, the World Bank, was created with the sole 
purpose of promoting long term economic development and poverty reduction.47 The 
original mandates of these institutions have however evolved to address the growing 
level of ML/TF due to possible adverse macro-economic effect on the international 
economy48 as well as socio-economic and political consequences on developing 
countries.49 The cooperation of both institutions resulted in the launch of the Financial 
Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), a collaborative assessment of compliance levels, 
the report of which is infused into the IMF’s Article IV surveillance.50 
 
                                     
46 IMF, ‘The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank’ (IMF, March 2018) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/imfwb.htm > accessed 7 April 2018; IMF, ‘Articles of 
Agreement’ < https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf > accessed 26 April 2017. 
47 Ibid. 
48 World Bank, ‘Enhancing Contributions to Combating Money Laundering: Policy Paper’ (World Bank, 
April 2001) <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/moneylaundering.pdf> accessed 19 May 2015; IMF, 
‘Intensified Fund Involvement in Anti-Money Laundering Work and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism’, (IMF, November 2001) < https://www.imf.org/External/np/mae/aml/2001/eng/110501.pdf>  
accessed 19 May 2015. 
49 Paul Allan Schott, ‘Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism: Second Edition and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX’ (World Bank, 2016) < 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6977/350520Referenc1Money01OFFIC
IAL0USE1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y > accessed 10 December 2017.; For the IMF Action Plan, 
see, IMF Policy Paper, ‘Review of the Fund’s Strategy on Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the 
Financing of Terrorism’ (2014) < http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/022014a.pdf > accessed 
21 January 2015.  For the World Bank Action Plan, see, ‘Proposed Action Plan for Enhancing the Bank’s 
Ability to Respond to Clients in Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism’, 22 
January 2002. 
50 For the roles of the IMF, see Ngaire Woods, The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and 
their Borrowers (Cornell University Press 2006); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The IMF as an Organization, 
International Economic Law (OUP 2002); International Monetary Fund, ‘IMF and the Fight Against 
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism’ (IMF, October 
2017)<http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm> accessed 1 December 2017.; R. Barry 
Johnston and John Abbott, ‘Placing Bankers in the Front Line’ [2005] 8.3 Journal of Money Laundering 
Control 215-219. 
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According to Jae-Myong Koh, the FSAP’s findings affect three main categories of 
IMF/World Bank’s activities:51 assessing a country’s situation,52 lending53 and 
technical assistance.54 Moreover, the IMF/World Bank have incorporated operational 
activities aimed at curbing ML/TF which include: the promotion of sound financial 
systems, good governance, design and implementation of judicial reform and other 
related capacity building measures.55 Serre notes that four West African countries 
(Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger and Sierra Leone) have been so assisted by the World 
Bank.56 Unlike the FATF’s coercive style, the IMF’s technical assistance is granted on 
a voluntary and cooperative basis.57 Whilst technical assistance has faced limited 
challenges, the role of institutional aid as a catalyst for preventing or remedying terrorist 
activities has generated some discussion. Serre postulates that the link between 
development aid and the fight against terrorism remains unproven – which has however 
not prevented some states from relying on aid.58 
 
The role of the IMF/World Bank in ML/FT has been disputed on two independent 
grounds, external influence and expertise. Developing countries, particularly ACs, have 
                                     
51 Paul Allan Schott, ‘Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism: Second Edition and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX’ (World Bank, 2016) < 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6977/350520Referenc1Money01OFFIC
IAL0USE1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y > accessed 10 December 2017.  
52IMF’s Article IV Consultation see, “IMF Articles of Agreement’ < 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf > accessed 1 January 2014. 
53 The Fund has come to include the fights against money laundering, corruption, and terrorism as factors 
in conditional lending programs. 
54 IMF, ‘IMF Policy Paper: Review of the Funds Strategy on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism’ (IMF,  2014)  <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/022014a.pdf> 
accessed 7 May 2015; Jae-Myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 
(Springer 2006).  
55IMF, ‘Articles of Agreement’ (IMF, 2944) < http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf > 
accessed 2 April 2015. Paul Allan Schott, ‘Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism: Second Edition and Supplement on Special Recommendation IX’ (World 
Bank, 2016) < 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6977/350520Referenc1Money01OFFIC
IAL0USE1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y > accessed 10 December 2017.  
56 Julien Serre, Development Aid in the Fight Against Terrorism’ [2012] 77 (4) Politique étrangère. For 
example, AML/CFT Technical Assistance totaling US$2.2 million has been included in lending 
programs for four countries (Bangladesh, Guatemala, Honduras, and Pakistan). In addition, for 
Serbia/Montenegro, AML/CFT is an area to be covered in the adjustment loan; see Jae-Myong Koh, 
Suppressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering (Springer 2006) 176. 
57 Under the FSAP, the IMF/World Bank have set the standards and codes in 12 areas under which 
AML/CFT issue is subsumed. Under the FSAP, the IMF/World Bank prepare the country reports which 
analyze each country’s status and implementation of the 12 standards and codes. It is voluntary and can 
only be triggered at the request of the assessed country. 
58 Julien Serre, Development Aid in the Fight Against Terrorism’ [2012] 77 (4) Politique étrangère. 
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resisted its adoption on the ground that these international institutions have become 
instruments in the creation of regimes of governance coordinated by the United States 
and the G7 in the face of security threats.59The asymmetry of influence is not only 
evidenced by the composition of the institutions, but also by the fact that when 
providing technical assistance or loans to ACs, the IMF/World Bank attach 
conditionalities mandating that they tackle ML/TF.60 In contrast, similar technical 
assistance is granted in emerging economies by way of assessment recommendations.61 
Furthermore, the soft law enforcement mechanisms which function as an inducement 
device is meted out mainly on ACs.62 The paradox however is that EEs may, in certain 
instances, contend with more ML/FT issues due to their sophisticated financial 
markets.63 The presence of external influence may explain the inability of the 
IMF/World Bank to render independent unbiased advice. There is constant 
underestimation of a country’s economic problems, given the absence of robust 
information on which the conditionalities are based. 64 
 
                                     
59 Eleni Tsingou, ‘Global Financial Governance and the Developing Anti-Money Laundering Regime: 
What Lessons for International Political Economy’ (2005) Centre for the Study of Globalization and 
Regionalization (CSGR) Working Paper No 161/05 
<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/1959/1/WRAP_Tsingou_wp16105.pdf> accessed 11 February 2015; Ben 
Hayes, ‘Counter Terrorism, Policy Laundering and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil 
Society 14 (1) [2012]  IJNL.  
60 Peter Aldridge, Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, Confiscation, Civil Recovery, Criminal 
Laundering and Taxation of the Proceeds of Crime (Hart Publishing 2003) 194. The World Bank has 
provided technical assistance, assessment and policy development support to West African countries. 
Pertinently, the intrusion of IMF/World Bank in the assessment of a country’s standard is optional, 
however, African countries usually submit themselves to such assessments. 
61 IMF, ‘Brazil: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – FATF Recommendations for Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ (IMF Country Report 05/207, June 2005) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05207.pdf> accessed 10 July 2015; IMF, ‘People’s 
Republic of China - Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Report on Observance of Standards and 
Codes’ (IMF Country Report No, 08/360, November 2008) < 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08360.pdf>  accessed 14 July 2015. 
62 Highlighting the asymmetry that occasions soft law, see Jon Nirger Skjaerseth, Olav Schram Stokke 
and Jorgen Wettestad, ‘Soft law, Hard Law and Effective Implementation of International Environmental 
Norms’ [2006] 6.3 Global Environmental Politics 104, 118-119.; Eilis Ferran and Kern Alexander, ‘Can 
Soft Law Bodies Be Effective? Soft Systemic Risk Oversight Bodies and the Special Case of the 




23023077127127103107006079003001087124078&EXT=pdf > accessed 11 February 2015. 
63 There is an assumption that due to financial flows, emerging economies are most susceptible to illicit 
crimes, but may indeed be better able to curtail it as opposed to West African countries.  
64Nicholas Ryder, Financial Crime in the 21st Century, Law and Policy (Edward Publishing Limited 
2011). 
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 Ngaire Woods appraises the composition of the IMF/World Bank boards, questioning 
their competence to effectively dispense their duties with objectivity and the requisite 
information.65 Furthermore, scholars have queried the ability of the IMF’s assessment 
to deal efficiently and legitimately with standards closely linked to criminal justice.66 
Buira and Babb re-echo this concern, stating that there is little reason to believe that the 
IMF’s staff possess expertise in this area.67 The choice of soft law as an enforcement 
mechanism is further critiqued as evidence of non-expertise.68 
 
In addition, mutual evaluation does not always reveal to IFIs the range of capacity 
related issues faced by various jurisdictions within their legal structures. Thus, IFIs’ 
recommendations may be unsuitable to specific countries. That IFIs have been more 
influential in ACs as opposed to EEs69 can be attributed to the adverse effect of 
porousness in countries with unsophisticated mechanisms for dealing with ML/TF on 
the integrity of international markets. 
 
It is arguable that the effectiveness of AML/CFT regulation is not necessarily reliant 
on the legal development of jurisdictions, as exemplified by China’s overt compliance 
with the AML/CFT regulations irrespective of its poor rule of law records.70 This is 
however an exception, particularly due to the country’s drive for reputational standing 
within the global financial space. What is however noticed with ACs is that where the 
                                     
65Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: the IMF, the World Bank and their Borrowers (Cornell University 
Press 2006) 141. 
66 IMF, ‘ Public Information Notice: IMF Executive Board Reviews and Enhances Efforts for Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’, (IMF, Public Information Notice, 
No.04/33, 2 April 2004) < http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2004/pn0433.htm > accessed 2 May 
2019.  
67 Sarah Babb and Ariel Buira, ‘Mission Creep, Mission Push and Discretion: The Case of IMF 
Conditionality’ (Presented at the XVIII G24 Technical Group Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, March 
2004). 
68 Leonard Seabrooke and Eleni Tsiongou, ‘Revolving Doors and Linked Ecologies in the World 
Economy: Policy Locations and the Practice of International Financial Reform’ [2009] 260/09 CSGR 
Working Paper, 14 < 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/papers/workingpapers/2009/26009.pdf 
> accessed 10 July 2015. 
69 Devesh Kapur, John Lewis, and Richard Webb, The World Bank: Its First Half-Century - Volume 1 
History (Brookings Institution Press 1997) 730; Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World 
Bank and their Borrowers (Cornell University Press 2006) 141.   
70 World Justice Project, ‘Rule of Law Index 2017 – 2018’ (World Justice Project) < 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2018-June-Online-
Edition_0.pdf > accessed 20 March 2018.  
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legal structures are ineffective, the law exists only on paper and is neither known to the 
public nor respected by the state.71 It is not only riddled with uncertainties but its 
ineffectiveness encourages corrupt practices and illicit financial crimes.72 Furthermore, 
this structure usually has an unreliable judiciary and inefficient executive.73  This thesis 
posits that legal structures that exist mainly in ACs do not offer favorable conditions 
for the emergence of a suitable AML/CFT regulatory structure, thus diminishing the 
prospects for robust compliance. This indicates that usually the level of a jurisdiction’s 
legal development is related to its likelihood of compliance with the AML/CFT 
regulations. Improving the functioning of legal structures and institutions is a 
prerequisite for economic development and vice versa. Yepes lends credence to this, 
asserting that domestic governance hinders compliance levels, which are in turn 
interrelated with socio-economic development.74 To this end, this thesis asserts that 
legal and institutional reform is crucial not only for effective AML/CFT regulation but 
also for economic development.  
 
1.1.3 Why IMF/World Bank and the FATF?  
 
The IMF and the World Bank, which are IFIs, are considered alongside the FATF for 
two key reasons. Firstly, these are the paramount institutions that govern AML/CFT 
regulations globally. These institutions, even with diverse legal status, work in concert 
in re-formulating, assessing and facilitating compliance with the FATF standards. 
Hence, scrutinizing their evolution, legal status, legitimacy and role in AML/CFT 
regulation is a crucial starting point for examining how AML/CFT regulation operates 
                                     
71 Cheryl Gray, ‘Reforming the Legal Systems in Developing and Transition Countries’ [1997] Finance 
and Development <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/09/pdf/gray.pdf>  accessed 15 
December 2014. 
72 Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United 
Kingdom’ (2000) ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No.172 
<http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Brian_Cheffins/publication/24101528_Does_Law_Matter_The_S
eparation_of_Ownership_and_Control_in_the_United_Kingdom/links/5416f0c80cf2bb7347db80d6.pd
f> accessed 7 June 2015. 
73 Ibid. 
74Concepcion Verdugo-Yepes, ‘Compliance with the AML/CFT International Standard: Lessons from a 
Cross-Country Analysis’ (2011) International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/11/177, 9 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1899578 > accessed 19 April 2015. 
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at a global level, the interrelationship between IFIs/FATF and countries, and how this 
relationship facilitates or hinder compliance. It is imperative to state that there is limited 
focus on pre-existing United Nations (UN) Conventions on ML/TF given that the FATF 
has inculcated the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (Vienna Convention), and the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) into its recommendations.75 
 
Secondly, through the application of the agency theory, the degree of proximity of these 
institutions to countries in setting and implementing standards can be examined. 
Through the prism of the agency theory, the FATF is the proximate principal to 
countries, whilst the IFIs, as observers on the FATF, have an extended principal 
position. Their positions are however not static within the agency theory. Interestingly, 
the dynamics of their non-static position unearths legitimacy concerns which are core 
to this thesis.  
 
1.1.4 Focus on African Countries and Emerging Economies 
 
Limited literature discusses the bias that ACs/EEs encounter in complying with 
AML/CFT regulations due to their limited integration to the global economy.  Hence, 
it is interesting to see how these bloc of countries that had no role in the AML/CFT 
policy formulation have come to align with the global standards. This thesis shows how 
such alignments are problematic due to the deficient legal framework of ACs, 
underpinned by socio-economic and political difficulties. This is enriched by 
quantitatively assessing the compliance drivers to AML/CFT standards within EEs who 
face similar issues, but are better equipped to deal with them.    
 
                                     
75 FATF, ‘The FATF Recommendation’ (FATF, February 2012) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf > accessed 10 
March 2015. 
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The similarities and differences inherent in this bloc of countries allow for some 
generalizations in considering their likely behavioral responses to the FATF 
recommendations. Similarities within and across each bloc include factors such as 
entrenched cash-based economies, capacity deficiencies and corruption ingrained in 
legal, institutional and political structures. However, EEs usually have more robust 
capacity, stronger financial institutions and a greater degree of integration with the 
international financial economy. Additionally, they have greater macro-economic and 
political stability than ACs, which are crucial in explaining the variation in compliance 
behavior of countries.  
 
1.2 Hypothesis  
 
The agency theory, through which the creation and implementation of standards are 
examined at the global and national levels, has been used to develop competing 
hypothesis that aids in enriching the understanding of this thesis.  
 
Hypothesis: The uniform standards and benchmarking of AML/CFT, which all 
countries are subjected to, create a regulatory paradox for ACs/EEs. Additionally, they 
hinder ACs/EEs from assimilation of standards given their capacity deficit coupled with 
the inability of the standards to encapsulate the peculiarities of countries. These 
undermine compliance prospects which is further worsened by sanctions that hinder 
financial integration. 
 
Competing hypothesis: Compliance with uniform standards is crucial to mitigating 
illicit crimes. The inculcation of the peculiarities of ACs/EEs within the global 
AML/CFT framework narrowly projects the interest of these jurisdictions. 
Additionally, it limits the justification for combatting ML/TF globally, meaning that 
ML/TF will become a global issue given the weakness that accompanies taking the 
peculiarities of ACs/EEs into account.   
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1.3 The Theoretical Argument  
 
This thesis engages the agency theory to understand the relationship between 
IFIs/FATF and states on one hand, and the relationship between states of varying 
degrees of integration to the global financial economy on the other hand.   
 
This theory sheds light on the dynamic relationship between actors (IFIs/FATF and 
countries). It argues that their relationship is defined by the economic positioning of 
countries within the global economy which determines their membership hierarchy 
within IFIs/FATF.76 It argues that the economic positioning of countries, coupled with 
how these countries perceive their compliance to AML/CFT standards determines the 
degree of information asymmetry that exist between the actors. Simply put, it 
determines how countries communicate their true AML/CFT compliance levels to 
IFIs/FATF. For instance, countries that are highly integrated with the global economy 
and can pre-empt high compliance to AML/CFT standards, are more inclined to curtail 
information asymmetry in interacting with IFIs/FATF. Additionally, these countries are 
more inclined to comply with the FATF standards, irrespective of their internal 
challenges - due to the need to avert sanctions that can affect their positioning within 
the global economy. Where, however, countries are not highly integrated and suffer 
internal compliance challenges, they are more likely to communicate strategically with 
IFIs/FATF. In such situations, the conflicting interest between IFIs/FATF and countries 
becomes more prominent. Where, for instance, IFIs/FATF strive for integrity and 
stability at the possible expense of financial inclusion – thereby compelling information 
asymmetry and compliance gaps. This indicates that the continued asymmetry of 
standards and benchmarking processes may hinder the ability of ACs/EEs to comply 
proactively with global standards. In most cases, a regulatory paradox may ensue given 
the dearth of legitimacy.  
 
                                     
76 IFIs (core member countries entitled to one vote each as against group of members), FATF (core 
members, belated members, associate members)  
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In examining the interrelationship between countries of varying degrees of integration 
to the global economy, this thesis argues that compliance is usually dependent on self-
interest. It however finds that lesser integrated countries have less incentive to comply 
except when engaged in a continuing business relationship. Where however, these 
countries are compelled to comply, capacity deficiency hinders proactive compliance.  
 
This theory facilitates an understanding that, as opposed to the arguments advanced by 
the FATF that the ‘efficiency’ of standards is crucial in addressing illicit crimes, in the 
absence of ‘equity’ countries may be crippled from proactive compliance. This position 
recognises that the legal structures of countries, coupled with the confidence level in 
their financial market and structures determines to a large extent, their compliance 
capability.  Shortcomings of these indices, which is predominant in ACs/EEs has 
largely undermined their compliance ratings. This is further worsened by non-legal 
factors such as the absence of political will and resource deficiency.  
 
1.4 Definition of Key Terms and Contribution to Knowledge  
 
Implementation and compliance are used interchangeably, however, they are 
significantly different. Implementation technically refers to the transplantation of 
standards into domestic law, coupled with the measures geared at putting international 
recommendations into practice at the domestic level. Compliance however transcends 
implementation; it refers to an actor’s behavioral conformity to specific 
recommendations.77 For example, when state introduces national laws and regulations 
on AML/CFT, compliance entails ensuring that the standards are obeyed and not 
observed in breach. This indicates that implementation is a pre-condition for 
compliance. Understanding the concept of compliance drivers is critical in constructing 
the design of recommendations to ensure proactive compliance. These concepts are 
                                     
77 Roger Fisher, Improving Compliance with International Law (1981); Benedict Kingsbury, The 
Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law [1998] 10 Mich. 
J. Int’l 345. 
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crucial themes within this thesis and are key to understanding the conflict of interest 
between IFIs and states.  
 
Effectiveness cannot be divorced from these concepts. There are varying perspectives 
on the concept of ‘effectiveness’ within international law. It may relate to whether an 
international law attains its objectives78 or the extent of behavioral improvements 
within targeted countries. The FATF sees effectiveness assessment as the former, given 
its definition of the term as ‘the extent to which the defined outcomes are achieved’.79 
This thesis however views effectiveness as the degree to which the recommendations 
are met through desired changes in state behavior.80 
 
Additionally, the terms ‘standards’, ‘recommendations’ and ‘rules’ are used 
interchangeably in reference to the FATF recommendations. Whilst the FATF 
recommendations are referred to as soft law standards, the hardening of these standards 
during the transplantation process acknowledges their transformation to hard law, thus 
the reference to rules.  
 
Furthermore, the term ‘developing countries’ is used interchangeably with African 
countries. Likewise, ‘illicit crimes, activities or transactions’ refer to ML/TF and its 
predicate offences.  
 
                                     
78 Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, ‘Compliance with the International Environmental 
Accords’ [1995] 119 Global Governance 119, 123. 
79 FATF, ‘Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the 
Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems’ (FATF, 2012) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf > 
accessed 14 July 2015. 
80 Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy (with the assistance of Gail Osherenko), ‘The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes’, in Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes: Casual Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1999). 
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It is imperative to make clear that however scarce, literature exists on the global 
AML/CFT governance, especially as regards the transplantation of international 
policies.81Eminent scholars such as Rainer Hulsee,82 Chris Brummer83and Jason 
Sharman84 have discussed extensively on the suitability of the FATF standards to 
countries around the world. More particularly, Norman Mugarura has examined the 
adaptability of the FATF standards across various jurisdictions, especially developing 
countries and argued that the framework should be designed with ‘flexibility’ to ensure 
its adaptability.85 Inspired by these literature, my thesis goes deeper in examining 
whether the evolution of the IFIs/FATF creates an agency slack and evident legitimacy 
crises that facilitates strategic communication between ACs/EEs and IFIs/FATF to 
project actual or proactive compliance. It also questions the suitability of the 
‘flexibility’ introduced through the risk-based approach and whether it serves its 
purpose. Crucially, it examines the compliance drivers that propel or repel compliance 
with the FATF standards and how these are influenced by the uneven development of 
the ‘law and confidence’ in ACs/EEs underpinned by socio-economic and political 
factors. Arguments are buttressed with empirical findings from secondary data, which 
illustrate the compliance variances across countries, indicating that internal dynamics 
affect compliance.  
 
Consequently, my critical contribution to knowledge are my findings that the level of 
integration of ACs/EEs to the global economy and their perceived compliance levels to 
the FATF standards are crucial in determining:  
a. Their delegation powers to the IFIs/FATF and  
b. Their communication strategy with these institutions. 
                                     
81 See Norman Mugarura, The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed 
Countries (First Published 2012, Routledge 2016); Jae-Myong Koh, Suppressing Terrorist Financing 
and Money Laundering: The Evolution and Implementation of International Standards (Springer, 2006)   
82 Rainer Hulsee, ‘Even Clubs Can’t Do without Legitimacy: Why the Anti-Money Laundering Blacklist 
was Suspended’ [2008] 2 Regulation & Governance 459 – 479.  
83 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century ( CUP, 
2012)  
84 Jason Sharman, ‘Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in Developed 
States [2008] 52 (3) International Studies Quarterly 635 – 656.  
85 See Norman Mugarura, The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed 
Countries (First Published 2012, Routledge 2016). 
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These in turn can propel or limit their compliance levels as well as inhibit the 
effectiveness of the FATF regime over these states.  
This study seeks to fill the literature gap on the current global AML/CFT framework 
and its suitability across jurisdictions. Therefore, it explores the interplay between 
national and global factors and how they play out in the implementation of the global 
AML/CFT framework across jurisdictions. In doing so, it evaluates the role, 
composition, competencies and legitimacy of IFIs/FATF and the mechanisms they 
employ to cause behavioral changes. Conversely, the pressure on ACs/EEs to comply 
may occasion creative implementation and compliance. This discourse unveils the 
conflicting interests of the IFIs/FATF and ACs/EEs, which also results in conflicts of 
interests for implementing authorities. Indeed, this hinders proactive compliance with 
FATF standards when they do not necessarily promote national interests. The resulting 
divergent implementation and compliance outcomes have consequences for ACs/EEs.  
  
Thus this study reveals that the increasing number of countries becoming associate 
members of the FATF is indicative of the importance attached to the institution, not of 
their willingness to actually implement or comply with its standards. By examining the 
dynamics of implementation and compliance, this study aims to contribute to 
understanding conditions that are likely to make the current recommendations effective. 
It also seeks to contribute to the wider debate about potential reform of the FATF 
standards and processes.  
 
Whilst this study is focused on the compliance of countries to AML/CFT standards, it 
is limited in scope to the technical compliance of countries. It does not extend to the 
‘effectiveness compliance’ levels of countries evaluated by the FATF. Furthermore, it 
is not a study of illicit financial crimes in ACs/EEs, rather the regulatory responses to 
ML/TF through the FATF strategies. Through the lens of the agency theory, the focus 
is on the transplantation to national legislation and implementation of the FATF 
regulations and recommendations and how ACs/EEs have responded to them. 
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1.5 Structure of Thesis  
 
Chapter two examines the evolution of AML/CFT standards, the institutions central to 
AML/CFT administration and the influence of these on state compliance. It establishes 
a link between ML/TF regulation and the financial sector reform which was due to the 
challenges posed to financial integrity by financial liberalization, especially as regards 
cross-border financial relations. It argues that the AML/CFT standards created at 
different historical points only inculcated the perspectives of a select group of 
developed countries. Consequently, standards and processes recommended were at best 
suited to combatting ML/TF within these countries. Given the lack of transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy, the ACs/EEs have suffered a compliance deficit. This 
predicament is understood through the lens of the agency theory which unearths a 
legitimacy crisis, showing that the ACs/EEs are disproportionately involved and 
inexplicably affected by the regulations – an indication of hegemonic subjection.  
 
Chapter three contends that ‘law and confidence’ are crucial pre-conditions for ensuring 
a conducive environment for transplantation of laws in ACs/EEs. Law matters, but most 
importantly, the design of the law is crucial in compelling compliance and averting the 
gaming of the law. Law is largely dependent on confidence – in financial stability, 
institutions, governmental and political systems, and enforcement structures. 
Confidence in these bodies would ensure that financial institutions are held accountable 
and regulations are effective and able to ensure financial stability. These factors are 
however lacking in ACs/EEs, an indication that ACs/EEs will be incapable of 
effectively transplanting or implementing the FATF standards as required from every 
country, thereby incurring unmerited sanctions. These pre-conditions feed into the 
compliance drivers which are categorized as legal and non-legal factors and can be 
internal or external to a country. An examination of the compliance drivers succinctly 
alludes to the agency slack that exist in delegation of standards.  
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Chapter four uncovers the interrelationship between the collective principals (CPs) –  
the IFIs/FATF. This synergy examined through the agency theory unveils the power 
dynamics between developed countries, the institutions they create and lead and 
ACs/EEs. It reveals that the AML/CFT standards reflect the priorities and interests of 
the global north and is sublimated with covenants of agency capture which can hinder 
the unique development of ACs. Analyzing the interaction between agent states and the 
CPs, it argues that two factors are crucial for understanding information asymmetry 
between these actors on ML/TF issues; the level of a country’s integration with the 
global financial system and its perceived compliance levels. It finds that the incentive 
for information sharing is highest when a country is ‘highly integrated’ with perceived 
high compliance levels. In opposite situation, the countries would usually engage 
strategically with the principal in order to evade observatory tools or sanctions.  
 
Furthermore, in acknowledgement of the flow of money within countries, the 
interaction between ‘highly integrated’ and ‘mid-integrated’ countries are examined. 
The chapter illustrates that these set of countries share information only when it is in 
their self-interest, particularly when there is a continuous financial business that is of 
systematic importance to both parties. It however argues that even when low-integrated 
countries are willing to exchange viable information, they may be limited by capacity 
challenges. Where however information asymmetry continually thrives, the CPs are 
privy to tools to rein in the agent-states. The tools utilized are dependent on the 
circumstances in question and the application of the inappropriate tool may indeed lead 
to under-regulation, as the tool would at best be inadequate.  
 
Chapter five examines the socio-economic history of Africa, revealing the effect of pre-
mature liberalization on the African economy which placed considerable pressure on 
African trade and finance. This worsened Africa’s position within the global economy 
as countries became more susceptible to external shock thereby serving as a catalyst for 
agency slack. Consequently, this led to inequality amongst countries in the continent, 
with certain banking and financial markets performing better than others. The rein of 
the colonial exploits which had ingrained socio-economic and political issues further 
restricted the growth of markets whilst facilitating illicit crimes. Yet, ACs’ response to 
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combatting illicit crimes were tailored to meeting international standards that did not 
acknowledge their challenges. This necessitated a homegrown approach that would 
preserve the sovereignty of ACs, whilst remedying the democratic deficit at the 
international level. The ineffectiveness of the ‘homegrown approach’ meant that ACs 
remained subject to the international standards irrespective of their compliance 
challenges. This chapter appraises the extent to which the compliance drivers discussed 
in chapter 3 have an effect on the compliance levels in ACs and illustrates this 
empirically. It firmly argues that subjecting ACs to the same standards, methodology 
and sanctions would be to ignore their heritage and socio-economic challenges whilst 
serving as a catalyst for legitimacy crises.  It would be setting these countries to fail or 
permitting them to engage strategically with IFIs/FATF given their low-integration 
with the global economy.  
 
Chapter six focuses on the BRICS which has created newer inequalities of power and 
influence regionally and globally. The extension and receipt of FATF membership to 
the BRICS were centered on varying jurisdictional reasons. Whilst the BRICS and 
developing world viewed this as a means to gain increased representation within the 
FATF, the agenda of the West was to ensure that the financial movement to the Global 
South is not replete with illicit transactions. The power-play involved in negotiations 
between these ‘North-South strategically important countries’ was predicated on the 
assumption that representation would be a catalyst for improved compliance to 
AML/CFT recommendations. This approach however did not take into consideration 
pertinent issues that are peculiar to BRICS’ economies, such as their diverse legal 
developmental levels underpinned by chaotic political structures and creeping 
economic growth. Furthermore, the FATF continues to exercise some restraint in 
including EEs as core members and thus shapers of its standards. It had merely treated 
them as regulation-takers. Their coerced and belated membership has created a very 
unbalanced membership between EEs and developed countries – a catalyst for agency 
slack. It argues that the BRICS membership of the FATF does not necessarily guarantee 
comparable representation or legitimacy; neither does it guarantee the overtly improved 
compliance of BRICS countries. Rather, it taints the socio-economic complexities 
inherent in these countries and their ability to comply. Worse still, it conceals the 
asymmetry occasioned by variances in the strength of legal structures reinforced by 
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political and economic differences between members of the FATF. In considering the 
determinants of compliance empirically, it argues that for membership to equate to 
legitimacy, there must be extant changes along existing political and economic global 
structures. 
 
Chapter seven illustrates that although ACs/EEs adopted the FATF’s standards 
grudgingly, they have continued to implement them particularly due to the 
instrumentality of the IFIs. Their continued implementation has however only resulted 
in formal or creative compliance. The FATF’s attempts to resolve this through the 
introduction of the RBA, which was hoped to address the legitimacy crisis and resolve 
agency slack has proved futile. Scholars have promoted other options to resolving this, 
most profoundly – the uncertainty based approach (UBA). This holds some promise in 
resolving issues on legitimacy, in addition to institutionally ingrained changes.  
 
Chapter eight sets out how each chapter answers the set out research questions by 
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1.6 Research Methods  
 
This multidisciplinary research (law of institutions and, law and economics perceptive) 
questions the suitability of uniform standards and benchmarking. It adopts a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative analyses to draw its conclusions. Empirical data is utilized 
in evaluating current compliance level of countries to the FATF recommendations. This 
involves re-coding secondary data derived from the FATF’s assigned compliance levels 
(from non-compliant to compliant ranked 0-4) to countries on each of the 40 
recommendations. The data is gathered from an examination of 43 mutual evaluation 
reports and further follow-up reports. The findings from the secondary quantitative 
analysis of the FATF standards is then pitched against five compliance drivers’ 
statistical variables: corruption, rule of law, democracy, ease of doing business and 
human development indexes. This exercise concretizes arguments for compliance 
drivers suitable to ACs/EEs and illustrates the impact of conformity to the FATF 
standards.  
 
Furthermore, to understand the research questions posed by this thesis, a qualitative 
study is undertaken, which engages semi-structured interviews as the prime data 
collection medium. This entailed interviewing staff of, amongst others, the IMF and 
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1.7 Research Methodology  
 
This thesis which is largely library-based, is based on the agency theory. This 
economics theory which is sparsely used in examining the global regulation of 
AML/CFT provides an understanding of the dynamic relationship between IFIs/FATF 
and the hierarchy of countries they interact with. The applicable theory is enhanced by 
interview responses from IFIs/FSRB staff. These staff better understand the 
relationship IFIs/FATF share with countries and also can illuminate on the challenges 
that hinder compliance by ACs – knowledge garnered through practice. Hence, the 
interviews are tremendously crucial to this thesis.  
 
Additionally, it utilizes an empirical research approach as an extension of the 
theoretical framework. It provides the opportunity to evaluate the interaction between 
institutions and countries, and how institutions rein in compliance by countries. It 
engages in an expository methodological approach in examining the internal and 
external drivers of compliance across ACs/EEs, which are categorized as legal and non-
legal factors. Moreover, it provides understanding of the interaction between developed 
countries and developing countries, illustrating interest-driven compliance, which is 
sometimes circumvented by capacity deficiency.  
 
This thesis recommends a regulatory framework that recognizes the peculiarities of 
ACs/EEs, whilst also advocating for regional and state involvement in a manner that 
does not disrupt international finance. If properly re-evaluated, this thesis would serve 
as a catalyst for improved compliance, whilst fortifying the integrity of the international 
financial architecture.  
Chapter 2 
The International Financial Sector Reform and International Legal 
Framework for AML/CFT Regulation  
 
2. Introduction  
 
Financial liberalization and the accompanying illicit crimes prompted international 
harmonization of a patchwork of domestic regulations on AML/CFT regulation. This 
process of global regulation, driven by IFIs and the FATF, was in response to the 
growing complexity of illicit crimes which increasingly occurred on a cross-border 
level. The relationship between the evolution of the IFIs/FATF and the suitability of 
the AML/CFT regulations has been questioned, particularly regarding the ability of the 
regulations to elicit compliance by countries. This has been examined in relation to 
developed countries such as the United Kingdom1 and the United States;2 and also the 
continental blocs, such as Europe.3 There has, however, been limited focus on 
ACs/EEs.4 Parochial emphasis on ACs/EEs has occasioned arguments that the global 
design of IFIs/FATF allows for suitable regulation of, and compliance with, AML/CFT 
standards globally. Yet, this is not the case, specifically as regards ACs/EEs given the 
hegemonic subjection of these countries and the resulting agency slack, an indication 
of regulatory paradox. To understand the mechanics of this, it is crucial to engage in an 
examination of the rationale for international financial regulation, the historical 
                                     
1 Nicholas Ryder, Money Laundering – An Endless Cycle? A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Money 
Laundering Policies in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada (First 
Published 2012, Routledge 2012) 8-39, 73.  
2 James T Gahtii, ‘The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law’ [2010] 197 J. Prof. 
Law 1, 2-11; Saby Ghoshray Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict Between 
Agency Capture and Soft Law [2014-2015] 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 521, 533. 
3 Ines Sofia De Oliveria, ‘The Anti-Money Laundering Struggle: Actors, Interest and the EU’ (4th ECPR 
Graduate Conference, 2012). 
4 See Norman Mugarura, The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed 
Countries (2nd edn, Routledge, 2016) 145. 
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underpinnings and legal structures of the IFIs/FATF, and how these affect the 
suitability of the global standards.  
 
Section 1 of this chapter focuses on the nature and rationale for financial international 
regulations as instruments for curbing cross-border externalities. Sections 2 and 3 
examine the evolution of international financial regulation (IFR) with an emphasis on 
the historical and legal status of the IFIs/FATF, coupled with justifications and reactive 
steps taken to tackle illicit crimes. The sections highlight that the backing of the FATF 
by IFIs has hardened the trajectory of the AML/CFT standards and led to a move 
towards mandatory compliance. Section 4 engages the agency theory to understand how 
the evolution of IFIs/FATF facilitates compliance with AML/CFT regulations within 
countries. It argues that the existing ‘reverse and continuing international delegation’ 
has created a global hegemony that hinders the suitability of the standards, thus limiting 
compliance. Section 5 deconstructs the concept of legitimacy and its compliance 
potential. This section also examines how agency issues flow from legitimacy crises. 
Section 6 draws the strands together and concludes.
2.1 The Nature of International Financial Regulation  
 
As a sub-set of public and, arguably, private international law, IFR is focused on 
facilitating cross-border financial relations with the aim of bolstering trade whilst 
maintaining financial integrity and stability.1 Such regulation which is designed to 
avoid or minimize the probabilities of a systemic risk across borders2 is derived from 
sources such as soft law standards and treaty agreements.  
 
One may presume that treaties, which are binding international agreements between 
states would serve as the primary source of international financial standards given their 
ability to compel enforcement. This is not the case. Rather, soft law standards which 
are non-binding agreements have surfaced as the primary means through which 
international financial standards are set. However, the role of treaty bodies, such as the 
IMF/World Bank in regulating international finance cannot be relegated to history. 
Although they are not standards-setting institutions, the treaties of the IMF/World Bank 
contain regulations and policies that affect FIs. For instance, the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement state that it shall oversee members’ compliance with their general 
obligations.3 This underscores the monitoring and enforcement powers of the IMF to 
ensure member states comply with their obligations and other relevant soft-law 
standards. The IMF’s backing hardens the trajectory of soft laws, giving them binding 
authority. This bolsters the argument by scholars that soft law and hard law interact on 
a continuum and are not necessarily opposites.4 
                                     
1 Shapovalov Mikhail Alexeevitch, ‘History, Current State and Prospects of Development of 
International Financial Law’ [2015] 43 Revista de Derecho 350. 
2 John William Anderson, Jr., ‘Regulatory and Supervisory Independence: Is there a Case for 
Independent Monetary Authorities in Brazil?’ [2004] 10 L & Bus Rev. AM. 253; Weber Rolf H., and 
Douglas W. Arner, ‘Towards a New Design for International Financial Regulation’ [2007] 29 (2) 
Penn.LJ Int’l Econ. Law. 510. 
3 IMF, Articles of Agreement, 1944. Article IV Section 1 (ii) states that each member is obligated to 
‘seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions that a 
monetary system does not tend to produce erratic disruptions’. 
4 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Why States Act through Formal International Organizations’ 
[1998] 42 (1) Journal of Conflict Resolution 3; Kern Alexander, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the 
Legalization of International Banking Supervision: A Conceptual Approach’ (2000), ESRC Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge 168 < 
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This thesis focuses on IFR, a crucial aspect of international law which can pre-empt 
and possibly forestall a financial crisis when armed with the requisite tools. 
 
2.1.1 Rationale for International Financial Regulation  
 
A pro-cyclical relationship exists between the internationalization of finance and 
regulation, one which becomes more prominent after a financial crisis.5 Thus, 
increasing integration occasions cross border capital flows which heightens the case for 
international regulation and national adaptation of international standards to forestall a 
financial crisis.6 This position is advanced by the proponents of financial regulatory 
convergence.7 Kern Alexander et al argue that ‘as financial markets become 
integrated…states must form IFIs to manage systemic risk and other types of financial 
risk in the global market.’8 Brown adds that ‘because today’s financial markets are 
global, we need not only proper national supervision, but also a fundamental reform – 
global financial regulation’.9 These views capture the potential damage imminent from 
international deregulation, whilst projecting the need for international regulation.  
 
                                     
https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-
papers/wp168.pdf > accessed 10 July 2015.  
5 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, ‘Regulation Should Be International’ (Financial Times, 18 
November 2008) < https://www.ft.com/content/983724fc-b589-11dd-ab71-0000779fd18c  > accessed 
28 August 2017.  
6 Cally Jordan and Giovanni Majnoni, ‘Financial Regulatory Harmonization and the Globalization of 
Finance’ [2002] World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2919 < 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19224/multi0page.pdf?sequence=1&isA
llowed=y  > accessed 11 June 2015.  
7 Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale and John Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The 
International Regulation of Systemic Risk (OUP, 2006) 35. 
8 Ibid. 
9 HM Treasury, ‘Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown MP at the Council for 
Foreign Relations in New York’ (HM Treasury, 16 September 1999) < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407173039/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/speech_chex_160999.htm > accessed 10 June 2015. 
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An unregulated integrated financial system creates various risks. For instance, it can 
trigger a ‘dominant neighbor’ case, where, according to Jordan et al, a country’s 
economy can be significantly affected by the proximity of an economically buoyant 
neighbor.10 Such situations prompt the affected neighbor to align its standards with 
international regulations in order to level the playing field and attract liquid foreign 
investment.11 Barring such an alignment, information asymmetry and negative  
externalities, which are the principal drivers of market failure, are bound to arise. 
Information asymmetry thrives in the absence of regulation, when countries decide not 
to disclose damning financial information that could be dissuasive to an investor. 
Additionally, the interconnectedness of cross-border systemic financial institutions 
precipitate risk of contagion in the event of a bank failure. This can propel negative 
externalities resulting in systemic risk.12 Gianni De Nicolo et al agree that high 
interconnectedness intensifies large shocks as they can reach more counterparts.13 
Hence, the argument that regulation should mandate some level of transparency across 
countries with the sole aim of ensuring or restoring financial stability.14 
 
The risk associated with international regulation has propelled arguments by some 
scholars that market forces alone should regulate the global financial market. These 
scholars believe that excessive regulation can damage the functioning of the financial 
markets and reduce their economic utility.15 Additionally, there is the perception that 
                                     
10 Cally Jordan and Giovanni Majnoni, ‘Financial Regulatory Harmonization and the Globalization of 
Finance’ [2002] World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2919 < 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19224/multi0page.pdf?sequence=1&isA
llowed=y  > accessed 11 June 2015. 
11 Ibid.; Thomas Oatley, ‘The Dilemmas of International Financial Regulation’ [2000] 23 (4) Regulation 
36; Gianni De Nicolo, Giovanni Favara and Lev Ratnovski, ‘Externalities and Macro Prudential Policy’ 
[2012] SDN12/5 IMF Staff Discussion Note. 
12 Rick Gorvett, ‘Systemic Risk as a Negative Externality’ [2009] Risk Management: Part – Two 
Systemic Risk, Financial Reform and Moving Forward from the Financial Crisis, Society of Actuaries 
(SOA) 33; Pawel Smaga, ‘The Concept of Systemic Risk’ [2014] SRC Special Paper No 5, 13. 
13 Gianni De Nicolo, Giovanni Favara and Lev Ratnovski, ‘Externalities and Macro Prudential Policy’ 
[2012] SDN12/5 IMF Staff Discussion Note 1, 10.  
14 Frederic Mishkin and National Bureau of Economic Research, ‘Financial Stability and Globalization: 
Getting it Right’ (Bank of Spain Conference - Central Banks in the 21st Century, 2006) 
15 George Selgin, ‘Proposal – Let Market Forces Play a Greater Role’ (Global Economic Symposium, 
2014) < http://www.global-economic-symposium.org/knowledgebase/the-new-global-financial-
architecture/proposals/let-market-forces-play-a-great-role > accessed 10 September 2017; Masahiro 
Kawai and Micheal Pomerleono, ‘Who Should Regulate Systemic Stability Risk? The Relevance for 
Asia’ in Masahiro Kawal, Eswar Prasad (eds.), Financial Market Regulation and Reforms in Emerging 
Markets (Brookings Institution Press, 2011).   
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the cost of regulation may be too high for small countries, thereby leading to uneven 
application of regulations.16 This is no doubt a critical problem in the development of 
robust standards in a world with numerous jurisdictions. For this reason, Oatley 
believes that national regulation and international agreements can handle risk and 
insurance issues; and international regulations are simply a political response to avoid 
a race to the bottom for less regulated states caused by international competition.17 He 
exemplifies this with the Basel Accord I which mandated an 8% minimum capital 
requirement for international active banks and additional capital for loans considered 
more risky.18 He finds that banks in affected countries engaged in regulatory arbitrage 
to maintain an appearance of compliance to these standards. He states that irrespective 
of the advantages it brings, international regulation could cause greater harm to 
financial systems and less safe banking systems.19 
 
Though strong, Oatley’s argument does not consider that the failure of a financial 
system within an integrated global structure can create negative externalities. 
Furthermore, it can lead to the movement of capital towards less regulated systems, 
thus potentially causing financial instability. Moreover, the general welfare 
considerations as regards systemic risks suggest that market forces may be inadequate 
to ensure regulatory harmonization. 
 
However, Oatley’s argument cannot be fully discarded, particularly his recognition of 
the inequalities that occasion the application of international standards. Viewed from a 
functionalist perspective, the role of IFR is to ensure financial liberalization, stability 
and integrity, goals with some attendant shortcomings.20 This is evidenced by the 
uniform regulatory standards and benchmarking mechanisms applicable to all 
countries, irrespective of their legal developmental stages. Such arrangements give 
                                     
16 Thomas Oatley, ‘The Dilemmas of International Financial Regulation’ [2000] 23 (4) Regulation 36, 
37. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Basel Accord 1988. 
19 Thomas Oatley, ‘The Dilemmas of International Financial Regulation’ [2000] 23 (4) Regulation 36, 
37. 
20 This perspective is focused on the operational functions of the international financial regime.  
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credence to the argument that international standards are prejudicial, as they establish 
a hierarchy of values, some of which are superfluous.21 Although the standards aim at 
efficiency, integrity and stability, the need for an equitable or legitimate regime suitable 
for all countries is disregarded.22 This is reflected in uniform standards, which are 
difficult to transplant and result in information asymmetry between countries and 
standard setters, particularly in ACs/EEs. Shortcomings in compliance levels, 
particularly in ACs, reveal this.  
 
No doubt, the international standards are a projection of the inequalities in the 
distribution of power within the regulatory sphere, spearheaded by developed countries 
pushing their domestic policy objectives, laws and commercial preferences through as 
international standards.23 Consequently, these standards have failed to take sufficient 
account of the interests and preferences of ACs/EEs and can potentially stifle the 
regulatory structures and policies of ACs, whilst producing marginal gains for 
ACs/EEs.24 These shortcomings add to the view that international regulatory standards 




                                     
21 Naomi Haynes and Jason Hickel, ‘Hierarchy, Value and the Value of Hierarchy’ [2016] 60 Social 
Analysis 1; Myres S. McDougal, ‘Jurisprudence for a Free Society’ [1966] 2583 Faculty Scholarship 
Series 1, 6. 
22 Norman Mugarura, The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed 
Countries (2nd edn, Routledge, 2016) 145. 
23 The FATF recommendations were derived from a combination of national strategies from Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, in collaboration with the international recommendations of 
the Basel Committee from 1998. See Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘The Private Sector Becomes 
Active: The Wolfsberg Process’ [2003] 10 (4) Journal of Financial Crime 359, 359-360; Braithwaite 
John and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, 2000).; Chris 
Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (CUP, 2015) 183.  
24 Norman Mugarura, The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed 
Countries (2nd edn, Routledge, 2016) 145. 
25Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (CUP, 
2015) 184; Jason C. Sharman, ‘The Global Anti- Money Laundering Regime and Developing Countries: 
Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don’t’ [2006] Paper Presented at the International Studies 
Association Annual Conference 1, 13. 
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2.2 Evolution of International Financial Regulation and Institutions 
 
Prior to the First World War (WW1), global finance was sparsely regulated, both 
internationally and nationally.26 During the inter-war period, market activities collapsed 
and economies crashed. Countries raised barriers by curtailing financial freedom and 
risking potential currency devaluation.27 Undoubtedly, this was self-defeating, leading 
to a decline in world trade and destruction of international monetary cooperation. Thus, 
after the Second World War (WW2), when trade regulation started emerging, there was 
still no structure for the regulation of international finance.28 It was paradoxical that 
only trade was regulated given that finance flows more easily across borders than goods 
and services. Nevertheless, given the gradual breakdown of the gold standard (instituted 
pre-WW1 for monetary stability), finance was now based on closed domestic systems 
with limited capital flows and a fixed exchange rate due to the disintegration of the 
world economy.29  
 
IFIs, particularly the IMF, were created on the heel of the WW2 to facilitate cross-
border monetary transactions and ensure currency stability. The IFIs founders generally 
excluded a regime for capital movements from the IFIs’ structures as this was 
considered antithetical to trade and investment capital.30 Keynes and White believed 
                                     
26 Gerald Epstein, ‘Should Financial Flows Be Regulated? Yes’ in Jomo Kwame SundaraM (eds.) 
Reforming the International Financial System for Development (CUP 2011) 194,194; Lance Taylor, 
‘Global Macroeconomic Management’ in Peepak Nayyar (eds.) Governing Globalization: Issues and 
Institutions (OUP 2002) 51,52; Ethiopis Tafara, ‘Speech by SEC Staff: How Much Regulation Is Just 
Enough’ (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 February 2006) < 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022806et.htm > accessed 27 March 2015. 
27 Richard Overy, The Inter-War Crisis (Routledge, 2016) 1, 62; Richard S. Grossman, ‘Banking Crisis’ 
(2006) Wesleyan Economic Working Papers 001 < 
http://repec.wesleyan.edu/pdf/rgrossman/2016001_grossman.pdf > accessed 13 July 2015; Michele 
Fratianni and Federico Giri, ‘The Tale of Two Great Crises’ [2017] 81 Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control 1, 25. 
28 Yilmaz Akyuz, ‘Towards Reform of the International Financial Architecture: Which Way Forward’ in 
Yilmaz Akyuz (eds), Reforming the Global Financial Architecture: Issues and Proposals (Zed Books 
2002) p 1.  
29 Weber Rolf H and Douglas W. Arner, ‘Towards a New Design for International Financial Regulation’ 
[2007] 29.2 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 510. 
30 Yilmaz Akyuz, ‘Towards Reform of the International Financial Architecture: Which Way Forward’ in 
Yilmaz Akyuz (eds), Reforming the Global Financial Architecture: Issues and Proposals (Zed Books 
2002) 4; Ross Buckley, International Financial System: Policy and Regulation (Kluwer Law 
International, 2009) 1, 105. 
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that, although progressive, cross border transactions could have destabilizing 
consequences within states.31 Following their concerns, the IMF’s Article IV 
recognized the right of members to impose capital controls, as long as this did not 
restrict payments for transactions on the current account.32 This design, which ensured 
adequate national macroeconomic management, was based on a concept of embedded 
liberalism. It was rooted in Keynesian ideology and White’s perspective that not only 
favored nationalistic capital controls but perceived unregulated capital mobility as an 
example of market failure.33 Such failure was based on the inability of countries to 
pursue tailored economic policies or maintain fixed exchange rates.34 Capital controls 
were thus perceived to be necessary for a smooth functioning of an open international 
economy. Indeed, this ideology resulted in a surge of economic prosperity in the 1950s 
and 1960s.35 
 
However, the increasing risk occasioned by the internationalization of finance in the 
late 1970s36  and the ensuing financial and socio-economic crisis raised questions about 
the continued application of the embedded-liberalism ideology. The resulting neo-
liberalist ideology mandated the replacement of the fixed exchange rates with a flexible 
exchange rate to restore stability.37 This ideology also led to the creation of informal 
committees, including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to formulate unified 
                                     
31 James M Boughton, ‘The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas that have Shaped 
the Institution’ [2004] IMF Working Paper 04/75 < https://goo.gl/Vhc6pr > accessed 9 November 2015; 
Benjamin Cohen, ‘Monetary Governance and Capital Mobility in Historical Perspective’ in Rainer Grote 
and Thilo Maruahn (eds,) The Regulation of International Financial Markets: Perspectives for Reform 
(CUP 2006) 48-50. 
32 Ibid.; See Article IV of IMF Articles of Agreement, 1944.  
33 Jonathan Kirsher, ‘Keynes, Capital Mobility and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism’ [1999] 6 (3) 
Review of International Political Economy 313; Ikuo Gonoi and Hiroaki Ataka, ‘Conceptual Relevance 
of “Embedded Liberalism” and its Critical Social Consequences’ [2006] Artigo aspresentado no ISA-
South Annual Conference: PAIS Graduate Working Papers 3 (6) 
<https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/currentstudents/phd/resources/crips/working_papers/2006/working
_paper_3_gonoi_and_ataka.pdf  > accessed 19 November 2016 
34 Ibid. 
35 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP, 2005) 178. 
36 Richard O’Brien, ‘Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography’ [1992] Royal institute of 
International Affairs 531. 
37 Katja Freistein and Philip Liste, ‘Introduction: Fragmented Territoriality’ [2016] 19 (2) Journal of 
International Relations and Development 193. 
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approaches to curtail crises, especially as regards emerging economies.38 Agreements 
resulting from the findings of the neo-liberalists were to be implemented via domestic 
and regulatory systems. Although the BCBS and IOSCO recorded successes, repeated 
financial crises such as the developing countries debt crisis of the 1980s, the global 
stock market collapse of 1987 and the periodic collapses of financial intermediaries 
illustrated their limitations in dealing with trends that fundamentally altered the 
financial landscape.39  
 
For instance, the Asian financial crisis was the sharpest to hit the developing world 
since the 1982 debt crisis.40 The dynamics of this crisis prompted academic controversy 
as to its immediate cause.41 There was however consensus that the absence of sound 
regulatory oversight was significant, especially in the advent of liberalization in 
developing countries.42 Avgouleas notes that attention was focused on policies aimed 
at abolishing capital restrictions and opening up the market, without regard to the 
domestic competence or expertise of its regulatory institutions.43 He also observes that 
international governance structures were inadequate to sustain the pressure from these 
policies. Combined with the financial panic that arose from weaknesses in the 
                                     
38 Weber Rolf H., and Douglas W. Arner, ‘Towards a New Design for International Financial Regulation’ 
[2007] 29 (2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 391,403; Cally Jordan 
and Giovanni Majnoni, ‘Financial Regulatory Harmonization and the Globalization of Finance’ (2002) 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2919 < 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/19224/multi0page.pdf?sequence=1&isA
llowed=y  > accessed 11 June 2015. 
39 Ibid 391, 403. For the trends listed: technological innovation, liberalization of capital, 
disintermediation of financial markets, reduction in the role of centralized decision makers, breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
40 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis’ (1998) NBER 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper 6680, National Bureau of Economic Research 2 < 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8691.pdf > accessed 7 June 2016; Ivan Savic, ‘Explaining Compliance 
with International Commitments to Combat Financial Crisis: The IMF and the G7’ (47th Annual ISA 
Convention, 2006).  
41 Goldstein Morris, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures and Systemic Implications (Institute for 
International Economics, Washington DC, 1998); Biag Taimur and Ilan Glodfajn, ‘Financial Market 
Contagion in the Asian Crisis’ (1998) IMF Working Paper 26/2 < 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.2307/3867666 > accessed 19 April 2016.  
42 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (First 
Published 2012, CUP 2012) p 13; Gregory W. Noble and John Ravenhill, ‘Cause and Consequences of 
the Asian Financial Crises’, in Gregory W. Noble and John Ravenhill, (eds.), The Asian Financial Crisis 
and the Architecture of the Global Finance, ed., (CUP 2000) 1.   
43 Emilios Avgouleas, ‘Governance of Global Financial Markets’: The Law, the Economics, the Politics’ 
(CUP 2012) 185.  
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economies, these precipitated the Asian financial crisis,44 which demonstrated that the 
financial sector of domestic economies is uniquely able to inflict damage on the broader 
economy.45  
 
The Asian crisis triggered financial sector reforms, aimed at promoting financial 
stability across borders and providing early warning signals.46 Measures were put in 
place to identify potential vulnerabilities in national financial systems, with a view to 
forestalling any potential localized financial crisis47 and ensuring effective resolution.48 
This myopic reform, which brought forth a New International Financial Architecture 
(NIFA), encompassed the enhanced involvement of transnational governance 
institutions wielding soft law instruments as standards setters with supervision from the 
IMF/World Bank.49 Concurrently, the IMF sought to amend its Articles of Agreement, 
to make the promotion of capital account liberalization its specific purpose.50 This 
would give it jurisdiction over capital movements and the power to mandate 
unrestricted capital flows as a condition for membership.51 From a Keynesian 
perspective, this would be unsuitable in curbing future crisis. 
 
                                     
44 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubini, ‘What Caused the Asian Financial Crisis? Part 
1: A Macroeconomic Overview’ (1998) NBER Working Paper No.6833 < 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6833.pdf > accessed 24 May 2016.  
45Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (First 
Published 2012, CUP 2012) 69; GAO Report, ‘International Finance: Actions Taken to Reform Financial 
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https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228224.pdf > accessed 24 May 2016.  
46 Cally Jordan, ‘The Dangerous Illusion of International Financial Standards and the Legacy of the 
Financial Stability Forum’ [2010] 12 The San Diego Int’l LJ 333, 336. 
47 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (First 
Published 2012, CUP 2012) 68. 
48 Barry J Eichengreen, Towards a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia 
Agenda (Peterson Institute Press: All Books, 1999); Weber Rolf H and Douglas W. Arner, ‘Towards a 
New Design for International Financial Regulation’ [2007] 29 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law 391, 403. 
49 See Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (First 
Published 2012, CUP 2012) p 68; the IMF (transparency and liquidity) and the World Bank (technical 
assistance); Lawrence G Baxter, ‘Understanding the Global in Global Finance and Regulation’ in Ross 
Buckley, Doug Arner, & Emilios Avgouleas (eds) Reconceptualizing Global Finance and its Regulation 
(CUP 2015) 1, 2. 
50 IMF Survey, ‘IMF Wins Mandate to Cover Capital Accounts, Debt Initiative Put in Motion’ [1997] 
26.9 International Monetary Fund 131.  
51 Pierre G. Goad, ‘Acceptance of Capital Controls is Spreading’ [1998] Asian Wall Street Journal.  
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Additionally, although the NIFA structure broadened representation of EEs and 
reinforcement of the roles of standard setting bodies, its legitimacy was however 
limited by two factors: the marginalization of developing countries in the standard 
setting process52 and the inability of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to effectively 
exercise its mandate in generating standards, not even voluntary ones.53  
 
Although well-intentioned, the eruption of global financial crisis (GFC) on a larger 
scale a decade later54 revealed the ineffectiveness of the NIFA to restore confidence in 
the financial system. Avgouleas attributed the GFC not to the inadequate effectiveness 
of regulatory initiatives, but rather to the absence of compulsory monitoring 
mechanisms and a binding framework for managing cross-border crisis55 under the 
NIFA.56 Disputing this, Brummer argued that the NIFA was itself riddled with 
ambiguities, buttressing his argument with the abstruse mandate, technique and 
implementation style of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).57 These criticisms were 
predicated on the soft law approach adopted by the FSF, which lacked the transparency 
and contestation of the legislative process.58 These arguments reveal that though the 
NIFA was not fundamentally the cause of the GFC, it was inefficient in meeting the 




                                     
52 See Robert Delonis, ‘International Financial Standards and Codes: Mandatory Regulation without 
Representation’ [2004] 36 NYU J. INT’L L.& POL.563, 631- 633.  
53 Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale and John Eatwell, ‘Global Governance of Financial System: The 
International Regulation of Systemic Risk’ [2006] 55 (04) International and Comparative Law Quarterly.  
54 Emilios Avgouleas, Governance of Global Financial Markets: The Law, the Economics, the Politics 
(First Published 2012, CUP 2012) 185. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid (n 54)  
57 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (First 
Published 2012, CUP 2012); See also John Eatwell, ‘The Challenges Facing International Financial 
Regulation’ [2001] Western Economic Association p 14; Stavros Gadinis, ‘The Finacial Stability Board: 
The New Politics of International Financial Regulation’ [2013] 48 (2) Texas International Law Journal 
165. 
58 Cally Jordan, ‘The Dangerous Illusion of International Financial Standards and the Legacy of the 
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2.3    Towards Effective Regulation of International Finance and AML/CFT 
 
The factors considered as precipitants to previous financial crises were listed by the 
FSB and the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).59 However broad, the 
compendium of standards compiled by the FSB enumerates twelve (12) economic and 
financial standards that are internationally acknowledged as crucial for a functional 
financial system.60 The FSB emphasized that these key standards were considered to 
be deserving of priority implementation.61 Amongst the standards identified for rating 
a financial system were the recommendations of the FATF on AML/CFT.62 The 
IMF/World Bank endorsed these with an agreement to monitor the compliance levels 
of countries.63 
 
The addition of AML/CFT in the twelve (12) FSB standards generated a debate64 that 
their inclusion was undemocratic, but rather based on the lobbying, networking strength 
and support for the governing body of the standard setting organization.65 Furthermore, 
it is argued that banks are not harmed by being used as a conduit for illicit funds; rather 
illicit funds can be profitable to economies, banks, and depositors and thus do not 
warrant international regulation.66 The international community has nevertheless 
                                     
59 Financial Stability Board, ‘Table of Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems’  
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-
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65 Ibid. 
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continued to include the regulation of money laundering and terrorist financing 
(ML/TF) in its agenda. 
 
2.3.1 Justification for the Inclusion of AML/CFT Regulation in Financial Sector Reform  
 
To justify the inclusion of the AML/CFT regulation in the international financial sector 
regime, it is crucial to parallel their aims.  
 
Financial sector reforms (FSR) were aimed at enhancing combined regulatory 
supervision to prevent or mitigate a financial crisis, also one of the main aims for 
regulating ML/TF.  This is because these illicit activities can harm financial stability 
and integrity, hence constituting a triggering factor for a financial crisis.  This argument 
is not far-fetched. Tsingou postulates that ML/TF is the price for financial 
liberalization.67 Echoing this assertion, Schroeder argues that illegal proceeds are easily 
converted into seemingly legitimate funds due to increased trade liberalization and the 
expansion of the global financial system.68 Increased and unanticipated cross border 
transfer of illicit funds can however have a destabilizing macroeconomic effect.69 Such 
transfers, Schroeder argues, can lead to inexplicable changes in the demand for money, 
resulting in an unhealthy volatility of international capital flows and exchange rates.70 
This reveals an interesting link between market abuse and financial instability - 
triggering factors for a crisis. 
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The occasional association of financial crisis with ‘run on banks’71 can be likened to 
the effect of ML/TF on banks and the financial sector as a whole. Morais adds that these 
illicit crimes erode the integrity of FIs, weakening or destroying their positions as 
repositories of trust and confidence.72 He states that in the long run, there is the real risk 
that if left unchecked, criminal interests could assume greater control of FIs.73 Thus, 
illicit activities can undermine the soundness of FIs and occasion material damage and 
loss of confidence or reputation as a result of fraud. 74 
 
Additionally, illicit transfers through FIs can harm a country’s economic growth and 
development.  This can be viewed from two perspectives. On one hand, ML/TF channel 
resources to less industrious activities, thus facilitating domestic corruption and 
crime.75 In a bid to legalize funds, launderers may channel their monies into sterile 
investments such as luxury goods or front companies.76 This diversion of funds can 
undermine legitimate businesses and harm a country’s economic progression. On the 
other hand, unconstrained illicit transfers, especially in countries with weak regulatory 
capacity can weaken the financial sector’s role in a country’s economic progression. 
The Asian and subsequent international crises illustrated that financial institutions that 
allow themselves to be abused by ML will bring serious detrimental effect to the 
economies of their countries.  
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Thus, it is also clear that ML/TF depress the revenue of states, particularly where tax 
evasion is involved.77 Consequently, various countries, particularly developed 
economies have successfully argued for the inclusion of proceeds of illicit crimes in the 
national gross domestic profit.78 The European statistical guideline states that illegal 
transactions backed by consent should be included in measurements of economic size.79 
The argument runs that the exclusion of these activities from national accounts gives 
rise to discrepancies as the income earned from illegal means are often invested in legal 
assets.80 Critics have not only questioned the methodology utilized in generating the 
data, but have also argued that this inclusion is likely to provide an unrealistic 
representation of economic development.81 This has attendant consequences, such as 
investor distrust in a perceived ‘inauthentic estimate of GDP’ which can serve as a 
catalyst for reduced investment. Regardless, the European Union restated its position 
on mandatory illicit transactions accounting in the 2010 version of the European 
Systems of Accounts.82 
 
According to the European Union, illicit transactions have become bothersome and 
reporting them as part of GDP may heighten capital flight of funds to jurisdictions that 
abide by this requirement.83 This may damage the reputation of countries, particularly 
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developing states whose funds are laundered. It may also deter foreign investments84 
and discourage foreign banks from continuing correspondent relationships with  FIs in 
countries that report illicit transactions as part of GDP.85 
 
The ‘victimless’ nature of ML/TF has been contested. Adopting Mill’s argument, Groot 
postulates that in the presence of a valid agreement, the predicate crime of drug 
transactions constitutes a valid contract and therefore cannot be assumed to harm 
anyone.86 He argues, in line with Posner, that on a scale of a cost benefit analysis, 
criminalizing money laundering would not be beneficial to society.87 Based on this, he 
takes the position that, in the absence of a direct victim, ML should not be regulated.  
Ferwerda however takes a pragmatic stance that these illicit crimes have social, 
economic and political effects.88 These serve as a catalyst for inflation, insolvency and 
bankruptcy, as well as increased housing and living costs, which have spillover effects. 
These examples defeat the ‘victimless nature’ argument, conferring undue advantage 
on launderers to the detriment of society.89 Moreover, by the very act of aiding 
terrorism, TF causes security challenges, leading to loss of lives and livelihood, and 
creates an atmosphere of fear.90 
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Increasingly disturbing was the evidence by experts that ML/TF are more detrimental 
to emerging and developing economies, which have less sophisticated FIs.91 Identifying 
that a ‘break’ in the chain of AML/CFT regime, especially in developing countries, can 
expose other countries to the detrimental effects of ML/TF, the international 
community prompted the inclusion of AML/CFT regimes in FSR. This was based on 
the recognition that strengthening AML/CFT regimes could significantly improve 
prospects for sustainable growth, development and social cohesion.  
 
Interestingly, the regulation of ML, once predicated upon the need for the United 
Nations to curb drug transfer,92 has gone beyond considerations of financial stability.93 
This became evident post 9/11 attacks, spurring the innovation of FATF nine (9) 
additional recommendations on TF.94 These not only mandated adherence to the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism95 but also 
imposed more stringent recommendations and attendant punitive measures on the 
regulation of TF.96 This move prompted scholars to question why discussions on an 
international CFT regime occurred only in response to the attack in the United States 
and was not triggered by earlier terror activities in Africa, the Middle East and Europe.97 
On close scrutiny, it is clear that, unlike other terror attacks, the 9/11 attacks unearthed 
a pervasive network of underground banking and other financial channels that were 
used to finance terrorism.98 Facing these dramatic new threats, AML/CFT was 
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perceived as a way of ensuring global security.99 Thus, the international community 
was able to mandate countries to agree on a consensus for reasons that went beyond 
financial stability.  
 
These arguments reinforce the reasons why the international community has, although 
belatedly, recognized as crucial, the regulation of ML/TF. 100  
 
IFIs and soft law bodies, including the FSB, are at the forefront of putting these agenda 
forward. Whilst highlighting the role of the FSB, this thesis restricts its scope to the 
IMF/World Bank and the FATF, given that the FSB underlines the role of these 
international bodies in AML/CFT regulation.  
 
2.3.1.1 The Financial Stability Board (FSB)  
 
 
The FSB, a successor of the FSF, was established by developed countries to foster 
international financial stability through the coordination of emerging international 
standards.101 The aim of such coordination is to ensure the effective supervision of 
financial markets and enhanced information exchange.102 Envisaged as a group of 
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technocratic authorities with relevant expertise and experience,103 the FSB unifies IFIs, 
regulators and national authorities responsible for financial stability, in order to 
promote convergence to minimum standards in the form of soft law, with compliance 
by force of law and moral suasion.104 The establishment of this body underscored the 
importance of sound financial sectors to national macroeconomic stability and the 
global financial order.  
 
As earlier mentioned, the FSB identified twelve (12) key standards as benchmarks, 
which are considered as quintessential minimum requirements for good practice in the 
various areas of their coverage. Recognized in the standard category of market integrity 
is the FATF’s standard on AML/CFT backed by its supporting methodology for 
assessment and implementation. The inclusion of the FATF’s standard in this category 
marked the recognition of the fact that ineffective application or non-compliance with 
the FATF’s recommendations can contribute to market abuse and financial instability.   
 
Thus whilst concentrating on dialogue amongst partners, the FSB beckoned on the IMF/ 
World Bank for assistance in financial stability reform. The response by these formal 
international organizations through FSAP105 was to assert their intellectual skills on 
comparative policy, which provided a foundation for much of its activity, including the 
country-by-country assessment.106 The implementation of the FSB’s standards also 
focused on the use of FSAP, the financial sector assessment conducted by IMF in 
developed economies and jointly with the World Bank in developing economies.107 
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2.3.1.2 The IMF and the World Bank: Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP)  
 
Although 45 countries attended the Bretton Woods meeting in 1944 and agreed to 
establish a framework for international economic cooperation, only 29 countries signed 
the IMF Articles of Agreement by the following year.108 These select countries formed 
the initial members of the IMF. The World Bank, which was formed alongside the IMF, 
was described as an ‘afterthought’, given initial resistance by the United Kingdom (UK) 
government. Support from the United States government however saw to its creation. 
This is not unsurprising as all accounts show that while each of the IMF and the World 
Bank articles where signed by several countries, their establishment was negotiated 
between representatives of the UK and the United States.109 Whilst WW2 provided the 
impetus to expedite the creation of these institutions, the closed negotiation process was 
arguably important for expediency. However, this may have been achieved in a manner 
detrimental to excluded countries, particularly developing countries – a theme that will 
run through this thesis.  
 
Unlike the FSB, the IMF and the World Bank are treaty bodies with detailed articles 
which impose legally binding obligations on their member states.110 Their precise rules 
backed by obligations and enforcement capabilities warrant their classification as 
‘hard-law’ bodies.111 Accession to their treaties deprives countries of adopting a 
flexible approach towards the interpretation of their articles, breach of which can result 
in the imposition of sanctions such as the withdrawal of membership or access to 
resources. Whilst this may constrain the behavior or sovereignty of states, it has the 
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advantage of reducing transaction costs and strengthening the credibility of their 
commitments, particularly at a macro-economic level.  
 
Whilst the IMF has responsibility for facilitating macroeconomic stability, the World 
Bank is responsible for reconstruction and development.112 However, their mandates 
have evolved over time to meet global changes. The IMF has become involved in 
financial stability, an area that was strictly the domain of Central Banks.113 Minton – 
Beddoes states that this expansion reflects its yearning for a pioneering role post the 
deterioration of Bretton Woods Institution.114 Notwithstanding its underlying 
motivation, the IMF was key in lending to countries to assuage financial crises.115 For 
this reason, this chapter aligns with the argument by Arner and Taylor that the IMF’s 
involvement is largely due to the fact that it has come to regard these issues as ancillary 
to its mandate.116 This is buttressed with the experience of the Asian crisis that 
illustrated how large contingent liabilities on government budgets results from poorly 
regulated banking systems; financial stability was therefore crucial for fiscal discipline 
and by extension, the balance of payments mandate.  
 
The IMF seeks to ensure that countries comply with these key areas through its core 
functions of surveillance, financial assistance and technical assistance.117 These key 
functions allow the IMF to assess members’ economic and monetary policies against 
its purpose to determine the probability of the risk they pose as against the stability of 
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the international financial systems. These tools equip the IMF with some level of 
intrusion, giving it power to mandate that countries make changes to monetary and 
economic policies to assuage existing risk.  
 
Two agencies make up the World Bank: the International Bank For Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association.118 The World 
Bank’s primary aim is to act as a financial intermediary, a development institute and a 
development agency for countries. Interestingly, financial sector reform has been on 
the World Bank agenda for a considerable length of time. This is evidenced by the 
Bank’s financial and technical support for structural reforms119 and improvements in 
country capacity building to oversee the financial systems through trainings and 
legislative changes. The World Bank’s mandate has further evolved to cover banking 
supervision, creating a legal environment for the financial system, accounting and 
auditing practices and information provision. This was born out of the Asian financial 
crisis and is justified on the basis of substantial spillover threat from badly governed 
financial systems.  
 
The cornerstone of the IFI’s approach is the FSAP; an investigative tool launched 
jointly by the IMF and the World Bank post the financial crisis.120  Described as the 
primary architecture for supporting the monitoring of international financial standards 
at global level, the FSAP was established to harness the respective strengths of IFIs in 
identifying financial sector vulnerabilities and developmental needs. 121 Additionally, 
FSAPs determine countries’ compliance levels with international standards of financial 
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regulation and supervision. The overarching aim remains to ensure diminished 
likelihood of a crisis, thus fostering financial stability.122 
 
Seabrooke and Tsiongou strongly argue that the FSAP was introduced for two 
interrelated reasons; to ensure the control of policy location for financial sector reform 
and to rescue the IFIs from their battered reputations following their shortcomings 
during the 1997 financial crisis.123 They stated that it was an attention gaining strategy 
employed by the IFIs during this period.124 There was however evidence that the FSAP 
presented the fora where issues concerning international financial systems could be 
effectively discussed, especially the evolving issues of AML/CFT. Moreover, the IFIs 
possessed the technical expertise and ability to monitor compliance in these areas.125 
The advantages of these structures made a case for its establishment.  
 
However, the IMF and the World Bank remained reluctant to intervene due to 
reservations held by developing countries over additional conditionalities and fears 
regarding the IFIs expertise in AML/CFT.126 The IFIs were however prompted to 
intervene by the G7 in 2000. This intervention is the foremost cooperative approach of 
stakeholders to take a more significant role in countering ML/TF.127  No doubt this was 
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significantly facilitated by the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States,128 an event 
which quelled the reservations of developing countries on the role of the IFIs in 
addressing AML/CFT issues. During this period, the AML/CFT policies served as 
shock therapy.129 
 
The IFIs have endorsed a list of twelve (12) areas of concern under which AML/CFT 
is incorporated130 in the form of the 40 recommendations of the FATF.131 These indicate 
an accommodation of AML/CFT into the mandate of both institutions. The IFIs also 
commenced assessments of countries against the FATF’s methodologies to ensure 
compliance with the FATF’s standards. This marked the contracting out of assessments 
of compliance with the FATF recommendations to the IMF and the World Bank.132 
Compliance and implementation records are documented in the ‘Reports on 
Observance of Standards and Codes’ (ROSCs),133 which constitutes the basis for the 
publication of the Financial System Stability Assessments (FSSAs) in the IMF and the 
Financial Sector Assessment (FSA) in the World Bank. AML/CFT issues related to 
financial supervision and regulation by the IMF are covered under its Article IV 
consultation.134 Thus broadening the scope of financial sector monitoring. Interestingly, 
the IFIs now integrate FSAP reports into Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) for 
borrower countries;135 making it a regular part of their work. The infusion of AML/CFT 
regulation into the activities of these institutions illustrates the extent to which it is 
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Development.pdf > accessed 12 May 2015.  
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considered vital in protecting the financial system and safeguarding lives.  
 
The engagement of the IMF/the World Bank in ensuring compliance to AML/CFT 
regulations is further enhanced by their observer status within the FATF. However, this 
indicates a paradox as notwithstanding the repulsion to the centralization of standard 
formulation and coercive authority through governments, the FATF utilizes the 
IMF/World Bank framework given their membership base. Their participation however 
raises questions about the involvement of governments.136 This paradox is addressed 
by the FATF which permits the exclusion of governments for their agents,137 whilst 
seemingly maintaining the uniformity of standards with a measure of flexibility.  
 
2.3.1.3 The Financial Action Task Force 
 
 
The legal status of the FATF differs from that of treaty bodies. Established by the G7 
to respond to the threat of ML/TF, the FATF is a ‘soft-law’138 international standard-
setting body for AML/CFT regulation. It is so described due to the nature of its 
standards and its operational base. The FATF’s standards are perceived to lack 
compulsion and precision.139 They are considered as minimum standards on AML/CFT 
which countries are encouraged but not bound to implement. Unlike the treaty options 
which require a long ratification process, this model allows for flexibility of the 
standard making process, permitting the swift response of soft law bodies to issues such 
as ML/TF that pose real-time threats.140  
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137 The FATF interacts with government representatives such as ministers who cannot bind their 
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138Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004) 54. 
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Additionally, the FATF standards are not formulated or disseminated at state level, but 
rather, through a regulatory alliance between countries represented by Ministers of 
Finance and/or Central Bank Governors. This subnational participation, exercised 
independently of national governments, gives the FATF its trans-governmental 
regulatory character.141  
 
Furthermore, the operational base of networks is still relatively light in comparison to 
the IFIs.142 For instance, the FATF is reliant on the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) for secretarial service. It has few employees, a 
limited budget, a website and operates through consultations.  
 
The context of the legal status of the FATF gives an opportunity for in-depth 
understanding of the body. The FATF began operations in 1989, with the role of issuing 
AML/CFT recommendations addressed to countries.143 Tsiongou recognizes that the 
regime, which is backed by interpretative guidance and periodic updates, is developing 
on two fronts: prevention and enforcement.144 Prevention is focused on regulation, 
supervision, reporting, consumer due diligence and sanctions. The FATF 
recommendations preventive role also includes risk assessment and financing terrorism 
laws. Enforcement is however designed to be more punitive, centered on investigation, 
confiscation, prosecution and punishment. Tsiongou identifies the development of the 
regime across international and regional levels; whilst standards are formulated at 
international level, monitoring, enforcement and implementation are usually 
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undertaken by regional styled-bodies.145  Actual adoption, a precondition for effective 
compliance is at the national level.146 Continental bodies like the African Union have 
also been influential in necessitating the implementation and compliance of ACs to 
FATF recommendations.  
 
The FATF has necessitated the development of an intrinsic commercial position 
towards AML/CFT from financial and non-financial institutions. As a self-protective 
reflex, these institutions have engaged in compliance to protect against regulatory and 
reputational risks. Nevertheless, in certain instances, they fall short, signaling a low 
level of compliance by their host country.147  In the absence of legally binding authority 
and direct supervisory enforcement ability to bind countries to its recommendations,148 
the FATF employs soft law techniques to ensure compliance. It places failing countries 
on a High Risk and Other Monitored Jurisdictions (HRMJ) document,149 which comes 
with attendant consequences, including financial isolation.150 This sanction gains its 
vitality from the FATF’s linkages with the IMF/World Bank, the United Nations 
Security Council and other related international institutions,151 which have given it 
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force of compliance.152 On this basis, various scholars have argued that the FATF’s 
relationship with established supranational bodies has ‘hardened’ the trajectory of its 
soft laws, allowing it exert sufficient authority as a legitimate supervisory body capable 
of setting international standards.153  
 
Critics have however questioned the FATF’s global effectiveness in the absence of 
hard-law making ability.154 The soft law nature has been critiqued as ineffective on the 
ground that various countries on the previous HRMJ document formerly known as the 
Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCT) list have remained unperturbed by 
the constant ‘naming and shaming’.155  However, given the scope of the FATF’s 
regulation, hard law treaty-based solutions might be unsuitable as it would involve 
harmonization of the rulebooks of national regulators. 156The majority of domestic 
financial regulation takes place not through legislation but through rules promulgated 
and enforced by regulatory agencies.157 Arner and Taylor argue that such 
synchronization is highly impracticable as typified by the European Union (EU) failed 
experiment on regulatory harmonization. The EU eventually shifted focus to minimum 
standards, leaving substantial discretion to national authorities on the implementation 
of standards.158 This indicates the impracticality of having a hard law regulatory 
framework. States would be unwilling to agree to a single regulatory system or 
structure, a process further hindered by the differences in legal systems. 
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Notwithstanding its perceived enforcement shortcomings, the FATF’s sanctions are 
arguably effective, especially as the IMF/World Bank give it some measure of validity. 
Moreover, given the increasing significance of trans-governmental networks (TGNs), 
the soft law approach of the FATF cannot be underestimated.159 
 
For the next section, the question is whether the global design of AML/CFT regulation 
propagated by IFIs/the FATF is suitable by allowing for effective interactions between 
the FATF/the IFIs and states without a form of hegemonic subjection of a set of 
countries. This thesis aims to answer these questions through the lens of the agency 
theory in light of the concept of legitimacy.  
 
2.4 The Agency Theory: Defining International Delegation 
 
The powers wielded by the IFIs/the FATF is best described as ‘delegated authority’. 
The concept of international delegation is derived from the ‘agency theory’ which is 
built on the idea of a relationship that involves the contractual engagement of, and 
subsequent delegation of authority from a principal to an agent.160 This conditional 
delegation requires that the agent acts within the confines of the authority bestowed on 
it and always in the interest of the principal when making decisions.161 The agent is 
granted some measure of autonomy and discretion to carry out its responsibilities 
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160 Don Delves and Brian Patrick, ‘Agency Theory Summary’ [2008]; Josh Bendickson, Jeff Muldoon, 
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effectively.162 This process entails the assumption that at some point, the agent’s 
interest and risk perspective would diverge from that of the principal. This might 
occasion agency slack, which comes with a cost to the principal.163 It is the resulting 
dilemma that the agency theory seeks to resolve whilst avoiding a revocation of 
delegated authority. 
 
Applying this theory to international delegation, the central idea is that states transfer 
rulemaking and adjudication authority belonging to their governments to international 
institutions (IIs) such as the IFIs by signing treaties concerning these institutions. This 
means that the ability of the FATF and the IFIs to prescribe standards is determined by 
delegation of authority by a state or its representative.  
 
However straightforward the concept of international delegation seems, its true nature 
has been subject to scholarly debate. Guzman and Landsidle contend that international 
delegation is largely mythical in rule-making and adjudication, as states usually refrain 
from handing over significant authority to international institutions.164 Belanger agrees 
that there is no true international delegation of authority in rulemaking, and any such 
delegation is limited to the interpretation of rules.165 Their argument challenges the 
definition of international delegation as the assignment of responsibilities from states 
to international institutions.166 In opposing this, Belanger argues that the state usually 
retains the responsibility of drafting its own rules, as such, there is no separate agent 
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involved in international delegation.167 The argument runs that states do not surrender 
significant degrees of autonomy or sovereignty when engaging in rule making.168 
Backing this assertion, Oliveria contends that although member states delegate power 
to IIs , these member states retain control through established mechanisms and provide 
guides to the IIs.169  Whilst these arguments have merits, they fail to consider the true 
role of specialised staff of IIs in the delegation process.170 Taking this into 
consideration, Swaine contends that international delegation simply describes the 
arrangements that ‘vest continuing law-making authority’ in international 
institutions.171 
 
The concept of international delegation is distinct in its own right. For instance, the 
authority assigned to IIs is revocable and conditional, and can be withdrawn by a state 
should it choose to.172 Although bodies such as NGOs usually take actions similar to 
IIs, their actions do not stem from state-derived authority and hence cannot be qualified 
as international delegation.  
 
There has however been a noticeable change in this arrangement. Previously, the 
validity of international delegation was dependent on its binding nature 173  which was 
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perceived to be a pre-requisite for good governance in the public interest.174 However, 
in recognition of the emergence of ‘disaggregated states’ (a term which signifies power 
wielded by separate components of a state without, theoretically speaking, legal 
authority to bind the state),175 Bradley et al contend that states also delegate to soft law 
institutions such as standard-setting bodies.176 This position shows that binding 
authorities do not reflect the realities of global regulations, as international delegation 
is not invalidated if a state grants non-binding powers to an institution such as the FATF 
to issue standards or resolutions.  
 
In international delegation, the difference between binding and non-binding 
arrangements can be appreciated by examining the historical underpinnings of the 
institutions concerned. For instance, IFIs such as the IMF/World Bank were established 
by a group of states at the end of WW2, a phase which ushered in a period of 
decolonisation177  and marked the political/economic autonomy of Asian and African 
countries.178 This transition from imperialism to a regime founded on the principle of 
sovereignty propelled increasing nationalism, which in turn occasioned lack of 
cooperation and served as a catalyst for political conflict amongst states.179 Hence, IFIs 
were justified by the need to overcome political conflicts through cooperation and 
integration of technical tasks.180 With 189 member states each, a measure of 
cooperation was achieved and collectively, these states (principals) through authority 
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delegated to the IMF/World Bank’s boards (agents), made binding decisions on 
monetary policies and development respectively.181 
 
This grant of state power to IFIs is however not without its problems, primarily because 
it conflicts with state sovereignty.182 Daugirdas argues that international delegation is 
‘constitutionally suspect’ as it is far removed from the people in nation states183 and 
reduces democratic control.184 This is particularly accurate given the chain of 
delegation within the states which ousts the input of certain communities/electorates in 
the delegation process coupled with the contested legitimacy and democratic processes 
in IFIs. This crisis denotes that states may have different objectives from IFIs, 
generating a principal-agent problem.185 Moreover, IIs may be subject to capture by 
interest groups such as multinational institutions or global non-governmental 
organisations, who can influence rule-making to serve their interests. IFIs are also 
critiqued on their inflexibility and lethargic response to critical issues, attributable to 
the difficult process of treaty amendment. 
 
Irrespective of these problems, international delegation to IFIs remains largely 
beneficial creating an avenue for specialisation. It also allows for cross-country 
collaboration towards a unified response to these issues. Moreover, it often makes for 
cheaper policy making and expertise.  
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Conversely, non-binding, soft law bodies such as TGNs emerged in the early 1950s186 
and evolved to meet critical issues such as oil price crisis, security issues, ML/TF  - 
crimes in which wrongdoers present a networked front.187 Slaughter asserts that unlike 
treaty bodies, these TGNs do not operate through formalized stovepipe hierarchies.188 
Rather, they are usually flexible, responsive and collaborative. They engineer 
regulatory alliance between countries, a unique power-allocation approach that has 
earned them the tag of disaggregated state.189 
 
However, like IFIs, TGNs are usually created by a collection of countries or networks 
and so suffer from similar legitimacy concerns. For instance, the FATF was created by 
the G7 countries, a networked body with persuasive but decisive powers. These 
countries (principals) delegated authority to the FATF (agent) to create standards on 
AML/CFT.190 Yet, due to the non-binding nature of these standards, there were 
concerns that it imposed no real obligations, thus occasioning a weakening of the 
standards adopted globally. This concern was allayed by collaborations with treaty 
bodies, from which TGNs gain their enforcement validity, illustrating how non-binding 
rules can become consequential irrespective of their voluntary nature.  
 
International delegation to binding or non-binding institutions have also been criticized 
on the ground that it escalates agency costs and slippage.191 Such situations, where an 
agent (FATF/IFIs) starts to act beyond the powers granted and towards its preference 
is a cause for concern. Hence, countries usually engage monitoring tools such as the 
use of representative boards on the IFIs and membership status at the FATF. Countries 
have also threatened to withdraw their funding from these institutions as a means of 
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limiting agency slippage.192 These methods have been critiqued as unsuitable given 
their limited capability in resolving information asymmetry and consequential 
escalation of agency costs that exist in international delegation. This is comparative to 
the minimal agency costs that accrue in domestic delegation from arms of government 
to regulatory institutions, attributable more to the proximity of monitoring mechanisms 
than to agents determined to ensure transparency.193 Given the absence of proximity, 
and the fact that IIs are not representative of one country, countries are restricted from 
employing certain domestic oversight over IIs,194 thereby according some level of 
respect for states sovereignty.  
 
This bottom-up delegation from states to IFIs/TGNs focuses on one half of the 
delegation process which classes core members of these institution (G7 and OECD 
countries) as principals to the FATF. This is attributable to the role of these countries 
in the establishment of the FATF and the formulation of its standards. This delegation 
process does not however inculcate how these countries are bound by the standards and 
processes promulgated by IFIs/TGNs, requiring transplantation and implementation. 195 
This reverse position which allows the IFIs/FATF to evaluate compliance levels  of its 
core members and possibly issue sanctions is referred to in this thesis as ‘reverse 
international delegation’.  
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It is interesting to note that, for belated and associate members, there is no initial 
delegation, as the initial delegation only comes from core FATF member countries.  
EEs had no input in the FATF establishment process and have only had some measure 
of involvement in the FATF’s standards re-formulation process, which demonstrates 
their role as ‘rule-takers’ because of their belated membership.  ACs suffer a worse off 
fate with minimal input in standards re-formulation, which restricts them from 
contributing to the FATF standards and adding their peculiarities, yet ACs are still 
subject to the FATF rules. The position of ACs/EEs indicates a ‘continuing delegation’ 
relationship with the FATF as their ‘rule-taking’ position has only experienced a 
minimal shift, whilst the position of developed countries reversed. These models are 
discussed within the context of AML/CFT regulation.  
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2.4.1 Reverse and Continuing International Delegation in AML/CFT Regulation  
 
That the G7 delegated authority to the FATF to procure global standards and rules for 
combatting ML/TF reveals a complex agency relationship. Scholarly opinions are 
divided on the precise nature of the relationship between the FATF and its member 
states. The divergence of views, as we would see, reveals that the relationship between 
the FATF and states is not static but dependent on the membership position of states.196 
This refutes the rationalist position projected by Oliveria that the FATF can always be 
classed as an agent of sovereign states,197 a myopic perspective which advances the 
stance of developed member countries represented by the European Commission within 
the FATF. 198 Shah et al however project a more holistic but knotty viewpoint which 
emphasizes the position of developing countries as agents to developed countries 
through international institutions or networked bodies.199 They assert that in its 
                                     
196 Membership can also move – so there are two angles to the non-static nature. However, since 1992, 
the FATF has closed its membership ranks.  
197 Ines Sofia De Oliveria, ‘The Anti-Money Laundering Struggle: Actors, Interest and the EU’ (4th ECPR 
Graduate Conference, 2012). 
198 Daniel Abebe, ‘Rethinking the Costs of International Delegations’ (2012) University of Chicago 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 391 < 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.co.uk/&httpsred
ir=1&article=1260&context=public_law_and_legal_theory > accessed 7 July 2015. 
199 Syed Azhar Hussain Shah, Akher Hussain Shah, Sajawal Khan, ‘Governance of Money Laundering: 
An Application of the Principal-Agent Model’ [2006] 45 (4) The Pakistan Development Review 1117, 
1118. 
 66 
interactions with developing countries, the FATF assumes principal responsibilities, 
often delegating tasks to these countries to ensure they imbibe the AML/CFT standards 
promulgated by developed countries in their national legislations, whilst benchmarking 
them to ensure implementation.200 Accordingly, when there is a conflict between FATF 
standards and national legislations, (for instance, on financial secrecy) the backing and 
enforcement powers of the IFIs ensure that the standard-rules will take precedence.201 
Within this context, the FATF is subservient to developed countries and acts according 
to their requests. This illustrates the duality of the FATF role in the delegation 
arrangements which are dependent on the developmental stage of countries – a criterion 
for FATF membership.202  
 
This model, which takes legitimacy concerns into consideration, is not devoid of agency 
problems. Whilst certain agent-states, particularly ACs/EEs are driven to preserve laws 
for reasons of financial secrecy, exclusion or other self-serving objectives, the principal 
is besotted with the goal of financial integrity and stability, which are antithetical to the 
limited objectives of these states. To resolve this problem, the principal often relies on 
oversight and incentive laden mechanisms to curb the use of agent-states as instruments 
for facilitating ML/TF. These tools have been critiqued as unsuitable because they are 
incapable of resolving information asymmetry or conflict of interests. The effectivity 
of these mechanisms in resolving agency problems will be examined in the context of 
the agency relationship between principal and agents.  
 
2.4.2 The Agency Relationship between IFIs/FATF and Agent-States 
 
In the agency relationship between the IFIs/the FATF (collective principals) and agent 
states, the FATF formulates and delegates AML/CFT standards and, together with the 
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other principals, assesses the agent’s compliance levels to resolve pending conflict of 
interests. The reports derived from these assessments determine whether to issue 
sanctions, heighten supervision or engage in capacity training. Assessments are utilized 
to ensure that the agent’s objectives remain aligned with that of the principal. This 
observatory tool coupled with training and incentives, such as deeper financial 
integration and withholding of sanctions, are employed by the principals to reduce 
information asymmetry in interactions with agents. The idea is that symmetrical 
information exchange would indicate improved interface on confidential information 
between actors. This is the optimal position which would aid the collective principals 
in tailor-fitting country assistance programs, or in reformulating standards whilst 
encouraging agent-states to share private findings on their socio-economic and political 
information. This mutual exchange of information, derived from the observatory and 
incentive mechanisms, is encouraged. Principals own some private information and 
expertise gained from in-house research, cross-country interactions and credit agencies, 
which would help in analyzing information derived from countries.  
 
Whilst seemingly ideal, the effectivity of these mechanisms in achieving symmetrical 
information and resultant compliance is uncertain. Allan and Fisher assert that tools 
employed by the principal may have limited ability to discern the actions of agents or 
outcomes resulting from such actions.203 This indicates that information derived from 
agent-governments are imperfectly observable, meaning that the agent’s efforts or true 
actions cannot be fully ascertained,204 thus hindering the principal’s contractual ability 
to rein in the agent. Furthermore, Deleanu’s empirical findings signal that where there 
is conflict of interests and an opportunity to misinform the international community 
about AML combatting efforts, agents are likely to manipulate indicators during 
assessments.205 Benabou et al affirm that manipulation is possible because detection is 
imperfect.206 Rational economists reject this argument, contending that agents are 
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rational and would restrain from cheating with official statistics or information, as the 
market would detect such slip.207 Evidence has however shown that the market does 
not always detect this slip.208 Rather, there is confirmation that when governments 
anticipate correction strategies by the principal which threaten flows to capital and 
access to market, they may decide to communicate with the principals strategically 209  
by either omitting or manipulating statistics to project compliance.210 
 
It is however pertinent to state that not all agency slack is attributable to information 
asymmetry. Even when the principal monitors the agent effectively, peculiarities within 
a country may hinder compliance. In the absence of full knowledge of these 
peculiarities, incentives for compliance based on actions would at best be imperfect.  
 
Against this backdrop, the argument runs that a reduction in information asymmetry 
may also occasion robust standards design and implementation. This can enhance 
legitimacy within the structural framework of principals. For instance, the FATF sets 
recommendations for recipient states, a step that does not hinder its interaction with 
‘all’ states in the reformulation process of the recommendations or the evaluation and 
technical assistance provision.  
 
2.4.3 Unravelling the Agency Quandary  
 
An examination of the reverse and continuing agency model reveals complexities 
inherent in the formation and membership structure of the proximate principal (FATF) 
which has resulted in an augmented legitimacy crisis. This crisis is inherent in the 
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overlap in the FATF’s position as both principal and agent to developed countries. As 
earlier discussed, the FATF is the agent of the developed countries given their role in 
the formation and continued membership of the FATF. On the other hand, the FATF’s 
principal relationship with these countries is predicated on the fact that its rules are 
binding on its member states. ACs are not involved in the FATF formation process and 
do not hold core membership positions. They are however subject to the FATF’s rules.  
 
As we will see, the disparity in the FATF relationship within its members and between 
‘non-members’, the resulting FATF standards derived mainly from ‘original member 
states’, coupled with the gravitation of decision making authority from the national to 
the international level occasions questions on accountability, transparency and 
legitimacy. Furthermore, questions abound on the suitability of the standards for the 
ACs/EEs, particularly due to the uniqueness of their terrain, such as their cash-based 
economy.  A solution driven approach adopted with the aim of ensuring improved 
compliance and clarifying the nature of the legitimacy crisis is necessary.  
 
2.5 Deconstructing the Concept of Legitimacy in International Law and Governance  
 
The phrase ‘legitimacy crisis’ may presuppose the existence of a legal difficulty, given 
the conjecture by positivists that ‘legitimacy’ is the presence of valid and acceptable 
law, in the absence of which a legal crisis subsists.211 This perspective aligns with the 
origin of the word in law. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines legitimacy 
as ‘the quality or state of being legitimate’, whilst ‘Legitimate’ refers to ‘accordant with 
law or with established legal forms and requirements’.212 It is also described as 
‘conforming to recognised principles or accepted rules and standards’.213 Whilst the 
former definition constricts the usage of the word to legal matters, the latter indicates 
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its applicability in other contexts when it is backed with ‘justification of authority’.214 
This indicates that once ‘illegal’ standards are justifiable or accepted, they are cloaked 
with the garment of legitimacy. For instance, slave trade was justified for economic 
purposes and codified constitutionally, giving it a cloak of legitimacy.215 Those who 
argued that slave trade was repugnant to the British Constitution and Christian values 
were considered as acting ‘illegitimately’. Hence, whilst treaty organisations and nation 
states mirrored the law-based definition of legitimate, the justification-based definition 
illustrates the varied application of the word. 
 
The foregoing gives a glimpse of the continuing debate on legitimacy which has 
metamorphosed into the area of international regulation and governance. Treaty bodies 
such as the IFIs contend with legitimacy crisis on grounds of lack of democracy and 
asymmetrical decision making process, which affects their perceived normative 
legitimacy. ‘Normative legitimacy’ in this sense means the ‘right to rule’ when 
attempting to secure compliance with standards.216 This right, however contestable, is 
justified by the legal root of the IFIs in state accession or consent to treaty making.217 
This state-consent positivist approach which asserts that the IFIs derive legitimacy from 
the consent of states is focused on the source of power as a means of justifying 
legitimacy.218 Conversely, decentred regulatory regimes, such as the BCBS, the IOSCO 
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and the FATF do not have the state as the locus of authority. 219  They have no clear 
legal structures such as legislative bodies, courts, national authorities or ombudsman 
which can ensure their accountability. Additionally, they do not have clear 
jurisdictional boundaries or an identifiable set of potential democratic participants in 
their processes,220 which raises questions about their legitimacy. Black however 
postulates that using law or legal validity to assess the legitimacy of these institutions 
would be futile.221 Such transnational organisations have informed the extended 
definition of legitimacy in international law to encapsulate ‘the perception of actors on 
the acceptability of an institution’.222 
 
Such fluid construction of ‘legitimacy’ postulates that a soft-law regulatory body 
perceived as holding the normative right to govern by those on whose behalf it 
administers is ‘legitimate’.223 Thomas describes this ascription to an objective 
perspective on legitimacy by actors as ‘legitimisation’, a process by which actors come 
to believe in the normative legitimacy of an object.224 This extended perception grants 
decentralised bodies other basis for legitimacy which is rooted in the reasons for 
acceptance. Black categorises these reasons as ‘pragmatically-based’, ‘morally-based’ 
and ‘cognitively-based’.225 Pragmatically-based legitimacy suggests the belief held by 
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persons that the institution will pursue their interest directly or indirectly. Morally-
based legitimacy implies the perception of the institution and its procedures as morally 
appropriate. Cognitively-based legitimacy refers to the perception of the institution as 
necessary or inevitable based on its knowledge and expertise.  These different 
approaches to legitimacy reveal the fluidity of the concept. Whereas some actors may 
view legitimacy on a set of values and beliefs, others may base their reasons on different 
factors.226 Notwithstanding the factors that may inform legitimacy, any institution or 
body recognized as legitimate provides a reservoir of loyalty from which leaders or 
institutions can draw to govern effectively.227 
 
2.5.1 The Importance of Legitimacy  
 
Ensuring compliance with regulatory standards informs the need for deeming 
legitimacy vital. Black states that legitimacy is fundamental in motivating behavioural 
responses.228 Arguably, when members consider their institutions as legitimate, the 
members are more likely to ensure actual compliance to established standards, as 
opposed to formal or constructive compliance.229 What then does the term ‘compliance’ 
connote? 
 
Despite various definitions ascribed to compliance, its meaning in a regulatory context 
is widely accepted. Hoe describes compliance with international laws in terms of 
compulsion, defining it as the conformation of state behavior to international law.230 
Shelton sees compliance as the adherence of countries to international norms or accords 
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and the implementation of measures instituted.231 Both Hoe and Shelton agree that 
implementation is a pre-condition for compliance and that effectiveness is divorced 
from compliance.232 Given the above definitions, this chapter accepts the meaning of 
compliance as state or private institution behavior, stimulated by international norms 
and laws – inclusive of national motivations.   
 
Compliance may be actual, constructive or proactive. Actual compliance in this case 
denotes effective adherence to the spirit of the global regulatory standards, which is 
usually done voluntarily.233 Tyler asserts that voluntary observance to the law is 
preferred by legal authorities given its cost effective nature.234 This varies from formal 
or constructive compliance which requires higher enforcement cost, is usually achieved 
through a coercive manner and is harder for law authorities to effectively monitor. 
These snags can however be avoided when compliance is voluntary and participatory, 
which is proactive, as opposed to coerced.235 This illustrates that the presence of 
coercion negates effectiveness of ‘legitimate’ standards. Irrespective of the nature of 
compliance, what is evident is the role of legitimacy in ensuring responses from 
institutions and persons.  
 
Additionally, the concern of ‘legitimacy’ can project the need for inward re-evaluation 
that results in the re-engineering of an institution and its standards to become 
objectively legitimate. According to Shaffer, such re-engineering must be able to stand 
the test of input, throughput and output legitimacy.236 Input legitimacy is concerned 
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with the membership and participation of countries in decision making processes within 
institutions.237 Throughput legitimacy focuses on the quality of procedural fairness and 
deliberations in the absence of coercion, whilst output legitimacy deals with the 
effectiveness of the response of an institution to a problem.238 Any restructuring to 
inculcate these forms of legitimacy must ensure that all actors (states) have a voice in 
the process of standard formulation, its procedures are fair, devoid of coercion and its 
overall output is effective towards meeting set goals.239 This perspective on legitimacy 
was not reflected within the FATF’s original processes and an overhaul is required to 
gain compliance and acceptability within developing countries.240 Emphasising the 
need for the club-like bodies to gain acceptability, Weber’s argument that perceived 
institutional legitimacy translates to effectiveness aligns with Shaffer’s tests for 
legitimacy.241 This further buttresses the fact that a legitimate TGN would foster 
dialogue and reciprocal exchange of information where persuasion would be wielded 
as opposed to coercion.242 Against this backdrop, it can be argued that the need for re-
engineering foretells the presence of ‘illegitimacy’ in the FATF institutional processes 
and standards.243 
 
As the terminology suggests, input legitimacy simply means the ability of all actors to 
have a voice in the FATF’s processes.244 ‘Voice’ here denotes a right to uniform votes 
and participation by virtue of equivalent membership rights. More significantly, it 
symbolises involvement in the formation process of institutions and standards. Having 
                                     
Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?’ [1999] 93 (3) American Journal of 
International Law 596. 
237 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge Studies in Law and 
Society, 2014) 50. 
238 Ibid 51. 
239 Ibid (n 237) 50. 
240 At the time of original blacklisting, prior to 2006 (herein referred to as Black1) and also prior to the 
establishment of the FSRB and partnership with the IFIs in 2001. 
241 I Max Weber, Economy and Society (Guenther Roth & Clau Wittich eds., 1968).  
242 Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (CUP, 
2011)  
243 As there was an absence of ‘voice-able’ members in the standards formulation, lack of 
representativeness and procedural unfairness in its processes. These signalled accountability and 
transparency issues thus had the capability of hindering effectives.  
244 Chris Brummer, ‘How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t)’ [2011] 99 
Georgetown Law Journal 257, 307; Marie Wilke, ‘Emerging Informal Network Structures in Global 
Governance: Inside the Anti-Money Laundering Regime’ [2008] 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 
509, 520. 
 75 
a voice is considered crucial in generating a sense of collective ownership in the fight 
against ML/TF within countries, whilst achieving geographical balance.245 Hulsee 
argues that this sense of ownership can propel pro-active compliance, which is futuristic 
and effective in curbing illicit crimes in dynamic environments.246 Differentiating 
actual from pro-active compliance, Hulsee argues that whilst the former is focused on 
implementing enshrined TGN rules into law, the latter is focused on ensuring that even 
when there is a lapse in the international rules or the risk envisaged by the international 
rules has transformed at the implementation stage, the country goes further to deal with 
emergent risk.247 In the latter example, countries comply out of self-interest and not 
coercion or dictation. For instance, the FATF rules last revised in 2012 did not cover 
emerging issues like cryptocurrencies which, as is envisaged, poses huge ML/TF 
challenge. However, the EEs have all reacted to this by issuing an outright ban. This 
may not be the most innovative approach, as signalled by the IMF’s step towards 
understanding the risks posed by these currencies to ML/TF and how it operates.248 
However, it signals that a sense of ‘ownership’ may have facilitated such futuristic 
move.  
 
Given the initial presence of the G7 and certain OECD countries in the formation 
process, it is trite to say that any re-engineering towards input legitimacy would be ‘too-
late’ to guarantee any involvement in the formation of institutions or standards. 
Consequently, this resulted in a membership asymmetry led by the global hegemon, the 
US (which constituted the rule makers) on one end, and the ACs/EEs who represented 
the rule takers on the other.249 To correct this emerging defect, the FATF continually 
reformed and expanded its membership. Subsequently, membership of the FATF grew 
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from G7 and OECD countries to the current 35 countries and 2 gulf regions; although 
growth was restricted to ‘strategically important countries’.250 Later members of the 
FATF appear to have been forced to incorporate the regime, whilst non-members are 
side-lined from the decision making processes.251 Coerced members and non-members 
who are usually rendered reticent in decision making processes suffer the consequences 
of their non-participation during the transplantation process. One plausible outcome is 
the inability to foster voluntary actual or pro-active compliance with national 
legislations derived from global standards, due to lack of legitimacy at the international 
level. This is especially so when countries do not consider the standards to be in their 
best interest or suitable to their terrain.  
 
Black suggests that the variance in ‘interests’ is usually prominent when there is a long 
chain of delegation.252 For instance, the FATF usually delegates to the executive arm 
of government, such as ministers, which further delegates to related regulatory bodies, 
such as the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), the Central Banks, Securities and 
Exchange Commissions, etc. This chain of delegation habitually bypasses the elected 
state representatives. For this reason, delegates to the FATF are often accosted from 
entering compromising agreements with the institution which has an uneven effect on 
particular communities that bear the costs of compliance. This can be typified with the 
international investment arbitration process which has formed a global governance 
niche monopolized by an exclusive number of countries that ousts Africa and other 
developing countries. Furthermore, professionals from ousted countries are deprived 
the opportunity to contribute to the development processes governed by past judges 
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from developed countries and influenced by multinationals.253 This has negative 
implications for socio-economic development, as countries that are far removed from 
the processes are forced to imbibe the rulings made.254 Hence, acceding to coercion by 
the existing hegemony can be considered illegitimate, requiring normative 
legitimization.255 
 
Throughput legitimacy which is based on the quality of procedural fairness and 
deliberations devoid of coercion is important because it proves some level of normative 
legitimacy. To achieve this, the FATF entered into a partnership with the IFIs – through 
sharing of methodologies for evaluation. Cooperation between these institutions opens 
the FATF’s standards and methodologies to increased scrutiny by the boards of the IFIs 
which represent about 189 countries, and are thus considered legitimate. The input of 
the IFIs’ boards was presumed to give non-members of the FATF increased input in 
the FATF standards whilst enhancing the quality of the process for input. This argument 
is however blindsided to the asymmetries within the IFIs. Although emerging 
economies have high quotas, ACs have far lesser quotas, and hence a smaller voice in 
the decision making process. Thus, it can be argued that some level of ‘double-
illegitimacy’ exists, particularly towards ACs. The FATF tried to cure this illegitimacy 
through its FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs)256 in the belief that an endorsement 
of the institution’s standards would translate to an increased partnership between the 
FSRB and the FATF. It was hoped that elevation from observer status to membership 
would ensure increased sense of ownership and local acceptability amongst FSRBs 
countries, which would in turn secure improved compliance at the regional level.257 
However, this continually fell short of expectations as the non-member/associate 
member countries were only given ‘second-class membership’. This permitted only a 
slight increase in the input of these countries in the plenary deliberations, indicating 
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that the issue on non-suitability of standards persisted. Hence, it can be argued that the 
FSRB were nothing more than vehicles for imposing and preserving the FATF regime.  
 
Other limits to procedural fairness can also be attributed to a resource factor. Countries 
with more resources focused on AML/CFT could afford to send more delegates, and 
thus have increased input in the FATF’s deliberation processes on standards and mutual 
evaluation reports.  
 
Additionally, to build procedural fairness devoid of coercion, the FATF blacklisting 
sanctions which was targeted at non-member countries was considered illegitimate, as 
it alienated certain countries from deliberation processes.258 This hindered actual or 
even proactive compliance, as alienated countries refrained from investing their 
resources or energy to combating ML/TF. The FATF blacklisting sanctions were 
expunged as a breach of the sovereignty norm due to the effect of financial isolation 
and the double standards that arose therefrom, which were only applicable to non-
member states.259 Furthermore, it was argued that it contravened the AML/CFT regime 
of voluntary participation and non-binding rules.260 Sharman refutes this contention, 
arguing that the elimination of the blacklisting process was based on the 
accomplishment of the objective which it sought.261 Contesting this, Hulsee argued that 
the evaluation process to warrant sanctions for non-compliance by the FATF was still 
                                     
258 Christian Reus-Smit, International Crises of Legitimacy [2007] 44 International Politics 157, 172. 
259 Jason Sharman, ‘International Organization and Implementation by Blacklisting’ (Paper presented at 
ISA Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28-March 3 2007).; Reuter P, Truman EM Chasing Dirty 
Money: Progress on Anti-Money Laundering (Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 
2004) 165-170; Levi M, ‘Money Laundering and its Regulation’ [2002] 582 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political Social Science 181, 182; Mitsilegas V, ‘Countering the Chameleon Threat of Dirty 
Money: Hard and Soft Law in the Emergence of a Global Regime against Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Finance’ in Edwards A, Gill P (Eds) Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global 
Security (Routledge, London, 2004); Daepp Kathrin, Le Regulation Selective De de la Finance 
Internationale: L’ Initiative Sur Les Pays Ou Territoires Non Cooperatifs du GAFI’ Universite De 
Lausanne. Travaux De Dcience Politique (2006) Political Science Working Paper Series < 
https://www.unil.ch/iephi/files/live/sites/iephi/files/publications/TSP/28DaeppTSP.pdf > accessed 6 
May 2015.  
260 Doyle T, Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate 
International Law [2002] 24 (2) Houston Journal of International Law 279, 298. 
261 Jason Sharman, Havens in a Storm: The Struggle for Global Tax Regulation (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, NY, 2006). Sharman argues that the removal of this process came head on with its rebuttal by the 
IFIs with whom the FATF sought partnership due to resource constraints, as it was considered to be 
against the nature of the fund’s seemingly voluntary agenda. 
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ongoing when the blacklisting process was truncated.262 Hulsee thus maintained that 
the illegitimacy of the process fostered a re-evaluation. Nevertheless, the re-engineering 
did not last long as it has been replaced with a two-tier list compiled by the International 
Co-operation Review Group (ICRG).263 As earlier discussed, a closer examination of 
these lists – the ‘call on members to apply counter-measures’ list and the ‘call for 
enhanced due diligence risk proportionate to the risk arising from defaulting countries’ 
reveals that similar deficiencies exist. This two-tier list can easily be categorised as a 
‘black-2’ and ‘grey’ list. The effect of the earlier blacklist that was expunged in the 
form of financial isolation is still present in ‘black-2’ list and more subtly present in the 
‘grey list’. Thus there is a need to refine this to ensure procedural fairness and 
deliberations devoid of any form of coercion.  
 
Flowing from input and throughput legitimacy is output legitimacy. This is concerned 
with the effective response of institutions to a problem. Whilst it is arguable that the 
FATF would be perceived to have output legitimacy when input legitimacy is 
accounted for, this is not necessarily the case, particularly when output is determined 
by expertise. Hulsee and Kerwer argue that the FATF standards are derived on the basis 
of expertise and not membership politics.264 Acceding to this, Vibert asserts that the 
IFIs and the TGNs belong to the knowledge world where their decision making skills 
are dependent on epistemic authority.265 This indicates that they draw on the procedure 
of the natural and social sciences to identify complications and frame policy 
responses.266 Thus, Winer asserts that the product of the FATF’s plenary sessions 
reflected in its standards are considered ‘neutral…and fair.’267 This illustrates the 
projection of the FATF as legitimate on the basis of the expertise wielded by its 
secretariat and staff in its processes. This position is blindsided to the politics of the 
                                     
262 Hulsee argues that this illustrates the power of stronger organisations over soft law bodies. 
However, he argued that the G7 and OECD could have given the FATF similar power as the IFIs and it 
is not for this reason that blacklisting was recoiled.  
263 FATF, ‘High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions’ (FATF) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/more/more-on-high-risk-and-non-
cooperative-jurisdictions.html?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate) > accessed 10 June 2017.  
264 Dieter Kerwer and Rainer Hulsee, ‘How International Organizations Rule the World: The Case of the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering’ [2011] 2 Journal of International Stud. 50 – 67. 
265 Frank Vibert, ‘Reforming International Rule-Making’ [2012] 3 (3) Global Policy 391, 391. 
266 Ibid.  
267 Winer Jonathan and Trifin Roule, ‘Fighting Terrorist Finance’ [2002] 44 Survival 84. 
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agenda within the institution and its effect on the FATF’s design and compliance. The 
politics is evident in the composition of experts from the private and public sector, who 
are mainly representatives of developed countries. This configuration does not 
encompass or represent the views of developing countries. And is thus capable of 
stifling the compliance of these countries to the FATF standards. Thus, any 
restructuring should de-politicise the FATF and ensure a truly ‘expertise’ process that 
includes the views of developing countries.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter examines the evolution of AML/CFT standards, the institutions central to 
AML/CFT administration and the influence of these factors on state compliance. This 
chapter starts by establishing a link between the regulation of ML/TF and the financial 
sector reform, thus reinforcing the decision to incorporate this theme into global 
regulation. The AML/CFT standards had a contentious beginning but emerged as a 
crucial theme during financial sector reforms. This is attributable to the challenges 
posed to financial integrity by financial liberalization, especially as regards cross-
border financial relations.  
 
Whilst the FATF was initially responsible for the setting and dissemination of 
standards, the IFIs evolution through various cross-border crisis occasioned their 
perception of illicit crimes as auxiliary to their mandate. The IFIs are now involved in 
ensuring compliance with AML/CFT standards through participation in assessment 
processes. Consequently, as observers on the FATF, the IFIs hardened the trajectory of 
the FATF’s soft law –  a means of mandating global participation and compliance. This 
collaborative support between the IFIs and the FATF was aimed at facilitating 
compliance with AML/CFT standards.  
 
However well-intentioned, the evolution of the IFIs and the FATF, although at different 
historical points, only inculcated a select group of developed countries. Consequently, 
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standards recommended and processes were at best suited to combatting ML/TF within 
these countries. Given the lack of transparency, accountability and legitimacy, the 
AC/EE have suffered a compliance deficit. This predicament is understood through the 
lens of the agency theory which unearths a legitimacy crisis, showing that the AC/EE 
are disproportionately involved and inexplicably affected by the regulations – an 








Preconditions for Effective Regulations of AML/CFT and 




The preconditions for effective AML/CFT regulation aimed at forestalling illicit 
transfers and the role of law in its development have been the subject of a long and 
distinguished body of research. 1 This literature, although limited, has propelled debates 
on whether law is crucial to the in-country development of robust AML/CFT structures; 
and if it is, the design it ought to take to combat illicit crimes. Whilst the development 
of the ‘law matters’ thesis in AML/CFT regulation is still unresolved, there is 
recognition that law has to be situated with ‘confidence’ for countries to effectively 
combat illicit crimes.  
 
The presence of ‘law and confidence’ across ACs/EEs does not necessarily result in 
similar domestic circumstances to effectively combat illicit crimes. More particularly, 
unlike EEs, a majority of ACs have continued to deviate from the expected outcomes 
in terms of compliance. This can be attributed to a range of factors such as reputational 
concerns, capacity and resource disparities. Such challenges feed into the compliance 
drivers in different jurisdictions. An examination of the preconditions for effective 
regulation and possible compliance drivers illustrate divergent effects on ACs/EEs, 
                                     
1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Consultative Document: Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision’ (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 20 March 2012) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs213.pdf > accessed 1 February 2016; International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, ‘Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation’ (OICU-IOSCO February 2008); International Monetary Fund, 
‘Canada: Financial Sector Assessment Program: IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation – Detailed Assessment of Implementation 2014’ (IMF Country Report No. 14/73). 
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further indicating the possible unsuitability of the current regime in effectively 
combating ML/TF in ACs.  
 
Section 1 examines the possibility of law as a precondition for effective regulation. 
Whilst acknowledging counter-arguments, it posits that law does serve as a bedrock for 
financial regulation. Additionally, it contends that the design of law is imperative given 
that in the absence of proper drafting, laws can and will be gamed. More so, it argues 
the robustness of law is largely dependent on other factors which are internal to a 
country. Section 2 encapsulates these factors as ‘confidence’ and discusses this as a 
pre-condition for effective regulation. Confidence is examined within the framework 
of financial stability, governmental, political and institutional systems within a country. 
These factors are required for the well-functioning of law, attainable through the design 
of the law. Section 3 discusses the variances in confidence and the resulting effect of 
legal transplantation across ACs/EEs.  Section 4 discusses the perspective on 
compliance with global standards. It builds on previous sections given that the 
preconditions for effective regulations feed into the compliance drivers. This leads to 
section 5 which advances the claim that compliance is a function of legal and non-legal 
factors. Section 6 focuses on how countries are benchmarked against their compliance 
to international standards. It argues that the process of benchmarking reveals agency 
problems and further raises legitimacy concerns. Section 8 concludes by drawing the 










3.1 Pre-conditions for Effective Regulations of AML/CFT in African Countries and 
Emerging Economies  
 
IFIs and TGNs have agreed on certain preconditions to ensure effective financial 
regulation.2 The BCBS categorises them into six key areas which are mainly outside 
the scope of regulatory power. These include sound and sustainable macroeconomic 
policies, a well-established framework for financial stability, well developed public 
infrastructure, a clear framework for crisis management and an appropriate safety net.3 
There are overlaps with the International Organisation of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO) requirements which recognise similar preconditions categorised as the 
presence of sound economic policies, appropriate legal, tax and accounting framework  
and the absence of entry barriers to the market.4 This chapter however takes the 
perspective that there are two interrelated preconditions for effective regulation of 
AML/CFT – law and confidence, which although debatable, are crucial in ensuring 
robust regulation and compliance to the AML/CFT standards.  
 
3.1.1 Law as a Precondition for Effective Regulation 
 
Sturdy banking sectors arguably serve as stimuli for economic growth when regulated 
effectively. King and Levine’s cross-country empirical study finds a strong positive 
correlation between financial sector development indicators and economic growth.5 
                                     
2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Sound Management of Risks Related to Money Laundering 
and Financing of Terrorism’ (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, June 2017) 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d405.pdf > accessed August 2017; International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors, ‘Guidance Paper on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ 
(2004); The Joint Forum, ‘Initiatives by the BCBS, IAIS and IOSCO to Combat Money Laundering and 
the Financing of Terrorism’ (June 2003) < http://www.bis.org/publ/joint05.pdf > accessed 1 May 2016. 
3Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Consultative Document: Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision’ (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 20 March 2012) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs213.pdf > accessed 1 February 2016.  
4International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Methodology for Assessing Implementation of 
the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ (OICU-IOSCO February 2008); 
International Monetary Fund, ‘Canada: Financial Sector Assessment Program: IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation – Detailed Assessment of Implementation 2014’ (IMF Country 
Report No. 14/73). 
5 Robert King and Ross Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right’ [1993] 108 (3) The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 717, 732. Indices taken into consideration are the amount of liquid 
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Later studies by Levine6 and Fink et al7 contend that development of the financial sector 
accelerates economic growth. Petkovski and Kkosevski however note that the 
contribution of relatively underdeveloped credit market to growth is limited, with only 
a minor positive effect of ratio of quasi money (RMQ) on financial development.8 
Suggesting that although interest margin and credit to the private sector are negatively 
related to economic growth, RMQ has a positive correlation. This argument, which 
follows the global financial crisis, is aligned with Alexiou et al’s empirical findings 
which indicate that the potential benefits of the financial sector finance has resulted in 
‘uncreative destruction’ in recent years.9 This suggests a severance of link between the 
financial sector and real economy. Alexiou et al., therefore, advance the argument that 
institutional framework proxied by quality of governance have a crucial role in 
determining economic growth.10 
 
However, creating a regulated framework within which banks can thrive and advance 
economic growth in the absence of financial crime is challenging. Indeed, it is 
surprising that the banking sector still exists despite the effect of numerous financial 
crises on the confidence of depositors and the economy as a whole. The viability of 
banks as the suitable savings or investment option has been threatened with ‘run on the 
bank’ in jurisdictions like the United Kingdom.11 Such atmosphere indicates the need 
for tougher regulations. Consequently, reactive laws have resulted from the need to 
address the vulnerabilities in the banking system. This indicates an assumption that safe 
                                     
liabilities divided by GDP, the importance of commercial banks in relation to the central bank when 
allocating credit, the ratio of credit allocated to private enterprises to total domestic credit, and credit to 
private sector divided by GDP.  
6 Levine Ross, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Viwes and Agenda’ [1997] Journal of 
Economic Literature, XXXV, 688, 703. 
7 Gerhard Fink, Peter R Haiss and Sirma Hristoforova, ‘Growth Triggers in the European Union’ (2004) 
Papers and Proceedings of the 3rd IWH Workshop in Macroeconomics, Nomos, Baden, < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1317621 > accessed 4 August 2017.  
8 Mihail Petkovski and Jordan Kjosevski, ‘Does Banking Sector Development Promote Economic 
Growth? An Empirical Analysis for Selected Countries in Central and South Easter Europe’ [2012] 27 
(1) Economic Research-Ekonomska Istrazivanja 55, 64.  
9 Constantinos Alexiou, Sofoklis Vogiazas, Joseph Nellis, ‘Reassessing the Relationship Between the 
Financial Sector and Economic Growth: Dynamic Panel Evidence’ [2018] 1, 17. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Hyun Song Shin, ‘Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the Global Financial 
Crisis’ [2009] 23 (1) Journal of Economic Perspectives 101, 101. 
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banking activities can only function in a tightly regulated space.12 This is highlighted 
by contract law which governs the relationship between banks, their investors and 
depositors, and mandates adherence to conduct of business regulations. Furthermore,  
there is increased legislation on such issues as money laundering, cybercrime, and tax 
evasion13 in ACs/EEs. Statutory supremacy mandates that these legislations are adhered 
to,14 and that a breach will result in attendant consequences.  
 
The assumption that rigid regulation serves as a catalyst for bank safety also informed 
the FATF’s mandate on AML/CFT regulation which is designed to: 
 
‘promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for 
combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation, and 
other related threats to the integrity of the financial system.’15 
 
The emphasis on the implementation of legal measures is not only an indication of the 
assumption that in the absence of enforcement actions, ML/TF will persist. More 
importantly, it signifies that robust legislation is required to guide implementation of 
legal measures. Additionally, it indicates that in the absence of tough laws, the capacity 
of countries to combat illicit crimes and their predicate offences will be severely 
restricted.16 Reverberating this perception, the IMF states that:  
                                     
12 Gerard Caprio, Jr, ‘Financial Regulation After the Crisis: How Did We Get Here and How Do We Get 
Out?’ [2013] Federal Reserve of San Francisco Proceedings 1, 19; Stijin Classens, Daniela Klingebiel 
and Luc Laeven, ‘Resolving Systemic Financial Crisis: Policies and Institutions’ (2004) 3377 The World 
Bank,13<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/306631468780599186/126526322_20041117165
058/additional/wps3377.pdf > accessed 18 November 2015.  
13  Indian Income Tax Act 1961 and subsequently the Finance Act 2015; Article 201 People of China 
Criminal Law Amendment 2015. 
14 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th Edition, Liberty 
Classics 1982) 3-4.  
15FATF,  International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation, The FATF Recommendations’ (FATF, 2013) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/fatf_recommendations.pdf > accessed 12 May 
2015.  
16 FATF, ‘FATF Recommendation 3 and 4’ (FATF, 2013) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/fatf_recommendations.pdf > accessed 12 May 
2015.  
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‘Money launderers and terrorist financiers exploit loopholes and differences among 
national AML/CFT systems and move their funds to or through jurisdictions with weak 
or ineffective legal and institutional frameworks.’17 
 
An examination of this IMF’s statement suggests that weak or ineffective laws are 
unsuitable for curbing laundering because criminals are specialist in understudying the 
jurisdictional laws of different countries – a crucial determinant factor for where to 
invest in.18 Interestingly, launderers also look at other business indicators such as 
openness and transparency of institutions to determine the strength of laws.19 For 
instance, sequel to the collapse of the Central Government of Comoros, each Island 
started exerting fiscal sovereignty.20 Of the three existing Islands, Anjouan created a 
business friendly and stress free regulatory environment which not only permitted the 
licensing of banks within forty-eight hours but acceded to the operation of shell banks 
with limited information on beneficial owners.21 This indicated its commitment to 
promote financial secrecy.22 Furthermore, Anjouan restrained from cooperating with 
foreign governments except regarding serious criminal cases which excluded tax-
related matters.23 A few months after the creation of this Island as an offshore location, 
launderers from Russia started opening shell banks and companies through which they 
transferred money.24 In 2008, it was reported that 300 offshore banks operated in 
Anjouan, many of which were shell banks.25   
                                     
17 IMF, Anti- Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism Topics – The Fund’s 
Involvement In AML/CFT (International Monetary Fund) < 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm> accessed 20 June 2016.   
18 EENA1, Consulting Counsel, Financial Integrity Unit, International Monetary Fund, Interview with 
EENA1, ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
19 EENA1, Consulting Counsel, Financial Integrity Unit, International Monetary Fund, Interview with 
EENA1, ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
20 Tax Justice Network-Africa, Why Africa Should Stand Up for Tax Justice (Pambazuka Press, 2011) 
36. 
21 Hilton McCann, Offshore Finance (CUP, 2009) 450. 
22 Tax Justice Network-Africa,Why Africa Should Stand Up for Tax Justice (Pambazuka Press, 2011)33 
23 Hilton McCann, Offshore Finance (CUP, 2009) 450.  
24 Scott Senccal, Murat Akuyev and Yulia Somomakhina, ‘Offshores Restricted From Participation in 
Privatisation and Acquisition of Russian Strategic Companies’ (Cleary Gottlieb, Alert Memorandum, 10 
July 2017) <https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/2017/publications/alert-
memos/offshores-restricted-from-participation-in-privatizations-and-acquisitions-of-russian-7-10-
17.pdf > accessed 21 August 2017.  
25 Tax Justice Network-Africa, Why Africa Should Stand Up for Tax Justice (Pambazuka Press, 2011) 
37  
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It is crucial to note that developed countries are not exempt from this difficulty. England 
has particularly weak regulations on real estate investments, a shortcoming that has 
encouraged launderers and foreign corrupt politicians to invest in real estate.26 
 
These examples demonstrate a pattern in the operation of launderers when dealing with 
jurisdictions with weak domestic legislations. Premised on these assumptions, the 
FATF makes soft law recommendations for countries that respond by promulgating 
legislation on AML/CFT.27  
 
This legislative process is followed by a monitoring and evaluation exercise by the 
FATF and or the IFIs to determine the extent of compliance.28 Where the exercise 
indicates that countries have failed to enact laws based on the FATF recommendations, 
or faulted in their implementation, such countries are characterised as ‘weak’ or ‘non-
compliant. This measurement of compliance is indicative of the failure to align 
legislative frameworks with the Vienna and Palermo conventions. Consequentially, 
pressure is mounted on countries to elicit compliance in the formulation and 
construction of their laws.29 The primary reactionary motives of countries are usually 
to avoid placement on the ‘black-2’ and ‘grey list’ and the penalties associated 
therewith.30 This is one of the reasons behind the adaptation of laws which are 
perceived to be a mechanism for improved compliance and financial stability.31 While 
                                     
26 Robert Booth, ‘MPs Decry ‘Failed’ Effort to Stop UK Property Money Laundering’ (The Guardian, 
15 July 2016) < https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/jul/15/mps-decry-inadequate-efforts-stop-
money-laundering-uk-property > accessed 10 August 2017; Damien Gayle, ‘Foreign Criminals Use 
London Housing Market to Launder Billions of Pounds’ (The Guardian, 25 July 2015) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/25/london-housing-market-launder-offshore-tax-
havens > accessed 10 August 2017.   
27 Saby Ghoshray, Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict Between Agency 
Capture and Soft Law’ [2014-2015] 59 N.Y.L. SCH.L.REV.521, 537.  
28 FATF, ‘Methodology: For Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and 
the Effectiveness of AML/CFT System’ (FATF, 2013) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2017.   
29 This is usually done through sanctions.   
30 This was previously referred to as the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT).  Leonardo 
Borlini, ‘The Financial Action Task Force: An Introduction’ (U4 Brief, January 2015) < 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a0898ee5274a27b2000137/U4Brief-2015-02WEB.pdf 
> accessed 18 March 2016. 
31 Hemeiri Shahar, Lee Jones, ‘Regulatory Regionalism and Anti-Money Laundering Governance in 
Asia’ [2015] 69 (2) Australian Journal of International Affairs 144, 145; Jackie Johnson, ‘Blacklisting: 
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it is plausible that a system of laws guiding businesses including corporate laws, 
AML/CFT laws, bankruptcy laws, contract, consumer protection and property laws 
may serve as a precondition for effective regulation, the extent to which they can do so 
has been subject to debate.  
  
3.1.2 Law as the Bedrock for Financial Regulation  
 
Some scholars have argued that robust laws would lead to effective supervision, 
efficient risk management and good corporate governance practices within banks.32 The 
assumption is that this would serve as a catalyst for improving confidence in the 
banking system, thus possibly limiting the extent of any potential financial instability.33 
Singh highlights the importance of the law in ensuring financial stability, stating that it 
is crucial in preserving confidence in institutions and holding government agencies 
accountable.34  
 
Acknowledging the diverse application of law, Medish contends that laws form the 
basis for microeconomic change, as such, laws of economics do not get a proper chance 
to work without the rule of law.35 His argument underscores that accountability, 
transparency and legitimacy of regulatory actions are built on the premise of functional 
rule of law. This indicates subjection of all institutions, entities and the state itself to 
                                     
Initial Reactions, Responses and Repercussion’ [2001] 4 (2) Journal of Money Laundering Control 211, 
213. 
32 Klaus J Hopt, ‘Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis’ in E. Wymeersch, K.J Hopt, 
G Ferrarini (eds), Financial Regulation and Supervision, A Post-Crisis Analysis (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 3; Klaus J Hopt, ‘Better Governance of Financial Institutions’ (2013) European Corporate 
Governance Institute Working Paper 207/2013, 23 < 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/schustee/hopt%20governance.pdf > accessed 6 May 2016.  
33 Klaus J Hopt, ‘Better Governance of Financial Institutions’ (2013) European Corporate Governance 
Institute Working Paper 207/2013, 23 < http://personal.lse.ac.uk/schustee/hopt%20governance.pdf > 
accessed 6 May 2016. 
34 Dalvinder Singh and John Raymond La Brosse, ‘Developing a Framework for Effective Financial 
Crisis Management’ [2012] 2 OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 1,7.  
35 Mark Medish, ‘Lesson from Economies in Transition During Global Financial Crisis’, in Joseph R 
Sisignano, Wiliam C Hunter, George Kaufman, Global Financial Crises: Lessons from Recent Events 
(Bank for International Settlement Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2000) 61.  
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legislation,36 which provides for judicial independence and consistent enforcement. 
These assertions feed into the five criteria for effective regulation enumerated by 
Baldwin et al, the top criterion listed as a robust legislative mandate.37 They argue that 
regulatory action deserves support when authorised by parliament, the recognised 
bedrock of democratic authority.38 As a supervisory law, banking law is a specialised 
area of administrative law. It elucidates how agencies operate and circumstances where 
the right of citizens can be contained by the state.39 
 
However, there is the recognition that the strength of laws are predicated on the system 
in which they operate.40 Chinn and Ito argue that financial openness can only be 
beneficial when appropriate legal systems and institutions are in place.41 This study 
reveals that equity market development can be spurred by financial openness if a 
threshold of legal development has been attained.42 Cooter, Schafer and Ulen argue that 
the differences in legal institutions are reflective of the level of development in 
countries.43 An application of these studies to global regulation of AML/CFT provides 
some explanation for the disparities in the assimilation of the FATF recommendations 
by ACs/EEs. Through a historical perspective, the following sub-sections will illustrate 
that, in comparison with ACs, EEs have more robust legislative responses due to 
stronger legislative capacity, however, they do not necessarily have stronger rule of 
law. Nevertheless, legislative capacity amplifies their ability to adopt tougher laws to 
                                     
36 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1960) 191.  
37 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and 
Practice (First published 2012, 2nd Edn., OUP 2014) 27.  
38 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1960) 9.  
39 Wouter Bossu and Dawn Chew, “But We Are Different!” 12 Common Weaknesses in Banking Laws, 
and What to Do About Them (2015) IMF Working Paper WP/15/2000 < 
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03302402407500200204207400002508310802910408110204601003000400211709811611608802409
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40 Rahmat Mohamad, ‘Access to International Justice: The Role of the International Criminal Court in 
Aiding National Prosecutions of International Crimes’ [2012] 1 (2) AALCO Journal of International Law 
1.8.  
41 Chinn Menzie and Ito Hiro, ‘What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions 
and Interactions’ [2006] 81 (1) Journal of Development Economics 163, 165.  
42 Ibid 163, 187.  
43 Cooter, R. and Schafer, H.B, Solomon’s Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations (First 
published 2012 Princeton University Press 2012) 173; Ulen T, The Uneasy Case for Competition Law 
and Regulation as Decisive Factors in Development: Some Lessons for China in M, Faure and Z,, Xang 
(eds), Competition Policy and Regulation. Recent Developments in China, the US and Europe (Edward 
Elgar 2011) 13 – 44.  
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combat illicit crimes. Additionally, the economic position of EEs makes it imperative 
to address reputational concerns before they manifest, an issue which is easier to 
address in countries with sturdier legal structures.  
 
3.1.2.1 Legislative Changes in African Countries Resulting from AML/CFT Laws  
 
 
The importance of law as a bedrock of financial regulation can be exemplified with the 
significant changes recorded within countries resulting from AML/CFT legislations; 
particularly in ACs, as can be seen through the continent’s legislative and technical 
evolution post the colonial era.44   
 
It is imperative to state that during the colonial period, the crime of ‘money laundering’ 
was nonexistent. Although certain predicate offences like bribery, corruption, extortion 
and other offences had been acknowledged to exist. Attesting to this, Rodney stated 
that ‘colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation, but one whose essential 
purpose was to repatriate the profits to the so-called motherland’.45 Rodney speaks of 
an era dominated by slave trade and a gradual move to a period characterized by the 
exploitation of labor and forced labor where ‘Africans in their country were forced to 
grow cash crops by gun and whip’.46  The gradual change evidences the tactical means 
employed by colonial masters to circumvent the 1833 Abolition of Slave Trade Act, 
which was not only illegal but a process through which ill-gotten wealth in Africa was 
made clean through transfers to capitalist economies. Interestingly, during this 
dictatorial period, such ‘illicit’ transfers, exorbitant taxation and exclusive rights of 
                                     
44 Focus here will be on Nigeria in particular, as a prism through which other African countries can be 
viewed.  




exploitation granted to British and European firms over mineral and natural resources 
were legalized.47 
 
The prevalent exploitation that riddled the colonial era set the tone for the 
decolonization struggle, given that the structures instituted by the colonial masters 
hindered the fight for independence in ACs. Colonial masters struggled to give up 
power, arguing instead that their colonies were politically corrupt and unable to handle 
independence. For instance, colonial masters contended that Nigeria was ridden with 
‘corruption and bribery’48 and hence required ‘ceaseless vigilance of the British Staff 
to maintain a high standard of integrity and…prevent the oppression of peasantry’.49 
Tignor, however, argued that the colonial masters had expected their collaborators to 
behave this way.50 Hence, as the struggle for independence grew, colonial masters 
continually produced reports which indicted leaders of the movement as corrupt and 
unjustly enriched to the detriment of their people.51 Nevertheless, ACs began to gain 
their independence in the 1950s.  
 
During the decolonization period, the ruling class had opportunities to amass wealth. 
They were made ministers or chairmen of parastatals, with power to issue licenses, 
award contracts or scholarships, subject only to veto powers of colonial authority.52  
They exploited these positions to gain ‘kickbacks’ which are illegal pre-payment of a 
percentage of the contract awarded to the official in power.53 This was particularly 
predominant in Nigeria after she gained independence in 1960, a period marred by 
widespread corruption. To combat these illicit crimes, coupled with the disregard for 
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rule of law and lack of accountability, the military took over control in 1966 and 
dominated for about 32 years.54 Over six successful military coups occurred aimed at 
curbing corruption.55 The regimes of Murtala Mohammed in 1975 and Mohammadu 
Buhari in 1983 made considerable progress.56 Murtala Mohammed was killed 6 months 
into his regime, whilst Mohammadu Buhari was deposed by another military coup in 
1985.57 Sadly, disregard for rule of law, corruption, lack of accountability and 
transparency remained mainstream; most prominently showcased during the Sani 
Abacha regime, which looted about £5 billion from Nigeria’s coffers and stashed in 
jurisdictions including the United Kingdom and Switzerland.58  
 
Whilst there were steps to curb corruption by each successive military government, 
there was limited focus on money laundering until Nigerian’s accession to the 1988 
Vienna Convention. This culminated in Nigeria’s first significant piece of legislation 
(by decree) – the Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act, imbuing the NDLEA 
with enforcement powers against drug crime. Mirroring the Vienna Convention, the 
NDLEA decree focused on tackling money laundering through a fight on drugs alone. 
At that time, Nigeria had developed large-scale drug trafficking and was classed as 
second only to China in the trafficking of drugs to the United States.59 The environment 
was facilitated by drug lords who operated from a relatively safe home-base given the 
absence of laws. The NDLEA cracked down on drug lords at the point of cultivation, 
processing, sale and trafficking.60 However, the NDLEA decree could not take 
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cognizance of other crimes in Nigeria, such as corruption, bribery, etc. This 
shortcoming led to the enactment of the Money Laundering Decree (MLD) 1995.61  
 
A perusal of the MLD reveals the recognition that the use of financial institutions as a 
conduit to launder funds could potentially trigger financial instability.62 Hence, this 
decree was focused on ensuring financial stability and integrity. As a result, for the first 
time, financial institutions and individuals were mandated to commence consumer due 
diligence in cash payment above a certain threshold, a process which kickstarts once a 
customer seeks to open an account.63 The decree mandated banks to comply with these 
requirements given the force of law and the regimented structure put in place to combat 
money laundering. Financial institutions were also mandated to disclose overseas 
transfers and ensure that all details are precise.64 It also covered the activities of casinos 
and gambling houses, mandating that due diligence be carried out on all customers and 
appropriate recordings made.65 More importantly, this decree required a continued 
relationship between financial institutions and the NDLEA, to ensure that drug 
traffickers do not get under the radar of the laws.66  
 
These decrees which changed the landscape of money laundering regulation in Nigeria, 
had their limitations. For instance, the MLD which was the first legislation to require 
customer due diligence by financial institutions saw individuals and institutions 
gradually align their practices to conform with its provisions. It however failed to the 
extent that it provided discretionary powers to financial institutions on whether or not 
to report suspicious transactions. Additionally, penalties were only targeted at staff of 
the financial institution and not the institutions themselves, a shortcoming which may 
have warranted limited compliance. More so, the decree was unclear regarding its 
definition of money laundering. Additionally, Nigeria was still largely a cash-based 
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economy where less than 37% of adults had access to financial services.67 Hence, like 
drugs, money was usually laundered physically – mainly through airports or seaports, 
an area unaddressed by the MLD. These deficiencies proved the limitations of 
legislative capacity in terms of comprehension of the scale of the problems and how 
best to tackle it. It showed that Nigeria was not ready to effectively tackle money 
laundering or its predicate offences. The focus of the decree was mainly on 
criminalization and enforcement (breeding a ‘don’t-be-caught’ mentality), not 
necessarily on prevention. These shortcomings led to the FATF blacklisting of Nigeria 
in 2001. 
 
Nigeria enacted the Money Laundering (Amendment) Act 2002 in order to cure existing 
deficiencies and avoid the possible effects of the FATF’s sanction. This Act expanded 
the scope of predicate offences to other illegal acts. It also extended AML obligations 
to other non-financial institutions and required enhanced due diligence. The FATF 
however still faulted the Act, leading to the enactment of the Money Laundering 
(Prohibition) Act 2004 which repealed the 2002 Act. The 2004 Act was modelled to 
ensure the delisting of Nigeria from the FATF’s blacklist. Hence, it limited the amount 
of cash that private individuals and corporate entities could hold for the purpose of 
making any payments to five hundred thousand naira (N500,000) and one million naira 
(N1,000,000) respectively.68 It also provided that transfers above the stipulated amount 
be done through a financial institution. Additionally, it limited international transfers 
to ten thousand dollars ($10,000), mandating a report to the Central Bank of Nigeria or 
the Securities and Exchange Commission when the mandated limit was exceeded.69 
The aim of these requirements were to ensure a move away from a cash-based to a 
cashless economy, whilst ensuring that regulatory agencies can formulate and 
implement practical futuristic policies. The Act achieved the aim of delisting Nigeria 
from the FATF’s blacklist.  
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Importantly, two other notable laws, the Corrupt Practices and Other Offences Act 2000 
which sets up the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 
2002, also facilitated the delisting of Nigeria.70  The ICPC focuses squarely on fighting 
corruption through investigations, arrests, prosecutions, corrective, preventative and 
educational responsibilities. The EFCC has a broader agenda, focused on the 
investigation and prosecution of all financial crimes.71 The EFCC is also authorized to 
freeze bank accounts, seize assets or arrest suspects.72 The Nigerian Financial 
Intelligence Unit (NFIU) is domiciled within the EFCC and serves as the national center 
for the collation and analysis of suspicious transaction reports and other relevant 
information to money laundering. The NFIU mainly derives its power from the Money 
Laundering Prohibition Act 2011, as amended in 2012 and the EFCC Act. It is also 
responsible for establishing and maintaining relationships with other Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIUs) within the Egmont Group.  
 
Following these legislations, there has been appreciable progress in the way money 
laundering and terrorist financing is combatted in Nigeria, particularly through 
financial institutions. For instance, banks now implement the CDD requirements as 
mandated by law with the aim of creating and maintaining a paper trail. Reporting 
requirements entrenched by law mandate that suspicious transactions be brought to the 
attention of regulators. Management can now be held responsible for their acts and 
omissions in facilitating money laundering.  
 
Consequently, it is arguable that Nigerian and, indeed, Africa laws may be capable of 
curbing illicit crimes. EENA2 states that ‘it is not as dire as one might think in 
…African countries – in fact, the letter of the law is pretty good’.73 However, recently, 
the Egmont Group suspended Nigeria for failing to enact legislations to autotomize the 
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country’s NFIU from the EFCC.74 Nigeria is yet to take positive steps to avert an 
impending expulsion. Chukwuma Utazi, the Chairman, Nigerian Senate Committee on 
Anti-Corruption has stated that ‘they (Egmont) already said that if we did not comply, 
they would expel us, so there is no fresh news there…we are working towards it, 
nothing has been done.’75 This sort of response illustrates a nonchalant approach to 
addressing an issue pending for over five years. Furthermore, it shows a lack of 
legislative capacity and concern for reputational damage. It also demonstrates 
legislators’ reactive approach in ACs to addressing pressing issues.  
 
3.1.2.2 Legislative Changes in Emerging Economies Resulting from AML/CFT Laws  
 
 
Legislation-inspired changes are more profound in EEs, taking China as an example. 
China’s history indicates the effects of ML/TF during the ancient period (BC 2000), 
when all properties were vested in the ruler.76 Merchants had engaged in extortion, 
bribery and subsequent investment of these properties in other jurisdictions, 
circumventing restrictions imposed by the government.77 Measures devised to curb the 
appropriation of properties proved insufficient in the face of varied ways of laundering. 
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Like ACs, the first legislation came as a result of China’s accession to the 1988 Vienna 
Convention.78 These laws could only combat drug crime.79 Subsequent legislation 
included other predicate offences – in line with evolving international standards.80  
 
China’s evolving laws were inspired by responses to external pressures, for instance, 
from the FATF. Two thematic areas standout – customer due diligence and reporting.  
 
There is evidence that legislation on customer due diligence (CDD) impacted the active 
fight against illicit crimes.81 Prior to these legal requirements, there was no evidence 
that Chinese banks, especially smaller banks, implemented CDD  requirements.82 Thus, 
it is unsurprising that the first regulation requiring customers to use genuine names to 
open bank accounts was in 2000.83  Lack of CDD requirements cloaked launderers in 
anonymity, enabling them to operate for so long without detection. China has now 
implemented CDD requirements to combat AML/CFT following FATF’s 
stipulations,84 thus potentially reducing the extent to which financial institutions can be 
used to transfer illicit funds.  
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Law has also changed the culture regarding ‘reporting’ of suspicious transactions by 
financial institutions. China’s 2003 AML/CFT legislation introduced for the first time 
- the requirement to report suspicious transactions. However, due to legislative capacity 
challenges, it failed to capture FATF current recommendations 9 – 12 and 20 – 23 on 
reporting.85 In the absence of appropriate prescriptive guidelines on detection and 
reporting of suspicious transactions, compliance officers honoured the laws in breach. 
The shortcomings of the Chinese Financial Institutions Anti Money Laundering 
Regulation (CFLAMLR) do not overshadow its advantages. It set out the thresholds for 
identifying suspicious transactions.86 Furthermore, China imposed penalties for non-
compliance with reporting requirements, which emphasized its drive to foster a robust 
corporate governance culture. Persons found liable of non-compliance face disciplinary 
sanctions, usually in form of fines.87 Serious cases could lead to the revocation of 
business licences.88 
 
Considering that transplantation of global standards was key to advancing its economic 
vision, China enacted stricter AML/CFT laws, sometimes graver than international 
standards. For instance, whilst international standards impose financial penalties or 
imprisonment for tax evasion as a predicate offense,89 the Chinese Government made 
it a capital offence.90  This approach has gained scholarly support. Lacking empirical 
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evidence, Shuceng suggests that modifications of the punishment regimes have 
contributed to reduced criminal offences in China.91 Subsequent cross-country 
empirical studies support Shuceng’s suggestion, showing how tougher money 
laundering regulations, particularly those that criminalise feeding activities or 
improved disclosure are linked to lower levels of money laundering.92  
 
Given the foregoing legislative alignment with global standards, it is fair to postulate 
that China’s legislators have stronger capacity. This explains why, despite the 
omissions in the legislation regarding reporting suspicious transactions, the law gave 
room for effective implementation. This warranted the 2016 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR) which recorded China’s milestones in addressing the 
early challenges posed by lack of relevant laws.93 This milestone demonstrates an 
awareness by the legislators of China’s economic and international relations agenda, 
including the need to maintain its global reputation.  
 
3.1.3 Law as the Bedrock of Financial Regulation: A Rejoinder  
 
The weakness or absence of AML/CFT laws in certain countries has revealed that tough 
laws may not necessarily be a precondition for effective regulation.94 Davis and 
Trebilcock reinforce this with empirical reports, which indicate that there is limited 
correlation between enhanced legal systems and development.95 Additionally, law and 
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economics scholars have argued that statutory laws are either immaterial or 
ineffective.96 Moreover, it can be argued, further to the principal-agent theory,  that 
laws can be gamed as countries have the power to manipulate and direct behaviour 
given their interpretation of  the law. Consequently, it is imperative to question the need 
for statutory law in AML/CFT regulation. Scholars have postulated five situations 
where laws may not be ideal for robust regulation.  
 
First, it is argued that laws are misdirected and the unintended consequences thereof 
are increased predicate offences. Chong and Lopez De Silanes argue that from legal 
and economic perspectives, the ineffectiveness of money laundering legislation is 
responsible for the misdirection of regulatory policies which focus mainly on 
laundering acts, as opposed to predicate offences.97 They argue that regulatory focus 
on predicate offences will eventually lead to a reduction in ML/TF crimes, given that 
ML/TF is an outcome of predicate offences.98 They also posit that AML/CFT statutes 
have not only been inactive in combatting initial predicate offences of drug crimes, but 
have further perpetuated other crimes such as kidnapping and smuggling.99 Resultantly, 
it is argued that AML/CFT regulation is immaterial and disadvantageous, as it increases 
demand for services by inventing new crimes, fostering the creation of a new criminal 
industry to evade new laws.100 Though compelling, this argument does not present the 
true nature of AML/CFT laws which no doubt includes predicate offences. 
Additionally, certain predicate offences such as tax evasion or kidnapping have separate 
laws which can be read alongside AML/CFT laws.  
 
The second perspective posits that the reputation of financial institutions alongside 
enforcement actions by courts are sufficient preconditions for effective regulation of 
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ML/TF. This argument recognises that potentially damaging penalties on financial 
institutions can propel robust regulation. For instance, blacklisting of tax havens by 
OECD potentially restricts the activities of institutions within the sanctioned countries, 
causing reputational damage and consequently leading to improved regulation and 
compliance.101 Furthermore, it also acknowledges the role of courts in ‘law-making.102 
Lending credence to this position, La Porta et al and North argue that irrespective of 
the content of the law, better enforcement could be associated with lower levels of 
criminal activity – including money laundering.103 However, this perspective that court-
driven enforcement is sufficient to tackle ML/TF and render AML/CFT regulation 
needless is limited given that in the absence of legislative structures, regulation may 
not have the force of law. It fails to recognise the difference between legislation (laws 
enacted by the legislature or the governing body of a country)104 and regulation (the 
process of monitoring and enforcing legislation or a written instrument containing rules 
built on laws).105 Thus, for instance, where the legislature enacts a law requiring 
telecommunication companies to register all Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card 
users, the relevant regulatory body is duty-bound to guide implementation of the law. 
This underscores that law informs regulation and enforcement.  
 
Thirdly, scholars have postulated that legislation that is not backed by tough regulatory 
measures would not serve as a precondition for effective regulation.106 This can be 
illustrated by the weak regulation of beneficial ownership in Nigeria, Togo and China, 
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notwithstanding their tough legislation which signals a gaming of the law.107 Beneficial 
ownership which refers to the ‘real ownership’ of funds or stocks held in trust or 
corporate vehicles is an identified avenue for ML/TF.108 ‘Nominees’ who hold assets 
on trust have no executive authority over the business affairs of their clients, but merely 
charge for use of their details on official documents. In certain instances, the nominee 
is usually unaware of the owner’s true identity. Weak regulatory measures on beneficial 
ownership means that funds may be laundered through this structure by industries that 
have evolved to meet the demands of individuals and organisations seeking privacy for 
legitimate and illegitimate reasons.109 These weak regulatory measures can however be 
supplanted by parliamentary committees, the ombudsman, competition commissions or 
judicial review.110 The parliamentary committee’s role was decisive in ensuring 
financial due process in the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission.111 
 
Fourthly, there is a global challenge to evaluate the effectiveness of AML/CFT 
legislations and resulting regulations. Academics have noted the difficulties in 
estimating the annual cost of laundering due to varying and evolving money laundering 
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techniques, especially in underground banking methods.112 There remains a concern 
that actions based on AML/CFT laws would be inaccurate and ineffective. Levi and 
Gilmore contend that it was never clear that measures such as confiscation and 
monitoring constituted a significant condition for success.113 This indictment can be 
backed by the 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) which 
revealed that China’s involvement in money laundering is still growing, as it currently 
leads the world in illicit capital flow.114 Additionally, in 2016, the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) raised concerns over increased drug trafficking and 
laundering in West African States.115 This reveals the challenges in gathering empirical 
data for measuring the effectiveness of AML/CFT laws.116 This scenario indicates that 
although contextually different, these jurisdictions suffer similar issues relating to 
mining data and combatting illicit crimes.  
 
Lastly, there is the argument on the cost involved in legislation and regulations. Studies 
have shown that, in certain jurisdictions, money laundering has a negative effect on 
bank efficiency,117 particularly given the cost-implication of compliance. However, 
compliance-related cost is not comparable to the risk money laundering could pose to 
the financial system, if it contributes to a financial crisis. Recent studies have however 
illustrated that tougher AML/CFT regulations are associated with reduced levels of 
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ML/TF, particularly those that criminalise predicate offences and improve 
disclosure.118  
 
Other arguments that critique the position of law as the bedrock of financial regulation 
include the role of market forces and customary norms. Posner119 and Lessig120 
postulate that the assumption that legislation is the bedrock of regulatory effectiveness 
and compliance is erroneous and empirically unsubstantiated, as compliance is not a 
sequence of regulatory efforts. Posner attributes effective regulation to community 
customary norms rather than legislation, 121 whilst Lessig attributes it to market 
forces.122 Taking such factors as primary influencers to compliance as opposed to law 
comes with consequences. Market forces can be manipulated and customary norms do 
not necessarily take into consideration the interests of all parties – women for instance 
are usually prejudiced by customary norms in developing countries.123  
 
The above responses to the rejoinder illustrates that the role of law in financial 
regulation cannot be displaced. For this reason, the vagueness of the FATF soft laws 
have facilitated increased public-private partnerships in combating ML/TF.124 Wlike 
argues that this explains the shift from rule-based to risk-based regulation, where banks 
engage in self-regulation unless indicators of risk are detected. The FATF has 
acknowledged these principles on the basis of pragmatism.125 This pragmatism 
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contributes to the argument that the development of law does not necessarily translate 
to robust AML/CFT regulations. Nevertheless, as shown above, in the absence of robust 
laws, proactive steps are usually not taken by ACs/EEs to combat illicit crimes. The 
effectiveness of legislations is however not solely dependent on transplantation, but on 
the design of the law.  
 
3.1.4 Design of the Law  
 
Where laws would serve as a precondition for effective regulation, the content and 
drafting technique employed is vital. This is because the robustness of laws and their 
ability to supervise market operations are largely dependent on their design. Poorly 
drafted laws give room for subjective interpretation by regulators and financial 
institutions, which facilitates gaming of the law, thus resulting in breach. Bossu and 
Chew assert that the problems with banking laws are not inherent in local circumstances 
but attributable to challenges in drafting and designing laws globally.126 However, 
given the positioning of developed countries in training ACs/EEs in legislative drafting 
through their agencies, it can be assumed that the robustness of laws are subject to 
jurisdictional circumstances.127 
 
The question then is, to what extent have international network bodies like the FATF 
and BCBS provided sufficient legislative or regulatory guidance to ACs/EEs? This 
question is posed against the background of the FATF recommendations and 
exemplified with Recommendation 3 on criminalisation.  
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Recommendation 3 (Money Laundering Offence) states that: 
 
‘Countries should criminalise money laundering on the basis of the Vienna Convention 
and the Palermo Convention. Countries should apply the crime of money laundering to 
all serious offences, with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences.’128 
 
‘Should’, the operational word in Recommendation 3, which also resonates in other 
recommendations, reflects the persuasive nature of the framework document. The soft 
law documents express more of a moral obligation than a mandatory requirement. The 
non-mandatory signpost to the Vienna and Palermo Conventions leave room for over-
inclusion or under-inclusion in legislative drafting. For this reason, legislative 
documents in various countries do not meet up with the expectations of the 
recommendations. Hinterseer argues that the leverage given to legislators place them 
in a quandary between controlling the abuse of financial services and penalising those 
who utilise these services legitimately.129 The soft law adaptation system has however 
created a situation where financial institutions may be unduly penalised despite 
compliance with obligations mandated by criminal law.130 This illustrates the limitation 
of the FATF as an intergovernmental body blindsided to law making but focused on 
standard setting.  
 
This shortcoming is further highlighted by the recommendations review (or selection 
process). Potential recommendations are proposed  to the FATF plenary by the  FATF’s 
Policy Development Group.131 The plenary then presents the proposal before its 
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members and associate members to deliberate on its adoption. Noting the power 
asymmetry in the deliberation process,  EENA5, a GIABA staff member stated that 
‘there are powers that their opinions supersede the others’132 Acknowledging this, Rose 
contended that recommendations are produced by consensus reached by largely 
developed like-minded states.133 However developed, precision is sometimes forfeited 
for compromise during the negotiation process. Thus, without conceding transparency 
and flexibility, the FATF should ensure that there is an element of certainty afforded to 
legislative drafters to carry out their duties effectively or risk the gaming of the law.134  
 
Primary and secondary legislation should have well defined rules governing 
supervision of financial institutions. For instance, they should encompass 
independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors.135 The 
inclusion of these would indicate the required absence of government or industry 
interference with the role of the supervisor to avoid regulatory capture.136 The mandate 
of the supervisor and the ambits of his powers should be properly set out. It should be 
clearly stated whether the supervisors will be granted executive powers over banking 
laws, or limited powers which would be determined on the basis of the implementation 
of regulations.137 Both options have implications; whilst the former grants the 
supervisor broad regulatory powers in unforeseen instances and grants the opportunity 
to catch up with advances not captured by legislation, it however makes regulation 
susceptible to arguments that it was not established on sufficient legal grounds. 
Contrariwise, where subject to regulations, it restricts the ability of supervisors to react 
to issues not expressly stated by the legislation. Limiting the discretionary powers of 
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the supervisor has an adverse effect on the market, as it may lead to frequent update of 
the law, which regulatory bodies and institutions may struggle to adjust to.  
 
For the above reason, the IMF/World Bank provide technical assistance to enable 
legislative draftsmen to construct robust laws. However, does this legal guidance take 
into consideration the level of development of countries or their local circumstances? 
In collaboration with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the 
IMF crafted model legislation on money laundering for countries to adopt.138 Such 
model laws come across as a prototype that does not address the particular local 
circumstances of countries. EENA3 argues that the legal development of countries is 
not factored into discussions on law formulation, rather, the process of law making 
smacks of quasi-imperialism.139 He exemplifies this with the case of Sri Lanka which 
was pushed to adopt AML/CFT laws by the IMF, without factoring its weak legal 
system or its attempt to settle a war with the Tamel Tigers, an insurgent group that 
would have viewed the adoption of the AML/CFT standards as bad faith.    
 
EENA1 however argues that the IMF does not necessarily engage in a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach, but spends time discussing with countries and customizing standards.140 
He posits that such modifications take into consideration the legal development, 
framework and culture of countries. EENA1 exemplifies his stance by alluding to 
recommendation 4 on Confiscation and Provisional Measures which clearly states that 
‘Countries should consider adopting measures that allow… proceeds or 
instrumentalities to be confiscated without requiring a criminal conviction (non-
conviction based confiscation) … to the extent that such a requirement is consistent 
with the principles of their domestic law.’ Although precise, this standard allows for 
some manoeuvre to give precedence to domestic law when drafting legislation or 
regulations, a feature that model laws may be blindsided to. Conceding, EENA1 asserts 
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laundering/Model-Legislation.html > accessed 10 August 2017.  
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that prior to the institutionalisation of discussions that served as a prelude to technical 
assistance, ACs were involved in ‘copying, pasting and publishing laws’ such as the 
penalty of 15 years for ML/TF, which were not often implemented.141 EENA1 
acknowledges that the involvement of ACs, coupled with the deference to their 
domestic legislation has led to the inclusion of pieces of legislation in the right place in 
the legal framework. Examples include the addition of standards relating to 
criminalisation in the country’s criminal code and the reduction of sanctions to 5 to 10 
years imprisonment.142 These were achievable mainly through partnership with Inter-
Governmental Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). Although 
better design of the law has led to remarkable improvement in technical compliance, 
this does not translate to effective compliance.  
 
EENA1’s arguments, though practical, does not acknowledge that the transplantation 
of AML/CFT laws in ACs were simply to evade sanctions of the FATF. Hence whilst 
15 years’ penalty might have been unsuitable, ACs adopted it to avoid sanctions and 
repercussions that flow thereof. Additionally, whilst recommendation 4 may have 
provided room for ‘domestic requirements’, alongside recommendations 37 and 39, 
other recommendations impose a blanket requirement. This would severely limit the 
IMF’s ability to tailor-fit legislations to a country’s domestic challenges or its ability to 
take into consideration the level of legal development, without breaching its collective 
principal arrangement with the FATF.  
 
The literature on the design of the law is however incomplete without an appraisal of 
the current and potential lawmakers. EENA1 argues that prosecutors and legislators 
alike, inclusive of law schools and students are wary of new topics on how to fight 
financial crime and hence kick against them. An example of such area is civil 
confiscation, an FATF recommendation that permits the confiscation of proceeds of 
crime without a criminal conviction.143 This is largely rejected in countries where laws 
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require that a civil confiscation can only commence after a criminal conviction, because 
it is regarded as an affront on traditional legal structures. Such countries usually refuse 
to amend their laws to reflect the evolving requirement of standards. This is also the 
case with the FATF requirement on criminal liability of legal persons, that is, the 
conviction of a legal entity misused by criminals. Countries have however failed to 
amend their laws for non-conformity with national laws and norms. This indicates that 
although the design of laws is seemingly good, there is still room for improvement to 
eliminate existing bottlenecks.  
 
The design of law reiterates the argument that law is insufficient as a sole precondition 
for robust regulation of AML/CFT for two reasons. Firstly, law can be gamed by 
countries even when drafted perfectly on paper. Secondly, the strength of well-designed 
laws cannot be divorced from broader political and economic settings in which they 
function.144 For this reason, law must be discussed in concert with confidence as 
preconditions for effective regulation.  
 
3.2 Confidence as a Precondition for Effective Regulation  
 
Absence of confidence in financial institutions not only destabilises an orderly market, 
it also increases market volatility. This warrants action from financial regulators to 
make and enforce regulations aimed at resolving a destabilised market. Governments 
in various jurisdictions devote resources and manpower to guarantee against systemic 
and non-systemic risk to the market. Otherwise, the market may remain volatile, 
resulting in an unexpected crash, which would trigger loss of confidence.  
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Ruxiev and Dow assert that confidence is the backbone of financial institutions and 
systems and is thus necessary in a free enterprise system.145 Presenting a graphical 
representation of this assertion, they liken the financial system to an inverted pyramid 
built on confidence in outside money held as reserves in the central bank by commercial 
banks.146 If confidence in  outside money falls, there is a danger that the entire inverted 
pyramid of the private financial sector may collapse.147 This indicates that internal and 
external factors contribute significantly to the build-up of confidence.   
 
To this end, this section argues that effective regulation requires confidence. 
Confidence in this context is further subdivided into four thematic areas; confidence in 
financial stability, political and governmental systems, institutional systems and 
regulation and enforcement.  To explain these, it is imperative to understand the concept 
of confidence.  
 
3.2.1 Defining Confidence  
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘confidence’ as ‘trust, reliance (or) grounds of trust’.148 
The interchangeable nature of the words indicate that ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’ are not 
mutually exclusive.  
 
Confidence is derived from the legitimate expectations of specific actions from people 
or institutions due to the rules, conventions and morals which dictate their activities.149 
Kaufman and Ciesolka postulate that this expectation is built on trust in robust 
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regulatory frameworks and actors loyalty to the framework and each other.150 Where 
such trust is established, investors can entrust a financial institution with the 
management of their assets. A depositor can also be restrained from withdrawing funds 
from an institution at the slightest sign of market turbulence. Legitimate expectations 
can however be violated, resulting in financial crises and devastating effect on financial 
stability and integrity. Thus, the importance of confidence cannot be overstated.  
 
Murphy argues that financial regulations should be constructively designed to not only 
mitigate risks in stressed conditions but to be seen as mitigating such risk to stimulate 
confidence.151 The appearance of a crack in the system occasioned by information 
asymmetry can cause a mini crisis of confidence leading to investor withdrawal.152 This 
denotes a twofold problem. Firstly, withdrawal – a catalyst for increased cash 
transaction153 which facilitates ease of laundering across weak borders.  Secondly, 
information asymmetry between financial institutions, regulators and stakeholders. In 
such instances, stakeholders’ confidence and their rational expectations will not be 
dependent on the actual health of individual banks, but moulded on the chance of future 
bailouts, hence relying on information on government’s financial constraints and 
bailout policy. 154  
 
Scholars have argued that drastic alterations in stakeholders’ confidence are only 
affected by massive scandals155 such as the Asian crisis.156 While this is usually the 
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case, pockets of mini crises of confidence indicate that business cycles have an effect 
on public opinion in this domain. Murphy stressed how important it is for investors to 
believe that banks can absorb losses in stressed conditions, observing that well 
capitalised banks do fail, but confidence in them gives these banks the opportunity to 
survive long enough to correct problems that may arise.157  
 
These arguments illustrate that ‘confidence’ vested in the ability of financial regulatory 
bodies to deliver cannot be underestimated. Confidence serves as a guide to financial 
regulators, keeping them abreast of public opinion in financial regulation and is a check 
against illicit activities in financial institutions.  
 
3.2.1.1 Confidence in Financial Stability 
 
 
ML/TF weaken financial institutions and pose harm to the stability of the financial 
market as a whole. When stakeholders evaluate accessible information on financial 
markets, findings of illicit crimes can destroy their confidence. To retain their 
confidence in the system, there must be a clear framework for crisis management, 
resolution, discipline and prevention.  
 
A crisis management structure sends a message to stakeholders that potential 
disruptions to financial stability would be properly managed.158 A lender of last resort, 
which is usually a central bank and robust deposit insurance system fall within the 
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framework of crisis management.159 Their roles are critical for systemic protection 
against financial instability. Central to their financial stability mandate is minimising 
the likelihood of a bank-run whilst also protecting depositors and retaining their 
confidence in the financial system.160 The presence and effectiveness of these 
institutions enhance stakeholder confidence in financial stability.   
 
The crisis management institutions have their distinct functions, inclusive of the 
mandate to curtail illicit crimes. Central banks offer loans to financial institutions with 
liquidity problems,161 particularly those that pose systemic risk.162 This mandate is 
however discretionary. Goodhart contends that central banks would usually not support 
the most egregiously badly-behaved banks,163 indicating that where banks are heavily 
dependent on laundered funds for liquidity and suffer a solvency crisis, such banks are 
unlikely to receive support from the central banks. This was the case with Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), which although had become ‘too big to 
fail’ could not be restructured with liquidity provision by the Bank of England (BoE) 
due to largescale evidence of fraud, money laundering and terrorist financing.164 Hence, 
the BoE let the bank fail. Whilst this may lead to short term crisis of confidence, in the 
long-term, stakeholders would support the government’s decision. This is particularly 
so because central banks allow financial institutions to fail in an orderly manner.  
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The deposit insurance system protects depositors from losses caused by a bank’s 
inability to pay its debts when due as a result of bank failure.165 This is usually done by 
insuring customers’ deposits up to a certain limit.166 However, the deposit insurers are 
only required to pay out to eligible depositors and not launderers, demonstrating that 
endemic cases of financial crime can undermine the deposit insurers pay-out mandate. 
This indicates that some due diligence is mandatory to delineate clean money from 
illicit funds in the process of transfer of funds from a collapsed bank. The presence of 
a deposit insurer can lead to a moral hazard; a situation whereby financial institutions 
take on more risk than necessary given the desensitised approach of insured customers 
to the bank’s risk appetite.167 However, profit maximising launderers would be deterred 
from depending on such bailouts and may seek alternative, non-regulated institutions 
to deposit their funds. This may no doubt protect the desensitised customers and elevate 
their confidence in financial stability.  
 
In addition to crisis management structures, market discipline also provides confidence 
in financial stability and serves as a precondition for effective regulation. This form of 
discipline, which complements official supervision, is utilised where there is 
unavoidable information asymmetry between financial institutions and their 
supervisors or forbearance associated with political considerations.168 These 
circumstances place an onus on market participants to monitor financial institutions and 
discipline excessive risk-taking behaviours.169 Market discipline is however largely 
dependent on the dissemination of information within the market, appropriate 
incentives to reward well-managed institutions and arrangements that ensure that 
investors are not insulated from the consequences of their decisions.170 Where market 
                                     
165 Patricia A. McCoy, ‘The Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance: Theory and Evidence’ 
(Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, October 2006) 8. 
166 Ibid.    
167 Ibid 1; Gillian Garcia, ‘Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management’ (2000) IMF Working Paper 
WP/00/57/2000, 19 < https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0057.pdf >  accessed 10 January 
2017.  
168 Constantinos Stephanou, ‘Rethinking Market Discipline in Banking: Lessons from the Financial 
Crisis’ in Panagiotis Delimatsis and Nils Herger, Financial Regulation at the Crossroads: Implications 
for Supervision (Wolters luwer, 2011) 212.  
169 Ibid.   
170 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Sound Management of Risks Related to Money 
Laundering and Financing of Terrorism’ (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, June 2017) 
<http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d405.pdf > accessed August 2017. 
 117 
discipline is robust, information such as governments’ lending or guarantee of lending 
is disclosed. Furthermore, governments are not permitted to influence or override 
commercial decisions to achieve public policy objectives.171 Given the complementary 
nature of this disciplinary approach to official supervision, it engineers improved 
compliance in financial stability.172 For this reason, there is improved emphasis on 
market discipline as illustrated by Pillar 3 in the Basel II framework which is focused 
on obtaining empirical data on banks’ capital, risk profile and risk assessment.173 
 
Financial institutions saddled with ML/TF problems are prone to concentration, 
operational, legal and reputational risks.174 The reflection of these risks to the market 
however undermine the confidence of stakeholders, especially depositors and investors, 
prompting withdrawal of funds from the affected bank or country. 
 
Concentration risk is the potential for loss resulting from the exposure of financial 
institutions to particular individuals or sectors as a result of their lending patterns.175 
Restrictions put in place by regulations are usually honoured in breach, thus creating a 
scenario where a group of persons or sham companies can subsequently withdraw 
laundered funds from the bank within a period of time – thus posing a risk to the 
associated institutions. Losses from bad loans also result from unenforceable contracts 
and contracts entered with fictitious persons.176 FIs are not adequately protected in the 
absence of a robust CDD regime which mandates that beneficial owners of an account 
are identifiable to forestall chances of laundering. Defrauded stakeholders question 
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their trust in FIs and consequently financial stability. Their search for remedies result 
in numerous lawsuits and unenforceable contracts. McCormick argues that loss of 
significant funds attracts frivolous litigations177 with stakeholders contesting light touch 
regulations. These result in penalties which generate losses for the associated 
institutions.178  
 
Conversely, operational risk, which is the breakdown of internal procedures, people 
and systems, thrives in the absence of sturdy corporate governance structures.179 
Barakat and Hussainey argue that enhanced risk reporting, a component of operational 
risk disclosure quality in European banks, is best achieved when there is board 
independence, enhanced audit committee activity, and greater proactive roles for bank 
supervisors.180 Buttressing this, Wang and Hsu argue that the board is to set the proper 
governance structure and culture for effective operational risk.181 Losses that occasion 
operational risk also occur when institutions incur reduced, terminated, or increased 
cost for inter-bank or correspondent banking services.182 In the absence of sturdy 
operational risk structures, confidence in financial stability may dwindle.  
 
Lastly, reputational risk is associated with confidence, as it has the ability to affect 
multiple institutions, given the contagious effect of information asymmetry. 
Information in the market, coupled with a lax regulatory system or repeated sanctions 
can lead to loss of confidence. Likewise, the blacklisting of countries effectively 
restricts foreign investment.  
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In handling risks which undermine effective regulation, supervisors and relevant 
authorities are to identify high risk sectors and ensure proper direction of resources. 
These risks differ in presentation and in manifestation and thus would require a tailored 
approach towards their resolution. This would improve internal and external confidence 
within the system.  
 
3.2.1.2 Confidence in the Political and Governmental System  
 
 
Confidence in the political system is vital for financial stability, serving as a 
precondition for effective regulation. Political systems that create an atmosphere where 
rule of law prevails and crime is punished deter ML/TF activities and, more 
importantly, create confidence in FIs. This can be attributed to the fact that FI’s become 
increasingly adherent to prescribed regulations, knowing that breach would result in 
severe penalties and reputational damage. This indicates a top-down approach where 
the scene is set by the executives elected or appointed into power. 
 
This top-down approach requires that governments do not compromise on sound 
macroeconomic policies for effective regulation. In the absence of sound policies, 
discrepancies such as astronomical spending by government, excessive shortage or 
supply of liquidity may affect the stability of the financial system.183 Furthermore,  
certain government policies may specifically use banks and other financial 
intermediaries as instruments and this may inhibit effective supervision.184 Where this 
is allowed to flourish, the state in question would not experience effective regulation.  
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Sequential patterns in ACs have indicated that government representatives may be 
actively involved in ML/TF,185 exemplified in Sub-Saharan ACs where corruption is 
an integral part of the political fabric. In Sierra Leone, for instance, government 
officials were recently embroiled in the laundering of UKAid in excess of £1million 
which was granted to support ‘peacekeeping’.186 In Uganda, £800,000 intended for 
schools was embezzled by education ministers.187 There is also evidence that corrupt 
officials in Senegal, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria have used their children to 
embezzle funds overseas.188 These actions are antithetical to financial stability and the 
dictates of good governance, thereby undermining confidence in the governments. 
Former South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma faced a no-confidence vote partly due to 
corruption allegations, which resulted in his removal from office. 189  Similarly, there 
was an unsuccessful coup attempt on the current president of Equatorial Guinea due to 
prevalent corruption and inequality.190 Where the government is successful in curtailing 
the leakage of this intelligence, the resulting asymmetry of information may create a 
false sense of confidence in the political and financial system.  
 
Confidence in the political and governmental system also encompasses political will. 
This requires that governments must fight corruption and be publicly perceived to be 
doing so. Resultantly, there would be effective regulation of regulators, publication of 
enforcement actions, timely judicial decisions and effective partnership for repatriation 
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of laundered assets. Furthermore, independence of the legislature and law enforcement 
agencies would be guaranteed to ensure that they are not prey to corruption, under-
resourced or demoralized. Without such circumstances backed by political will, the 
presence of sturdy legislation as a pre-condition for effective regulation would be 
invalidated. Political will and the resultant AML/CFT regime will encourage domestic 
coordination and exchange of information among the various domestic parties at policy 
and operational levels.191 
 
 
3.2.1.3 Confidence in the Institutional System  
 
 
Confidence in the institutional system is largely dependent on agencies external to FIs. 
Government regulations, budgetary allocations and factors such as the global financial 
crisis play a vital role in ensuring trust in FI in any economy.  
 
Positive governmental regulations are crucial in building and sustaining confidence as 
a precondition for effective regulation. These regulations ensure a suitable political and 
economic climate for investment and business. Where, however, government policies 
create a hostile environment that facilitates corruption, high inflation and 
unemployment rates coupled with low social wellbeing, FIs would be unable to carry 
out their day-to-day businesses satisfactorily.192 This indicates that the public’s 
confidence in institutions may be pro-cyclical.193 So when countries experience a sharp 
rise in unemployment, there is a dramatic decline in public confidence in national 
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governments and financial sectors.194 This suggests that decline in confidence may 
sometimes be a standard response to a cyclical downturn.195 Thus,  there is a challenge 
for governments to ensure long term domestic growth as opposed to short term 
investment, in order to engineer confidence within FIs.  
 
Additionally, there are concerns that budget constraints contribute to the loss of 
confidence in FIs. Budget constraints can indirectly promote ML/TF given that 
insufficient funding provision to equip regulatory bodies with the technical skills to 
combat illicit crimes promotes an environment where criminals are permitted to thrive. 
Additionally, on a tight budget, regulators usually work with fewer staff or unmotivated 
staff in comparison with staff of FIs, otherwise known as under-regulation which may 
result in regulatory arbitrage. Recognising the occurrence of this situation in ACs, 
Interviewee - EENA4 stated that, ‘from all African countries, Nigeria has the most 
resources directed to curb ML/TF, but it is usually diverted.’196 Such diversion leads to 
under-provision of necessary resources which has socio-economic consequences.  
 
The effect of budget constraints is also noted in the limited regulation on internet and 
mobile use, which is the direction of crime in ACs/EEs.197 Within the African continent, 
Nigeria records the highest overall value of fraud.198 The 2015 Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (NDIC) report disclosed a 15.71% increase in fraud cases.199 It 
revealed that most fraudulent activities were particularly relating to internet banking 
and bank card fraud.200 Undoubtedly, these activities pose significant cost to the 
Nigerian economy and hinders financial inclusion. It illustrates the limited regulatory 
                                     
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
196EENA4, Interview with Anonymous, ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
197 Jayshree Chavan, ‘Internet Banking-Benefits and Challenges in an Emerging Economy’ [2013]1 (1) 
International Journal of Research in Business 19, 23. 
198 Sahara Reporters, ‘Nigeria is the Most Fraudulent Country in Africa, KPMG Report Says’ (Sahara 
Reporters, 23 November 2012) < http://saharareporters.com/2012/11/23/nigeria-most-fraudulent-
country-africa-kpmg-report-says > accessed 10 July 2016.  
199 Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, ‘NDIC Releases 2015 Annual Report’ (NDIC, 2015) < 
http://ndic.gov.ng/ndic-releases-2015-annual-report/ > accessed 10 May 2017. 
200 Ibid.   
 123 
powers, capacity and resources in addressing these issues.201 Globally, Brazil and India 
are ranked 2nd and 3rd respectively in the list of countries with the highest fraud levels.202 
These include credit card fraud and internet fraud which create room for increased 
opportunities for ML/TF. The false sense of security projected by banks in Brazil has 
done little to salvage the situation.203 For instance, a 2014 financial cyber threat report 
ranked Brazil second in online banking fraud and financial malware.204 The situation 
seems to be worsening with research showing that cyber-attacks grew by 197% and 
online fraud by 20% in 2014.205 The effect is reduced stakeholder confidence as 
customers who have once experienced fraud are less likely to continue using the mode 
of banking that exposed them to that risk.206 It also indicates the need for customers to 
be properly informed of fraud levels and their responsibility to safeguard their bank 
details.207  
 
Also, external forces that affect confidence is further highlighted by the global financial 
crisis. This accentuated a shift in investment from developed to ACs/EEs who were not 
so severely hit by the financial crisis.208 This indicated the impact of loss of confidence 
on FIs and the security offered to stakeholders needing to diversify their risk beyond 
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developed countries.  The 2014 OECD report stated that whilst confidence in FIs in 
general declined in OECD countries, it increased in other countries, including Russia209 
and Brazil.210 These reports indicate the necessity for FIs in emerging economies to 
continually ensure compliance with regulatory authorities in order to retain confidence 
in their financial systems. It also requires that FIs accept their pivotal role in the fight 
against ML/TF.211  
 
Scholars however believe that although highly resisted by practitioners, the obligations 
of banks and other FIs to curtail ML/TF is unlikely to diminish in the near future212 
because they are able to monitor movement of funds. Professor Rider states:  
 
‘it is not surprising that increasingly those who handle other people’s money have been 
placed in the forefront of attacks on money laundering… of course, it is a very 
unpleasant place to be, particularly if you are ill prepared, ill advised, unsupported and 
probably entirely sacrificial.’213  
 
From Rider’s statement, two factors which are required for improved functionality and 
confidence in the institutional system can be deduced. Firstly, efficiency of FIs in 
curtailing ML/TF backed by supervision and secondly, an institution supported by 
insurance in the event of a mishap. These two factors are not mutually exclusive, but 
are contradictory.  The paradox is that the presence of an insurance system would give 
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room for banks to engage in excessive risk-taking, with the knowledge that they would 
be bailed out.214 The resolution of these goals requires effective and continuous 
supervision to set risk parameters whilst ensuring that regulatory capture is avoided.   
 
In light of the above, regulatory agencies are to ensure that FIs have a framework to 
facilitate strict adherence to AML/CFT regulations as a precondition for entry and 
continued operation in the market. This would foster a culture of accountability where 
efficiency is also measured by the competence and reputation of board members in 
adhering to the AML/CFT regulatory requirements. Such atmosphere would protect the 
reputation of FIs and the public interest in their integrity. Operationalizing this 
framework comes with challenges. For instance, regarding financial secrecy laws, 
certain jurisdictions mandate FIs’ staff like lawyers and other bank professionals to 
honour the confidentiality of their contract with their client(s).215 However, their 
position as gatekeepers in curtailing illicit crimes places them in a legal quandary 
whereby the contract on confidentiality may be honoured in breach to uncover 
illegality. Scholars and practitioners have argued that bank secrecy may sometimes be 
for legitimate purposes216 like tax avoidance. Whilst acknowledging that illegal use can 
occasion untold hardships, there are significant cost implications associated with 
appropriately distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate use.217 Moreover, any-less-
than universally applied bank secrecy policy can have stringent adverse consequences 
for institutions, triggering a race to the bottom.  Conversely, strict adherence to FATF 
recommendations by institutions can unveil the rot in non-compliant institutions. In 
these instances, there are increased possibilities of customers wishing to safeguard their 
savings or interests by moving their business to more adherent institutions. 
Additionally, dissolving bank secrecy laws for AML/CFT risks is not only a trigger for 
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competition within FIs, it also risks driving customers to underground banking, 
especially in ACs which are still largely unbanked and unregulated.  
 
Thus, it is evident that resolving this dilemma requires the building, acceptance and 
integration of the culture of integrity within FIs in such a way that is not antithetical to 
the business of banking. Although countries vary in their adoption of laws, policies and 
standards aimed at combatting AML/CFT as well as in the quality of their institutional 
framework and general level of development, an optimal institutional framework 
should encompass certain key traits. Examples of these traits include an operative 
corporate governance where the tone is set at the top, as well as continuous staff 
training.218 The challenge is however not usually one of intention but complexity and 
execution.219To this end, Wheatley argues that ‘it is not straightforward to govern the 
behaviour of individuals in large, heavily stratified banking institutions. Invariably, it 
takes time.’220 
 
This illustrates the difficulty for FIs to control the risk posed by their staff based on 
individual behavioural values and choices. In seeking measurable conclusions, value 
judgements are to be made and competitive peer evaluations may replace standard 
appraisals.221 
 
The effect of curtailing these factors is financial stability and improved confidence of 
stakeholders in FIs.   
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3.2.1.4 Confidence in Regulation and Enforcement. 
 
The robustness of regulation is dependent on the strength of the law and legal structures 
in place. Law is crucial in determining the framework of regulations and providing a 
safe and sound banking system. For this reason, Cheffins argues that in the absence of 
laws, and the legal protections that flow thereof, investors will be deterred from 
investing in an affected country, but would consider it risky and fear possible 
exploitation.222 This is recognized by the BCBS which highlights the role of the law as 
a pre-condition for effective regulation.223 Hinterseer contends that legal measures such 
as regulations will remain subject to market discipline because information blind spots 
will permit money laundering to fester.224 This view however ignores the study by 
Masciandaro which highlights the inverse relationship between the degree of diffusion 
of ML activities and AML regulation in a given economy.225 This indicates that tougher 
regulation can reduce ML and its feeder activities, controlling for other country 
characteristics, legal enforcement and potential endogeneity.226 This is reiterated by 
Chong et al who argue that AML/CFT laws and regulations can deter launderers 
focused on maximizing profit.227 This is particularly so because, in reaction to 
regulations, financial intermediaries mandatorily engage in CDD, ensure transparency 
in financial dealings and construct a culture that facilitates accountability. 
 
The adoption of a suitable enforcement mechanism is crucial in curtailing ML/TF, 
allowing for the collection of information and the setting of rules that sanction 
misconduct. It also fosters a safe and sound banking system, expanding public 
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disclosure, transparency, enhanced financial reporting and audit.228 Two enforcement 
mechanisms can be adopted; the compliance based approach (CBA) and/or the 
deterrence-based approach (DBA).229 Adopting a mechanism is dependent on various 
factors, such as, the gravity of the approved person’s offence, the perception of the 
regulatory agencies and the characteristics of the offender or institution.230 During 
examination of FIs, regulatory bodies consider the identity, personal history and 
responsiveness of the regulated to sanctions or assistance.231 They also consider 
whether the regulated is engaged in a business, the fall of which poses systemic risk. If 
the regulated’s activities would not have disastrous consequences on the economy, the 
regulator can use the CBA. Where however, the activity of the regulated carries grave 
consequences, e.g. when it relates to the liquidity of a bank, the regulator may use the 
DBA. These approaches are not mutually exclusive. The CBA focuses on creating an 
avenue for interaction between the regulator and the regulated,232 to ensure that it 
complies with regulatory rules. The DBA is focused on imposing sanctions and 
retributions 233 to serve as deterrence. This exposes FIs to a variety of sanctions which 
may be punitive or non-punitive.234 FIs may also be subjected to legal claims, with 
possible civil, administrative or criminal sanctions.235 
 
Confidence in institutions is based on the potency and immediacy of prescribed actions, 
the ability of regulatory institutions to follow through, the frequency of interactions 
with regulatory institutions and possible publication of enforcement actions. The 
enforcement activities and design of adopted regulations are vital in determining and 
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influencing compliance. Becker and Stigler argue that institutions comply with 
regulations when they believe that non-compliance will be harshly dealt with.236  
 
The deterrent effect of criminal punishment, the harshest form of DBA is highly 
contested.  Reviews on the impact of varying levels of punishment do not suggest that 
harsher sanctions deter illicit activities.237 Moreover, Coglianese et al emphasize that 
the organizationally incompetent may not be amenable to criminal sanctions.238 Black 
further expressed fears that criminal sanctions would not have an impact on behavior 
over a long term period.239 The practicalities of holding bank officials responsible for 
fiduciary duties or to a criminal prosecution is also problematic.240 The practical and 
conceptual difficulties that occasion this method of enforcement has led to the 
advancement by Brummer of the compliance based approach.241 He asserts that 
effective monitoring systems can have important deterrent effects, having been 
designed to deter and prevent launderers from using FIs as conduits for illicit 
transfers.242 It must be noted that however persuasive the compliance approach seems, 
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Enforcement mandates that in the absence of regulatory capture,244 regulatory agencies 
must be willing to authorize FIs to comply with AML/CFT regulations in the form of 
negotiated non-compliance.  Publicity of enforcement actions has also been undertaken 
in various jurisdictions, to punish erring financial institutions and deter others from 
engaging in sharp practices or economic crimes. By so doing, governments define what 
is considered acceptable, in the hope that policy makers ensure that unacceptable 
activities are less economically attractive. This is no doubt a way to eliminate the 
benefits of crime through a deterrent approach, including sanctions. It is however 
recognized that deterrence is not necessarily the best option for certain institutions, as 
already discussed.  
 
 
In light of this, the ability of regulatory bodies to ensure robust enforcement systems 
aimed at improving confidence in the financial system is largely dependent on the 
quality of their workforce and the levels of interaction between regulatory bodies. Their 
effectiveness in achieving these is dependent on their understanding of the nature of 
criminal expertise and the cultural aspect of criminal organizations. However, in the 
absence of sturdy capacity and collaboration, expertise would be stretched and unable 
to deliver. This is typified with Nigeria, alongside other developing countries where ill-
equipped regulatory bodies are limited in capacity to combat regulatory deficiencies, 
inclusive of illicit crimes.245 In Brazil, although regulators are equipped with trained 
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quality supervisors, this is challenged by the limited numerical capacity of its 
workforce.246 Consequently, their ability to effectively combat ML/TF is restricted.   
 
This argument is also applicable to the judicial system. The strength of the judiciary 
serves as a vital pre-condition for effective regulation. It plays a pivotal role in building 
stakeholder confidence in a financial system that offers significant protection. Cheffins 
asserts that a reliable and corrupt-free court system is crucial for speedy dispensation 
of justice, serving as a catalyst for confidence building in investors.247 This argument 
emphasizes that a corrupt system delays and possibly denies justice. It also creates an 
atmosphere where illicit activities become acceptable. This results in increased 
utilization of a countries ‘weak points’ by criminal syndicates, confident in their profit 
maximization in the face of the inability of judicial structures to issue sound judgments. 
This was the situation in Brazil, as recorded in its 2010 FATF Mutual Evaluation report. 
It noted that although sentences and convictions were recorded for ML/TF, these were 
insignificant compared to the size of the country and the sophistication of its financial 
system.248 In response, Brazil introduced specialized trial courts in financial crimes and 
money laundering to ensure improvements in the quality of decisions and information 
exchange.249 This novel approach however ensures that quality judgments are not 
sacrificed on the altar of expediency, especially given the complexities of cases 
involving ML/TF. Consequently, Brazil has been making strides towards combating 
corruption in the judiciary, particularly by improving the interface between the 
regulators, police, judiciary and public prosecution.250 
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Improving the capacity of judges can contribute positively to the financial market. La 
Porta et al support this assertion with empirical research which indicates that there is a 
strong correlation between the strength of a country’s law and order and the size of its 
equity market.251 This suggests that an independent and efficient judiciary may guide 
and determine investment from other countries252 whilst ensuring that erring FIs are 
punished effectively. The expertise and ability of judges can however be hindered by 
existing laws which may cause lawyers to exploit procedural irregularities to favor their 
claim, or to simply stall the case. Courts may not have the necessary legal tools to 
ensure that the goals of criminal law are achieved.253 In instances that concern 
substantive law, judges are sometimes forced to engage in judicial activism to bring the 
purpose of legislations to life. This would be necessary where the tools provided by the 
legislature are insufficient to ensure conviction. This is imperative as statistics have 
illustrated that lower levels of enforcement are invariably related with higher levels of 
ML activities.254 This indicates that well-crafted laws in corporate bankruptcy, contract, 
private property, tax, consumer protection and financial regulation are consistently 
enforced through a well-structured public infrastructure. In the absence of these, there 
can be a weakening of financial systems, markets and confidence. Thus countries are 
charged with improving their legal systems.255  
 
In the presence of structured and robust laws, regulatory institutions and enforcement 
agencies have to work closely to ensure accessibility to information and swift action in 
curbing illicit crimes. The conflict of interest that hinders this cooperation becomes 
clearer when the issue of trust between enforcement agencies and FIs is broached. 
Whilst FIs presume that clients are innocent until guilty, the law enforcement agencies 
think otherwise because they realize that swift action is needed to freeze or confiscate 
the assets of a suspect.256 Notwithstanding their differences, the strategies of 
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enforcement bodies in supplementing regulatory approaches in combatting illicit 
crimes cannot however be undermined.  
 
3.3 Differences in the Transplantation and Confidence Trajectory between African 
Countries and the BRICS 
 
From the foregoing discourse, it is evident that transplantation and confidence patterns 
differ in ACs/EEs. For instance, Nigeria’s AML/CFT standards suffered from 
legislative and enforcement lapses that hindered implementation. Conversely, China 
opted for stricter legislative and enforcement standards to ensure implementation of 
standards. EENA1 asserts that these differences are attributable to variances in 
compliance levels and strength of institutions.257 EENA1 acknowledges that all ACs 
are unique, however, corruption is a rife issue and stifles the growth of sturdy 
institutions.258 He adds that whilst corruption is rife within the BRICS, these countries 
have been more proactive in combatting these illicit crimes.259 More so, the BRICS 
have an agenda to build reputable institutions to facilitate cross-border information 
exchanges, an agenda that is not firmly on the table of ACs.  
 
Concurring with EENA1, EENA2 states that ‘by virtue of having more at stake, having 
an AML/CFT framework that is consistent with the international standards is a bigger 
priority for EEs than for African states.’260 This is attributable to EEs financial sector 
size and interlinkage of these financial sectors with other financial sectors within and 
outside the region. For this reason, EEs are subject to scrutiny by other jurisdictions 
and groupings like the OECD and G7. Consequently, it becomes a political matter to 
adopt the AML/CFT laws and ensure a conducive environment for this to thrive. In 
contrast, ACs have a more contained and smaller financial sector. Thus, ACs have other 
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pressing issues to focus on and an established AML/CFT framework is not considered 
pressing.  
 
Another explanation for the disparity in legal transplantation and confidence in 
ACs/EEs is their timeline of ascension to the FATF membership. EENA1 stated that 
‘BRICS became members of the FATF in the late 90s – now they are going through 
their third or fourth mutual evaluations…whereas African countries only became 
members of the FSRBs post 2001’.261 Whilst membership is not necessarily a catalyst 
for improved transplantation and confidence, it can be deduced that early ascension 
gave the BRICS the opportunity to understand the FATF standards better, and faster. 
The lapse of time before the ascension of ACs to the position of associate membership 
no doubt hindered their ability to adapt to the standards, transplant them and improve 
their confidence levels.   
 
3.4 Perspective on Compliance with Global Standards  
 
Academics have increasingly scrutinized factors that precipitate government 
compliance with international instruments.262 The economics perspective takes the 
stand that compliance is determined by a comparative analysis between the supposed 
benefits of non-compliance with the probability of detection and punishment.263 
Therefore an effective enforcement system with severe punishment will ensure that 
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compliance is attractive to amoral calculators.264 Political determinants of compliance 
are largely dependent on the direction of political will of country leaders and the 
reaction of pressure groups to non-compliance.265 Bounded rationality and behavioral 
theory postulates that there are operational risks which undermine compliance – these 
risks are triggered by the limits of organizations in processing and acting on 
information.266 Alternative explanations include social norms,267 negative effect of 
formal sanctions, deterrent impact, legitimacy and trust.268 In certain instances, 
compliance is determined by moral obligations and social influence.269 
 
An appraisal of the varying compliance perspectives provides an understanding of the 
interplay between international agreements, domestic politics and financial institutions 
on ML and counterterrorism.270 Examining the perspectives reveal that the motivations 
for compliance are either calculated, normative or social271 and operate as a legal or 
non-legal factor. As a result, policy responses for enhanced compliance have moved 
from pure-command and control approach to one favoring a mix of enforcement 
strategies as listed in the regulatory pyramid.272 These changes are predicated on the 
general agreement that the borderless nature of illicit crimes warrants an internationally 
coordinated response273 managed by IFIs, tackled through cooperation among states 
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and implemented by states.274 This logic is premised on the fact that the AML/CFT 
regime is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain, because astute criminals would 
reroute their finances to countries with weaker regimes.275  
 
Regarding AML/CFT regulation, the crucial question is whether the commitment of 
ACs/EEs to the FATF standards and compliance interests are aligned? What factors 
influence their regulatory and compliance responses? The next section will address this 
succinctly, given that the following chapters discuss this in more detail.   
 
3.5 Compliance as a Function of Legal Factors 
 
 Scholars have argued that various legal factors affect the compliance of countries to 
domesticated international standards. Whilst Yepes refers to cultural,  institutional, 
socioeconomic and financial factors,276 Simmons refers to reputational concerns as one 
of the most crucial factors that propel compliance.277 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter278 refer to enforcement and legalization as some factors that influence 
compliance.  This thesis however restricts these legal factors to democracy and rule of 
law, enforcement and the mirroring of law.  
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3.5.1 Compliance engineered by Democracy and Rule of Law  
 
Key amongst factors that influence government’s compliance to international 
instruments is the presence of domestic political institutions driven by democracy.279 
Studies suggest that non-democratic governments are less likely to comply as opposed 
to liberal democratic governments.280 The reasons for this include the democratic 
government’s respect for legal processes through the judiciary or the presence of 
domestic interest groups.281 Civil societies, court processes and democratic political 
constituencies may act as enforcement mechanisms pressuring governments to comply. 
Against this backdrop, Simons argues that governments with respect for rule of law and 
stable democracy are unlikely to harm their reputation by breaching commitments to 
standards.282 Conversely, the restriction on human rights in dictatorial regimes will 
prevent activists pushing the government for results.283 These arguments suggest that 
democracies are reliable partners in ensuring compliance with AML/CFT 
regulations.284  
 
However, it may be too simplistic to assume that non-democratic countries are not 
compliant with international standards, or that countries with entrenched rule of law 
would comply. Other factors may come into play that propel countries to comply 
notwithstanding the rule of law status, such as the culture or imperative need of a 
country.  
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3.5.2 Enforcement Driven Compliance  
 
According to the enforcement model, compliance occurs ‘in the shadow of the law’, 
given that state behavior can be shaped by concerns about the possibility of 
adjudication, rule enforcement and legal sanctions.285 Within the context of AML/CFT 
regulation, the FATF does not have an adjudicatory framework or process to resolve 
conflicts and mandate compliance, thus foreclosing the possibility of international 
adjudication.286 This shortcoming has however not limited its ability to drive 
compliance through sanctioning. This idea is central to the economics perspective 
which is focused on a comparative analysis between the cost and benefit of 
compliance.287 The assumption is that the motivation of states to comply with standards 
are influenced by their interests and only in manipulation of benefits and costs defined 
in terms of those interests can compliance be achieved.288Therefore, where enforcement 
powers are used, severe punishment will ensure that compliance is attractive even to 
amoral calculators.289 
 
Enforcement in this context refers to mechanisms such as sanctions. Within the 
framework of international law, it is assumed that the aim of enforcement is to put 
‘measures (in place) to ensure the observance of rules’.290 As already noted, the FATF 
carries out enforcement actions through reputational damage to countries which has the 
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effect of further isolating countries from the global financial market. This creates a 
strong enforcement regime, particularly for countries that want to remain strong players 
in the market.  
 
Counter arguments however hold that compliance is better induced through instruments 
of active management, such as verification, review and monitoring.291 The FATF 
provides such enforcement tools through the Mutual Evaluation Reports (MER).292 
Mutual evaluations entails gathering information on countries to decipher their 
compliance levels. Information derived from this ‘review and verification process’ 
forms the basis for further interactions with countries and decisions on sanctions.  
 
Active management and enforcement cannot however be totally divorced. Koh 
observes that the success of the management model is sometimes dependent on the 
‘shadow of sanctions, however rare or remote that possibility might be’.293 This 
indicates that whilst dialogue established through monitoring and review may be 
ineffective on their own, when backed with sanctions – countries may be willing to 
comply. So also, countries may be unresponsive to sanctions or threat of same in the 
absence of persuasiveness.  
 
Additionally, the enforcement and management models derive their validity from laws 
and regulations. Laws and regulations are not constricted to serving as preconditions 
for effective regulation, but work to ensure compliance within states.  For laws and 
regulations to ensure compliance within states, national legislation and implementation 
is necessary.294 Laws are not only symbolic but serve as a catalyst for practical changes 
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because laws usually serve as the primary basis upon which courts can enforce 
judgment, or regulators issue penalties in cases of AML/CFT. 
 
However, as earlier discussed, enshrined laws may not always be a determinant factor 
for compliance, even when non-compliance would result in reputational damages. 
Black argues that it is overly simplistic to assume that putting laws in play would result 
in predictions on improved compliance solely on the basis of reputational concerns.295 
This indicates the likely repulsion towards laws and the need for laws and regulations 
to be translated to regulatory practice. This requires that regulatory bodies make clear 
their mandate. A clear mandate may however not result in formal adherence to 
regulations, especially when such a mandate is prescriptive or technologically outdated.  
 
3.5.3 Law: A Mirroring of Society?  
 
An age old argument is that laws reflect how a society views itself.  Friedman states 
that ‘legal systems do not float in some cultural void, free of space and time and social 
context: necessarily, they reflect what is happening in their own societies.’296 Vago also 
argues that law reflects the intellectual, social, economic and political climate of its 
time.297 Wendel Holmes’s statement that ‘the law, wherein, as a magic mirror, we see 
reflected, not only our lives, but the lives of all men that have been’, encapsulates the 
mirroring thesis of law.298 This view is reflected by Teubner’s autopoiesis which views 
law as a deeply integrated aspect of society, and that the external environment 
influences law only as it is filtered through legal discourse.299 According to this author, 
autopoietic systems, such as laws construct their images of other systems only through 
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the distorting lens of their perceptual view.300 When domestic laws which are 
considered legitimate are in conflict with international laws, the latter may be 
internalized gradually or not at all.301 These arguments illustrate that law provides a 
representation of a society’s value and norms.  
 
 
This argument has faced a myriad of contestation, particularly from the notion of 
transplantation of international law.302 Transplantation holds that the transfer of rules, 
principles and legal concepts from one legal system to another usually occasions some 
measure of legal transformation, either voluntarily or otherwise.303 Roos et al argue that 
laws are crossing geographical and cultural boundaries 304 and this has an impact on the 
social ordering of law.  
 
 
Nevertheless , it is recognized that the surrounding social circumstances determine how 
rules are interpreted or function.305 To that effect, the design or construction of globally 
applicable standards for governance should entail some flexibility for universal 
adaptability. Consequently, IFIs and the FATF should take into consideration the 
peculiarities of countries in crafting standards. It must not only interact with a set of 
countries, but all countries involved should have a say in the adaptability and 
applicability of standards for suitability.  
 
 
Legal factors cannot by themselves drive compliance, but they work in tandem with 
non-legal factors. Non-legal factors are variable and not developed on the basis of legal 
considerations. They are nevertheless instrumental in shaping compliance responses of 
states.  
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3.6 Compliance as a Function of Non-Legal Factors  
 
An examination of the pre-conditions that allow for effective regulation has given 
pointers to certain factors that can influence compliance outside the law.  Five main 
factors are discussed. These include: (1) political will, domestic conditions and policy 
priorities; (2) compliance based reputational concerns; (3) legitimacy; (4) globalisation 
and integration; and (6) technical capacity and resources.  
 
3.6.1 Political Will, Domestic Conditions and Policy Priorities   
 
 
The concept of political will is illusive and ambiguous with various scholars defining 
it contextually.306 This thesis however adopts the definition by Post et al, that political 
will is the ‘extent of committed support amongst key decision makers for a particular 
policy solution to a particular problem’.307 This encompassing definition reveals that 
political will is usually the collective aspiration of a majority of citizens within a 
country represented by decision makers. These aspirations are reflected in budget 
allocation, 308 drive of civil societies, pro regulation interest groups, voice of the people 
and determination of the different arms of government. This reveals that domestic 
conditions and policy priorities are crucial in generating political will.  
 
Domestic conditions are also indicated in the system of government operational within 
a state. Scholars have argued that the level of democracy of states determine their 
compliance records.309 They argue that internal structures, including budgetary 
                                     
306 See Lori Ann Post, Amber N.W. Raile, Eric D Raile, ‘Defining Political Will’ [2010] 38 (4) Politics 
& Policy 653, 653.  
307 Ibid 653, 659.  
308  Ibid (n 306) 653, 668.  
309 Anne- Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ [1995] EUr. J. Int’l L 503, 
538; Helen V Milner and Andrew Moravcsik (eds.), Power, Interdependence and Non-State Actors in 
World Politics (Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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allocations, reflect the policy priorities and the domestic conditions of a state.310 Also, 
domestic politics has long been understood to determine the decision of the state to 
accept international obligations.311  
 
Yet, in certain instances, political will is foisted on a country through its external 
agreements. The extent to which this can produce compliance is however debatable. 
For instance, there are expectations that involvement of ACs/EEs with the FATF would 
propel political will within these states and translate to improved compliance. In such 
instances, compliance is largely dependent on the perception by states that FATF’s 
recommendations reflect their national interests and priorities.312 For instance, 
countries faced with high level predicate offences, including high crime rates, terror 
attacks, capital flight, tax evasion and diminishing financial stability are more inclined 
to comply with these recommendations as a means of combatting these difficulties. 
States that are predominately financial inclusive also tend to be more compliant with 
AML/CFT regimes.313  
 
However ideal this may seem, the degree of political will and institutional commitment 
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3.6.2 Compliance based on Reputational Concerns  
 
Scholars have argued that reputation affects state behavior.314 Goldsmith and Posner 
believe that states refrain from violating treaties or non-legal agreements simply 
because they are motivated by the need to avoid reputational loss.315 Guzman also 
agrees that reputation encourages states to comply with international law.316 This 
reputational perspective can be applied to the AML/CFT regime which is derived from 
the desire for financial stability and integrity – factors which can have an effect on the 
reputation or credibility of countries.  It also forms the basis for understanding the 
FATF’s sanction through listing of countries.  
 
Reputational concerns are not necessarily always external to a country, sometimes it is 
internal. For instance, the pressure for compliance with AML/CFT standards can come 
from large localized institutions which are more predisposed to comply for reputational 
reasons.317 Such banks recognize that a ‘good reputation’ would enable them to 
compete effectively in the market. These efforts sometimes serve as a catalyst for 
increased national regulatory supervision on banks and other FIs.  
 
Concerns are however expressed about the role of reputation in ensuring compliance. 
Downs and Jones argue that states have multiple reputations, not a single reputation.318 
So whilst for instance a state has a good reputation for complying with environmental 
standards, it may have a negative record for complying with ML standards. This 
suggests that reputations vary according to commitments. Consequently, Downs and 
Jones argue that with increasing global integration, reputational concerns alone is 
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insufficient to ensure improved compliance.319 They assert that states would comply 
with standards that are more likely to be beneficial, or agreements with high sanctions 
that have a detrimental effect on their economy.  
 
3.6.3 Legitimacy and its effect on Compliance  
 
Legitimacy is considered crucial in encouraging compliance with regulatory standards 
and in motivating behavioural responses.320 Proactive compliance with international 
law would be improved when institutions are considered legitimate, where they permit 
ownership, inclusiveness and procedural fairness in their processes.321 This is ingrained 
in Shaffer’s perspective that legitimacy must be able to stand the test of input, 
throughput and output.322 According to Tyler, such compliance is a catalyst for 
voluntary observance of the law and is preferred due to its cost-effective nature. 323This 
varies from formal or constructive compliance by countries which not only necessitates 
higher enforcement cost, but is usually achieved through coercion.324 
 
Given that the G7 and certain OECD countries formulated FATF’s standards, the extent 
to which ‘associate members’ can perceive the FATF or its standards as legitimate is 
questionable. The membership asymmetry within the FATF has occasioned arguments 
that a global hegemony exists325which facilitates an agency slack. This explains why 
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the FATF has yet to gain acceptability and its ability to engineer compliance by 
ACs/EEs has been stalled. For this reason, it is argued that the FATF’s standards and 
processes be re-engineered, particularly its sanction scheme.326 
 
Scholars have however argued that any re-engineering in favour of legitimacy ignores 
that fundamentally, soft law bodies such as the FATF are epistemic authorities. Hulsee 
and Kerwer argue that the FATF standards are derived on the basis of expertise and not 
membership politics.327 Acceding to this, Vibert asserts that the IFIs/TGNs belong to 
the knowledge world where their decision making skills are dependent on their 
epistemic authority.328 They draw on the procedure of the natural and social sciences to 
identify complications and frame policy responses.329 This illustrates the projection of 
the FATF as legitimate on the basis of the expertise wielded by its secretariat and staff 
in its processes. A position blindsided to the politics of the agenda within the institution 
and its effect on the FATF’s rude design and compliance. The politics is evident in the 
composition of the experts from the private and public sector who are mainly 
representatives of developed countries, a configuration that does not encompass or 
represent the views of developing countries. It is thus capable of stifling the 
effectiveness of developing countries to the FATF standards. This suggests that any re-
structuring should de-politicise the FATF and ensure a truly ‘expertise’ process that 
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3.6.4 Globalization and Integration  
 
Several macroeconomic variables determine a country’s level of integration to the 
global financial market. These include a country’s level of financial exposure, 
openness, relevance, transparency or the interconnectedness of its banking and 
financial markets.330 These indices are utilized by the IMF in determining the 
systematic importance of a country .331 Such categories separate countries whose 
financial sectors potentially have the most impact on systemic stability from those that 
do not and subjects the former to a heightened surveillance process.332 These variables 
arguably have an effect on the level of compliance to international standards.  
 
Countries that are plugged into the international economy arguably have more 
incentives to comply for two reasons. The level of supervision by multilateral 
institutions and the potential effect of sanctions. Supervision, which usually entails 
monitoring can reveal the shortcoming of countries, a catalyst for reputational damages 
that such countries would rather avoid. Furthermore, sanctions meted out by the FATF 
and backed by the IFIs have the effect of limiting the involvement of these countries in 
global economic activities – a position countries are uncomfortable about. Conversely, 
it can be argued that countries not connected to the international global economy may 
defer compliance knowing that sanctions would have a limited effect on them.  
 
Nevertheless, the ability of countries not classed as ‘systemically important countries’ 
to renege on AML/CFT compliance is largely limited by the involvement of IFIs. As a 
pre-condition for financial assistance, IFIs have incorporated law reforms and 
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compliance requirements.333 Additionally, multilateral institutions and FIs within 
highly-integrated countries use compliance with accredited standards to determine 
potential finance opportunities or threats within developing countries.334 
 
Consequently, although the impact of globalization and integration in propelling 
compliance cannot be overlooked, it needs not be overelaborated. This is because, 
countries have internal reasons that can propel compliance irrespective of external 
pressure.335More difficult is the position whereby internal factors within the country 
prevent compliance.  
 
3.6.5 Technical Capacity and Resources  
 
Technical capacity of countries is crucial in ensuring compliance to international 
standards. Within the private and regulatory sector, a new market has emerged for 
lawyers, accountants, auditors, economists, front desk officers and other professionals. 
These officers are bestowed with a gate-keeper responsibility of ensuring that FATF 
recommendations are adhered to, particularly in carrying out strict CDD. It requires 
that financial transactions are monitored and prompt reports made to the FIU where 
suspicion arises. These responsibilities mean that staff should be trained in the requisite 
skills required to drive the new market.336 Hence, countries are to intensify training for 
these set of professionals to ensure compliance, or risk falling short of required 
standards.  
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Training is also required due to the increased use of technology in facilitating illicit 
transfers. Internet penetration and evolving payment methods have increased the 
vulnerability of financial systems to a new form of risk. Regulators and operators are 
to get acquainted with the new processes of transfers, such as cryptocurrencies, so as to 
ensure that their countries are not adversely affected by illicit autonomous transfers. 
 
In recognition of the need for capacity building, IFIs provide technical assistance to 
countries. The aim is to ensure that countries can address the vulnerabilities within their 
system locally. This is however largely dependent on the political will of the country 
which is reflected through its interactions with IFIs and the resources it approves for 
this purpose.  In the absence of resources, the ability of countries to combat illicit crimes 
would be greatly limited, illustrating the interaction between varying non-legal factors. 
 
 An important point is that the source of funding may determine its influence on 
compliance. For instance, international funding may come with pre-conditions and 
specificity which is likely to ensure improved compliance resulting from the buildup of 
pre-conditions for effective regulation. However, when funding is from a government’s 
budget, it usually comes without conditions and lacks the transparency associated with 
foreign funding.  
 
It is imperative to state however that adequate training and funding may not always 
translate to improved compliance. This is because the ‘human factor’ element cannot 
be overlooked. Training and resources are no guarantee that staff cannot be manipulated 





3.6.6 Setting out Factors that Influence Compliance  
The literature on compliance has been examined with the aim of explaining internal 
and external compliance drivers in ACs/EEs. In line with the core argument of this 
thesis, these factors are set out as legal and non-legal factors, both of which are not 























Table 1: Legal and Non-Legal Compliance Drivers. 
Legal Factors  Description  
Compliance engineered by 
Democracy and Rule of Law 
This refers to factors such as ‘democratic’ or ‘non-democratic’ 
governments, judicial independence and respect for the rule of 
law.  
Enforcement driven  Compliance  This refers to factors such as legal sanctions, ‘instruments of 
active monitoring’ such as monitoring or surveillance, effective 
contract law and sturdy judicial systems. 
Law Mirroring Society  Culture (e.g. remittances/financial inclusions). 
 
Non-Legal Factors  Description 
Political Will, Domestic Conditions 
and Policy Priorities 
Government stance, pressure groups/civil societies.  
Compliance based on Reputational 
Concerns 
Reputation, Sanctions. 
Legitimacy and its effect on 
Compliance 
Perception of legality of institution. 
Globalization and Integration Position of countries within the global financial market.  
Technical Capacity and Resources 
Human and financial resources, training, technological 
advancements. 
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3.6 Benchmarking Compliance Ratings  
 
Notwithstanding the above drivers of compliance that have an impact on a country’s 
compliance levels, the IFIs/FATF benchmark all countries to the same standards using 
the same methodology. To appreciate the impact of this, it is crucial to understand the 
concept of benchmarking.  
 
Benchmarks, which are usually indicators that measure the achievements of set goals, 
are widely used to track market developments. They serve as a guide to investors, and 
thus determine the direction of investments.337 This instrument is however not novel 
and has been used in diverse areas, including health industry338 and service productivity 
industry339 to achieve improved compliance. Although originally recognized as an 
instrument for improving compliance with policy goals, it has recently been usurped by 
international organizations to circumvent their enforcement problems.340 This usually 
requires reliance on states for sanctions,341 indicating the renewed ability to employ 
coercive tools to effect policy change.  
 
Although the determinant factors considered in building a global AML/CFT benchmark 
are usually unspecified, the effectiveness of macro and micro prudential supervision is 
largely determined by benchmarking scores attributed to each FATF recommendation. 
Countries are adjudged to be compliant to AML/CFT regulations by the extent to which 
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they conform to FATF indicators or other regulatory benchmarks.342 The extent of 
compliance is however determined by a combination of technical compliance, and 
effectiveness in meeting defined outcomes.343 In both estimates of compliance, there is 
a measure of benchmarking; however, whilst the technical compliance approach adopts 
a more rigid methodology, the effectiveness measure adopts an open but exploratory 
language.344  
 
Technical compliance with FATF recommendations is categorized into four different 
levels against which countries are measured: Compliant, Largely Compliant, Partially 
compliant and Non-Compliant.345 It measures the implementation of specific 
requirements of the FATF recommendations, including framework of laws and 
enforceable means.346 Effectiveness on the other hand aims to provide an appreciation 
of a country’s AML/CFT, how well it works and how defined outcomes are achieved.347  
 
The FATF methodology presents the illusion that its benchmarks are supposed to 
highlight the best practice attainable by countries. Indicating a purpose focused on 
fostering creativity and encouraging improvements whilst giving countries the 
opportunity to learn from each other.348 The implication, however, is that states are 
urged to emulate these standards, failing which they would face enforcement sanctions. 
The benchmarking process which is a ground for sanctioning countries is however not 
infallible.  
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Firstly, the FATF reports may be unreliable. For instance, monitoring and measurement 
of compliance is done through mutual evaluations, self-assessment surveys and 
progress reports349 carried out by FATF staff in agreement with related FIs and criminal 
justice agencies. The ratings produced from this technical exercise are however 
generalized, whilst giving the impression of democratic standard setting. For instance, 
in India (as with other EEs), only about three FIs are assessed along with several 
regulatory bodies. In a country with over 93 commercial banks, an assessment of only 
three FIs cannot be reflective of actual compliance levels. It is immaterial that an 
examination of regulatory bodies, criminal justice agencies and relevant ministries are 
also carried out, as a ‘clear picture’ can only be obtained directly from FIs, which serve 
as first point of call, providing information to other bodies. Blacklisting a country based 
on an unrepresentative assessment of the true position of compliance levels is 
unsatisfactory. Lombardo asserts that the judgment of performance is strictly formal, 
assessing the legal implementation of the standard does not adequately reflect the de 
facto attainment of the policy goals contained in the standard.350 
 
Secondly, the subjective nature of data collection is also problematic. However, the 
problems associated with subjective measurements vary. For instance, the FATF 
methodology has an open and closed perception-based index which asks specific 
questions linked to industry experience, as opposed to simply measuring the perception 
of money laundering in a particular country. However, the variance in such reports as 
the Basel AML Index 2015 and the FATF NCCT 2015 list demonstrate the difficulty 
of subjective criteria.351 For instance, whilst the FATF list Algeria, Ecuador and 
Myanmar as countries with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and high risk,  Basel AML 
Index only list Myanmar as one of the top 10 highest risk countries.352Additionally, 
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whilst the FATF MER-derived statistics of China list it as one of the most compliant 
countries, the Basel AML Index classifies China as a country with high risk.353 The 
result is that key institutions in certain jurisdictions may stretch data to meet the policy 
objectives of the most renowned standard setter.354 Countries that are in the lower 
regions of the ranking would be the most likely to engage in these sharp practices in a 
bid to avoid associated financial stigma and reputational damage, indicating existent 
information asymmetry.  
 
Flowing from this is the argument that countries may become immune to the ranking 
process. For instance, it may be easier to report notorious countries like Afghanistan, 
overlooking its growing ability to combat AML/CFT.  In comparison, reporting 
countries such as China which is assumed to be clean would demand a higher threshold 
requiring substantial proof. Oliver suggests that this could demotivate those that come 
out at the top of the ranking.355 
 
The backlash that has trailed the culture of benchmarking has classed this concept as a 
power-based instrument for two reasons. Firstly, it is negotiated by groups with 
conflicting interests. This is evident in the composition of FATF members with China, 
an EE, which has diverse socio-political interests from countries like the UK and the 
US. Although the interest of the latter set of countries trumps that of the EEs.  Secondly, 
its resulting policies and sanctions are imposed on groups that are not privy to the 
negotiation process, particularly developing countries.356 Expounding on this, EENA4 
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stated that ‘the ICRG usually list developing countries. Whereas, the money flows from 
these countries are much less than that from developed countries…it [the ICRG list] 
does not represent a totality of the countries not complying’.357 EENA4’s statement 
illuminates on the subjectivity of the benchmarking process which usually seeks to 
sanction non-member countries. This is reflected in the two-tier list compiled by the 
ICRG – the black-2 and grey list.358 It is indeed deplorable that whilst these listings can 
have grievous consequences, such as the financial isolation of countries – the criteria 
for listing is unclear and shrouded in secrecy.  
 
Thus, compliance with the FATF standards is mandatory irrespective of this absence of 
democracy in the negotiation or ‘listing’ process. Additionally, the lack of 
preconditions for robust AML/CFT regulations coupled with the variances in internal 
country circumstances are not considered in subjecting ACs to the same standards, yet 
these countries are benchmarked similarly.  
 
 This can result in information asymmetry, with countries producing false compliance 
standards, but more deeply, it unearths a pervasive legitimacy crisis. This is not peculiar 
to the FATF. More damning financial scandals which have involved benchmarks such 
as libor and eurolibor have shown the susceptibility of the benchmarking system to 
manipulations. These benchmarks were used to price EU citizen’s mortgages, loans and 
other forms of lending. However, the daily values of these were usually determined and 
manipulated by a few big players in the market. What becomes obvious is the need for 
benchmarking administrators to be independent, registered and carefully selected to 
ensure a transparent process.  
 
The importance of an independent set of benchmarking administrators is imperative to 
address concerns related to how benchmark indicators are formulated and classified 
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according to importance. The conceptual framework of benchmarking is particularly 
important given the effect of the benchmarking process which is noted by the exercise 
of the determinants of compliance backed by statistical evidence. Furthermore, it is 




‘Law and confidence’, factors which are crucial to ensuring a conducive environment 
for transplantation of laws in ACs/EEs are weak. Law matters, but most importantly, 
the design of law is crucial in propelling compliance and averting gaming of the law. 
Law however does not work in a vacuum but is largely dependent on confidence. 
Confidence in financial stability, institutions, governmental and political systems, and 
enforcement structures. Confidence would ensure that FIs are held accountable and 
regulations are effective and able to ensure financial stability. These factors are 
however lacking in ACs/EEs, an indication that ACs/EEs will be incapable of 
effectively transplanting or implementing FATF’s standards. This is particularly so for 
ACs due to the enhanced effect of corruption, belated understanding of the FATF 
standards, coupled with their absence of integration within the global economy. Yet, 
due to the subjection of states to AML/CFT regulation, they are mandated to comply 
or face sanctions.  
 
The preconditions for effective regulation and variances in the internal country 
structures feed into the compliance drivers that are determinants of compliance levels.  
Compliance drivers, categorized into legal and non-legal factors are not always internal 
to a country and may in certain instances, be external – not within the control of the 
country’s authorities. The legal factors considered include democracy and rule of law, 
enforcement and mirror of the law. Political will, domestic conditions and policy 
priorities, reputational concerns, legitimacy, globalization and capacity are non-legal 
factors found to have an impact on the compliance level of countries with AML/CFT 
standards. It is however noteworthy that none of these factors can influence compliance 
solely, rather, they work in tandem and are interlinked.  
Chapter 4 
The Agency Relationship between Collective Principals and their 
Interaction with African Countries and Emerging Economies 
  
  4. Introduction  
 
Information sharing is crucial in combating financial crimes.  Hence, the collaboration 
between IFIs and the FATF is aimed at presenting a synchronized global approach to 
counter illicit crimes which would facilitate information sharing with agents. The 
collective principals (IFIs/FATF) interact with agents (countries) to advance 
transparency of information and cure any underlining asymmetries. Findings however 
reveal that countries with the highest degree of integration and potential compliance 
levels have the strongest incentive to interact with IFIs/FATF. ACs do not fall within 
this category and to evade sanctions, these countries interact strategically with the 
collective principals. Yet, financial crime remains a borderless crime and can flow from 
ACs to highly integrated countries. Acknowledging this, the interaction between these 
set of countries are examined to determine how compliance is generated in these 
instances.  
 
Section 1 examines the relationship between the collective principals. The evolution of 
their relationship is examined in light of AML/CFT rulemaking, implementation and 
compliance measures aimed at fostering standardization for ease of application. Section 
2 focuses on the relationship between the collective principals and agent states. It 
analyses how the level of integration with the global financial system and perceived 
compliance levels play a role in resolving or escalating information asymmetry. It 
further considers how information asymmetry can hinder cross-border transactions 
between countries at various ends of the spectrum of global financial integration and 
compliance. Regarding cross-border banking, it contends that countries converge better 
when it serves their self-interest and they have capacity. The monitoring and 
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sanctioning tools employed by the collective principals in evading the shortcomings 
associated with information asymmetry are considered. Section 3 concludes the 
analysis.  
 
4.1 Rule Design, Implementation and Compliance  
 
The reverse and continuing agency relationship postulates that all developed and 
developing countries are agents to the collective principals (IFIs/FATF). This means 
that ACs/EEs fall within the purview of agents to the collective principals. The FATF, 
as the proximate principal (PP) within this context, has the authority, as delegated from 
the agents, to issue rules which incorporate compliance measures. IFIs, as extended 
principals (EP) only have the authority to assess compliance levels, provide technical 
assistance, organize high-level meetings and back up sanctions by the PP. However, in 
discharge of their assessment responsibilities, IFIs usually acquire practical knowledge 
of the workability or suitability of rules. This grants them the expertise to advise the PP 
on the amendment of or addition to certain existing rules/standards.  
 
It is against this background that this chapter discusses the evolution of the relationship 
between the collective principals in rulemaking, implementation and compliance aimed 
at ensuring a unified approach to combatting ML/TF.  Whilst recognizing that ‘ideally’ 
all countries delegate authority to collective principals for this purpose, there is a 
recognition that certain countries, particularly ACs, are not involved in the delegation 
process. The implication is that their interests are not reflected at any stage, or are 
discounted as unparalleled to the direction of the global financial economy. This has 
occasioned agency slack aimed at ensuring continued compliance in a bid to retain their 





4.1.1 Rule Design: Relationship between the FATF and IFIs  
 
The construction of global recommendations for transplantation to nation-states 
(agents) is the task of the international standard-setter principal (FATF), with the 
assistance of other assessment and implementation principals (IFIs). Agents, i.e. 
national legislators, ensure that transplanted recommendations transcribed to 
legislations reflect the objectives of the principals. A deviation, which may be in favour 
of local factors, may necessitate sanctions in the form of financial isolation from the 
international financial market.    
 
Recommendations/Standards for transplantation created by principal(s) are referred to 
as ‘soft law’, a nomenclature attributed to the creation of a global order through the 
stipulation of best practices applicable to autonomous countries and organisations.1 
These recommendations which set benchmarks that ‘gives advice to many’2 gain their 
peculiarity from capturing rule-making through the use of voluntary standards injected 
with a measure of flexibility.3 Put simply, standards form a category of rules that 
address public policy issues.4 Vibert contends that this form of recommendation design 
is employed to solve cross-border issues affecting various countries, with the advantage 
of adding to the predictability of the world.5 This is arguably a major stabilising factor 
in a world where relative power is rapidly shifting.  
 
Arguably, there are profound differences between hard law and soft law instruments, 
and the spaces they regulate. For instance, though borne out of negotiations with actors 
that are seemingly bound by a unified objective, unlike hard law, ‘soft laws’ lack 
binding enactment power.6 This can be typified with organisations such as the BCBS 
                                     
1 Rainer Hulsse and Dieter Kerwer, ‘Global Standards in Action: Insights from Anti-Money Laundering 
Regulations’ [2007] 14 (5) Organization 625, 627. 
2 Brunsson Nils, ‘Standardization as Organization’ in M. Egeberg and P Laegried (eds.) Organizing 
Political Institutions: Essays for Johan P. Olsen (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1999) 109 -28. 
3 Rainer Hulsse and Dieter Kerwer, ‘Global Standards in Action: Insights from Anti-Money Laundering 
Regulations’ [2007] 14 (5) Organization 625, 627. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Frank Vibert, ‘Reforming International Rule Making’ [2012] 2 (3) Global Policy 391, 391. 
6 Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law [2006] 100 AM. J. Int’l/ 291, 319.  
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that is involved in setting best-practices on banking capital requirements.7 The role of 
the BCBS requires it to undertake a large amount of rulemaking due to the uncertainty 
in its regulatory niche.8  Consequently, these rules are sometimes classified as ‘hard-
law’ due to their precision coupled with requirements on countries to legislate on the 
guidelines. This extends the concept beyond treaties9 which are employed to deal with 
areas of law that have some measure of certainty such as trade or monetary policy. 
Additionally, with hard law, there is reliance on military intervention, coercive 
diplomacy and economic means for binding powers.10 Such enforcement approaches 
are unavailable with soft law. However, unlike soft law rules which can be easily 
reassessed,11 hard law is rigid, with changes to treaty agreements possible only through 
costly and burdensome renegotiation.12 
 
There is a dichotomy between hard and soft law rules in the context of international 
law. However, the hardening of the boundaries of soft law through separate legal 
instruments internationally or domestically denotes a continuum within which several 
instruments of coercion or persuasion exists.13 Nevertheless, its source is usually not 
authoritative or binding. It is within this setting that the FATF, the foremost standard-
setting body for AML/CFT sits.14 
 
                                     
7 Kerwer Dieter, ‘Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation’ [2005] 12 (4) Governance 
611, 619; Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law as Delegation’ [2008] 32 (3) Fordham International Law Journal 
888, 892. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Raustiala Kal and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’ 
[2002] 02 (2) Princeton Law & Public Affairs Paper 538, 539.  
10 Gallarotti Giulio, ‘Soft Soft Power: What it Is, Why it’s Important, and the Conditions for its Effective 
Use’ [2011] 4 (1) Journal of Political Power 25, 29.  
11  For instance, the FATF recommendations were reassessed in 2001, 2012.  
12 Wilson, Ernest. J, ‘Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power’ [2008] 616 (1) The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science.  
13 Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, ‘Hard Power, Soft Power Reconsidered’ [2000] 1 (3) Canadian Military 
Journal 51, 52. Soft law is hardened in application but its source is usually not authoritative or binding, 
see Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law as Delegation’ [2008] 32 (3) Fordham International Law Journal 888, 
892.  
14 Saby Ghoshray, ‘Combating Threats to the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task 
Force: Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict Between Agency Capture and Soft 
Law’ [2014/2015] 59. N.Y.L School Review 521, 528. 
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Ideally, international rules should permit for regulatory space to ensure its adaptability. 
Vibert contends that in engineering compliance, international rule making does not in 
fact overregulate an area.15 This can be attributable to the ‘mirroring’ of law which 
postulates that the design or construction of globally applicable rules for governance 
should reflect socio-economic and political peculiarities of countries. Hence, flexibility 
of international rules is required for universal adaptability. Put simply, laws reflect how 
societies sees themselves.16 Therefore, the creation of these rules/standards through 
networks requires that actors construct and convey them in a way that appreciates the 
uniqueness of countries.17 The actors in this case are staff of international institutions, 
such as the FATF, the IMF and the World Bank. As principals, these actors must 
interact with representatives of member states’ legislature to ensure that rules adopted 
are suitable to those states. This will ensure that rules adopted result in the best 
outcomes for global regulation of ML/TF in the form of financial integrity and stability. 
More importantly, these actors must also interact with themselves to ensure a 
synchronisation of rules which makes for easy adaptability.  
 
4.1.1.1 Interaction Between Principals in Rule Making  
 
 
The FATF manages global regulation in AML/CFT through a comprehensive array of 
recommendations related to prescribed conduct.18 However, as earlier stated, its lack of 
an internal constitution or constituent charter19 coupled with a non-direct supervisory 
enforcement ability renders its laws soft. This seeming deficiency is resolved by two 
                                     
15 Frank Vibert, ‘Reforming International Rule Making’ [2012] 2 (3) Global Policy 391, 391. 
16 Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Process and State Change’ [2012] 37 (2) Law & Social Inquiry 
229, 238.  
17 Ibid 229, 259. They are constructed or conveyed by actors, including government officials, members 
of international secretariats, professionals’/ business representatives and civil society representatives. 
18 FATF, ‘International Standards on Combatting Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations’ (FATF, 2012) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf > accessed 13 
April 2017.  
19James T Gathii, ‘The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law’ (2010) J Prof. Law 
197, 198; Beth Simmons, ‘International Efforts Against Money Laundering’ in Dinah Shelton (eds.), 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (OUP, 
2000, First Published 2000) 255. 
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means. Firstly, its issue of specific guidelines for prudent behaviour and publication of 
compliance levels of countries. These ensure that the FATF recommendations become 
a comprehensive governance framework for member and non-member jurisdictions.  
 
The second means is through collaboration with established supranational bodies such 
as the IMF, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the World Bank who 
have observatory membership on the FATF.20 Such engagements reveal that the FATF 
does not act in isolation when prescribing recommendations, since  assessment reports 
from IFIs are fed back into the remodelling of the FATF standards.21 Recommendation 
1 of the FATF which adopts a risk-based approach to technical compliance illustrates 
this. It is argued to have been included to douse the FATF’s legitimacy crisis as 
requested by the IFIs.22 
 
Additionally, these relationships have compelled the FATF to exert authority as a 
legitimate supervisory body capable of setting international standards.23 The FATF also 
gains its normative authority through its working relationship with the United Nations 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC) and endorsement of its recommendations by 
the Sanctions Committee of the UNSC.24 Ghoshray asserts that the global endorsement 
of various recommendations through specific UNSC resolutions have significantly 
contributed to the enhancement of the FATF status as a supervisory body, transforming 
its recommendations from mere prescriptions to legitimate legal norms.25 
                                     
20FATF, ‘FATF Members and Observers’ (FATF) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/ > accessed 13 April 2017.  
21 FATF, ‘Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations’ (FATF, 2013) < 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF-4th-Round-Procedures.pdf > 
accessed 10 April 2017.  
22 Sean Hagan, ‘Revision to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standard – Information Note to the 
Executive Board’ (IMF, July 2012) <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/071712a.pdf > 
accessed 11 May 2017.  
23 Saby Ghoshray, ‘Combating Threats to the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task 
Force: Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict Between Agency Capture and Soft 
Law’ [2014/2015] 59. N.Y.L School Review 521, 529. 
24 FATF, ‘Briefing Briefing to the United Nations Security Council Committee, New York’ (26, October 
2009) < http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/statements/2009_10_26_fatf_brief.pdf > accessed 19 April 
2017.  
25 Kenneth S Blazejewski, ‘The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the Effectiveness and 
Accountability of Trans-Governmental Networks’ [2008] 22 Temp. Int’l & Comp LJ 1, 14; Saby 
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An examination of the relationship between the FATF and the IFIs reveals a collective 
principal framework, with the FATF as the PP and the IFIs as EPs to the agents in the 
context of rulemaking. This position is attributable to the individual and collaborative 
roles of the actors in the realisation that so long as they are bound by principal 
responsibilities, no principal of nation-states is an island.26 Rather, efficiency is derived 
when expertise and specialisations are harnessed. Cooperation in this circumstance can 
be defined to include exchange of information, analysis, views and deliberations on 
best practices between IFIs and FATF officials.27 
 
A sequential scrutiny of the partnership between the FATF and IFIs illustrates how the 
FATF has cultivated these institutional relationships to advance its objectives. IFIs have 
now assumed the role of providing technical assistance and carrying out assessments 
on the soundness or vulnerabilities of economies to ML/TF. Prior to that, the IMF was 
solely responsible for providing short-term loans to stabilise members’ balance of 
payments concerns,28 whilst the Bank was responsible for providing long term loans 
for development projects.29 Such disparity in their specialisations required no 
collaboration or consultation. However, these institutions began to overlap their 
mandates over time, requiring partnership and continuous discussions for effective 
division of labour.30 In 1997, the Bank-Fund Financial Sector Liaison Committee was 
established to oversee collaboration between the two institutions, a process which 
culminated in the creation of the FSAP in 1999.  
 
                                     
Ghoshray, ‘Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict Between Agency Capture and 
Soft Law’ [2014/15] 59 NYL. Sch.L. Rev. 521, 542. 
26 James M Boughton, ‘Tearing Down Wall’ (International Monetary Fund 1990-1999) 82. 
27 ibid; FATF, ‘Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations’ (FATF, 2013) 
< http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF-4th-Round-Procedures.pdf > 
accessed 10 April 2017. 
28 IMF ‘Articles of Agreement’ < https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf > accessed 26 April 
2017.  
29 IMF and IBRD, ‘Articles of Agreement: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ 
[1944] 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARCHIVES/Resources/IBRD_Articles_of_Agreement.pdf > 
accessed 10 April 2017.  
30 James M Boughton, ‘Tearing Down Wall’ (International Monetary Fund 1990-1999) 82. 
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The integration of these institutions was not without hitch. The IMF’s mission chiefs 
consistently complained of the World Bank’s bureaucracy or indifferent response. 
Conversely, World Bank staff complained that the IMF staff were inflexible and too 
quick to draw conclusions.31 This revealed that irrespective of similar structures and 
culture of cross-fertilization of staff, the ethos within these organisations were varied, 
hindering their abilities to collaborate effectively. Through this period of IFIs 
collaboration, the FATF’s relationship with these institutions was strained. Although 
the FATF considered a relationship expedient, the IFIs did not. Engardio contends that 
the IFIs’ initial reception of the FATF’s proposal for collaboration was lukewarm,32 
expressing concern that AML/CFT lay outside their mandate.33 
 
However, some elements of coordination between these institutions existed for two 
reasons. Firstly, IFIs and the FATF are created and largely funded by the same set of 
countries – a commonality that led to frequent networked meetings. Secondly, the role 
of the IFIs in assessing compliance level of countries in specific areas and providing 
technical expertise based on its FSAP reports – a niche which was observably crucial 
in expanding the FATF’s reach. This meant that coordinated meetings were vital.34 The 
latter reason propelled the FATF to seek partnership with the IFIs post the 
commencement of the FSAP, of which the Report of the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSC) is a key component.35 The ROSC is particularly relevant as it reports 
on the implementation of 12 benchmarks of good practice earmarked by the IMF as 
areas relevant to the financial and economic soundness of the state.36 One of the 
                                     
31 Ibid. 
32 Pete Engardio, ‘Commentary: Don’t Use the IMF to Push U.S. Foreign Policy’ (Bloomberg, 26 
November 2001) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2001-11-25/commentary-dont-use-the-
imf-to-push-u-dot-s-dot-foreign-policy > accessed 10 April 2017.  
33 IMF and the World Bank, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT): Materials Concerning Staff Progress Towards the Development of a Comprehensive 
AML/CFT Methodology and Assessment Process’ (IMF and World Bank, 2002) 
<http://www.imf.org/External/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/061102.pdf  > accessed 10 April 2017.     
34 Given the role of the IFIs in monitoring and implementing the FATF’s recommendations, an area that 
overlaps the FATF provision of technical assistance, meetings are required to ensure coordinated efforts 
that save resources without unnecessary overlaps. This is also important in engineering changes to set 
recommendations.   
35 Kenneth S Blazejewski, ‘The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the Effectiveness and 
Accountability of Trans-Governmental Networks’ [2008] 22 Temp. Int’l & Comp LJ 1, 30. 
36 International Monetary Fund Factsheet, Standards and Codes: The Role of the IMF (IMF Factsheet, 
2017) <http://www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/25/Standards-and-Codes?pdf=1 > 
accessed 10 April 2017.  
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benchmarks is the FATF AML/CFT recommendations. Its inclusion signalled a 
recognition of the macroeconomic problems posed by ML/TF.37 Hence, the ROSC has 
been identified as a means of assessment of its recommendations amongst non-member 
states of the FATF. This move was also partly based on the FATF’s membership 
shortage which necessitated partnership to penetrate hard-to-reach states through the 
voluntary FSAP instruments.38 More importantly, the 9/11 attack propelled the IFIs to 
engage collaboratively with the FATF and align with its participation schedule39 as 
endorsed by their boards.40  
 
Consequently, the IFIs engaged in a 12 month pilot programme to include FATF 
recommendations within the FSAP and Offshore Centre Program (OFC) assessment, 
whilst the FATF and its regional bodies continued their mutual evaluations.41 This 
scheme, which facilitated an effective working relationship between the necessary 
actors,42 was, however, not without its difficulties. For instance, IFIs continually 
critiqued the FATF recommendations on the ground that it did not take the peculiarities 
of countries into consideration. The subsequent adoption of a risk-based AML/CFT 
approach by the FATF propelled the IFIs to re-endorse the recommendations and work 
hand-in-hand to ensure reflective standards.43 This working relationship has been 
further cemented by cross-fertilisation of information, as IFIs usually employ previous 
                                     
37 IMF, ‘Financial System Abuse, Financial Crime and Money Laundering – Background Paper’ (IMF, 
2001) < http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Financial-System-Abuse-
Financial-Crime-and-Money-Laundering-Background-Paper-PP128 > accessed 10 February 2017.  
38 IMF Press Release No.14/447, ‘Press Release: IMF Executive Board Concludes Review of the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program’ (2014) < 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14447.htm > accessed 12 April 2017. Both IFIs had 184 
member countries and over 120 participated voluntarily in the FSAP. See International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program – Review, Lessons and Issues Going 
Forward’ (2005) < https://www.imf.org/External/np/fsap/2005/022205.htm > accessed 11 April 2017. 
39 Ibid.; Both IFIs had 184 member countries and over 120 participated voluntarily in the FSAP. See IMF 
and the World Bank, ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program – Review, Lessons and Issues Going 
Forward’ (2005) < https://www.imf.org/External/np/fsap/2005/022205.htm > accessed 11 April 2017. 
40 IMF and the World Bank, Twelve Month Pilot Program of Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting 
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Assessments 7 (2004) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/aml/eng/2004/031004.pdf > accessed 10 April 2017.  
41 Ibid. 
42IMF, ‘The IMF and the World Bank’ (2016) < 
http://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/31/IMF-World-Bank > accessed 10 
February 2017.  
43 Sean Hagan, ‘Revision to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Standard – Information Note to the 
Executive Board ’ (IMF, July 2012) <https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/071712a.pdf > 
accessed 11 May 2017.  
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FATF staff. In Particular, the IMF has employed FATF staff in its Financial Integrity 
Group (FIG), a unit of its legal department which is involved in FSAP preparations and 
provision of technical assistance to countries combatting ML/TF.   
 
As expected, the relationship between these actors created a division of labour in 
executing the FSAP. Whilst the IFIs jointly worked on building the AML/CFT 
framework for developing and EEs, the IMF was solely responsible for that of 
developed countries. As stated, they have minimal roles to play in rule design as their 
task is restricted to the assessment of and compliance with FATF recommendations. 
However, these are crucial in highlighting policy issues that can be imputed in the 
modification of the recommendations. This implies that IFIs continually deal with 
issues related to AML/CFT rule design through their interaction with the FATF. Thus, 
overtime, staff of IFIs developed substantial expertise relevant to AML/CFT 
regulation.44  
 
The interaction between these institutions is further heightened by the establishment of 
country and regional bodies. These are crucial for resolving information asymmetry 
and ensuring compliance with standards. Thus, whilst the FATF established FATF-
Styled Regional Bodies (FSRBs),45 the IMF/World Bank both have regional and 
country offices.46 FSRB member countries inducted after 1990 were included to ensure 
improved representation,  because the plenary meetings grants countries an opportunity 
to air their opinions only through regional bodies. FSRB member countries are classed 
as ‘associate members’ of the FATF.  
 
                                     
44 IMF, ‘Intensified Work on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT): Joint Progress Report on the Work of the IMF and World Bank’ (IMF, April 2002) < 
https://www.imf.org/External/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/041702.pdf  > accessed 7 July 2017.  
45 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, ‘Financial Action Task Force & FATF Style Regional 
Bodies’ (APG) < http://www.apgml.org/fatf-and-fsrb/page.aspx?p=94065425-e6aa-479f-8701-
5ca5d07ccfe8> accessed 10 July 2017; U.S Department of State: Diplomacy in Action, ‘The Financial 
Action Task Force and FATF-Style Regional Bodies’ (US Department of State) < 
https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol2/239046.htm> accessed 10 July 2017.  
46 Tine Hanrieder, International Organization in Time: Fragmentation and Reform (1st edn. OUP 2015) 
119.  
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The FSRB was praised as an ingenious means of globalising the FATF without losing 
its decision making process. The extent to which the creation and collaboration are 
equitable is however questionable. This is evidenced by the composition of the FATF 
cadre, its decision making process and the sanctioning mechanism.  
 
The FATF cadre, which is responsible for framing decisions on AML/CFT, is 
composed of the Plenary, President, Steering Group and Secretariat.47 Within this 
structure, the secretariat, through the instrumentality of the Policy Development Group 
(PDG) is responsible for developing global policies and best practices48 which receive 
assent from the plenary – the body with the authority to adopt FATF standards, 
guidance and reports.49 The steering group is responsible for assisting the President in 
day to day activity and coordinating work groups.50 The President convenes and chairs 
meetings of the Plenary and Steering group and oversees the secretariat.51  
 
An examination of the workings of the secretariat and plenary sessions shows the lack 
of equity in the standards making process. For instance, the workings of the secretariat 
reveal the influence of OECD countries in the daily processes of the FATF. This 
influence is to the exclusion of ‘associate members’ whose input is only required at the 
plenary sessions – which hold three times a year.52 During these sessions, all the votes 
of ‘associate members’ count as one as compared to core members that exercise one 
vote each. This restricts the extent to which the voices of associate members are 
considered in the design of standards. Furthermore, the FATF, which is housed by the 
OECD, is mandated to employ staff only from OECD countries,53 a provision which 
                                     
47 FATF, ‘Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012-2020)’  (2012) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf > accessed 13 
April 2017.  
48 FATF, ‘FATF Secretariat’ (FATF, 2017) < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/fatfsecretariat/> accessed 
20 January 2017.  
49 FATF, ‘Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012-2020)’  (2012) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf > accessed 13 
April 2017.  
50 Ibid.   
51 Ibid.  
52 At these meetings, they do not get the opportunity to set the agenda or drive the discourse, thus their 
ability to frame recommendations or decisions of the FATF is limited. 
53 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Better Policies for Better Lives, ‘OECD 
Careers’ (OECD) <http://www.oecd.org/careers/whatwelookfor.htm > accessed 20 January 2016. 
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impliedly excludes ACs/EEs from participating in the daily workings of the secretariat. 
This highlights the minimal input of ACs in the formulation of policies or the daily 
workings of the FATF. Yet, the FATF would wield coercive powers against them.54  
The disparity amongst countries in the FATF standard setting process is also 
commonplace in the IFIs’ decision making process. For instance, in the IFIs’ head 
offices, the voting structure of the Board is ingrained in their decision making process, 
which is reliant on the existing quota configuration. Thus, a country’s vote is dependent 
on its funding contribution to the IFIs.55 The US has the largest quota with 
approximately 82.99 million SDRs56 which totals 831,406 billion dollars. The US is 
followed by Japan, China, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, four of which 
are part of the G7. Collectively, all other countries of the world hold 23.2% voting 
rights,57 with Africa holding only 5.6% of the overall votes.58 This is similar to the 
World Bank system where voting rights are determined by each country’s agreed 
annual contribution to the Bank59 which reflects how much weight the country carries 
in the world economy.60 This quota diversity is also enshrined in the executive directors 
(EDs) spread. The Bank has 26 EDs, the largest stakeholders of this decision making 
organ – the US, Japan, France and the UK, together with China, Russia and Saudi 
Arabia each have one executive director appointed by their countries.61 Other members 
are grouped into 16 constituencies, each  electing one ED. This structure gives 
European countries the second highest representation, whilst all ACs have three EDs.62 
                                     
54 As members of the FATF, the BRICS countries are however privy to the plenary discussions and can 
sit as president of the FATF, the extent of their influence in this role is however debatable. 
55 Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank and their Borrower (Cornell University 
Press, 2006) 22-24.  
56 IMF, ‘IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors’ (International 
Monetary Fund, 24 January 2017) <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx#U > 
accessed 24 January 2017.  
57Ibid;; IMF, ‘Illustration of Proposed Quota and Voting Shares’ (IMF, 2010) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pdfs/pr10418_table.pdf > accessed 15 July 2016. 
58 Ibid.  
59 World Bank, ‘IBRD Articles of Agreement’ (World Bank, 1989) < 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf> accessed 
20 June 2017.   
60 Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank and their Borrower (Cornell University 
Press, 2006) 22-24. 
61 World Bank, A Guide to the World Bank (Third Edition, The World Bank) 9.  
62 Although some other ACs are merged with foreign countries in bloc 21 where Egygt and Libya are 
classed with middle eastern states, so also Ghana and Tunisia and Algeria in bloc 16. See International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Voting Power of Executive Directors (Corporate Secretariat, 
6 February 2017) < http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-
1215524804501/IBRDEDsVotingTable.pdf>  accessed 21 February 2017.  
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Given that a bloc can only have one vote, developing countries and ACs have limited 
say in AML/CFT matters, notwithstanding that these are ML/FT-prone countries. 
Undoubtedly, this overarching decision making process is unreflective of the diverse 
membership of these institutions, a shortcoming heightened by their undemocratic 
decision making process.  
 
Despite the shortcomings of these institutions, there is a trajectory of strengthened 
collaboration in standard-making as a step towards curbing illicit crimes. Shortcomings 
are however noted in the collective principal’s agenda, especially as regards the absence 
of equitability. Nonetheless, their interaction has presented a united front for countries 
combatting ML/TF by instituting rules that provide for a coordinated compliance 
approach to illicit crimes.  
 
4.1.2. Implementation and Compliance: Relationship between IFIs and the FATF  
 
Legislation can only go so far in the absence of implementation and compliance. 
Implementation denotes the operationalization of legislative requirements, whilst 
compliance warrants that such actions be done in strict adherence to laws and 
regulations. Hence, when an FIU is established, the FATF recommendation 29 is 
deemed implemented; compliance is achieved when this is done in alignment with the 
law.  
 
Compliance would however only be effective and accorded value where it converges 
with internal ethics. This implies that compliance is effective when it takes into 
consideration the values of a country. The effectiveness of such compliance can be 
gleaned from an instance where strict CDD is mandated to operate within a cash based 
society. Such rule would result in a regulatory paradox as it would defeat the 
overarching aim of financial integrity, whilst facilitating ML/TF outside the banking 
system. In such situations, country (A) may be adjudged to have ‘low level of 
effectiveness’ and may not evade the opprobrium of the law, whereas country (B) 
 170 
adopting the CDD/KYC in a cashless society would be deemed to have a ‘high level of 
effectiveness’.  This is worsened for country (A) as compliance comes with its costs. 
Although the principals (FATF/IFIs) consider these costs as necessary to protect 
institutions within countries from rule transgression and consequent regulatory 
sanction, the agents (financial and non-financial institutions) consider it unnecessary, 
cumbersome and a hindrance to profit.  
 
The above scenario between the principals and country (A) agent would be classed as 
a conflict of interest thus warranting continuous monitoring by the principals and 
necessitating further collaboration between these actors to foster systematical 
information exchange. In theory, this may potentially guarantee the elimination of 
conflicts of interest and the integrity of the international financial system. It would also 
place an extra policing role on principals, requiring them to monitor and report on 
compliance activities within states. Furthermore, the principals would be privy to 
private information which may affect rule modifications to cure the defects faced by 
country (A). In practice, it may be more complex given the absence of preconditions 
for effective regulation.  
 
It is pertinent to note that within the context of rule implementation and compliance, 
the IFIs are the principals and the agent-states institutions are the agents. Hence, the 
agents include, financial and non-financial institutions, regulatory bodies, enforcement 
bodies and the judicial and executive arm of government. As is the case in legislative 
interactions, the principals present a united front in their interactions with agents, to 










Presently, there is an intimate collaboration between the IFIs and the FATF, aimed at 
ensuring implementation of and compliance with the FATF standards. This however 
was not always the case. Upon engagement in assessments of compliance levels by the 
FATF, the IFIs expressed that their mandate restricted them from engaging in 
assessments of law enforcement issues throughout the pilot programme.63 This position 
was solidified by the IMF Board which stated that it would be ‘inappropriate’ for the 
IMF to become involved in law enforcement issues.64 It therefore limited itself to 
assessing FATF criteria which it considered ‘macro-economically relevant’.65 
However, the rigorousness of the IFIs’ assessments of implementation to the exclusion 
of enforcement necessitated the FATF to call for a revision of the IMF’s decision on 
the ground that it hindered the production of fully integrated assessments.  
 
This limited framework which deterred effective collaboration between principals 
necessitated revision. Consequently, the FATF beckoned on the IFIs to reassess this 
limitation and revise their evaluation approach, to become more comprehensive.66 The 
IMF Board subsequently adopted the FATF recommendations as a regular component 
of its FSAP and OFC programs, and the World Bank67 followed suit.68 This has 
                                     
63 IMF and the World Bank, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism: 
Review of the Quality and Consistency of Assessments Reports and the Effectiveness of Coordination’ 
(2006) < https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/041806r.pdf > accessed 11 April 2017.  
64 IMF and World Bank, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism 
(AML/CFT): Proposals to Assess a Global Standard and to Prepare ROSCs’ (2002) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/aml/2002/eng/071702.pdf > accessed 15 April 2017. 
65 Ibid.  
66 IMF & The World Bank, ‘Twelve Month Pilot Program of Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting 
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT): Joint Report on the Review of the Pilot Program (2004) 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/aml/eng/2004/031004.pdf > accessed 3 April 2017.  
67 IMF, ‘Public Information Notice No.04/33: IMF Executive Board Reviews and Enhances Efforts for 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism’ (2 April 2004) 
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/pn0433 > accessed 6 April 2017; IMF,  
‘Press Release No. 04/70: IMF, World Bank Enhance Efforts at Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist 
Financing’ (2 April 2004) < http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2004/pr0470.htm > accessed 4 
February 2017. 
68 2003 – 2004 the FATF stated that a ‘key priority’ of the FATF was to develop the relationship with 
the IMF and the World Bank as part of its efforts to ensure global action in combatting money laundering 
and terrorist financing.     
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improved communication between both institutions and created room for expert 
reliance on information exchange.  
 
This partnership has facilitated AML/CFT implementation and compliance. 
Blazejewsji contends that collaboration between the principals contributes to 
AML/CFT implementation in five ways.69 Firstly, through assessments conducted by 
the IFI programs which evaluate AML/CFT measures within countries. He contends 
that the programmes contained within the FSAP and OFC are far-reaching and 
comprehensive. By June 2006, IFIs had assessed over 60 jurisdictions on compliance 
with the FATF recommendations.70  
 
Secondly, the IFIs aligned their assessment methodology with that of the FATF to 
facilitate uniform benchmarking of recommendations.71 This was concretised by the 
fact that these standards became the only ROSC standards for which the IFIs accepted 
assessments conducted by external partners.72 
 
Thirdly, the IFIs maintain quality control, standardization and coordination of 
AML/CFT assessments.73 These came in response to an IMF report which revealed a 
‘high degree of variability in the quality of reports’ and between ongoing efforts to 
increase assessment quality.74 Hence the IFIs have worked to ensure consistency and 
                                     
69 Kenneth S Blazejewski, ‘The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the Effectiveness and 
Accountability of Trans-governmental Networks’ [2008] 22 Temp. Int’l & Comp LJ 1, 15, 31. 
70 US Department of Treasury, ‘Implementation of Legislative Provisions Relating to the International 
Monetary Fund: A Report to Congress 11’ (United States Department of the Treasury, March 2006) < 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/int-monetary-
fund/Documents/2015%20IMF%20Legislative%20Mandates%20Report.pdf > accessed 10 May 2017.  
71 The World Bank and the IMF, ‘Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook’ (2005) < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/306701468337879923/pdf/337970rev0Fina10Assessment0
1PUBLIC1.pdf > accessed 10 June 2016.    
72 IMF, ‘Public Information Notice No.11/74: IMF Executive Board Reviews Efforts in Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism’ (27 June 2011) < 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pn1174.htm > accessed 6 April 2017.  
73 IMF, ‘Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)’ < 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2.htm > accessed 10 April 2017.   
74 IMF and World Bank, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: Review of Quality 
and Consistency of Assessment Reports and the Effectiveness of Coordination’ (International Monetary 
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harmonisation across the ROSCs produced by various assessing bodies,75 and across 
all methodologies for assessing compliance;76 this avoids duplication of efforts.77 
 
Fourthly, the IFIs top-down perspective on AML/CFT monitoring permits their staff to 
analyse global trends and common weaknesses in implementation of AML/CFT 
measures. Such reports include the IMF Progress Report on the OFC program which 
provides an exhaustive profile of compliance with FATF recommendations within the 
offshore countries that participate in OFC programmes.78 Its 2005 Financial Sector 
Assessment Handbook highlighted some common weaknesses among national 
AML/CFT regulatory systems; so also did the MERs of countries by the FATF.79 
 
Lastly, the IFIs undertake technical capacity building to enable countries to achieve 
maximum implementation requirements. Technical assistance, which includes training 
of regional80 and country level supervisors, has focused on how to conduct mutual 
evaluations in compliance with the common methodology.81 What becomes evident is 
that the IFIs serve as a bedrock of the FATF’s efforts to advance implementation of 
recommendations amongst non-FATF member states, as their involvement has led to a 
more robust fight against ML/TF. Blazejewski reveals the collaborative approach by 
the principals in ensuring implementation and compliance with set recommendations 
transcribed to national laws and regulations.  
                                     
Fund and World Bank, 2006) < http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/041806r.pdf> accessed 11 
March 2017.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Mario Giovanoli, ‘A New Architecture for the Global Financial Market: Legal Aspects of International 
Standards Setting’ in Mario Giovanoli (eds.) International Monetary Law, Issues for the New Millennium 
(Oxford University Press, 2000) 3- 59.  
77 Ibid.  
78 IMF and the World Bank, ‘Twelve-Month Pilot Program of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Assessments: Joint Report on the Review of the Pilot Program’ 
(IMF and World Bank, 2004) < http://www.imf.org/external/np/aml/eng/2004/031004.pdf > accessed 12 
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79 Ibid. 
80 IMF, ‘IMF Policy Paper: Review of the Fund’s Strategy on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism’ (IMF, February 2014) < 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/022014a.pdf > accessed 10 May 2016.  
81IMF Legal Department, ‘Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: A Handbook for Legislative 
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June 2016.  
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Having discussed how collective principals engage in formulating rules and in guiding 
implementation and compliance, it is imperative to understand how these principals 
engage with agent states.  
 
4.2 Agency Theory: Interactions between the Collective Principals and Agent States in 
Rule Making, Implementation and Compliance  
 
The application of the agency theory (discussed in chapter 2) provides the theoretical 
framework to understanding potential agency problems that can arise from the side of 
the principal or agent. For instance, agent states may slack in transplanting or 
implementing rules. Conversely, the principals may retort by engaging observatory 
tools, such as sanctions, technical assistance or high-level meetings. A 
misunderstanding of the agency slack or the agent state may however occasion 
misapplication of observatory tools, further perpetuating agency problems. For 
instance, utilising sanctions where technical assistance should be used can weaken the 
incentive of agent states to comply with the AML/CFT standards.  
 
A fitting resolution of agency problems requires that any existing information 
asymmetry between the principals and the agent is addressed. For this to occur, two 
crucial factors are taken into consideration. Firstly, the level of integration of a country 
within the global financial market; and secondly, their perceived compliance levels with 
the FATF standards.82 The level of integration is largely dependent on quantitative 
factors that underscore membership of the FATF such as the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of a country, the size of its financial institutions market and its per-capita 
income.83 It also encompasses qualitative factors such as the openness of the financial 
sector and the potential of that country’s systemic risk on the global financial 
                                     
82 This conclusion was reached through an examination of the compliance pattern of countries assessed 
by the FATF. 
83 FATF, ‘FATF Membership Policy’ (FATF) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/fatfmembershippolicy.html  > accessed 11 October 2017  
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architecture.84 Countries with these attributes are classed as ‘systematically important’ 
by the IMF, signifying the need for heightened supervision to avoid risk of contagion 
should a crash occur.   
 
The second factor, the perceived compliance level of countries addresses the attainment 
by countries of the necessary pre-conditions for effective regulation and incorporates 
the legal development of countries according to the FATF recommendations. 
 
The table below shows the extent to which these factors play a role in triggering or 
addressing agency problems: 
S/No 
 




Effect on financial stability 
and integrity86 
1. High Priority High Low Elevated  
2. Low Priority Medium  High  Minimal 
3. Mid Priority Low Low  Minimal  
4. Low Priority Low High Very Minimal  
5. High Priority High  High  Very Minimal  
 
Table 2: Factors that influence/trigger information asymmetry between principals and 
agents in AML/CFT regulation.   
                                     
84 Ibid.  
85 Level of integration is dependent on factors such as country GDP, size of financial institutions, per-
capita income and openness of the financial sector. High integrated countries are developed countries 
and/emerging economies such as India and China. Medium integrated countries are certain emerging 
economies. Low integrated countries are developing countries and under-developed countries.  
86 Elevated = situation where the effect or risk of ML/TF lapses would have heightened effect on financial 
stability and integrity. Minimal = situation where the risk of ML/TF materializing would have marginal 
impact on financial stability and integrity. Very minimal = where the risk of ML/TF would have very 
marginal impact on financial stability and integrity.  
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The following three conclusive categories can be drawn from examining Table 2: 
a) High priority (HP) is associated with countries with high level of integration 
despite their compliance levels; indicating a need for sustained surveillance, 
assessment and reduced information asymmetry. However, information 
asymmetry may exist where a HP country has low compliance with the 
AML/CFT rules, as opposed to where such country has high compliance.  
 
 
b) Low priority (LP) is associated with medium or low level of integration with 
high level of compliance. In those countries, the risk to financial stability and 
integrity is low; there is minimal need to hinder information sharing.   
 
 
c) Mid priority (MP) is associated with countries with low level of integration and 
low compliance levels. The risk these countries pose to global financial stability 
and integrity is considered minimal. There is however a high incentive to hinder 
information sharing so as to avoid sanctions. Most ACs fall within this category.  
 
 
HP countries which are ‘highly integrated’ but with perceived low level of compliance 
to the AML/CFT standards would be a concern to the collective principals. Such 
concern stems from the fact that low compliance can have an effect on financial stability 
and integrity. Brazil, a member of the FATF falls within this category.  To ascertain 
how compliant a country is with the standards, the principals would have to carry out a 
mutual evaluation to ascertain the true compliance levels. Appreciating that a mutual 
evaluation report may occasion sanctions with the effect of financial exclusion, HP 
countries may choose to engage strategically with the principals. Supporting this 
assertion, Crawford and Sobel argue that when governments anticipate correction 
strategies by the principals which threaten capital flow and access to market, they may 
decide to omit or manipulate statistics.87 With the IMF, these countries may simply 
                                     
87 Crawford Vincent and Sobel Joel, ‘Strategic Informational Transmission’ [1982] Econometrica: 
Journal of the Econometric Society, 1431, 1451; Manne Henry G, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 
(First Edition, Free Press, 1996). 
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request nonpublication of the FSAP report, hence destroying any potential harm the 
market may read into their low compliance level. In a bid to document compliance in 
context, the mutual evaluation methodology requires that countries inform IFIs of any 
significant problems that arise in compliance. Whilst this ensures that the shortcomings 
are understood, agents are aware that these are not necessarily taken into consideration 
by the market or the IFIs, hence their strategic communication.  
 
Where, however, HP countries are classed as ‘highly integrated’ within the global 
financial system and have high compliance levels, they would still be classed as high 
priority although they pose minimal risk to the economy.88 This decision is necessary 
given that supervision is continuous, hence their placement on the IMF’s article IV 
surveillance. The IMF understands that though the risk these countries pose is minimal; 
crisis may escalate if a bubble exists. This may have a catastrophic effect on other 
countries. The role of the US in the global financial crisis exemplifies the situation, 
where vulnerability in the US financial market had a catastrophic global effect. 
Consequently, given the high compliance levels to formulation of legislative standards 
and implementation, these countries are less likely to have an incentive to omit or 
hinder information sharing, thereby limiting the chances of information asymmetry.  
 
The limited asymmetry or agency slack in this circumstance can be attributed to the 
fact that however limited their roles are, these countries, particularly EEs, are part of 
the rule making. Additionally, their FIs are strongly consulted in the re-modelling of 
standards due to the growing maturity of their finance industry. Most practices 
introduced as part of the FATF rules are not necessarily very foreign to them due to 
their rate of economic growth that has mandated numerous changes. Therefore, 
compliance does not require extensive re-modelling or re-learning.  
 
LP countries that have medium or low degree integration with potential high 
compliance levels pose minimal risk to global financial stability or integrity. Hence 
                                     
88 India and China fall within this category. 
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their classification as ‘low priority’.89 The IMF has not classed these country as 
systematically important given their limited contribution to the global world product 
(GWP) and per capita income, coupled with their limited openness and transparency. 
In such countries where potential compliance is high, the possibility of information 
asymmetry is reduced except in instances where compliance is a charade. 
 
MP countries with low degree of integration with the global financial economy coupled 
with low compliance levels are considered to have limited impact on financial stability 
and integrity.90 Despite their low degree of integration, they are considered mid priority 
because money laundering is a borderless crime and money from HP or LP countries 
can be laundered through these countries and vice versa. Additionally, agency concerns 
are raised because these countries are willing to protect their fragile space within the 
financial market, attract businesses and provide career advancement opportunities for 
their politicians. Hence, these countries are likely to find themselves manipulating 
information during mutual evaluations, sometimes leading to regulatory capture. 
EENA2, a staff  at a global multilateral bank mentioned that he did not trust the report 
of certain FSRBs – a concern that was pervasive within these institutions, even with the 
quality assurance standards.91 
 
The IFIs usually engage in technical assistance programmes in recognition that low 
compliance is sometimes attributable to lack of human and technical resources. 
However, in certain instances, low compliance may be attributable to the agent acting 
in his own interest as opposed to the interest of the principal which is financial stability 
and integrity. Thus, are there any conflicting goals between governments of countries 
and IFIs/FATF? Intuitively, it would be expected that they share the same goals. 
Dijkstra however finds that politicians do not necessarily follow the national interest, 
but act opportunistically to maximize their economic benefits, such as salary, public 
                                     
89 South Africa falls within this category, although it is one of the largest economies in Africa and a 
member of the FATF. However, the IMF has not classed South Africa as systemically important given 
its limited contribution to the global world product (GWP) and per capita income, coupled with its limited 
openness and transparency. 
90 This category includes Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and other AC with low compliance levels.  
91 EENA2, Interview with EENA2, ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
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reputation and power.92 Therefore, there is usually no political will. Such countries can 
be likened to the amoral calculator, requiring sanctions in addition to technical 
assistance.  
 
Low compliance may be because countries that are not well integrated into the global 
financial system largely focus on home-grown issues, such as financial exclusion.  
Consequently, these countries may issue standards that fall below the FATF’s CDD 
expectations. Thus, where compliance levels are deteriorating, countries will have 
incentive to delay information sharing or de-escalate the gravity of information, issues 
potentially solvable by observatory tools.  
 
Clearly, a high degree of integration and high compliance is the only conclusive 
category where countries have a strong incentive to share information that allows the 
principal make informed decisions. However, countries are not isolated and efforts by 
the FATF to reduce conflicts between MP/LP and HP has proved difficult. 
 
4.2.1 Agency Theory: Integration Between High Priority (A) and Mid Priority Countries 
(C) -  The domination of Self Interests? 
 
Integration gives room for laundered money to flow between HP, MP and LP countries 
given their engagement in trade and financial transactions. This engagement is mutually 
beneficial as foreign investors from HP countries are keen on investing in MP countries 
to maximise profit. MP countries also want to attract, protect and retain foreign 
investments to enhance their integration into the global financial market. Thus, as the 
interests of countries converge, the need for collaboration and information sharing for 
continued trade becomes higher. MP countries’ interest causes them to comply and 
                                     
92  Robert J. Dijkstra, ‘Accountability of Financial Supervisory Agencies: An Incentive Approach’ [2010] 
11 (2) Journal of Banking Regulation 115,122.  
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share information on AML/CFT to avoid de-risking. Conversely, HP countries comply 
and share information to ensure profit maximisation.  
 
Yet, HP countries do not necessarily profit, even when the self-interest of countries 
converge. Rather, they engage in a balancing act between profit maximisation and 
ensuring compliance via information sharing, an exercise that does not necessarily 
make economic sense. This is because the terrain of MP countries makes it difficult for 
HP countries to apply the FATF measures strictly, else they lose profit. For this reason, 
HP countries usually engage in de-risking. Where they decide not to, for instance, 
because of the importance of the business in question, an agency relationship may be 
established where, as principal, HP countries set conditions for compliance and 
information sharing with the FI in MP countries they wish to enter into a relationship 
with. Where the business is perceived as crucial to the country or institution in question, 
the MP country would align with the conditions. But, to what extent can MP countries 
comply? 
 
Compliance by agents may largely be undermined by their capacity deficit. For 
instance, agents strive to accede to conditions set by their principal, particularly where 
the countries have historical, economic and cultural ties. This can be exemplified with 
the UK (principal) and the Commonwealth states (agent) given their colonial history. 
This history has engendered migration from the Commonwealth to the UK, leading to 
increased remittances from the UK migrants to relatives in their home countries.93 Such 
cash flow requires increased collaboration in the interest of both parties, as these 
channels can be used to launder funds. Remittances are however more in the interest of 
agent states. Without true reciprocal interest, the interest of developed countries takes 
precedence. For this reason, whilst their laws aim to ensure transparency through the 
licencing and regulation of remittances,94 they also hinder remittances flowing out of 
                                     
93 Carlos Vargas-Silva, ‘Migrant Remittances to and from the UK’ (The Migration Observatory at the 
University of Oxford, 24 February 2016 ) 
<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/migrant-remittances-to-and-from-the-
uk/  > accessed 10 March 2017; Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, ‘The Good and the Bad in Remittance 
Flows’ (IZA World of Labor, November 2014) < https://wol.iza.org/uploads/articles/97/pdfs/good-and-
bad-in-remittance-flows.pdf > accessed 10 May 2017.  
94 The Payment Services Regulations 2017.   
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the country. Conversely, given lack of regulatory resources in manpower, skills and 
finances, unlicensed remittance operators thrive in the Commonwealth.95 The 
regulatory approach of the UK may hinder information sharing and instead facilitate 
underground remittances across jurisdictions. This indicates that institutional capacity 
becomes an issue when states are integrated. Hence, it is needful to identify overlapping 
interests that would drive compliance and resolve agency issues.  
 
It is arguable that reciprocal interest is present when there is a continuous business that 
is of systemic importance to both countries – such as in the case of correspondent 
banking (CB). CB ‘is the provision of a current or other liability account, and related 
services, to another financial institution, including affiliates, used for the execution of 
third party payments and trade finance, as well as its own cash clearing, liquidity 
management and short term borrowing or investment needs in a particular currency.’96It 
ensures that ‘respondent’ banks extend their services using foreign ‘correspondent’ 
banks as a proxy in places where the ‘respondent’ bank has no physical presence, but 
the correspondent bank does.97 CB however poses ML/TF risks, as the correspondent 
bank does not have direct contact with the customer, but relies on the CDD processes 
of the respondent bank, which may be inadequate. The effect is that the correspondent 
bank may unintentionally allow other FIs with inadequate AML/CFT systems and their 
customers direct access to the global banking landscape.  
 
                                     
95Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Press Release: Activities of Illegal International Money Transfer Operators’ 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2016) < 
https://www.cbn.gov.ng/out/2016/ccd/press%20release%20on%20illegal%20imtsos.pdf > accessed 10 
July 2017; The Economist, ‘Africa Money Transfers, Let them Remit’ (The Economist, 20 July 2013) < 
https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21581995-western-worries-about-money-
laundering-are-threatening-economic-lifeline > accessed 10 November 2017.  
96The Wolfsberg Group, ‘Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking’ 
(The Wolfsberg Group 2014) < 
https://sic.gov.lb/intorg/Wolfsberg%20Correspondent%20Banking%20Principles%20(2014).pdf > 
accessed 10 March 2016.; Bank for International Settlements, ‘Committee on Payments and Market 
Infrastructure: Correspondent Banking’ (Bank for International Settlement, July 2016) < 
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d147.pdf > accessed October 2016; Michaela Erbenova, Yan Liu, et al, 
‘The Withdrawal of Correspondent Banking Relationships: A Case for Policy Action’ (IMF Staff 
Discussion Note, June 2016) < https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1606.pdf > accessed 
10 October 2016. 
97 This is done in exchange for a fee. 
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Usually, the business is crucial to both countries and in line with the FATF Guidance 
on ‘Private Sector Information Sharing’,98 institutions would be incentivised to share 
information and illustrate compliance. This is especially so where the banking 
relationship is sustained and not ‘ad hoc’. However, this is not always the case, 
particularly where legal or operational challenges hinder information sharing and 
compliance. This is best illustrated by Table 3 below.  
 
 
Table 3. Determination of Self-Interest: Interaction between HP and MP countries.  
 
In category (a) both the principal and agent would share information and comply with 
the FATF recommendations, given their mutual best interest to do so. Compliance is 
however unlikely to be fool-proof due to legal and operational challenges in respondent 
bank’s country. Some legal issues that currently undermine the respondent bank’s 
ability to facilitate compliance include lack of clarity about the legal position on 
information sharing and differing regulatory requirements. These coupled with issues 
such as when the policy objectives at variance with the FATF’s can undermine 
compliance. This may also include the preference for data protection over national 
                                     
98 FATF, FATF Guidance: Private Sector Information Sharing (FATF, November 2017) < 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Private-Sector-Information-
Sharing.pdf > accessed January 2018.  
 Principal (High priority)   
Agent (Mid priority) 
Respondent Bank    
Sustained Correspondent Banking   
Correspondent Bank  
Ad hoc Correspondent Banking   
Sustained 
Correspondent 
Banking   
(a) Potential for coordination  (b) Conflicts of interest and 




Banking   
(c) Conflicts of interests and 
potential for coordination 
problems 
(d) Lack of compliance 
incentive  
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security by the respondent bank, at variance with the principal’s preference. 
Operational challenges include inadequate IT tools, varying data formats and the 
cultural disposition towards the value of information. Herring noted that the 
asymmetries of human and natural resources, coupled with weak legal infrastructure 
and corrupt processes may hinder the ability of the respondent bank to align with the 
correspondent’s standards.99 Instead, this entrenches conflict of interest.  
 
In category (b), where the CB relationship is ad hoc for the principal, but sustained for 
the agent. The agent has a stronger incentive to comply. The principal may not have an 
incentive to investigate the agent’s books to ensure compliance, and this may 
undermine the agent. Given the HP position of the principal, even an ad hoc 
arrangement may be caught by their home country regulators or the culture of the FI 
institution in question, thereby facilitating information sharing and compliance.  
 
In category (c), the principal has a higher incentive to comply, but the agent has 
relatively low incentive to comply and may slack to the dissatisfaction of the principal, 
who may then be forced to de-risk. Agency slack by the respondent bank may be due 
to capacity challenges on the part of the supervisory body or staff of the financial 
institution.  
 
In category (d), the principal and agent both lack compliance incentive given the ad hoc 
nature of their business. However, where the principal is not an amoral calculator or is 
subject to strict ‘in-country’ regulation, it would be in its interest to comply. This may 
indeed propel the compliance of the agent.  
 
In the four different scenarios, the correspondent banks, as principal, are willing to 
enable their FIs to be used by the respondent for a fee. The principal is however subject 
                                     
99 Richard Herring, ‘Conflicts between Home and Host Country Prudential Supervisors’ < 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.543.1482&rep=rep1&type=pdf > accessed 
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to more rigorous regulation given their location within ‘high priority’ countries. 
Therefore, it is more in their interest to comply to standards. For this reason, institutions 
in these countries usually exercise some form of control over the agent countries by 
setting down conditions necessary to establish and maintain business relationships, 
particularly where the respondent country has significant reputational risk factors, such 
as corruption.  
 
Regulatory institutions such as FIUs or central banks in MP and HP countries also 
collaborate on information sharing due to the traffic of transactions between their 
countries. Resultantly, institutions usually converge on information sharing when it is 
in their interest and diverge when it is not. For instance, in line with the Consolidated 
FATF Standards on Information Sharing,100 the UK and Nigeria have entered into a 
memorandum of understanding to facilitate the return of stolen assets from Nigeria.101 
This process has been frustrated by the conditions the UK has put in place before any 
such return can be made. EENA6 argues that the mandatory requirement for Nigeria to 
make a formal request, as well as numerous legal requirements that follow has stifled 
the process for repatriation of funds.102 Whilst some scholars have attributed this to the 
need to ensure that returned stolen wealth is utilised judiciously by Nigeria,103 various 
experts have argued that the UK has stifled this process because it is not in its interest 
to return stolen wealth.104 This shows how as principal, the strategic interest of the HP 
                                     
100 FATF ‘The Consolidated FATF Standards on Information Sharing: Relevant Excerpts from the FATF 
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countries continue to colour compliance and implementation, illustrating how 
economic interest can shape the political interest of powerful countries.  
 
The convergence pattern of FIs and regulatory bodies indicate that these institutions 
converge better when they have the same objective of financial stability, legal powers 
and processes, similar supervisory tools and capacity.105 Divergence on any of these 
factors would occasion gap in information sharing, even when the MP country is 
desirous of converging. Therefore, there is need to bring in players to facilitate 
compliance by all parties, including other countries and the IFIs/FATF. For instance, 
the US gave Pakistan some funding in order to incentivise the country to stop terror on 
Afghanistan.   
 
To circumvent agency issues, the principals (IFIs/FATF) engage agent states 
(MP/HP/LP) in various ways. These are, high level meetings, assessments, technical 
assistance and sanctions. These supervisory or monitoring engagements to cure agency 
issues would be discussed in the context of rule formulation and 
compliance/implementation.  
 
4.2.2 Interaction Between Principal(s) and Agents (Country Legislators)106 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, local laws usually mirror society. Hence, inherent 
in the role of the legislature is to ensure that legislations are contextualised whilst also 
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acting as checks on the executive arm of government.107 In combatting ML/TF, 
legislators have to imbibe international rules which may potentially mean 
compromising the contextualization of the law. Legislators may have to serve two 
masters – their local constituencies and global financial integrity and stability. Whilst 
the latter is projected to serve the global good, the former may be protectionist and 
competitive. Hence, in transplanting AML/CFT rules, legislators have the arduous task 
of striking a balance, ensuring that recommendations are carefully crafted into law, to 
ensure effective implementation.  
 
Transplantation is necessary because rules are not always home-grown to certain states. 
For instance, the FATF recommendations were derived from the combination of 
national strategies from Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, in 
collaboration with the international recommendations of the Basel Committee from 
1988 which was drafted by the United States.108 Despite the fact that ACs/EEs did not 
partake in the process of moulding these laws, the FATF, backed by the IFIs mandates 
implementation. This requirement places an onus on the legislatures of these countries  
to give such recommendations the force of law by imbedding them in their national 
systems.109  
 
The collaborative efforts of the principals give the agent-states little leeway to contest 
or amend rules produced by the FATF and its cohorts. This is despite the fact that 
recommended rules affect domestic affairs, inter alia, banking policies and ML/TF 
regulation of recipient countries. Therefore, the interaction between principals and 
agents is not aimed at formulation of global rules. Most recommendations promulgated 
in 1990 have not been scrapped; they have only undergone some modifications, most 
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Group, International Monetary Fund 2016) < http://www.parlnet.org/sites/default/files/Agenda-MP-
workshop-annual-meetings2016.pdf  > accessed 21 January 2017.  
108 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘The Private Sector Becomes Active: The Wolfsberg Process’ [2003] 
10 (4) Journal of Financial Crime 359, 359-360; Braithwaite John and Peter Drahos, Global Business 
Regulation (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
109 Ibid. 
 187 
profoundly – following the 9/11 attack, and later on, the global financial crisis.110 This 
illustrates that there is room for ex-post rule making which entails the modification of 
international standards for efficiency and effective transplantation. 
 
The ex-post rule modification process necessitates interaction between the FATF/IFIs 
(principals) and country legislators (agents). The purpose is to facilitate information 
exchange geared towards contextual global standards and efficient in-country 
structures. The interaction process, which employs the use of observatory tools and 
incentives, is usually facilitated by the principal. This process occurs through different 
methods: 
 
1. High-level meetings;  
2. Technical assistance; and/or;  
3.  Sanctions.  
 
 
While there is no clear sequence, the principals do not usually commence interactions 
with the imposition of sanctions.  
 
High-level meetings (HLMs), as an observatory tool, provides an avenue for 
information exchange between actors to facilitate rule modification processes. These 
take into consideration the underlying factors that precipitate legislative compliance 
differentials amongst countries. For instance, a country may have financial secrecy laws 
that prohibit the extraterritorial application of laws of other states. This situation 
actively hinders efforts to combat global ML/TF.111 Thus, the principals would seek to 
understand the underlying reason. Where non-compliance stems from lack of structures 
uncontemplated by the FATF at its drafting stage, such as the cash-based economy or 
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the solid minerals ML/TF trade risk, the principals will seek to amend its 
recommendations or guide documents to take these into considerations. Thus, HLMs 
are a two-way process, usually organised by the principals, agents or third parties (civil 
societies). 
 
As the PP, the FATF engages in HLMs with its members, FSRB members and country 
legislators in order to resolve legislative deficiencies. Sometimes, such meetings hold 
through intermediaries. This occurred in the case of the FATF’s review of Nigeria’s 
proposed legislation. An intermediary was employed to engage in HLMs with the 
FATF officials who appraised the draft and found it suitable for the purpose intended.112 
The decision to appoint an intermediary was most likely because he was best-positioned 
to get information the other party would not necessarily give out.   
 
A more intense relationship exists between the IFIs and country legislators. Their 
engagement occurs at multiple levels, sometimes through the IMF’s Article IV 
surveillance, and gives IFIs the opportunity to familiarise legislators with the FATF 
recommendations whilst listening to their concerns.113 This is usually achieved through 
dealings with in-country legislative committees focused on economic issues and/or 
interactions with parliamentary networks.114 Whilst the former occurs through 
seminars, briefings, mission visits or visiting delegations at the IMF/Bank, the latter 
occurs through organised conferences and workshops in partnership with parliamentary 
umbrella groups.115 Both processes are targeted at ensuring compliance with the FATF 
standards on sturdy legislations.  
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In a 2004 report, the Executive Working Group stressed that the IMF should ‘expand 
its outreach and listen to legislators to improve the understanding of the political and 
social context in which economic decisions are taken….(and) help build understanding 
of the IMF’.116 Consequently, there has been improved interactions between the IFIs 
and states, as illustrated by the yearly parliamentary network workshop meetings,117 the 
July 2015 Vienna workshop for MP countries across Central Asia and the Caucasus. In 
2014, programmes for parliamentarians were held in Mozambique and Tanzania. These 
meetings give the IFIs an improved understanding of the socio-economic and political 
context in which transplantation occurs.118 
 
Additionally, at the African Union’s High Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from 
Africa,119 experts from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 
worked with African Heads of States, legislative leaders, representatives of the World 
Bank, IMF and United Nations to recommend actions aimed at combatting illicit crimes 
within the continent. A key recommendation that resulted from this was that ‘clear and 
concise laws’ should be passed to regulate trade mispricing (TM). TM is the deliberate 
over-invoicing of imports or under-invoicing of exports by local entities, usually for 
the purpose of avoiding tax or levies.120 Although TM is a predominant means of 
laundering in ACs, it is only highlighted by the FATF Best Practices Paper for 
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combatting Trade-Based Money Laundering (TBML)121 and not given the focus 
required through the FATF recommendations. Delston and Walls contend that the Best 
Practices Paper for TBML and FATF recommendations should be harmonised, as the 
recommendations should demand that traders adopt CDD, KYC and STR reporting 
protocols. Otherwise companies may ignore the risk TBML poses.122 This proposal 
contradicts the FATF’s Best Practice Paper which cautions against undue regulatory 
burdens on legitimate businesses. The FATF viewpoint is supported by McSkimming 
who asserts that there is minimal evidence of the ill-effect of TBML and little 
consideration as to whether systematic monitoring of trade systems would be cost-
effective.123 Nevertheless, the findings of this HLM cannot be discarded, given their 
impact on Africa’s financial integrity.   
 
The extent to which these interactions promote strategic AML/CFT standards and 
effective transplantation is however debatable. Although highly promoted, it assumes 
that its agents (legislative members) are well versed on political and socio-economic 
situations within countries and have the expertise required to draft. This is not 
necessarily the case, as elected legislators usually have minimal knowledge of social 
circumstances surrounding drafted/sponsored bills.124 They are more concerned with 
the procedure for assent, a shortcoming attributable to nepotistic election process. This 
is usually remedied by working with experts from different agencies or third sectors 
who do not usually accompany legislators to such HLMs. In the process of briefing and 
debriefing, information may get lost in transmission.  
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Furthermore, political will is usually absent, because of fear of getting trapped by 
enacted legislations on AML/CFT. EENA4 noted this, stating that Angola is yet to 
institute checks against politically exposed persons (PEPs).125  This shortcoming is 
remediable by HLMs, which provide a platform for networks between legislators and 
their interactions with IFIs/FATF. This may engineer some competitive pressure 
amongst agents to comply, however, this may elicit varying responses based on 
resources, expertise and political will.  
 
Additionally, HLMs have revealed a top-down approach where developing and 
emerging countries meet the principals to seek solutions for their home-grown 
questions, rather than quizzing them on the suitability of recommendations or laws.126 
However, this is an inconclusive statement given that HLMs are not only sparsely held 
but are rarely publicised. There is therefore insufficient evidence on interactions 
between principals and agents. Nonetheless, the practice has continued because it is 
capable of generating political will from the legislatures of low income countries. It 
also empowers them with requisite information127 to push for increased resources in 
combatting ML/TF, challenge the executive arm of government, and facilitate national 
co-ordination amongst agencies.128  
 
Secondly, technical assistance (TA) bridges information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent in the re-modification and transplantation of standards. TA, 
which is carried out at national and regional levels, can be defined as ‘non-financial 
assistance provided by local and international specialists which take the form of 
information sharing, expertise dissemination, transmission of working knowledge and 
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consulting services.’129 The IMF refers to this as ‘building human and institutional 
capacity within a country to help government implement more effective policies, 
leading to better economic outcomes.’130 This description unveils a two-way stream; 
while it provides an opportunity for the agent to learn from principals and improve their 
drafting compliance levels, it also allows the principals to build their knowledge base 
on the agent so as to tailor their assistance programmes. 
 
TA is mainly employed because IFIs/FATF recognize that low capacity countries 
struggle to translate standards to legislation.131 For instance, in Nigeria, concerns were 
raised that ‘lawmakers and stakeholders in the financial sector are generally unfamiliar 
with AML/CFT issues.’132 Consequently, the FATF advocated for, and implemented 
robust interactions through a national coordination committee that included legislators 
and justice ministries/agencies that are also involved in legal policy, legislative drafting 
and mutual legal assistance. This robust national level TA recognises that although 
legislators are at the forefront of enacting laws, they are supported by other institutions 
that play a vital role in drafting and formulating legislation in accordance with 
international standards.  
 
At the regional level, the FSRB are also involved in training justice ministry/agencies 
staff. For instance, inbuilt in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering 
Group (ESAMMG) strategic plan for 2012-15 was  the need to consolidate regional 
AML/CFT capacity building, training and awareness raising programmes.133 This 
position resonates with GIABA. However, training is usually provided on request from 
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the FSRB. Thus, although GIABA noted that countries like Benin, Mali and Cote 
d’Ivoire needed support to strengthen their AML/CFT framework, it did not provide 
direct assistance because there was no formal request.134 To forestall information 
asymmetry through TA, the FATF Training and Research Institute (TRIEN) was 
established with the aim of granting government officials in FATF member countries 
access to comprehensive training and research programmes. 135  
 
The specialised TA provided by the IMF is a sequel to surveillance which identifies 
areas where TA can have the greatest impact. Thus, in certain countries, TA is focused 
on building institutional and human capacity for effective policy drafting. Although 
granted voluntarily, countries must pass the IMF guidelines which are in the form of 
prioritisation filters to engage in TA.136 IMF staff do not proceed on a one-way training 
stream but provide tailor-made assistance through engagement with countries over a 
period of time, thus, potentially resolving asymmetries.137  
 
The IMF has also included regional and country approaches in technical assistance 
through the establishment of 9 regional centres and various country offices.138 Thus,  
TA can be tailored to legislative guidance, such as enabling countries legislate 
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effectively on pertinent issues such as laws guiding the formation of the FIUs or 
restricting ML/TF through PEPs. The World Bank has done this, as evidenced by its 
sponsorship of the Joint Initiative by the Bank of Sierra Leone and Transnational 
Organised Crime Unit (TOCU) in drafting a National Procedure on Anti-Terrorism and 
Proliferation Financing.139 This was facilitated during a three-day workshop attended 
by relevant stakeholders such as the UN and other key bodies, where steps were agreed 
to curb illicit crimes. The interaction between IFIs/FATF and countries illustrates 
continuous engagement with agents.  
 
There are however difficulties in the effectiveness of TA projects in promoting 
successful AML/CFT strategies. For instance, TA is mostly led by regional and 
international bodies, usually in the form of workshops which hold for about two days 
per session. Such sessions are facilitated using a top-down approach where experts from 
developed countries provide technical-knowhow without being conversant with the full 
socio-economic and political issues in the host country. This prevents national 
stakeholders from contributing to the global standards or transplanting effectively and 
thus hinders the ‘global’ nature of the FATF recommendations. For example, the 
FATF’s TRIEN pulls government officials from member countries to engage in 
comprehensive training and research – which is then disseminated to low capacity 
countries with less mature AML/CFT regimes.140 
 
TA for each country usually occurs once within a five-year time-frame, the last in 
Africa being in 2012. This is ineffective given the fast changes in ML. For instance, 
cryptocurrencies are a new and evolving way for ML, a subject scarcely considered in 
2012. As already noted, training is usually offered to legislators who delegate drafting 
responsibilities to expert bodies or staff. This creates another agency relationship where 
information asymmetry thrives. However, follow-up MERs and ROSCs usually reveal 
an improvement in legislative drafts post TA, illustrating that despite the limitations of 
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this observatory and information exchange tool, it has provided a platform for improved 
law making, which is vital in combatting ML/TF.  
 
Thirdly, principals also interact with agents through sanctions, incentives or 
conditionalities. The distinction between incentives and sanctions are not always clear. 
Wagner states that, ‘incentives are often considered to be weak sanctions.’141 This 
perspective, which reveals the potential overlap between incentives and sanctions, 
indicates that, given that both ideals are in pursuit of the same goals, they are not 
necessarily opposites.142 Some differences exist between them. Incentives, which are 
usually in form of the granting of political and economic benefit to a country in 
exchange for specific policy adjustments are soft instruments.143 They are used to foster 
and maintain cooperative goodwill amongst states. This is evidenced by the fact that 
any grant of benefit usually involves interactions and agreements aimed at encouraging 
legislators to enact the requisite laws that would avoid the FATF’s listing. Conversely, 
sanctions are hard, hostile instruments or penalties which mandate a country to carry 
out a specific activity when there is a breach of international standards. Sanctions are 
usually achieved by taking away from such country rather than granting a specific 
advantage. At this level, there is minimal interaction. Consequently, Wagner has argued 
that sanctions are more effective than incentives because states value the marginal unit 
of a good taken away through sanctions than the benefit of the same amount added 
through incentives.144 Although closely related, conditionalities are neither sanctions or 
loans. Rather, they are conditions attached to the provision of benefits such as loans, 
debt relief or bilateral trade.145 
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The instrument used by the principal to enhance the agent’s compliance to the FATF 
standards depends on level of compliance and intensity of interactions. For instance, 
conditionalities may be issued to remedy a breach or simply to build interactions with 
agents to prevent a breach from occurring. Sanctions are however restricted to post-
breach occurrence. This can be typified with the case of a developing country failing to 
comply with the FATF recommendations 3 and 5, which mandates the criminalisation 
of ML/TF on the basis of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions. In such case, the 
principals would most likely issue a sanction or mandate compliance through 
conditionalities.146 Such hard stance may unearth the low level of interaction prior to, 
and during assessments which occasioned  a low compliance level. Hence, sanctions in 
form of listing would merit public censure through the placement of such countries on 
the FATF’s ‘high risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions lists’. Countries placed on this 
list would have to engage with FATF officials to facilitate de-risking as public censure 
may threaten financial flow and hinder market access.  
 
The level of engagement is however dependent on the specific list on which a 
jurisdiction is placed. Firstly, ‘jurisdiction with serious strategic deficiencies for which 
the FATF has called its members to apply counter-measures based on substantial risk 
to the international financial system’. This means that the country must show FATF 
officials that significant measures are being taken to remedy deficiencies.147 Secondly, 
‘jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies that have developed an action plan’. This 
means the FATF would only seek to ensure that the country implements its action plans 
whilst calling on its members to apply enhanced due diligence proportionate to the risk 
posed. Although it seems likely that countries with legislative deficiencies would be 
placed on the first list only, in the absence of legislative guidance, implementation 
would be problematic.  
 
                                     
146 FATF, ‘High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions’ (FATF)< http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/countries/#high-risk > accessed 10 February 2017; Note: This breach is considerably severe as 
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To avoid being listed, a number of countries have improved their interactions prior to 
assessments and ensured that their laws are properly transplanted. This was the case in 
Nigeria, where last minute efforts were initiated to avert sanctions over money 
laundering.148 After being blacklisted, Ghana strengthened its interactions and was de-
listed the next year.149 The effectivity of this interaction in ensuring transplantation and 
contributing to improved FATF standards is however questionable, because of conflict 
of interest and information asymmetry. For instance, in rushing to evade blacklisting, 
countries may engage in sham compliance by drafting legislation deemed suitable on 
paper. However, legislators may not follow up on other legislative roles, such as 
ensuring checks on the regulators and executive. Furthermore, legislators who work 
hand in hand with the government may also draft legislation to combat supposed 
enemies of the government or target opponents, safe in the knowledge that the 
‘immunity cloak’ prevents certain government officials from facing the wrath of the 
law.150 This information may be fed to the principal as improved compliance, whereas 
in actual fact it is the roadmap to implementing ML/TF.  
 
4.2.3 Interaction Between Principals and Agents in implementation and compliance  
 
The interaction between principals on the implementation of, and compliance with, 
AML/CFT standards fosters a unified approach towards agent states. Within the model 
of agency adopted by this chapter, the principal delegates standards by which regulatory 
and enforcement bodies ensure implementation and compliance. Such delegation grants 
authority to agents to carry out tailored projects in accordance with the principal’s 
objective post legislation. This illustrates the continuous need for interaction between 
actors to forestall agency slack post-legislation. The delegated and uninterrupted 
interaction further illustrates the ‘disaggregation of the state’. Although the state is 
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preserved as sovereign, the primary body responsible for implementation and 
compliance, the agents derive authority from the principal’s mandate which has been 
concretised via national legislation. This legitimises the interaction and network 
between principals and agents.  
As stated, agents within states include regulatory bodies such as, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Central Banks, FIUs, etc. These institutions, each answerable 
to their own global principals who are concerned about ML/TF issues, have dual roles 
in ensuring compliance with AML/CFT regulations. Firstly, they ensure the 
construction and synchronisation of regulatory rules for robust supervision of financial 
institutions that pose ML/TF risk. Secondly, they interact with financial institutions 
through supervisory and enforcement powers, utilised to checkmate non-compliance 
and protect the integrity of the international financial system. These institutions not 
only have enforcement divisions within their offices to enable swift response to cases 
of ML/TF alert, but also work in collaboration with other agents, such as the state’s 
enforcement officers and the judiciary. The issue then is how the principals, particularly 
the FATF/IFIs interact with the agents to ensure the resolution of conflict of interests 
for effective compliance with AML/CFT rules.  
 
As earlier stated, the interaction between the principal(s) and the agent is mainly 
through;   
1. High-level meetings  
2. Assessments   
3. Technical assistance  
4. Enforcement actions  
 
HLM, as discussed, gives the principal and the agents the opportunity to meet and 
exchange information on implementation and compliance strategies. The idea is that 
such meetings would inform effective transplantations and also input into the FATF 
rules update. Such high-level meetings occur through conferences, seminars, 
workshops or in-country meetings. Conferences may be organised by the Principal, 
agent or a third party. For instance, the Cambridge International Economic Crime 
 199 
Symposium which is usually attended by regulatory /enforcement officers and Principal 
representatives is organised by academics to foster high-level interaction to curb 
financial crime.151 
 
The IFIs spring meetings also gather private sector executives, regulators, lawyers and 
third parties to discuss regulatory and compliance issues.152 The 2017 spring meetings 
saw intense focus on Fintech and digital financial inclusion, with discussions on 
tackling regulatory issues that these raise.153 In-country meetings are also held as a 
prelude to technical assistance, with staff and members of various ministries and 
institutions – financial and non-financial. These meetings provide networked 
interaction between connected parties, a step towards strengthening the relationship of 
regulators and institutions with the enforcement agencies – such as the police who are 
considered extraneous to institutions profit ratio.154  
 
The interaction between various actors is premised on the fact that combatting ML/TF 
requires a co-dependent relationship between these institutions. In certain instances, the 
IFIs hold inter-ministerial meetings with country representatives, especially where it 
perceives that political will is the main issue at hand. The translation of these meetings 
to improved compliance and input into the FATF rules is plausible, but remains 
contentious. This is because although networked interactions may ensure that regulators 
and enforcement officers have a better relationship, a financial institution may remain 
unwilling to work effectively with enforcement officers at the expense of prosecutions 
or profit expected from ML transactions.155 Moreover, as would be seen, home-grown 
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compliance/enforcement solutions may sometimes be best suited to resolve compliance 
difficulties. In such situations, the FATF may seek to ensure that its rules reflect other 
means of compliance.  
 
IFIs/FATF carry out assessment of implementation or compliance to monitor adherence 
to set FATF standards.156 However, their modes of operation differ. The difference is 
predicated on the intrusiveness of their projects. For instance, the FATF carries out 
mandatory assessments through its mutual evaluation of a country’s compliance level 
to its standards.157 This exercise is usually carried out by secretariat staff and member 
country assessors158 or in particular cases, a composition approved by the FATF 
President.159 These may include pre-trained FSRB members or in cases of joint 
evaluations, staff of IFIs. These officials spend a period of 10 days within countries, 
assessing their private and public sector offices for technical compliance, and recently, 
the effectiveness of their AML/CFT regime.160 These in-country assessments do not 
occur in a vacuum but are based on prior research at the secretariat. This includes 
reviews of reports from countries via the ‘technical compliance update questionnaire’ 
which, combined with the previous MERs, follow-ups and ‘information on 
effectiveness’ of countries AML/CFT regime is utilised to pre-assess a country’s 
compliance level.161 The country, sometimes in collaboration with the assessment team 
makes a risk-based decision on focus areas during the onsite visits.162 Findings from 
these time-bound evaluations are however, rarely discussed with countries in order to 
understand reasons for non-compliance. Instead, discussions are based on the need to 
justify findings. The short period allotted to a country’s representative during the 
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plenary session reflects this;163 although countries engage in discussions on the initial 
two drafts of the MERs and are permitted to respond, evaluation reports published post-
adoption by the plenary session rarely reflect changes to the MERs.164 Thereafter, the 
MERs are published, a process designed to publicly shame the agents within a country 
into compliance. This step signals agency slack, with resultant interaction between the 
principal and agent to remedy defects. Although the FATF assessment process 
facilitates interaction with countries, it is intrusive, usually reporting on technical 
compliance and effectiveness from a perspective of non-ownership. This position may 
actually shroud the true compliance level of a country.  
 
Conversely, the IFIs interact with agents through FSAP programmes165 which test the 
soundness of a member state’s financial systems. The tests identify risks and 
vulnerabilities that hinder compliance to FATF standards.166 BRICs, along with 25 
other countries with systemically important financial sectors are however required to 
undertake mandatory financial assessments under FSAP. This decision warranted the 
inclusion of the FSAP under the IMF Article IV surveillance. It acknowledges that 
ML/TF may cause macroeconomic and financial instability which can be facilitated by 
these countries that are largely connected and pose contagion risk.167  In such cases the 
IMF enters discussions with the central bank governor or financial ministers of such 
countries in order to generate political support to combat ML/TF. This suggests that the 
IMF has greater interaction with these countries. Conversely, the Evaluation Report of 
the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF illustrates that IMF interactions are least 
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effective with advanced and large EEs.168  They were most effective with developing 
countries.169 This may be attributable to the fact that instead of discussions, the IFIs 
impose conditionalities on certain developing countries to mandate legislation and 
subsequent compliance with FATF standards. These conditionalities are usually 
beneficial in ensuring actual compliance, but have the disadvantage of altering the 
democratic ideal and accountability model of governance.170 
 
Nevertheless, the FSAP has remained largely voluntary in developing countries. 
Through its creation of the ROSC, the FSAP reports on member states implementation 
of AML/CFT recommendations.171 Reports produced from the assessment exercises are 
also reviewed in partnership with countries. As publication of such reports are at the 
discretion of the country in question,172 a country may withhold publications that might 
have disastrous consequences for it. This illustrates how IFIs uphold and respect 
sovereignty.  
 
Furthermore, interaction between countries and IFIs is largely dependent on the stage 
of assessment. At the pre-assessment stage, IFIs are usually involved in extensive 
research on countries, thus, interaction is usually limited to exchange of information 
which arms the IFIs with additional material data on the country in question.173 The 
provision of this information entails a process of self-reflection, which gives the 
regulatory/enforcement bodies and FIs sufficient time to plan the assessment 
procedures. Interaction between principals and agents is more intense during the 
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assessment, as the IFIs usually engage with regulatory bodies, FIs and other market 
participants (e.g., insurance agencies, pension funds, mutual funds) to gain a robust 
understanding of market developments, structure, outlook and risk management 
practices.174 This requires a two-way communication for robust understanding of the 
purpose of the FSAP and the importance of participation for propelling international 
financial stability. This project is usually carried out in collaboration with the country 
representative of IFIs, thus making for a more responsive assessment. Additionally, 
although assessment occurs within a 2-week time frame, the presence of a country 
representative of the IFIs resident in host countries significantly bridges existent 
information asymmetry, as these actors can furnish assessors with adequate context and 
information.  
 
The results of assessments are crucial in determining the direction of the principal’s 
relationship with the agent-state. Thus, where the agent is considered an ‘amoral 
calculator’175 in the sense that the regulatory body and institutions are purely driven by 
profit or the probability of being caught, the principal may categorise the agent-state 
under ‘high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions’. This ‘list’ sanction requires FATF 
core members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the 
international financial system from the ongoing and substantial ML/TF risk emanating 
from that country.176 Conversely, an agent-state may be considered to be either a 
‘political citizen’ who will adhere to regulations considered of public interest, even in 
the absence of political will. Or ‘organisationally incompetent’, where it has ineffective 
internal governance to propel compliance. In these cases, the principal will interact with 
these agent-states through continuous monitoring and TA. Sometimes, there is no clear-
cut solution and the deficiency of a country falls within grey areas. The IFIs may then 
decide that a country needs both sanctions and TA.  
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When an agent-state is intimated of the need for TA, it may or may not request for this 
service. When it is requested, the principals (IFIs) have to approve before the service 
can be provided. In offering this service, the IFIs interact mainly with regulatory and 
supervisory bodies. Training is offered on how to scrutinise financial and non-financial 
institutions under their purview without falling prey to ‘regulatory capture’, as well as 
how to maintain confidence in the financial system.177 Such training ensures that these 
regulatory bodies are knowledgeable on how to identify credible data from institutions 
and respond effectively to ML/TF risk, by drafting or updating regulations to fill any 
regulatory vacuum.  
 
Training is also offered on how to synchronise efforts with enforcement agencies such 
as FIUs, the police and courts to ensure swift and effective measures to combat ML/TF. 
The IFIs also train judges and judicial agencies to handle ML/TF evidence, so as to 
bring every case to an even-handed end. Such training is however not country-bound 
given the borderless nature of illicit crimes. The IFIs also encourage cross-border 
interactions via FIUs for real-time exchange of information in cases of cross-border 
crimes. The FATF wields sanctions with the IFIs’ backing when an agent is in breach 
of its recommendations. In such cases, the principal publicly ‘lists’ non-compliance. It 
also requires the submission of a progress report from the country and requests that FIs 
in other member countries give special attention to any transaction involving the ‘listed’ 
country. Where the country is a member, the membership is suspended. Osborne notes 
that the allied influence of observer members of the FATF would ensure that 
recalcitrant states bear the consequences of their actions.178 
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Despite the harsh stance taken against non-compliant countries, the problem-solving 
capacity of principals has been thrown into question as a result of cases of alleged agent-
state failure. For instance, despite sanctions and training offered to the appropriate 
agents, money is still moved without any report being flagged for follow-up. In Nigeria, 
the Central Bank, NFIU and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission received 
training from the principals to fortify their staff with skills against ML/TF risk. These 
engineered the indigenous political will to come up with home-grown solutions to 
combat financial crimes. The Bank Verification Number (BVN) exercise, one of such 
schemes, interlinks all financial accounts held by one individual.179 The aim is to 
promote transparency within the financial system and combat illicit crimes.180 Also, a 
single treasury account was introduced by the Federal Government of Nigeria to ensure 
that all funds belonging to government parastatals are kept with the Central Bank.181 
The aim is to prevent diversion of state funds and enable the Central Bank keep track 
of disbursements. These solutions received support from civic organisations such as 
BudgIT which applies technology to track financial disbursement and expenditure.182 
 
Nevertheless, there remained a gap in implementation and compliance. A news report  
uncovered through financial whistleblowing revealed that with approval from the 
presidency, government parastatals had received sums in excess of $50 million in cash, 
which were stored in apartments.183 This Indicates that such solutions just encouraged 
cash circulation amongst PEPs. This gap reveals the limit of the FATF 
recommendations in combatting ML/TF. Whilst GIABA focused solely on 
financial/non-financial institutions as a conduit of funds for PEPs, there is limited focus 
on the origin of these funds – the government coffers itself.  
                                     
179 Ehi Eric Esoimeme, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Bank Verification Number Project Introduced by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria’ [2015]. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Okechukwu Innocent, Chukwurah Daniel, Iheanacho Emmanuel, ‘An Analysis of Pros and Cons: 
Treasury Single Account Policy in Nigeria’ [2015] 5 (4) Arabian Journal of Business and Management 
Review (OMAN Chapter) 20, 23.  
182 BudgiT, ‘budgiT’ (BudgiT, 2017) < http://yourbudgit.com/about-us/ > accessed 10 July 2017.  
183 Sani Tukur, ‘How Nigerians Can Make Money, be Protected in New Whistle Blowing Policy – 
Finance Minister’ (Premium Times, September 21 2016) 
<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/218643-nigerians-can-make-money-protected-new-
whistle-blowing-policy-finance-minister.html > accessed 16 July 2017.  
 206 
Furthermore, institutions responsible for overseeing governmental laundering have 
repeatedly failed to work hand-in-hand with the NFIU or the EFCC to see cases to 
conclusion. Indigenous actions taken on the back of political will further illustrate the 
positive agency slack that exist within the actors. It reveals that TA programmes do not 
necessarily facilitate information exchange that inculcates the peculiarities of states 
which principals are sometimes unaware of. Rather, it cultivates a top-down approach 
where principals delegate to agents without fully contracting on unknown issues.  
 
Additionally, the interaction between principal and agent-states fails to capture the 
complex dual role of regulatory compliance officers who are charged with combatting 
ML/TF whilst maintaining confidence in the financial market. These roles are however 
conflicted in states where the regulator decriminalises, choosing instead to ridicule a 
company publicly by exposing the financial crime. The general public may lose 
confidence in the integrity of such a market. This implies treading a line between 
enforcing adherence to the FATF recommendations whilst evading release of 
information that would possibly damage the repute of the institution. Contrary to the 
tenets on which the FATF was built, regulatory bodies may be slacking from their 
delegation when protecting FIs from a ‘run’ and ensuring financial stability. Such slack 
may be corrected by finding a balance through TA and high-level meetings, as sanctions 
would prove unsuitable. This shows the interaction between various instruments 









4.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter commences by examining the relationship between the collective 
principals, (IFIs and the FATF). The evolution of their relationship is examined in light 
of AML/CFT rulemaking, coupled with the implementation and compliance measures. 
It argues that the synergy between the CPs was crucial in expanding the FATF’s reach. 
This was a catalyst for division of labor and specialization in the assessment of 
AML/CFT standards, whilst also allowing the CPs present a united front devoid of 
quality disparities. This synergy, driven by the FATF was however undermined by the 
inherent exclusion of ACs from contributing to the standards-making process despite 
being subjected to enforcement measures.  
 
The interaction between agent-states and CPs is then examined. It argued that two 
factors are crucial for understanding information asymmetry between these actors on 
ML/TF issues: the level of a country’s integration with the global financial system and 
its perceived compliance levels. It finds that the incentive for information sharing is 
highest when a country is ‘highly integrated’ with perceived high compliance levels. In 
opposite situation, the countries would usually engage strategically with the principal 
in other to evade observatory tools or sanctions. However, whilst robust, this 
perspective is limited in its inability to consider the borderless nature of crime given 
that laundering can originate from ‘low integrated’ countries to other countries. 
Acknowledging this flow of money between countries, this chapter examines the 
interaction between ‘highly integrated’ and ‘mid-integrated’ countries. Through a 
pictorial representation, it illustrates that these set of countries share information only 
when it is in their self-interest to, particularly when there is a continuous financial 
business that is of systemic importance to both parties. It however argues that even 
when countries are willing to exchange viable information, they may be limited by 
capacity challenges.  
 
It also argues that where information asymmetry continually thrives, the CPs are privy 
to tools to rein in the agent-states. The tools utilized are dependent on the circumstances 
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in question and the application of the inappropriate tool may indeed lead to an under-
regulation, as the tool would at best be inadequate.
 
Chapter 5 
Determinants of Africa’s Compliance Levels to the Global Anti-
Money Laundering Regime 
 
5. Introduction  
 
The efficiency of the global AML/CFT regime is largely dependent on the capability 
of countries to adopt and implement it. Majority of ACs are however beset with socio-
economic, legal and political challenges which impede their ability to transplant and 
comply, notwithstanding the FATF’s introduction of the risk-based approach. 
Consequently, the question is whether the commitment of ACs to the AML/CFT regime 
can be aligned with their compliance interests and capacity. Whilst the FATF argues 
that socio-economic, political and legal challenges should have no impact on 
compliance outcomes, these factors cannot be divorced, because, empirically, the 
absence thereof hinders the compliance trajectory of states.  
 
Section 1 examines ACs, acknowledging the historical and socio-economic 
dissimilarities between them. These considerations are not unconnected to the 
challenges faced by ACs in meeting the AML/CFT standards. Rather, they reinforce 
the need for a framework that would facilitate compliance, given that Africa serves as 
a fertile ground for ML/TF.  Section 2 examines the seemingly indigenous attempt to 
combat illicit crimes through the framework of the African Union (AU) and the FSRBs. 
Section 3 explores the regulatory environment across ACs, illustrating that majority of 
ACs are inundated by an interaction of legal and non-legal factors which affect or 
determine their compliance levels and regulatory responses. Section 4 presents the 
compliance levels of countries to the FATF recommendations and empirically 
evaluates the factors that influence the attainment of such compliance levels.  It 
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illustrates that pre-mature regulatory environments coupled with socio-economic 
challenges may indeed affect compliance. Section 5 knits the other sections together 
and concludes.  
 
 5.1 African States: Context 
 
Examining Africa’s socio-economic history reveals a chronology of setbacks, arguably 
from the pre-colonial era. Hence, although commodities trade was buoyant between 
ACs and the industrialized world during the early 19th century, there were structural 
inadequacies which hindered the continent’s economic growth.1 This argument, 
advanced by Davidson, is however limited to the extent that it perceived Africa’s 
setbacks as internal and distinct from colonialism.2 This perspective fails to 
acknowledge that prior to formal colonialism, there were external institutions that 
affected Africa’s interrelationship with developed countries.3 Dike agrees that the 
trading activities that preceded colonization occasioned the political subjugation of 
parts of Africa to Europe.4 Rodney adds that pre-colonial relations led to conquest of 
Africa by Europe.5 Analyzing the opposing arguments indicates that whilst internal 
structural shortcomings might have affected Africa’s economy, the role of external 
forces cannot be discounted.  
 
Perhaps, the socio-economic issues were exacerbated during the colonial era, where all 
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developed trade with China and India in iron, ivory and gold. In return, they received porcelain, heads 
and Persian/Arab Pots. As a result of Islamic influence, Northern Africa traded with Arab countries. See 
Randall L. Pouwels, The African and Middle Eastern World, 600 – 1500 (OUP, 2005).  
2 Basil Davidson, The African Genius: An Introduction to African Social History (Little, Brown and 
Company, 1969). 
3 Edward Alpers, ‘Rethinking African Economic History: A Contribution to the Discussion of the Roots  
of Under-Development’ [1973] 3 (3) Ufahamu A Journal of African Studies 97, 100; A.G Hopkins, ‘The 
New Economic History of Africa’ [2009] 50 (2) Journal of African History 155, 166.  
4 K.O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta (OUP, 1956); James Fenske, ‘The Causal History of 
Africa: A Response to Hopkins’ [2010] 25 (2) Economic History of Developing Regions 1, 17. 
5 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, 1972).  
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ACs, barring Ethiopia and Liberia, were subjected to colonial rule.6 Refuting the effect 
of colonialism, scholars have argued that Asian countries suffered a similar colonial 
fate, but their economies improved within a generation after independence.7 The merits 
of this argument cannot be discounted; it however fails to take account of the history 
of economic exploitation and psychological damage which ravaged Africa.8 The later 
part of the 19th century evidenced this; it was marked by capital and labor shortage, a 
catalyst of slave trade.9 Slave trade however did not only involve the trade of persons 
for goods, but settlement of the colonizers within Africa. Africans were used as laborers 
to harvest export items. Okigbo postulates that colonized states became exporters of 
goods such as minerals and commodities.10 Nunn validates this point through empirical 
findings which indicate that slave trade hindered the economic performance of 
countries.11 Colonial banks within ACs were also complicit in preserving the 
monopolistic position of colonies in the export-import trade,  through the provision of 
less favorable bank credit to Africans, than to Europeans.12 Such limited credit, coupled 
with the export trend which still subsists, has made ACs more susceptible to vagaries 
of changing global prices and external shocks than most diversified economies.13  
 
The subsequent introduction of neoliberal policies such as privatization, increased 
integration and deregulation in the 1980s worsened Africa’s position within the global 
financial system, as countries became more susceptible to external shocks.14 This 
                                     
6 Leigh Gardner, ‘Was Independence Really Better than Colonial Rule? A Comparative Study of Liberia 
and Sierra Leone’ [2013] 1, 3.  
7 The Economist, ‘The Heart of the Matter’ (The Economist, 11 May 2000) < 
http://www.economist.com/node/333437  > accessed 20 October 2017.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Biodun Olamosu and Andy Wynne, ‘Africa Rising? The Economic History of Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
(International Socialism, 2015) < http://isj.org.uk/africa-rising/#footnote-263-14> accessed 18 October 
2017.  
10 Pius Okigbo, ‘Problem, Crisis or Catastrophe: Any Exit for African Economies in the 1990s?’ [1993] 
3 Nigerian National Merit Award Lectures (Fountain Publications). 
11 Nathan Nunn, ‘The Long-term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades’ [2008] 123 (1) The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 139, 144. 
12 Chibuike Ugochukwu Uche, ‘Foreign Banks, Africans, and Credit in Colonial Nigeria, c. 1890 -1912’ 
[1999] 4 Economic History Review, LII 699, 699; Chibuike Uche, ‘Indigenous Banks in Colonial 
Nigeria’ [2010] 43 (3) The International Journal of African Historical Studies 467, 472. 
13Thankdika Mkandawire and Charles C Soludo (eds.) Our Continent, Our Future: African Perspectives 
on Structural Adjustment (Codesria, 1999) 42. 
14 Cull Robert, Lemma Senbet and Macro Sorge, ‘Deposit Insurance and Financial Development’ (2005) 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2682, 16 < 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/813041468739789102/pdf/multi0page.pdf > accessed 18 
November 2017.  
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occasioned inequality within the continent.15 For instance, economically, the continent 
is dominated by Nigeria with 405.1 billion dollars of nominal gross domestic product 
(GDP).16 Nigeria is followed by Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Angola with a 
cumulative GDP of 679.6 billion dollars,17 whilst Sao Tome and Principe, Comoros, 
The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau rank the least with a cumulative GDP of 2.98 billion 
dollars.18 Regionally, North Africa is the least poor region, closely followed by 
Southern Africa.19 Findings also reveal that 90% of the poorest people in Africa live in 
East, Central and West Africa.20 These statistics illustrate the inequalities triggered by 
a combination of external and internal factors.  
 
More disturbing is the economic inequality that liberalization has created between 
Africa and the industrialized world. Africa holds only 4.4% of the world’s GDP based 
on purchasing power-parity (PPP) share of world total.21 This is negligible when 
compared to the BRICS’s cumulative 32.02% share, with China alone holding 
18.26%.22 These statistics provide a prism to examine the degree of integration with the 
global economy. Contrary to EEs, ACs have a lower degree of financial integration 
with the global economy.23 This demonstrates Africa’s challenges to creating an 
                                     
15 Biodun Olamosu and Andy Wynne, ‘Africa Rising? The Economic History of Sub-Saharan Africa’ 
(International Socialism, 2015) < http://isj.org.uk/africa-rising/#footnote-263-14> accessed 18 October 
2017. 
16AfDB, ‘African Economic Outlook 2017’ (AfDB, 2017) < 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEO_2017_Report_Full_Englis
h.pdf > accessed 18 October 2017.  
17 IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook: Subdued Demand, Symptoms and Remedies’ (IMF, October 2016) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/#front > accessed 18 October 2017; The World 
Bank, ‘The World Bank in Africa’ (The World Bank, 2017) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview > accessed 18 October 2017.  
18 IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook: Subdued Demand, Symptoms and Remedies’ (IMF, October 2016) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/02/#front > accessed 18 October 2017. 
19 Sabrina Alkire, Christoph Jindra, Gisela Robles and Ana Vaz, ‘Multidimensional Poverty in Africa’ 
(OPHI Briefing 40, 2016) < http://www.ophi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Global-MPI-2016-8-pager.pdf  
> accessed 18 October 2017. 
20 Ibid.  
21IMF, ‘IMF DataMapper: GDP Based on PPP, Share of World’ (IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database, April 2017) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/WEOWORLD/ADVEC/MAE > 
accessed 10 October 2017. 
22Ibid. 
23 Benedicte Vibe Christensen, ‘Financial Integration in Africa: Implications for Monetary Policy and 
Financial Stability’ [2014] 76 BIS Paper 11, 11; African Development Bank Group, ‘Financial Sector 
Integration in Three Regions of Africa’ (African Development Bank, 2010) <  
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
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inclusive financial system, a factor crucial for financial sector development and 
improved economic performance.24 The effect is that ACs are more likely to suffer from 
poverty and stunted financial growth.25  
 
The resulting shortcomings from integration deficit is further revealed by examining 
Africa’s banking system.  It is characterized by a high interest margin26 usually 
triggered by low competition in domestic banking, weak property rights and lack of 
financial infrastructure.27 Additionally, African financial systems only deliver on a 
limited range of products at high costs. The financial sector reforms in the 80’s was 
however not all bad news. Stirred by improvements in global conditions and the advent 
of technology, these reforms connected Africa to the rest of the world and led to 
improved performance in the real and financial sectors.28 Consequently, until recently, 
Africa’s finance and stock markets experienced slow but uninterrupted growth, 
irrespective of low capitalization and liquidity.29 Surprisingly, the continent proved 
resilient during the global financial crisis. ACs, particularly the East Africa Community 
(EAC), have taken to regional financial integration, with blocks of countries 
establishing a common market, custom union and common currency.30  
 
                                     
Operations/AfDB%20Regional%20Financial%20Integration%20REPORT_EN.pdf > accessed 19 
October 2017.  
24Lemma W Senbet and Isaac Otchere, African Stock Markets (IMF, 2008) < 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2008/afrfin/pdf/senbet.pdf>  accessed 20 October 2017.  
25 Benedicte Vibe Christensen, ‘Financial Integration in Africa: Implications for Monetary Policy and 
Financial Stability’ [2014] 76 BIS Paper 11, 20; African Development Bank Group, ‘Financial Sector 
Integration in Three Regions of Africa’ (African Development Bank, 2010) <  
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
Operations/AfDB%20Regional%20Financial%20Integration%20REPORT_EN.pdf > accessed 19 
October 2017; Cyn-Young Park and Rogelio V. Mercado, ‘Financial Inclusion, Poverty and Income 
Inequality in Developing Asia’ (2015) ADB Economics Working Paper Series 426, 7 < 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/153143/ewp-426.pdf > accessed 19 November 2017; 
Ross Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence’ (2004) NBER Working Paper Series 10766, 
84 < http://www.nber.org/papers/w10766.pdf > accessed 19 November 2017.  
26 Benedicte Vibe Christensen, ‘Financial Integration in Africa: Implications for Monetary Policy and 
Financial Stability’ [2014] 76 BIS Paper 11, 19. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Lemma W Senbet and Isaac Otchere, African Stock Markets (IMF, 2008) < 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2008/afrfin/pdf/senbet.pdf>  accessed 20 October 2017 
29 Ibid.; Allen Franklin et al, ‘The African Financial Development and Financial Inclusion Gaps’ [2014] 
23 (5) Journal of African Economies 614, 621. 
30 Christensen Benedicte Vibe, ‘Financial Integration in Africa: Implications for Monetary Policy and 
Financial Stability’ [2014] 76 BIS Papers 11, 15  
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Notwithstanding the laudable performance in terms of regional financial integration, 
financial markets in Africa are significantly less well-developed than other markets 
around the world on all indicators of financial development.31 Hence, regulators have 
sought to achieve financial broadening and inclusion through adherence to the Basel III 
requirements whilst also facilitating improved access to financial products or services.32 
However, it is indeed questionable if the level attained by Nigeria or Egypt in terms of 
financial growth can be replicated in other countries given the diversity of countries 
within Africa.33 Other financial markets within Africa are relatively underdeveloped 
and fragmented, further hindering effective replication.  
 
Notwithstanding the low degree of integration of ACs to the global economy, certain 
countries pose a risk to the global financial system given the high rate of corruption and 
financial crimes. Sub-Saharan Africa countries were recently ranked with an average 
score of 3134, with 0 meaning highly corrupt and 100 meaning clean.35 Country-by-
country differences also exist; whilst Botswana and Cape Verde rank as the least 
corrupt ACs, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Guinea-Bissau rank highest on corrupt 
standard globally.36 Consequently, there is increased poverty, injustice and stunted 
development of food security, health facilities, educational services and infrastructure 
in these countries, and Africa as a whole.37  
                                     
31 Christopher J Green, Colin Kirkpatrick and Victor Murinde, ‘Finance for Small Enterprise Growth and 
Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries’ [2006] 18 (7) Journal of International Development 1017, 
1027. 
32 Beck Thorsten and Samuel Munzele Maimbo, (eds.) Financial Sector Development in Africa: 
Opportunities and Challenges (World Bank Publications, 2012) 4. 
33 Christopher J Green, Colin Kirkpatrick and Victor Murinde, ‘Finance for Small Enterprise Growth and 
Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries’ [2016] 18 (7) Journal of International Development 1017, 
1027. 
34 This is lower than the global average score of 43. See, Transparency International, ‘Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2016’ (Transparency International, 25 January 2017) < 
https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 > accessed 19 
October 2017. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid (n 34).   
37 Mohamed Sultan, ‘How Illicit Financial Flows Drain African Economies’ (Open Society Foundations, 
21 April 2014) < https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/how-illicit-financial-flows-drain-
african-economies  > accessed 20 October 2017; Theophilous Chiviru, ‘Panama Papers Reveal Africa 
Losing Billions to Corruption and Bribery’ (One.og, 16 August 2016) < 
https://www.one.org/international/blog/panama-paper-reveals-africa-losing-billions-to-corruption-and-
bribery/  > accessed 19 October 2017. 
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For the above reason, The Economist once referred to Africa as a ‘hopeless continent’ 
that would continually suffer series of crises until it was able to develop a consciousness 
to resolving corruption.38 More unflattering is the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) estimates that the continent loses about US$50 
billion annually to illicit dealings, most of which is looted by government officials and 
business leaders to developed countries.39 This demonstrates the lax structures and 
culture in Africa that permit and foster laundering. More interestingly, it also illustrates 
that developed countries provide gateways for illicit transfers in the shape of 
anonymous offshore companies and investment entities which enable the facilitation of 
stolen funds overseas.40 Such gateways however have catastrophic effects on developed 
economies, contributing directly or indirectly to the financing of crime or terror.41 
 
Undoubtedly, a correlation exists between Africa’s historical context and its current 
socio-economic structures. Examining the relationship between these factors reveals 
how Africa’s colonial history has catalyzed lack of robust FIs, redundant political will, 
corruption, financial inequality and lack of education. Although the IFIs/FATF view 
these as factors that hinder countries attaining full compliance with the FATF 
recommendations, these factors are somewhat peculiar to ACs and reinforce the need 
for a suitable framework that allows ACs combat illicit crimes within a structure that 
has not set it up to fail.    
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39 The Guardian, ‘Africa Losing Billions from Fraud and Tax Avoidance’ (The Guardian, 2 February 
2015) < https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/feb/02/africa-tax-avoidance-money-
laundering-illicit-financial-flows  > accessed 20 October 2017. Commissioned by the AU/ECA 
Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, ‘Illicit Financial Flows: 
Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa’ (Track it! Stop It! Get It!, 2014) 
< https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf  > accessed 
20 October 2017.  
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accessed 19 October 2017; Roberto Saviano, ‘The Real Threat to Britain’s Borders is the Flow of Dirty 
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Importantly, given the threat that illicit crimes pose to the global economy and the 
sustainability of Africa’s economic growth, Africa has developed a framework to 
combat ML/TF.  
 
5.2 Africa’s Response to AML/CFT  
 
Responding to international pressures and certain homegrown factors, some ACs have 
taken reactive steps by formulating, signing  and domesticating conventions42 via 
national legislations. Consequently, in 2002, action plans were developed to ensure 
compliance to ML/TF in Africa.43  
 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), an initiative of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD),44 was launched to reinvigorate the African voice in 
decisions concerning Africa. The APRM recognized the relationship between ML and 
corruption (ML/C) and put in place a corruption control mechanism aimed at fostering 
the implementation of banking and financial standards under its thematic area of 
economic governance.45 A brainchild of Africa’s experience, the APRM illustrates that 
poor governance in one country can have far-reaching negative implications on a region 
or continent.46  
 
                                     
42  In 1999, the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now AU) adopted a Convention on the Prevention 
and Combating of Terrorism (the Algiers Convention).  
43 See Charles Goredema and Anneli Botha, ‘Africa’s Commitment to Combating Crime and Terrorism: 
A Review of Eight NEPAD Countries’ [2004] 3 African Human Security Initiative 1, 3. In 2004, the AU 
adopted a protocol to the Algiers Convention, which addressed commitments to implement the Algiers 
Convention and criminalize the financing of terrorism.    
44 Similar to the OECD reviews, the APRM entails periodic reviews of policies and practices of 
participating states to measure progress made towards achieving the mutually agreed goals and 
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45 Anthony Afful-Dadzie, et al, ‘Tracking Progress of African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Using 
Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Method’ [2014] 43 (8) Kybermetes 1193, 1194.  
46 Charles Goredema and Anneli Botha, ‘Africa’s Commitment to Combating Crime and Terrorism: A 
Review of Eight NEPAD Countries’ [2004] 3 African Human Security Initiative 1, 1. 
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The ML/C objective is assessed against the standards and codes of the United Nations 
and African Union on ML/C, the FATF recommendations and the International 
Standards on Auditing.47 Participating countries are subject to a 5-stage review 
process.48 The risk-based approach49 benchmarks backed by indicators come in form 
of open questions requiring documentary evidence in certain instances.50 Examining 
the APRM processes shows that it synchronized international and regional standards 
with the aim of propelling implementation of standards, thus revealing external 
influence.51  
 
Nonetheless, the language of the APRM, which lacked precision, and its assessment 
processes warranted subjective and conflicting interpretations, thus lacking 
measurability. Also, staff of universities and research institutions are responsible for 
filling out assessment questionnaires.52 Thus, contrary to the objectivity portrayed by 
the APRM process,53 the resulting Country Review Reports (CRR) are prejudiced. For 
                                     
47 NEPAD Secretariat, ‘NEPAD/ HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI, 6th Summit of the NEPAD 
Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee; Nigeria Objectives, Standards, Criteria and 
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instance, the cases of Burkina Faso54 and Nigeria55 illustrate characteristic differences. 
Whilst both countries had evident ML/TF threats given their porous borders and cash-
based economy, the 2008 CRRs, assuming that ML/TF were alien to ACs, reported that 
ML did not seem to be a concern for both countries; TF was also unmentioned in the 
reports.56 Nigeria however interpreted the standards differently and took action to 
combat ML/C by legislating and putting legal structures in place to ensure 
enforcement.57 Consequently, Nigeria introduced laws on TF and fortified its 
regulatory policies. Subsequently, Burkina Faso also promulgated laws on ML.58 
Whether the legislative progress was due to the APRM cannot be ascertained, 
particularly given the initial flippant attitude by Burkina Faso and the fact that Nigeria 
wanted to leave the FATF’s blacklist.59 
 
Furthermore, it is indeed disputed whether the independent panel or heads of states 
were able to call Burkina Faso to order during its non-compliance period resulting from 
the misrepresented CRR. The APRM was a voluntary consensus-oriented mechanism.60 
Unlike the FATF or the IMF/WB, the APRM does not issue sanctions or impose 
conditionalities through aid. It does not blacklist or threaten suspension61 when 
countries fail to meet the required benchmark on AML/CFT. The APRM mechanism 
presumes that voluntary participation entrenches sovereignty and indicates political 
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Mechanism, May 2008) < 
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will and would thus facilitate good governance, peace and security.62 In practice, lack 
of compulsion may occasion difficulties in accession and compliance.63 This 
demonstrates why eighteen (18) ACs have refused to subject themselves to the APRM 
evaluations64 and, more fundamentally, erring countries have the opportunity to 
withdraw.65 Contrary to expectations, the non-enforcement approach of the APRM is 
likely to reinforce non-compliance and thus fail to incentivize political will. This 
informs why Hammed and Kobo advocate for sanctions,66 emphasizing the imperative 
need for an indigenous mechanism to ensure compliance.67 Without an appropriate 
monitoring and evaluation structure to ensure data analysis, the APRM will remain a 
cosmetic exercise without effect in the real world of policy and decision-making.68 
 
The APRM is further critiqued on the ground that its review process is a measure to 
assure international creditors of Africa’s determination to repudiate intolerable 
practices.69 It therefore appears as a donor imposed plan, repackaged under an alleged 
African ownership.70  This argument indicates that sovereignty is not necessarily 
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preserved, as supposed ‘African’ decisions are subject to external influence. This is 
further reflected given that the engineering of NEPAD by ACs was supported by the 
G8.71 It is however realized that Africa cannot combat ML/TF in isolation. Thus in 
2002,  the APRM’s steering committee proposed an action plan aimed at adopting and 
strengthening AML/CFT laws and promoting compliance with international AML/CFT 
standards.72 Further to this, the APRM forum approved the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) as one of the categories of partners to support the peer review process.73 The 
AfDB comes with a form of compulsion given that its Articles of Association entrust it 
with fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the proceeds of any loan it makes or 
guarantees are used only for the purpose of the loan.74 The aim is to prevent fraudulent 
transactions that may disguise the origins of proceeds of crimes/profits from corruption 
and use of the banks.75 Additionally, the AfDB has assisted in ensuring that laws and 
strategies are in compliance with international standards and norms.76 It has also 
intervened to guarantee that FIUs work together, thus promoting a unified approach to 
combatting AML/CFT.77 
 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the APRM has been lauded for appreciating the 
historical contexts and developmental stages of ACs. Upon this premise, it has stated 
that all countries are not expected to reach their highest level of performance 
simultaneously. This has however not encouraged countries to ratify and implement its 
processes. For instance, although the AU AML convention was adopted in 2003, at the 
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same time as the UN convention,78 evidence has shown that the AU convention has 
been ratified by fewer states, illustrating no respect for the AU’s likely reactions.79 
 
Hence, FSRBs, headed and run by African nationals (with international organizations 
as observers), have been perceived as more promising for curbing regional and 
continental ML. It is assumed that the African nationals are well versed in local issues, 
thus giving regions leeway in deciding their risk-based approach (RBA) in line with 
their peculiarities. For instance, the Central Bank of Nigeria and Kenyan regulators are 
supervising the niche created by mobile banking within the context of a more relaxed 
CDD.80 So far other regions in Africa have set up their regional bodies. These regional 
efforts signify Africa’s willingness to comply, but compliance levels have been far from 
impressive. 
 
5.3 Compliance by African States  
 
IFIs have argued that despite the internal factors that propel compliance to international 
standards, ACs are subject to the same standards as other countries. The logic is that 
the AML/CFT regime is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain. Given the 
borderless nature of ML/TF crimes, astute criminals would reroute their finances to 
countries with weaker regimes.81 Consequently, failure to meet the compliance levels 
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required in acceding to those standards would warrant financial isolation and 
reputational damage. This hard stance does not take into consideration the historical or 
socio-economic peculiarities of ACs that hinder compliance. By using the same 
benchmarking structure for every country, it can be argued that ACs are simply set up 
to fail, a catalyst for unmerited sanctions.  
 
Scholars have increasingly sought to understand the reason for varying compliance 
levels across ACs.82 Flowing from the pre-conditions for effective regulations and the 
compliance drivers discussed in this thesis, this chapter argues that ACs are inundated 
by legal and non-legal factors which affect compliance to international instruments. 
These factors may be subject to a balancing act between internal and external drivers 
which determine the degree of compliance.83 However, whilst external drivers may 
propel formal or creative compliance due to the implementation resistance , internal 
drivers may propel proactive compliance if properly guided. EENA1 argues that this is 
not always correct, given that ‘change from within is often impossible, sometimes 
because of vested interest and – often time – it’s because of habit…[and] it is difficult 
to change habit.’84 This indicates the need for a balancing act between internal and 
external drivers for compliance, given that where external drivers push for compliance 
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in a manner that does not encapsulate the peculiarities of ACs, it may occasion a 
regulatory paradox – where standards adopted are counterproductive.  
 
5.3.1 Compliance as a Function of Legal Factors  
 
As a function of legal factors, however debatable, compliance is chiefly influenced by 
three factors:  
 
1. Law reflecting society;   
2. Enforcement driven compliance; and 
3. Compliance engineered by democracy and rule of law.  
 
Evaluating these factors in turn illustrates how a robust regulatory environment backed 
by sturdy legal factors are crucial determinants for effective compliance. Where, 
however, these factors are not effectively ingrained within a country, they hinder the 
degree of compliance to AML/CFT recommendations that that country can attain 
notwithstanding external factors.  
 
5.3.1.1 Law: Mirroring Society to Combat ML/TF  
 
 
As discussed, the indigenous attempt by ACs to curtail ML/TF proved unsuitable and 
recorded limited success. It was modelled on the existing international standards 
alongside the perception that illicit crimes, particularly terror funding was alien to the 
ACs. Hence, ACs did not proactively legislate or implement frameworks to combat 
these crimes.85 This lackadaisical attitude, which reflects law as ‘mirroring society,’ 
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was further aided by the voluntary consensus decision making process which lacked 
sanctions to call countries to order.  
 
Yet, there remained an urgency to curtail these illicit crimes, which worsened with the 
liberalization of markets. Consequently, ACs paid more attention to the vast range of 
general and specialized international institutions established to ensure that every 
country transplanted and implemented the FATF recommendations via legislation.86 
This shift in attention focused on the ‘transplantation of laws’ was not voluntary or 
through rational responses to material incentives. Rather, it can be attributable to 
external pressure to fulfil obligations under international agreements.87 Sharman 
attributes the willingness of states to transplant laws to the diffusion of policies.88 He 
argues that the diffusion of the AML/CFT regime amongst ‘weak states’ is driven by 
discursive power-based mechanism, a combination of direct coercion, mimicry and 
competition.89 Whilst direct coercion works to ensure legislation and implementation 
through sanctions, mimicry is focused on the transplantation of standards to law within 
states. The fact that mimicry backed by coercion can elicit compliance in ACs gives 
credence to how compliance may be influenced by powerful states through 
international institutions and not the growing indices of ML/TF in the African terrain.  
 
The extent to which this external influence served as a catalyst for proactive compliance 
is questionable. Mainly because, although the international regulatory standards proved 
largely workable in developed jurisdictions, they have proved unsuitable and 
ineffective in stimulating proactive compliance in various ACs. This compliance 
deficiency is further perpetuated by the weak legal and institutional structures, 
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embedded in a culture of pervasive corruption. These challenges beg the question, to 
what extent can laws be transplanted in a way that stimulates compliance?  
 
Legal comparativist have engaged in a discourse on the practicality of transplantation. 
Watson strongly argues that the idea that law mirrors society is a fallacy, as change in 
the law is divorced from the workings of any historical, socio-economic or cultural 
substratum – but is rather a function of rules imported from another legal system.90 
Consequently, he argues that legal transplantation is not only practical but easy. 
Differences within jurisdictions does not limit the transferability of laws.91 It is against 
this backdrop that Sharman postulates that developing or perceived ‘weak countries’ 
mimic laws and implementation strategies of developed countries. This perspective 
sees laws or rules as culture neutral and assume that they can be transported across 
countries. Consequently, Sharman argues that developing countries adopt laws and 
implementation strategies for two distinct but interrelated reasons: to replicate recorded 
successes of pioneering countries and as a mere symbolic exercise to avoid a penalty 
or receive associated benefits.92 The results of these are seen in marginally improved 
compliance ratings granted to countries that have replicated laws which were not 
modified to fit into a country’s local context by a comprehensive risk assessment.93  
 
Legrand however disputes Watson’s perspective. He argues that rules are more than a 
series of inscribed words, but rather, are contextual.94 Hence, words cannot be divorced 
from their historical, socio-economic, cultural or ideological underpinnings. Therefore, 
when rules are technically integrated into a different legal order, the host jurisdiction 
will understand it differently because of cultural differences and distance between the 
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originator and host jurisdiction. Thus, the interpretation of a rule within a different 
context would at best be subjective, given the insensitivity of the originator to the 
cultural dissimilarities of the host jurisdiction.95 Consequently, the crucial element of 
the meaning of the rule does not in fact survive the journey from one legal system to 
another. Therefore, as the understanding of the rule changes, so does the meaning.96 
Against this background, Legrand argues that legal transplantation does not take 
place.97 
 
The AfDB supports this position, arguing that locally researched policies are better 
suited to ensure sustainable development for Africa than the transplantation  of 
international laws or standards.98 Spataru-Neguru further contends that there is 
evidential proof that transplanted laws usually cannot achieve the same results or fulfill 
the same aims.99 This argument assumes that results caused by laws are limited to a 
specific time and place. Sharman buttresses this with evidence that the effectiveness of 
AML policies in developing countries have remained marginal, whether categorized as 
successful in disrupting criminal finance and illegal activities, or in terms of greater 
benefit for the society which overrides the cost of regulation itself.100  Thus, although 
transplantation leads to improved compliance ratings, the proactive compliance levels 
are neither unusually high nor low, illustrating that states are merely concerned with 
achieving minimum acceptable standards.101 
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However, other scholars have argued that treaties and conventions can be easily 
transplanted, since they are rooted in negotiations amongst countries reflecting general 
interests. They argue that given the convergence of countries to address AML/CFT, 
such laws cannot be designed in isolation. Barak-Erez contends that legislations on 
AML are not necessarily ‘mimicked’ as it is expected that the international model or 
conventions can lead to similar laws in host countries.102 These arguments fail to take 
into consideration the composition of international AML/CFT standard setting bodies, 
which excludes ACs and thus suffers from democratic deficit. According to Legrand, 
this restricts host states (which in this case are ACs) from realizing the originators’ 
vision of their world.103 This deficit hinders the originator’s ability to decipher how its 
circumstances differ from the host states. Instead of organising diversity of discourse 
around varying cultural forms, what is noticed is a crowding towards uniformisation.104 
It can be argued that a more democratic standard setting body would ensure an inclusive 
strategy that takes into consideration the perspective of less developed states, making 
ACs more inclined to comply proactively.  
 
Berliner asserts that transplantations along regional lines are more effective.105 Whilst 
this might be true, it constitutes a facilitating condition rather than a causal mechanism. 
The AU model illustrated a lack of indigenous enthusiasm in combatting ML/TF. 
Nonetheless, the establishment of the FSRBs has, even if in a limited way, created the 
context to ensure that transplanted laws work effectively. 
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5.3.1.2 Enforcement Driven Compliance  
 
 
In the absence of an adjudicatory structure, the FATF ‘list’ non-compliant/high risk 
countries publicly. This soft law sanctioning strategy is aimed at ensuring observance 
to prescribed standards.106 Resolving or circumventing this ‘stick’ which occasions 
attendant reputational damages and financial isolation warrants some measure of 
compliance.107  Nigeria recorded history as the first West African country to fall into 
the category of non-compliant countries.108 Nigeria was blacklisted following the 
FATF’s realization that it was unwilling to legislate on, or implement the AML/CFT 
legislation.109 Furthermore, at the national level, the FATF noticed that prosecutions 
against persons or sanctions against banks for failing to carry out their duties as scripted 
by the FATF were rare.110 The lackadaisical nature and willingness to hide information 
were also demonstrated by the reluctance of Nigerian officials to cooperate with the 
FATF evaluation team during their fact-finding mission. Egypt was also blacklisted on 
similar grounds.111  
 
To avoid the harsh repercussions associated with this sanction, these countries aligned 
with the request of the AML/CFT regime by legislating and subsequently 
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institutionalizing structures to combat illicit crimes.112 Training was also provided to 
improve the capability of judges to bring cases to an equitable end. Subsequently, these 
countries were delisted. However, although blacklisting has been able to secure formal 
compliance, its ability to secure proactive compliance has been questioned.113 This 
indicates that although countries may comply with the ‘black letter’ laws, they might 
remain deficient in reality. This is the case with most ACs that remain largely deficient 
despite their expected compliance. (See Figure 1*) Put simply, external pressure on a 
country with weak enforcement institutions does not translate to robust AML/CFT 
regulation, implementation and compliance. 
 
Moreover, countries that are unconcerned with the adverse effect of blacklisting may 
remain uncooperative and thus non-compliant. This is evident in the response of certain 
ACs that remained on the NCCTs list without taking the requisite steps to correct the 
situation.114 Conversely, there is evidence that the sanction system itself is fallible, as 
international institutions do not discontinue aid transfers to failing countries.115 Neither 
do FIs cease transactions with erring countries.116 For this reasons, arguments have been 
advanced in favor of non-coercive means of compliance.  
 
Non-coercive compliance measures are usually induced through instruments of active 
management, such as monitoring or review.117 These oversight measures are instituted 
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through the FATF’s MER which entails the gathering and review of information on the 
compliance levels of all countries.118 Information derived from such exercises usually 
form the basis for further interactions with countries and inform decisions on sanctions. 
This indicates that active management and enforcement sanctions are interrelated and 
cannot be divorced. For instance, prior to the blacklisting of Nigeria – the FATF pushed 
for active management to comply. However, this was hindered by bureaucracy in 
Nigeria and lack of political will, which culminated in the FATF sanctioning Nigeria. 
This sanction propelled Nigeria to become subservient to the instruments of active 
management. This works vice versa: countries may be unresponsive to the threat of 
sanction in the absence of some measure of persuasiveness.  
 
Collectively, the enforcement and management models are sometimes largely 
dependent on the degree to which rule of law is entrenched in a country, as well as the 
operationalization of democracy.  A country without these factors may undermine the 
effectivity of the AML/CFT compliance regime.  
 
5.3.1.3 Compliance Engineered by Democracy and Rule of Law  
 
 
The rule of law is the notion that powers of state and government can only be exercised 
legitimately if such actions are in accordance with applicable laws and laid down 
procedures.119 This connotes that government officials and citizens are bound to act 
consistently with the law.120 It can then be argued that the rule of law is not just a 
prerequisite for democracy and democratic practice, it also protects democracy.121 
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Against this backdrop, Simons argues that governments with respect for the rule of law 
and stable democracy are unlikely to harm their reputation by breaching commitments 
to standards.122 These arguments strongly establish a link between the rule of law and 
democracy. These factors are crucial in determining the degree of compliance with the 
AML/CFT recommendations through the enhancement of institutional and government 
staff capacity.  
 
Hence, it is unsurprising that the presence of domestic and democratic political 
institutions have been identified as key internal factors that influence government’s 
compliance with international instruments.123 This is backed by studies which suggest 
that undemocratic governments are less likely to comply than liberal democratic 
governments.124 The reasons for this include the democratic government’s respect for 
the legal process, human rights, electoral processes or the presence of domestic interest 
groups.125 Domestic interest groups, including civil societies and democratic political 
constituencies, are usually constrained within undemocratic governments and can 
pressurize democratic governments to comply. The limitations of governmental 
institutions and civil groups in ensuring compliance by ACs can be gleaned from the 
2016 Democracy Index which demonstrates that no AC has attained full democracy.126 
Rather, most ACs fall within the purview of hybrid or authoritarian democracy.127 
Whilst the former refers to countries with weak rule of law, civil society and judiciary, 
the latter refers to states where political pluralism is absent or highly circumscribed, 
with no free or fair elections, and government-controlled media.128  
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For example, Nigeria, as a hybrid democracy, disregarded its growing corruption index 
and resulting capital flight between 2010 – 2015.129 The growing incidences of 
terrorism, kidnaps and economic inequality resulting from corruption compelled civil 
societies to champion the ‘Bring Back our Girls’ campaign. The Goodluck Jonathan-
led administration fearing it would not be re-elected during the next election, took more 
active steps to arrest the situation in Nigeria, sadly the efforts could not salvage the 
defeat at the polls.130 
 
The recent backlash against the Kenyan election which occasioned threats of internet 
shutdown is also another example.131 The Kenyan judiciary salvaged the election 
irregularities by annulling the election and declaring a re-run.132 This illustrates that 
certain institutions within hybrid-democracy countries are driven by the rule of law. 
Conversely, in authoritarian governments the restriction on human rights would prevent 
interest groups from pushing the government for results,133however other political 
factors may propel their compliance. These arguments suggest that proper democracies 
are more reliable partners in ensuring compliance with AML/CFT, a shortcoming in 
ACs.134  
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& Guardian Africa, 16 January 2017) < http://mgafrica.com/article/2017-01-16-kenyans-fear-a-
possible-internet-shutdown-during-2017-presidential-election > accessed 10 May 2017.  
132 Jason Burke, ‘Kenyan Election Annulled after Result Called Before Votes Counted, Says Court’  (The 
Guardian, 20 September 2017) < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/20/kenyan-election-
rerun-not-transparent-supreme-court > accessed 1) November 2017.  
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nature of their governments.  
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ACs’ inability to embrace full democracy is further buttressed by their low rating on 
the Rule of Law Index, particularly in relation to the Regulatory Enforcement factor.135 
Botswana, Senegal, Ghana and Morocco are the only ACs ranked among the top 50 
countries globally.136 Others are ranked in the bottom 100, with Ethiopia, Egypt and 
Zimbabwe ranking the lowest.137 There is evidence that the rule of law has declined for 
70% of ACs over the past decade.138 This shortfall indicates that the mere existence of 
formal laws does not translate to unbiased implementation or enforcement. The law 
may in certain instances be used to perpetuate inequality. For example, in non-liberal 
regimes, like Zimbabwe, political leaders can legitimize undemocratic rules, such as 
tenure elongation amendments to the constitution.139 In more liberal democracies, like 
Ghana, the law can be used to ensure that political leaders have prolonged immunity to 
enable them evade prosecution for illicit transactions, at the expense of the country’s 
economic development. Consequently, it may be overgeneralizing to assume that only 
undemocratic countries would be antagonistic to compliance pressures, or that 
countries with entrenched rule of law would comply. Other factors, like culture, the 
country’s imperative need or sanctions, affect compliance.  
 
Whilst external sanctions may potentially be crucial in remedying the shortcomings of 
democracy and rule of law – a step which can alter countries’ incentive to comply, 
impact-related challenges must be considered. Sanctions are largely expensive for ACs. 
The law and economics approach that the rule of law will be adhered to if the cost of 
non-compliance is higher than benefits illustrates the position of ACs. For example, 
certain ACs may comply with the FATF recommendations in the belief that ‘associate 
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membership’ through the FSRBs may overweigh the alternative of financial exclusion. 
Some considerations include: enhanced financial integration, improved FIs and 
regulatory space or the attraction of foreign investments to strengthen their economies. 
Forced ‘benefits’ through sanctions may however trigger sham compliance which may 
be formal or creative, as opposed to proactive compliance.  
 
Given the shortcomings of external sanctions, IFIs more readily utilize the management 
models. Notwithstanding, the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation is dependent 
on the validity of laws, regulations and institutions. The rule of law is not necessarily 
just symbolic; it catalyzes practical changes. As a ‘pre-condition for effective 
regulation’, law is one of the critical primary basis upon which institutions can ensure 
compliance with the AML/CFT regulations.  
 
5.3.2 Non Legal Factors that Affect Compliance  
 
Law and other legal factors may not always be a determinant of compliance with 
AML/CFT standards, even when non-compliance would result in reputational damages. 
Black argues that it would be overly simplistic to assume that putting laws in place will 
result in improved compliance, solely on the basis of reputational concerns.140 For this 
reason, this section argues that there are non-legal factors which support the legal 
factors that ensure compliance. These are:  
 
1. Compliance based on reputational concerns;  
2. Political will, domestic conditions and policy priorities;  
3. Technical capacity and resources;  
4. Legitimacy and its effect on compliance; and  
5. Globalization and integration.  
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5.3.2.1  Compliance based on Reputational Concerns  
 
Despite their reputational damage, some ACs usually undertake speedy transplantation 
or unreasoned copying of unsuitable rules to avert sanctions. Nigeria was recently 
suspended from the Egmont Group for failing to autotomize its FIU through legislation. 
Facing an impending expulsion, Nigeria is yet to comply. As earlier mentioned, 
Chukwuma Utazi, Nigeria’s Senate Committee Chairman on Anti-Corruption has 
expressed the view that ‘they (Egmont) already said that if we did not comply, they 
would expel us, so there is no fresh news there…we are working towards it, nothing 
has been done.’141 Given the pendency of the issue for over five years, such a response 
from a high-ranking legislator indicates scarce concern for reputational damage. 
Conversely, Nigerian FIs are pushing for the adoption of legislations to evade sanctions, 
recognizing that sanctions would not only adversely affect their continued service and 
expansion plans, but may possibly lead to the devaluation of their assets. This shows a 
stark misalignment of the objectives of FIs, regulators and legislators, which must 
converge for reputation concerns to have the desired effect.  
 
The reputational damage of being blacklisted include limiting foreign investments, 
increased cost of remittances or hindering correspondent banking relationships (CBR), 
given the high level of regulatory checks required to conduct business with ‘listed 
countries.’142 The AfDB stated that ‘the existence of money laundering would reflect 
poorly on (a) country’s governance reputation and would be taken into account in 
decisions about future lending in the country.’143 This would impact the private sector, 
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affecting risk views and investment ratings. Nash states that ‘[w]estern investors and 
banks are currently reducing the number of correspondent banks they interact with that 
are based in Africa…due to their (in)ability to demonstrate that they have the right 
AML procedures and systems in place.’144 This severance of CBR or other transactional 
engagements, known as ‘de-risking’, recently occasioned the termination of CBR 
between Deutsche Bank (HP countries) and Africa (MP countries).145 This was done 
chiefly to avoid reputational risks to the bank.146 The SWIFT report indicates a more 
dire picture, showing that de-risking in Africa is on the rise with Angola losing 37% of 
foreign counterparties and Mauritius losing at least 18% between 2013 and 2015.147 
Nigeria has however managed to maintain limited international de-risking, although 
there is evidence that local banks have severed relationships with other African banks 
or services deemed risky – such as bureau de change and money transmission 
companies.148 The de-risking exercise has a negative impact on the African economy, 
as such relationships strengthen financial integration.149 
 
The adverse effect of de-risking includes the challenge of accessing products and 
services, such as international wire transfers – a predicament which can result in 
consumers engaging in alternative, less regulated channels. To avoid this, ACs are 
pressured into compliance with AML/CFT to retain their clients.150 This pressure may 
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facilitate increased compliance or may in fact occasion a paradox, thus worsening 
compliance in certain countries. Where the latter occurs, it usually indicates challenges 
within a country’s regulatory environment that warrants internal changes. These may 
include improvements in regulatory processes in order to build reputation within the 
global financial market. This would counteract the paradox of de-risking as a catalyst 
for financial exclusion or the ousting of customers. 
 
Management of FIs may also project the need to protect banking activities, as a means 
of leveling the playing field. These institutions may then force regulatory bodies to 
adopt uniform regulations so as to avoid a race to the bottom as competitors’ price each 
other out on the international markets. Thus, banks with domestic and international 
competitive advantages pressure regulators to implement the law in order to attract 
international business. Whereas banks with high compliance that acknowledge the 
irrevocable harm which ML/TF can do to reputation and integrity will advertise their 
compliance levels to attract investors and depositors.  However, although banks or 
countries with compliance challenges which nevertheless still attract financial 
investment may remain immune to reputational concerns. In the long run, lapses in such 
countries by FIs are noticed by the markets and regulators. This will inevitably attract 
sanctions or in some cases – withdrawal of licenses. These external pressure points 
expose the reputational concerns that occasion non-compliance,151 which adversely 
affects the banking industry.  
 
5.3.2.2 Political Will, Domestic Conditions and Policy Priorities  
 
It is expected that appreciation of the adverse effect of ML/TF on an economy would 
cultivate political will; which would effectively facilitate compliance and thereby build 
a nation’s economy. This suggests that when government leaders appreciate, by 
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empirical evidence, that ML/TF occasions capital flight152 and hinders the effectiveness 
of monetary policies, they would actively curtail such crimes.153 Such assumptions are 
premised on the rational perspective that countries want to curtail macroeconomic 
issues that hinder economic development.154 
  
Yet, evidence has shown that this is not always the case. For instance, indices in Nigeria 
show capital flight in billions of dollars to Dubai and Washington by chief executive 
officers of banks.155 According to a former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
such  ‘bank officials had economic power…(and) had bought political protection…they 
had financed elections of officers...every time I said it was time for us to take action, 
people said to me, you can’t touch these people, you’ll be sacked…they will kill 
you….’156 This revelation shows the interrelationship between heads of FIs and 
government officials, a situation which creates regulatory arbitrage, and undermines 
the regulator’s ability to generate political will. This position of arbitrage is however 
not constant, particularly in countries where there is perceived threat of terror by the 
government in power,157 significant loss of government revenue or proactive civil 
societies. In such cases, there is political will to combat ML/TF and meet international 
standards.158 For example, the national assembly of Kenya recently enacted the 
Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act 2017, imposing stiff 
penalties on those guilty of economic crime. This law, coming shortly before a pivotal 
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Kenyan election, may indicate strong political will accelerated by civil societies and 
threats by the electorates.   
 
Political will is however not always internally generated at the domestic level; it may 
also be externally engendered through a hub that facilitates cross country regulatory 
interactions. Such a hub, usually created by soft law bodies like the FATF, produces a 
competitive atmosphere where national authorities start to perceive international 
banking regulation as a technique for guarding against systemic risk or threat of ML/TF. 
Hence, national authorities in ACs may start to impose additional pressure on 
governments to implement laws, knowing that FIs with reduced fraud are less likely to 
experience collapse which may trigger systemic risk. This provides security but also 
works to facilitate the reparation of capital laundered back to the country of origin. In 
certain instances, political will may be foisted on a country through its external 
agreements, such as the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.159  
 
The extent to which a combination of soft and hard law can propel political will within 
states with weak institutional structures is debatable. Notwithstanding how political 
will is generated, it may be hindered by domestic conditions, such as thriving 
corruption, cultural and socio-political contestation. In ACs, for instance, there is a 
thriving culture of ‘man-know-man’ within and between FIs, regulatory bodies and 
customers, which facilitates illicit transactions. It is not surprising that corruption 
indexes reveal that 92% of all ACs score below 50% of 100% – averaging 33%, 
considerably lower than the global average.160 Africa cannot achieve improved 
compliance with this level of corruption, which cripples the continent’s ability to 
effectively adhere to the AML/CFT regime. It compromises the efficiency of various 
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institutions, including the judiciary, the executive. It also affects the ability of private 
institutions to hold erring customers to account.161 
 
By way of illustration, the banking sector’s effectiveness as gatekeepers requires 
identification and prevention of the influx of illicit funds into the economy. This is 
largely dependent on the tone or culture set by senior management of banks. But, in 
certain ACs countries, senior management have fallen short of this responsibility. This 
is evidenced by the KPMG survey which revealed that 34% of boards of directors do 
not take active interest in AML issues,162 the weakest region being West Africa. This 
is reflected in Nigeria where bank managers have aided and promoted corrupt practices 
by permitting secrecy, authorizing the doctoring of or refusing to disclose statements 
of suspicious account holders who are subject to investigation by regulatory bodies.163  
The endorsement of these acts is enshrined in the ‘big man culture’, which entices bank 
officials to aid politically exposed persons (PEPs) transfer illicit funds without 
reporting a breach of AML/CFT requirements.164 These acts furnished some directors 
lavish lifestyles until the perpetrators were charged for corruption.165 It is startling to 
note that no FI has been sanctioned for lapses in its ML practices,166 though the FCA 
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has fined a Nigerian subsidiary bank for failures in its AML controls.167  Sanctions on 
a bank would not only cause reputational damage in a competitive market,168 it would 
also alter the tolerant culture of bank officials to ML/TF cases.  
 
Corruption is also rife within the judiciary in ACs. In Nigeria, serious cases of ML have 
not reached their expected conclusion.169 This is usually the case with PEPs who bribe 
their way to freedom.170 Certain landmark cases have revealed the corruption in the 
judiciary as regards ML in Nigeria; for instance, the case of former Governor James 
Ibori of Delta State. Despite overwhelming evidence, a Nigerian judge dismissed the 
case ‘for lack of merit.’171 Other instances in Nigeria have illustrated that cases 
concerning PEPs who are cronies of the government are usually not seen to a conclusive 
end172 or ex-convicts are subsequently pardoned.173 Other ACs have similar instances, 
albeit to a smaller extent. Angola has had no record of enforcement or prosecution of 
ML-related offences to date. Botswana, Niger, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Uganda are 
reported to have poor prosecutions or conviction levels despite the numerous 
investigations carried out.174 
 
Also, cases of TF have not received the right attention from the courts. Prominent cases 
against businessmen on the allegation of laundering funds aimed at financing a terrorist 
                                     
167 FCA, ‘FCA Fines Guaranty Trust Bank (UK) Ltd £525,000 for Failures in its Anti-Money Laundering 
Controls’ (Financial Conduct Authority, 17 September 2013) < http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-
guaranty-trust-bank-uk-ltd > accessed 21 March 2015.  
168 Antoinette Verhage, ‘Between the Hammer and the Anvil? The Anti-Money Laundering – Complex 
and its Interactions with the Compliance Industry’ [2009] 52 Crime Law Soc. Change 1, 12. 
169 Abdullahi Shehu, Strategies and Techniques of Prosecuting Economic and Financial Crimes (GIABA 
Secretariat, 2012) 61 -76. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Bolaji Akinola, Authority Stealing: How Greedy Politicians and Corporate Executives Loot the 
World’s Most Populous Black Nation (AuthorHouse, 2012) 122. 
172 GIABA, ‘Annex to Nigeria 2nd Follow Up Report, Money Laundering Convictions’ (GIABA) -  < 
https://www.giaba.org/media/f/305_Annexe > accessed 12 March 2015. 
173Nnenna Ibeh, ‘US Threatens Sanctions Against Nigeria over Pardon for Ex-Convict Alamieyeseigha, 
Bulama’(Premium Times, 16 March 2013)  <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/125112-u-s-
threatens-sanctions-against-nigeria-over-pardon-for-ex-convict-alamieyeseigha-bulama.html > 
accessed 21st May 2015.  
174 Tanzania recently reported that it had 14 cases instituted in its subordinate courts since the 
promulgation of the AML legislation in 2006. Whilst ahead of its neighboring states, a continued failure 
to prosecute is an issue which must be addressed in both Tanzania and other ACs. Conversely, it can be 
argued that corruption level is not a determinant factor to the level of compliance. Botswana is the least 
corrupt AC, yet it remains deficient in AML/CFT regulations.  
 242 
organization – Hezbollah.175 These cases were however struck out on the application of 
the prosecutor.176 Following the striking out of these cases, the United States 
Government stated that it had frozen all assets owned by the accused persons and 
banned them from dealing with any US person. Similarly, a former Nigerian senator 
was charged with assisting and funding Boko Haram. The judge dismissed the case on 
the grounds of insufficient evidence, disregarding evidence that may have warranted a 
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.177   
 
Notably, the attitude of the judiciary is not solely reflective of corruption; it also 
illustrates the absence of judicial independence. Judges may be pressured into 
dispensing unmerited decisions through coercion or bribery, a practice rife in ACs. 
These constraints are however not unusual as legal scholars posit that domestic regimes 
uncharacterized by rule of law and the independence of the judiciary are less likely to 
comply with international obligations.178 Conversely, empirical evidence has also 
confirmed that countries with sturdier legal and regulatory systems have better 
developed financial intermediaries179 -  indicating that law does matter.180 
 
Private and public sectors’ actions on ML/TF reflect the mind of the executive body of 
the country. Some past corrupt PEPs accused of ML/TF were later granted state 
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pardon,181 with the right to run for public office. Efforts to demolish businesses of 
alleged terror funders were rejected by the government.182 The constitutional cloak of 
immunity, which insulates some PEPs from judicial proceeding while in office, also 
presents difficulties for developing countries.183 These instances reveal the absence of 
political will to curb ML/TF in Africa, which aids and perpetuates non-compliance. 
 
Treatises on corruption in FIs, the judiciary and executive arms of government may 
suggest that internal domestic factors drive and affect compliance to international 
AML/CFT standards. Scholars accede to the effect of discursive mechanism in 
pressurizing countries to adopt AML/CFT regime, but have argued that this in itself 
does not equate to straightforward success.184 They argue instead that countries 
themselves, through regulatory regionalism, dictate the process of implementation and 
enforcement, which is shaped by their wider socio-political contestations.185 This 
argument recognizes that trans-governmental regulatory networks like the FATF do not 
operate by establishing and empowering supranational authorities to oversee issues 
directly, but rather by transforming regulatory apparatuses and processes that states 
must adopt. They posit that regulatory regional governance occurs by transforming 
rather than supplanting statehood so that states enact regional governance initiatives 
domestically.186 Thus submitting that the FATF only dictates but does not implement 
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or enforce these recommendations, rather enforcement is reserved to FSRBs to 
coordinate mutual peer reviews aimed at eliciting compliance.187  
 
Myanmar, which shares similarities with certain ACs,188 typifies the cultural and socio-
political contestations which determine a country’s compliance. Myanmar legislated on 
AML/CFT and was subsequently de-blacklisted. However, it remained on the FATF’s 
list of countries with AML/CFT strategic deficiencies. Myanmar was not especially 
known as a country complacent with the culture of laundering through banks.189 The 
adopted legislations were instruments to undermine groups considered disloyal to the 
ruling regime as opposed to tackling predicate crimes, indicating deliberate flouting of 
the FATF recommendations.190 Certain ACs, like Myanmar, use their structures of 
AML/CFT regimes to witch-hunt opposition parties or past military dictators. This 
demonstrates why though ACs have been removed from the watch list, they are still 
largely deficient. Funds are lost through the low level of compliance and the rates of 
corruption and terrorist activities leave much to be desired.  
 
States that are predominantly financial inclusive tend to be more compliant to 
AML/CFT regimes.191 ACs however operate cash-based economies,192 which leave 
room for uncontrolled and unregulated cash movement, thus perpetuating laundering 
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and the financing of terror.193 An empirical study by Verdugo-Yepes illustrates that 
developing countries most likely to be cash-based economies comply to a lesser degree 
with the AML/CFT standard.194 Hence, the limitations in compliance do not rest so 
much in imperfect laws as in the lack of capability to monitor and counter ML through 
the informal sector.195 The poor enforcement levels in the informal sector, which 
Norton Rose Fulbright describes as ‘lackluster or non-existent’, are attributable to 
absence of information to prompt prosecution.196 Paradoxically, the AML/CFT regime 
itself prompts financial exclusion by barring the financially vulnerable and 
marginalized citizens from the financial system.197 This is because persons in the lower 
economic strata may not possess banks’ requirement for requisite ID’s, address or proof 
of address.198 Thus, the prospects of ML are increasingly rife, with criminals able to 
move dirty money within and across borders. Many ACs, rich in either oil or precious 
stones, frequently launder funds around the continent using these commodities,199 
thereby hindering the economic development of Africa.  
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Corruption, financial exclusion and other socio-political contestations illustrate the 
arguments put forward by scholars who recognize that domestic factors determine the 
likelihood of actual or proactive compliance.200This underscores the inability of ACs to 
effectively converge. Furthermore, the discourse on political will and domestic 
conditions and their relationship with compliance illustrates that the narrative behind 
policies and political change is set within the broader culture of a country which 
determines what is most deserving of focus, from a scale of varying socio-political and 
economic interests.201 The policy priorities of a country or region can be evaluated by 
its budgetary focus.202 Countries like Kenya and Nigeria apportion their highest 
budgetary allocation to security with a focus on ensuring stability and economic 
growth. This focus is however undermined by corruption solidified through ‘immunity’ 
granted to PEPs and issues concerning financial inclusion – a key determinant of 
AML/CFT compliance.203 Thus, whilst the FATF recommendations  focus on FIs – the 
real damage is done outside these institutions. Hence, the current FATF 
recommendations and other international standards do not appear to advance practical 
and realistic methods of preventing and detecting ML/TF in a predominantly cash-
based economy, or in countries reliant on a parallel banking system and informal value 
transfer. These issues are prominent in Africa and deserve tailored solutions.  
 
5.3.2.3 Technical Capacity and Resources  
 
The capacity of regulatory and institutional officers to carry out their duties efficiently 
determines the degree of compliance. The AML/CFT regime has progressively 
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expanded from banks to encompass other businesses that criminals might explore to 
launder or transfer illicit funds. Thus, insurance companies, lawyers, accountants, 
bureau de change and casinos are mandated to be actively involved in ensuring 
compliance with the FATF recommendations.204 This requirement particularly 
encompasses suspicious transaction reporting (STR) and CDD.205 However, carrying 
out these tasks in Africa requires technical skills to deal with complicated software,206 
which staff of financial and non-financial institutions may not be well acquainted with.  
 
The dearth of technical capacity can be illustrated with the inability to use or objectively 
translate reports of software generated STRs.207 For example, reports forwarded to the 
FIUs by officials are those that raise suspicion of ML/TF activity. However, this is not 
always the case due to the subjectivity of officials in filtering STR which can lead to 
erroneous judgments; thus permitting some cases of ML/TF to go unnoticed. This 
shortcoming was highlighted by the FATF MER report on Nigeria, which underscored 
instances of inappropriate filling of Cash Transaction Report (CTR) and worse still, 
instances where CTR were filed in place of STR.208 These illustrate how the pressure 
to provide reports to regulators are attributed to reputational benefits as opposed to the 
main aim of combatting illicit crimes.209 The FATF evaluation team echoed their fears 
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that FIs did not have a clear understanding of how to determine suspicious activity or 
the significance of incorrect CTRs reporting on the effectiveness of AML/CFT 
regulation.210 
 
Furthermore, illicit transactions still go unnoticed as departments within banks operate 
in silos, meaning the compliance department may be oblivious of the business of the 
retail or business banking divisions.211 This creates a risk where links between a 
customer and an account used for illicit crimes are missed, particularly with the 
exclusion of the compliance department from the business of banking. This has been 
exacerbated by the risk assessment criterion, which diminishes the standard 
requirements for opening or maintaining a bank account in cash-based economies,212 
where a large segment of the population may not have proper verification documents.213 
The ability of FIs to effectively ascertain the extent of documentation that suffices 
determines to a large extent the level of compliance of ACs to AML/CFT requirements.  
 
Research has also indicated that the compliance of the regulated may be undermined 
by ineffective regulatory supervision.214 The regulator’s ability to enhance compliance 
may be hindered by limited knowledge, technical capacity, resources and evaluation 
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mechanism.215 For instance, the FATF report on Nigeria noted that regulatory 
authorities did not appear aware of the FATF standard of $1000 for off-wire 
transactions and were unable to cite a reference illustrating that a lower threshold for 
occasional wire transfers existed.216 This knowledge gap illustrates difficulties in 
enforcing proper sanctions. Additionally, evaluation by regulators is usually preceded 
by formal information to the regulated on the proposed period of evaluation. This gives 
the regulated institutions time to prepare their books to meet the regulator’s 
requirements, making it more difficult to identify pitfalls and issue sanctions. Currently, 
none of the related regulatory bodies in Nigeria has issued sanctions for AML/CFT, a 
situation which prompted the US to threaten action.217 These shortcomings evidence 
that resources are to be directed at  training and re-training to ensure compliance –   
short of this, the ability of ACs to meet the regime’s requirements will be challenged.  
 
Capacity deficit is also evident in the various arms of government. Across ACs, 
legislators fail to grasp the fundamentals of the law, prosecutors fail to ensure 
admissible evidence is retrieved and preserved and the judiciary has insufficient 
training to effectively address cases of ML/TF. In the absence of properly crafted laws, 
criminals will use the existing lacunae to their advantage, thus weakening compliance. 
This is also the case with the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. Consequently, 
the IMF, World Bank, International Bar Association and various other global 
organizations have embarked on training in various ACs, to improve the capacity of 
staff to deal with AML/CFT cases.  
 
However, capacity deficit is not only based on human error. There is also the problem 
of inadequate infrastructure to effectively monitor information received by the various 
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agencies responsible for analyzing and reporting instances of AML/CFT. The FIUs 
across countries have repeatedly decried lack of necessary infrastructures to effectively 
carry out their duties.218 The primary reason is lack of requisite funding to boost 
institutional capacity and promote interagency coordination and international 
cooperation.219 It is therefore unsurprising that given the relatively low GDP and weak 
framework for financial regulation, ACs have low compliance levels. Moreover, 
externally sourced funds may influence operations. To this extent, Uganda and 
Tanzania’s dependence on foreign aid marginally improved their compliance levels, as 
these funds have conditionality to be fulfilled prior to the release of tranches.220 Lack 
of funding or sudden reduction in funds can adversely affect compliance levels.221 
 
5.3.2.4 Globalization and Integration  
 
Globalization and strengthening financial integration occasioned a degree of financial 
exposure and openness that ACs were not prepared for. The resulting neo-liberal 
policies worsened Africa’s position within the global financial market, making 
countries more susceptible to shocks. With low GDP economies, coupled with laxity 
towards resolving AML/CFT deficiencies, ACs have not been classed as ‘strategically 
or systemically important’. They are thereby excluded from the core FATF membership 
status. Consequently, their agency relationship with the IFIs permits agency slack 
which manifests in formal or creative compliance aimed at avoiding sanctions that 
further isolate them from the market. This slack is particularly through their 
communication strategy with IFIs which may be geared at projecting sham compliance 
to avert sanctions.  
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Yet, ACs already have a limited degree of integration and may only comply given their 
trade or capital interests. Coupled with the lack of political will and other domestic 
factors that hinder compliance, this facilitates illicit crimes.222 Moreover, it can be 
argued that these class of countries with limited connection to the global financial 
market may indeed defer compliance, knowing that sanctions would have a limited 
effect on them.  
 
Debunking this argument, scholars have argued that globalization and integration drive 
competition amongst countries and this may catalyze proactive compliance with the 
AML/CFT regime.223 This aligns with the position that countries that have 
implemented the AML/CFT regime are more attractive to foreign investors, than 
countries which have not. This may however not always be the case, as countries with 
lax regulations may attract investments, a situation that can lead to a race to the bottom.  
Given the global minimum standards to which all countries are mandated to adhere to, 
there is a mechanism of competition which creates policy interdependence, as countries 
implement AML/CFT laws to avoid the adverse effects of non-compliance.224  This is 
however not peculiar to AML/CFT regulations, it obtains in other policy areas like tax 
and expatriate laws. 
 
Nevertheless, the ability of ACs who are not classed as ‘systemically important’ to 
renege on AML/CFT compliance is somewhat curtailed by the involvement of IFIs. For 
instance, as a pre-requisite condition for financial assistance, IFIs have incorporated 
law reforms and compliance requirements. 225Additionally, multilateral institutions and 
FIs use compliance with accredited standards to determine potential finance 
opportunities or threats.226Whilst this may suggest that the scope for slack is addressed, 
this is not necessarily correct. For instance, if a FI within a HP country is entering into 
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a business with another FI in a MP country, the domination of self-interests may 
resurface, particularly if the transaction is ad hoc for the principal and agent. In such 
situations, the incentive to comply is low for both institutions, although it is higher for 
the HP country FI due to its mandated adherence to international standards and 
subjection to high regulatory standards. Where however, it is a continuous transactional 
relationship for both FIs, both countries are incentivized to comply to maximize profit. 
However, differing legal framework, policies and capacity means that the MP FI is less 
able to comply, thereby forcing the HP FI to de-risk so as to avert any possible home 
or international sanction. This serves as another explanation for the de-risking of 
African banks by Deutsche bank.227  
 
This difficulty is further exacerbated by the delegation of gatekeeper responsibilities to 
private institutions. Sharman notes that similar to the Basel 2 requirement where the 
task of determining capital requirements was assigned to banks, assigning and guarding 
against AML/CFT risk has been increasingly delegated to private firms.228 These firms 
are required to flag up high-risk countries and ensure extra scrutiny to guarantee safe 
transaction with such countries. However, due to their subjectivity, firms may fall back 
on casual impressions and shared stereotypes in making conclusions as to which 
countries are high and low risk.229 On this basis, FIs in regulated states are assumed to 
be more risk averse than in unregulated states. Sharman argues that the effect is ousting 
a country from an ‘in group’ thus warranting reputational damage.230 He bases this on 
the argument that AML standards are not in themselves effective in lowering risk, but 
serve as an indicator of membership of an ‘in group’.  His argument suggests that 
compliance response to competition is an involuntary measure; thus without 
competition and occasioning loss, some countries would not implement AML/CFT 
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laws. It is however not independent from coercion, which in itself forms the ‘in group’ 
membership. 
 
Whilst there are indications that ACs are keen to integrate with the global financial 
market, this aspiration is hindered by their culture and capacity. For instance, FIs in 
developed or EEs are owned by shareholders with dispersed ownership. Conversely, 
African FIs are usually family-owned and run.231 Hence, customers do not have the 
same political recourse to demand regulatory reform as opposed to countries. The 
absence of recourse for stakeholders largely undermines compliance. More so, these 
countries do not have the needed technological or expert capacity to ensure compliance.  
 
The literature on globalization and integration has indicated that supranational 
influences can only determine compliance level of ACs to a limited extent. Homegrown 
factors are paramount to ensuring effective compliance to AML/CFT. Given this fact, 
the FATF, the IMF/WB have intensified efforts to ensure compliance, by providing the 
assistance required to ensure effective capacity building and training in Africa. The 
extent to which this has ensured compliance would require a cross-country analysis 
based on country review.  
 
5.3.2.5 Legitimisation  
 
Legitimacy of institutions and standards is considered crucial for stimulating proactive 
compliance with regulatory standards.232 This is predicated on the perception of its 
ownership, inclusiveness and procedural fairness ingrained in its processes and 
standards.233 Given the establishment and formulation of FATF standards by a non-
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inclusive club of G7 countries to the exclusion of ACs, ACs postulated that a global 
hegemony exists.234 The subsequent attempt at resolving this ‘legitimacy crisis’ through 
the FSRBs has been deemed inadequate.  
 
Buttressing the absence of legitimacy in GIABA, EENA5 mentioned that GIABA did 
not evolve from rational incentives, but rather, as a result of external pressure from the 
blacklisting of Nigeria.235 EENA5 stated that ‘one of the conditions to be removed from 
that list was (for Nigeria) to become a strong pillar in dealing with the problem of 
ML/TF in West Africa’.236 Such expectation was bestowed on Nigeria given its 
economic influence in Africa and the involvement of its citizens in illicit crimes across 
West Africa. But given the lack of ownership or inclusion in the FATF standards 
making process at the time, GIABA remained dormant for a period of four years, due 
to limited understanding of the FATF’s standards. Consequently, compliance, which 
required adherence to ‘dead letter standards’ was met with scarce observance.   
 
The absence of legitimacy is further evidenced by the processes involved in the 
reevaluation of standards. EENA5 asserts that the recommendations review process is 
based on a participatory process where all countries, divided into groups, discuss and 
contribute to proposals by the PDG during the plenary sessions. However, when making 
final decisions ‘there are powers and opinions that supersede the others’, with opinions 
from developed countries dwarfing those of ACs.237   
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Furthermore, FIs from ACs are rarely ever consulted given their perceived pre-mature 
status.238 This perspective illustrates the semi-exclusive nature of the FATF decision 
making process regarding its standards and how that challenges the sovereignty of 
countries.  Accordingly, EENA5 asserts that any review process is belated as ‘no review 
will take the interest of African states into consideration.’239 His perspective is 
predicated on the fallibility of the FATF in encapsulating the input of African states in 
its standards. Acceding to this, Singer argues that in heterogeneous societies, for 
substantive legitimacy, the law must strike a balance between recognizing differences 
in worldviews and enabling society to function as a cohesive entity.240 The FATF does 
not currently have this provision.  
 
What becomes evident is that from ACs’ perspective, the FATF’s recommendations 
and processes lack legitimacy. This shortcoming is heightened by FATF sanctions 
which singles out countries for financial isolation and reputational damage. This 
perspective aligns with Shaffer’s stance that in the absence of input, output and 
throughput legitimacy, countries would be hindered from voluntary proactive 
compliance to international law.241 Instead, they would engage in formal or creative 
compliance to evade sanctions. This would necessitate higher enforcement cost to 
ensure compliance through coercion, but the result would be limited progress on 
effectiveness.242 
 
Vibert scrutinizes the perception that proactive compliance is subject to the institution 
of legitimacy, asserting that bodies such as the FATF have epistemic authority, which 
is based on expertise that confers legitimacy.243 This position is blindsided to the 
internal politics of the institution and its effect on the FATF’s rude design and 
                                     
238 Ibid.  
239 Ibid.  
240 Michael Singer, ‘Legitimacy Criteria for Legal Systems’ [2006] 17 (2) Kings Law Journal 229 -53. 
241 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change (Cambridge Studies in Law and 
Society, 2014). 
242 Cf with Rainer Hulsee who argues that coercion may be more cost effective and simpler for 
institutions to disseminate an unpopular regime. Rainer Hulsse, ‘Even Clubs Can’t Do Without 
Legitimacy: Why the Anti-Money Laundering Blacklist Was Suspended’ [2008] 2 (4) Regulation and 
Governance 459, 466. 
243 Frank Vibert, ‘Reforming International Rule Making’ [2012] 3 (3) Global Policy 391, 392.  
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compliance. The politics is evident in the composition of experts from the private and 
public sector who are mainly representatives of developed countries, a configuration 
that does not encompass or represent the views of developing countries. It is thus 
capable of stifling the effectiveness of these countries to the FATF standards. This 
indicates that any re-structuring should de-politicise the FATF and ensure a truly 
‘expertise’ process that include the views of developing countries. 
 
5. 4 Cross Country Analysis of Compliance to AML/CFT Regime: FSAP and FATF.  
5.4.1 Assessing the Financial Sector Assessment Program Reports (FSAP): The 
Procedure  
 
The FSAP assesses a country’s financial stability by measuring its compliance with 
international standards. The aim is to evaluate the attainment of minimum standards on 
rules and a country’s ability to absorb stress. The result of the FSAP is the Financial 
System Stability Assessment (FSSAs), a vital document in the IMF’s Surveillance 
process and Financial Sector Assessment (FSA) for the World Bank. The FSAP report 
signals the respect the IMF/World Bank have for sovereign boundaries given that 
countries are not mandated to partake in the FSAP process. Even upon participation, 
countries have a say in whether the FSAP is published and what part can be excluded 
from publication.244 The justification for this is to promote country ownership of 
financial stability reform and encourage voluntary rather than pressured participation 
in the process.245 A further rationale was that it would encourage compliance from 
countries wishing to be assessed in order to attract foreign capital. This rationale propels 
                                     
244 Paul Kupiec, ‘The IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program: A View from the Inside’ 
in Douglas D Evanoff and George G Kaufman (eds), Systematic Financial Crisis, Resolving Large Bank 
Insolvencies (World Scientific, 2005) 71. 
245 Leonard Seabrooke and Eleni Tsiongou, ‘Revolving Doors and Linked Ecologies in the World 
Economy: Policy Locations and the Practice of International Financial Reform’ (2009) CSRG Working 
Paper 260/09, 15 < 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/papers/workingpapers/2009/26009.pdf 
> accessed 10 July 2015.  
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countries to prepare adequately to ensure they are fit for assessments that will illustrate 
their conformity with the IMF/World Bank designs.246  
 
5.4.2 Assessment of FSAP Country Review  
 
AML/CFT regulation is an aspect of the FSAP review program; however, its 
concentration is wider as it encompasses prudential supervision and management. 
Thus, its focus on AML/CFT in this context is usually sparse; hardly concentrating on 
all areas and has neither depth nor any particular approach. This is evident in country 
reports. For instance, in Nigeria the AML/CFT focus was on pensions and insurance,247 
which largely differed from Algeria, which focused on AML/CFT as a means of 
facilitating financial deepening across all sectors.248 Country assessment reports vary 
based on content, quality and institutional findings, which complicate the ability to 
make effective cross-country analysis and comparisons.249 
 
By February 2015, only 18 of the 54 ACs had undergone the FSAP procedure and had 
their FSSA published.250 Among them, only 11 had AML/CFT discussed in their 
reports,251 indicating the apathetic attitude of ACs towards AML/CFT regulations. 
Conversely, it may indicate the incapability of ACs to adequately adopt or implement 
the AML/CFT recommendations or the FSAPs focus on other areas. This is paradoxical 
                                     
246 Leonard Seabrooke and Eleni Tsiongou, ‘Revolving Doors and Linked Ecologies in the World 
Economy: Policy Locations and the Practice of International Financial Reform’ (2009) CSRG Working 
Paper 260/09, 15 < 
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/papers/workingpapers/2009/26009.pdf 
> accessed 10 July 2015. 
247 IMF, ‘Nigeria: Financial Sector Stability Assessment’ (IMF, 2013) < 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13140.pdf > accessed 10 July 2015. 
248 IMF, ‘Algeria: Financial System Stability Assessment’ (IMF, June 2014) < 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14161.pdf > accessed 10 July 2015. 
249 Marco Arnone and Pier Carlo Padone, ‘Anti-Money Laundering by International Institutions: A 
Preliminary Assessment’ [2008] 26 (3) European Journal of Law and Economics 361, 369.  
250 Algeria, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda.  
251 Algeria, Central African Republic, Congo, Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, South Africa, and Tunisia.  
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as the FSAP was assumed to have a wider reach, able to ensure uniform widespread 
application of recommendations.252 
 
Despite the lack of participation, the FSAP reports illustrate resonating themes cutting 
across countries. These include strategic deficiencies in the AML/CFT legal 
framework, weak regulatory supervision, absence of a robust enforcement and 
implementation apparatus, absence of the technical ability to combat ML/TF especially 
in banks where the CDD and STR were defective, the presence of new laws which 
could not be assessed and the absence of FIU links across countries. It is difficult to 
comprehensively evaluate the merits, shortcomings and impact of the AML/CFT 
programme and implementation, nor draw founded conclusions due to the summary 
nature of the assessment reports. 
 
5.4.3 Assessment of the Financial Action Task Force Country Reports  
 
The FATF monitors a country’s implementation and compliance with its 
recommendations in two main ways: a self-assessment and a mutual evaluation.253 The 
self-assessment exercise is carried out by the countries themselves. This exercise, 
which requires completing questionnaires, enables them evaluate their progress in the 
implementation of specialist standards.254 Officials of the FATF who undertake the on-
site mutual evaluation task in countries depend on the self-assessment reports for 
preliminary information.255 An analysis of the information garnered forms the bedrock 
                                     
252 This can be attributed to the voluntary nature of the FSAP.  
253 FATF, ‘Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the 
Effectiveness of the AML/CFT Systems’ (FATF, February 2013) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/fatf%20methodology%2022%20feb%202013.pdf > 
accessed 21 May 2015; AML/CFT Evaluations and Assessments, Handbook for Countries and 
Assessors, (April 2009) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Handbook%20for%20assessors.pdf >accessed 1 June 2015. 
254 Ibid. 
255 FATF, ‘Mutual Evaluations’ (FATF) < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/  > 
accessed 1 June 2015.  
 259 
of the discussions at plenary meetings, where the compliance level of the country is 
decided.  
 
Unlike the FSAP, the only point where countries can influence the content of this 
resulting MER is during the self-assessment stage and to a limited extent during the 
country dialogue concerning the MER. The FATF does not require consent from a 
country to publish its extensive findings. To that extent, it can be argued that it 
encroaches on the sovereignty of countries.  
 
5.4.3.1 Empirical Assessment of FATF Country Reports 
 
An assessment of countries’ MER is carried out to determine the level of compliance 
to AML/CFT. Each qualitative assessment is recoded into a number to permit a 
quantitative analysis. Officially each recommendation (rec.) can be scored based on one 
of five possible assessments methodology as follows:  
- NA (0) = Not Applicable          (A requirement or part of it does not apply due 
to the structural, legal or institutional features of a country) 
- NC (1) = Non-Compliant          (There are shortcomings, with a large majority 
of the essential criteria not being met)  
- PC (2) = Partially Compliant    (The country has taken some substantive action 
and complies with some of the essential criteria)  
- LC (3) = Largely Compliant (There are minor shortcomings, with a large 
majority of essential criteria being fully met) 
- C  (4) = Compliant                (Recommendation is fully observed with respect 
to all essential criteria)  
 
The assessment of each recommendation is mapped out into a 5-valued measure where 
0 is the minimum and 5 is the maximum. 
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5.4.3.2 Analysis of AML/CFT by countries and geographical distribution  
 
 
Figure 1 represents a plot indicating the percentage score of compliance of 38 ACs with 
the 40 FATF recommendations. Data is derived from each country’s mutual evaluation 
reports spanning 2007 through 2015. Consequently, changes in updated MERs have 
been reflected in the compliance levels to the exclusion of post-2015 MERs. Of the 
countries examined, 30 of them are deemed to be < 50% compliant with the FATF 
recommendations. Only 7 are deemed to be > 50% compliant. The statistics indicate 
low level of compliance by ACs. Figure 1 shows that Egypt is the highest compliant 
AC, followed by Tunisia, Mauritius, the Gambia, Malawi, Senegal and then Zimbabwe. 
The weakest frameworks are those of Burkina Faso, Liberia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, 
Kenya, Swaziland, Mozambique and Mali. 
 
The weakest frameworks were mainly in the area of TF regulation, and sanctions related 
thereto.256 Thus, since TF was added to the FATF recommendations, ACs are yet to 
comprehend and implement these requirements for compliance purposes. Weakness is 
also noted in recommendation 10 (CDD), thus bolstering the argument about absence 
of capacity to effectively address the requirements of this recommendation.257 
Countries also contend with recommendations relating to the additional measures for 
specific customer control,258 indicating the pervasive nature of corruption and 
                                     
256 See FATF Recommendation 5, 6, 7 and 8, The FATF Recommendations, ‘International Standards on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (The FATF 
Recommendations, February 2012)  <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/fatf_recommendations.pdf> accessed 20 April 
2015. 
257 KPMG, ‘Global Anti-Money Laundering Survey 2011, How Banks Are Facing up to the Challenge’ 
(KPMG, 2011) 
<https://www.kpmg.com/UK/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/PDF/Advisory/glo
bal-aml-survey-2011-main-report.pdf > accessed 2 June 2015. Highlighting this, the KPMG report noted 
that ‘some countries in Africa have no national identify system and no proper verification 
documentation’; Hennie Bester, Doubell Chamberlain, Louis de Koker, Christine Hougaard, Rayn Short, 
Anja Smith and Richard Walker,  ‘Implementing FATF Standards in Developing Countries and Financial 
Inclusion: Findings and Guidelines’ (First Initiative, 2008) 
<http://cenfri.org/documents/AML/AML_CFT%20and%20Financial%20Inclusion.pdf > accessed 10 
May 2015. 
258 FATF, ‘FATF Recommendation 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16’ (FATF, 2012) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf > 
accessed 10 February 2017.  
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ineptitude in African financial regulatory institutions. Regarding Recommendation 14 
(‘money or value transfer services’), it is doubtful that the vast efforts required to 







Figure 1. Technical Compliance Levels of African Countries to the FATF 




Figure 2 presents a plot of the average score based on detailed assessments. Countries 
are grouped according to the following geographical category: North Africa (Region 
9), South Africa (Region 8), West Africa (Region 6) and East Africa (Region 7). On a 
100% scale, it emerges that no region achieves a compliance level of 50%.  East Africa 
with a compliance level of 34% is the lowest compliant region in Africa,259 followed 
by Western Africa260with 39% compliance. Southern Africa is 43% compliant,261 
whilst North Africa is the highest compliant region in Africa with 49%. 262 It is however 
imperative to note that an estimated assessment is not reflective of the actual 
compliance levels of the regions. Certain regions have more countries than others and 
some countries in particular regions were not assessed. It is therefore inappropriate to 
conclude that East Africa is the worst compliant region in Africa.  
 
Figure 2: Africa’s Compliance to the FATF Recommendations by Regions 
 
                                     
259 Comoros, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.  
260 Gambia, Senegal, Nigeria, Benin, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana, Cape 
Verde, Liberia, Sao Tome & Principe, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone and Mali.  
261 Mauritius, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, Seychelles, Zambia, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland 
and Mozambique.  
262 Egypt, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan, Algeria and Morocco.  
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5.4.3.3 Analysis by FATF recommendations 
 
 
Figure 3 highlights the compliance levels in accordance with the FATF 
recommendations. The clearest deficiencies noted regarding country compliance levels 
are mainly in ‘Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions.’263 These 
recommendations mandate effective regulation by casinos, real estate agents, dealers in 
precious metals and stones, lawyers, and trust and company service providers, to ensure 
that their businesses do not aid ML/TF. This recognizes that money launderers and 
terror funders are exploiting other lucrative and less regulated or licensed avenues to 
transfer illicit funds.264For activities like casinos, there are differences in regulatory 
climates in each AC. Whilst countries like South Africa suffer from discrepancies in its 
supposed casino regulation,265in Nigeria casino regulation is relatively recent, 
accounting for the huge number of unlicensed casinos. Contrariwise, in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, gambling is encouraged; however its regulation is growing due to internal 
conflicts.266  
 
This is particularly worrisome because they relate to actions and procedures, which 
require the identification of customers both domestically and across borders. This 
illustrates the need for more determined action on the side of non-financial sector 
regulators and supervisors. This also applies to recommendation 25, which requires 
                                     
263 See FATF Recommendation 22, 23, 28 - The FATF Recommendations, ‘International Standards on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (The FATF 
Recommendations, February 2012)  <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/fatf_recommendations.pdf> accessed 20 April 
2015, with the score of 1.05, 1.12, and 1.1 respectively, lower than the average of 1.66.  
264 Jan Mcmillen, ‘Online Gambling: Challenges to National Sovereignty and Regulation’ [2000] 18 (4) 
Prometheus 391 – 410. Casinos are lucrative in Africa and have continued to grow at healthy rates – see 
PwC page 9, Raising the stakes in Africa Gambling Outlook: 2014 – 2018 South Africa • Nigeria • Kenya 
3rd Annual Edition November 2014 <http://www.pwc.co.za/en_ZA/za/assets/pdf/gambling-outlook-
2014.pdf > accessed 10 May 
265 Professor Sphiwe Nzimande, Dr. Stephen Louw, Mr Clement Mannya, Ms Adheera Bodasing, Ms 
Astrid Ludin, ‘Review of the South African Gambling Industry and its Regulation, a report prepared by 
the Gambling Review Commission – Final Report submitted to the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
September 2010.  
266 Tonderayi Mukeredzi, ‘Young Zimbabweans Warming up to Gambling’ (AfricaRenewal Online) 
<http://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/young-zimbabweans-warming-gambling  > accessed 17 
May 2015.  
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countries to put in place measures to curb unlawful use of persons and legal 
arrangement by launderers. It states that ‘countries should ensure that there is adequate, 
accurate and timely information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal 
persons that can be obtained or accessed in a timely fashion by competent authorities’, 
indicating that specific actions are required to be taken by the government to support 
both regulatory bodies and FIs. That this is the lowest scoring recommendation shows 
the lackadaisical attitude of the authorities.  
 
Surprisingly, the statistics reveal that the recommendation with the highest level of 
compliance in Africa is recommendation 31 on the power of law enforcement and 
investigative bodies, with the score of 2.7, well above the average of 1.66.  This is 
followed by recommendation 9 on financial institution secrecy laws, with a score of 
2.6. If this is correct, it can be interpreted to mean that financial secrecy laws are not 
inhibiting implementation. It is therefore paradoxical that recommendation 25 on 
‘transparency and beneficial ownership’ is low given that beneficial ownership can only 
really thrive where there is financial secrecy. Compliance literature reveals that Africa’s 
investigative and enforcement structures are weakly developed.267 It is therefore 
worrisome when weakly developed areas are considered the most complied to by ACs.   
 
 Figure 3: Analysis by compliance to FATF Recommendations  
                                     
267  Abdullahi Shehu, Strategies and Techniques of Prosecuting Economic and Financial Crimes 
(GIABA Secretariat, 2012); Beth Elise Whitaker, ‘Compliance among Weak States: Africa and the 
Counter Terrorism Regime’ [2010] 36 Review of International Studies 639, 655. 
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5.4.3.4 Analysis by Compliance Drivers 
 
The compliance levels attained by ACs are plotted against five compliance drivers to 
illustrate empirically the relationship between compliance and these variables. This is 
achieved by using the pearson correlation coefficient (PCC). The PCC presents a range 
of values from +1 to -1. An r-value of 0 indicates that there is no association between 
the variables. A value greater than 0 indicates a positive association. However, a value 
of -1 is a negative linear correlation.  
 
Figure 4: Analysis by corruption index 268  
The r-value of -0.20153 indicates that corruption is negatively correlated to country’s 
compliance with AML/CFT regulations.269 The correlation reveals that the higher the 
compliance, the lower the corruption levels and vice versa. This indicates that reduced 
corruption in ACs would lead to improved compliance, thereby strengthening Africa’s 
financial system.  
                                     
268 Correlation is done using the Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results’ 
(Transparency International, 2014) < https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results > accessed 10 July 
2015.  The compliance index is derived from the FATF data gathered.  
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Figure 5: Analysis by rule of law index 270  
The r-value of 0. 3641826 is indicative of a positive correlation between rule of law 
and compliance to AML/CFT recommendations, signifying that the more advanced a 
country’s rule of law, the higher its compliance levels.271 This correlation is however 
not blind to exceptions. For instance, although Zimbabwe is the lowest ranked AC in 
the rule of law index, it is the 7th most compliant AC to the AML/CFT 
recommendations, indicating that the indexes employed by this evaluation body may 
be subjective.   
 
Figure 6: Analysis by Democracy Index 272 
                                     
270 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2015.  
271 =CORREL(AX2:AX39,AW2:AW39). 
272 David Campbell, Paul Polzlbauer, Thorsten Barth, Georg Polzlbauer,’Democracy Ranking 2015 
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Democracy index is positively correlated to AML/CFT recommendations indicating 
that countries with a democracy rating above the average exhibit minimal uncertainty 
as to implementation and compliance with the recommendations.273 The r-value of 
0.5023856 indicates this.  
 
These findings indicate that FATF compliant ACs are more democratic, less corrupt 
and structure rule of law system.  
 
Figure 7: Analysis by ease of doing business
274 
 
The r-value 0.242 shows a weak positive correlation between the ease of doing business 
index and compliance to AML/CFT recommendations. The graph shows that when 
AML/CFT compliance is high, the ease of business is likely to increase and vice versa. 
Indicating that ease of doing business is higher in countries with higher compliance. 
Indicating that with increasing AML/CFT compliance there is reduced corruption in 
the processes of starting a business and, the legal structures are sturdier to protect 
                                     
http://democracyranking.org/ranking/2015/data/Scores_of_the_Democracy_Ranking_2015_A4.pdf > 
accessed 30 December 2015.  
273 =CORREL(AX2:AX39,AV2:AV39). 
274 See World Bank Group, ‘Doing Business 2015: Going beyond Efficiency’ (World Bank Group, 12th 
Edition, 2015) < http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-
reports/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB15-Chapters/DB15-
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stakeholders. The outcome however varies by country. Angola and Nigeria, for 
instance, show a negative correlation between the variables whilst Cote d’Ivoire and 
Egypt show a positive correlation.  
 
 
Figure 8: Analysis by human development index275 
There is a positive correlation between compliance with AML/CFT standards and 
human development index (HDI).  The higher the compliance standard, the higher the 
HDI and vice versa. However, external factors are key which explains why, although 
Zimbabwe recorded increasing compliance to AML/CFT standards, its HDI was 
negatively correlated.  
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5.4.3.5 Caveats  
 
It is noteworthy that there are limitations associated with the general applicability of 
this study. Firstly, the FATF data quality is questionable, given that the data sources, 
usually gathered from national regulatory institutions, are subjected to limited 
regulation. Thus, recommendations are often interpreted in a manner that makes them 
appear compliant. Secondly, due to resource constraints, as regards finances and human 
capacity, intelligence and data supplied by these regulatory bodies may not reflect the 
accurate compliance level with the regulatory standards.  Thirdly, only 38 countries 
have undertaken an MER, as opposed to 54 ACs. This indicates limited 
representativeness, illustrating the difficulties with undertaking a meaningful cross-
country comparison using the limited sample of countries with published detailed 
assessments. Thus, the FATF’s recommended course of action may not always be 
consistent with the trajectory of domestic law and any measurement for compliance is 
deficient 
 
Additionally, the variables on democracy index, corruption index and rule of law have 
18, 6 and 20 missing variables which may indicate a non-conclusive study. Also, the 
indices utilised, particularly rule of law and democracy, take into consideration the 
strength of the laws or legal structure in a country, which the FATF considers in 
assigning compliance levels. To avoid duplication of results, HDI and ease of doing 
business are considered. 
 
Lastly, there is a disconnect between how FATF views these compliance indices in 
comparison to other institutions. This can be typified with the position of Transparency 
International (TI) on corruption. For instance, the FATF narrowly perceives corruption 
as bribery or theft of public funds for obtaining private gain.276Conversely, TI adopts a 
broader perspective which inculcates grand, political and petty corruption.277 Petty 
                                     
276 FATF, ‘Topic: Corruption’  (FATF) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/corruption/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate) > accessed 10 May 2018.  
277 TI, ‘What is Corruption’ (Transparency International) < https://www.transparency.org/what-is-
corruption#define > accessed 10 May 2018.  
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corruption refers everyday abuse of power by low and mid-level public officials, 
political corruption involves the manipulation of policies or rules to facilitate abuse of 
power. Grand corruption is referred to as acts committed at a high level of government 
that distorts policies, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good. 
Indicating that whilst the FATF’s perspective indicates a focus on PEPs through 
financial institutions, this is not the case with the TI. However, the FATF does take into 
consideration the indices of the TIs, and hence any further comparison may be an 
overlap of numbers difficult to distinguish. What this section indicates is that - although 
corruption still remains prevalent, compliance is a starting point for a conversation.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
The socio-economic history of Africa reveals the effect of liberalization on the African 
economy and the resulting diversity amongst countries. For ACs, liberalization was pre-
mature and placed considerable pressure on their trade and finance. This worsened 
Africa’s position within the global financial system as countries became more 
susceptible to external shock. Consequently, this led to inequality amongst countries in 
Africa, with certain banking and financial markets performing better than others. The 
rein of the colonial exploits which had ingrained corruption, lack of political will and 
financial inequality in countries across Africa further restricted the growth of markets, 
whilst facilitating illicit crimes.  
 
Yet, Africa’s response to combatting illicit crimes were tailored to meeting 
international standards that did not recognize their challenges. This necessitated a 
homegrown approach that would preserve the sovereignty of ACs whilst remedying the 
democratic deficit at the international level. The APRM which was created by the AU 
for this purpose was however unable to meet up with demands. This was due to its lack 
of enforcement powers, dependence on international bodies, procedural difficulties and 
the absence of a truly indigenous approach to curtailing illicit crimes.  
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Therefore, ACs have remained subject to international standards despite their 
compliance challenges. The FSAP and the FATF evaluation reports buttress this, as 
only 7 countries achieved over 50% compliance rate, with only Egypt achieving over 
60% but less than 70%. An examination of the compliance drivers within ACs as a 
function of legal and non-legal factors however illustrate that despite the drive to 
comply to evade sanctions, internal factors challenge compliance in ACs. This is further 
illustrated through empirical findings utilizing corruption, rule of law, democracy, ease 
of doing business and human development indexes. Surprisingly, with the exception of 
corruption, all these factors indicate a positive correlation with Africa’s compliance 
levels. Against the backdrop of these findings, subjecting ACs to the same standards, 
methodology and sanctions would be to ignore their heritage and socio-economic 
challenges. It would be setting them to fail.  
 
Albeit restricted in scope, it is hopeful that the recent AU partnership with the AfDB 
will improve compliance levels of ACs. However, the proper functioning of the 
AML/CFT regime in Africa would require a more active involvement of properly 










Chapter 6  
AML/CFT Regime: Compliance Within Emerging Economies (EE) 
6. Introduction 
 
The BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have created 
newer inequalities of power and influence regionally and globally. Although inherently 
diverse in terms of socio-economic and political structures the BRICS’s agreement is 
perceived as a threat to the existing IFIs. This is particularly due to the BRICS’s 
accelerating economic progression. Against this backdrop, the BRICS were conferred 
the FATF membership in order to drive compliance regionally, whilst facilitating 
financial stability. Compliance drivers within the BRICS however indicate a possible 
misalignment between the expectations of the FATF and the reality of the BRICS to 
deliver on compliance. Consequently, the extent to which the BRICS membership 
translates to improved compliance and perception of legitimacy is debatable.  
 
Section 1 provides a brief background to the BRICS and their emergence as an 
economic bloc. It highlights the interrelationship of the BRICS with reference to their 
socio-economic and political position with the United States. Section 2 focuses on the 
inclusion of the BRICS as FATF members, examining whether such inclusion, however 
belated, propelled improved compliance with the FATF recommendations. Section 3 
examines determinants of BRICS’s compliance with the FATF’s standards, through the 
lens of legal and non-legal factors, that may be internal or external to EEs. Section 4 
presents empirically the BRICS’s compliance to AML/CFT standards. The relevant 
data is used to quantitatively assess correlation to certain determinants of compliance 




6.1 Background to BRICS Countries  
 
Although recognized as developing countries by Kenny Chiu and Dominic Wilson et 
al,1 Lord Jim O’Neil accorded the BRICS the status of ‘emerging economies’ given 
their economic growth.2 The global power and influence that EEs wield justifies such 
status. EEs house a large percentage of the world’s publicly owned banks and account 
for about forty percent of the world’s population.3  China is recognized as the world 
factory, Brazil as the raw material base, Russia as a hub of petrol, India as the white 
collar center and South Africa as a resource reservoir.4  Collectively, the BRICS 
account for thirty percent (30%) of global GDP5 and control forty-three percent (43%) 
of global foreign exchange reserves.6 Admittedly, these features distinguish the BRICS 
from developing countries that have low GDP, underdeveloped industries and low 
standard of living levels.7 
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Given the characteristics and stage of development of BRICS,8 the implications are that 
they are already creating newer inequalities of power and influence in relation to 
smaller or developing African and Asian states.9 Additionally, the BRICS is attempting 
to checkmate western supremacy through its augmented position in the global 
economy. The financial crisis catalyzed this agenda, stimulating investors looking for 
alternative investment destinations to diversify their portfolio into the BRICS.10 This 
amplified the position of the BRICS in the global economy and within IFIs/TGNs.  
 
However, the BRICS’s political disconnect has raised concerns that their clustering as 
EEs was an awkward fusion.11 The BRICS have individual and divergent political 
ambitions12 somewhat linked to the United States (US). The strategic triangular 
relationship between India, China and the United States epitomizes the US link, which, 
although tense, is necessary to combat terrorism occasioned by financial 
liberalization.13 The strains in the relationship are evident in differences between China 
and the US on issues such as human rights, product pirating and unfair trading 
practices.14 The US-India relationship is equally strained, given India’s opposition to 
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India and China’ in Subhash C Jain (eds) Emerging Economies and the Transformation of International 
Business – Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2006) 452. 
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the US movement against communism and the US’s subsequent uncertainties about 
India’s nuclear program.15 Despite their differences, India and China are mending 
fences to develop stronger ties, but the US remains uncomfortable with these 
developments.16 
 
As protagonists of the cold war, the historical disagreements between Russia and the 
US were deepened by the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance 
to combat the Soviet Union,17 a recognized nuclear superpower.18 More recently, the 
US alliance against Russia facilitated its suspension from the G8 given Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea.19 Consequently, Russia has intensified its political and trade 
agreement with China.20 Russia has however shown little evidence that it intends to 
backtrack on its human rights stance, which the US does not agree with.21 However, 
the US and Russia work together to counter global terrorism.22 
   
Brazil and South Africa have dissimilar relationships with the US. Although 
historically perceived to be pro-American given its role in the second world war, Brazil 
has had a relatively distant relationship with the US and is currently seeking equality 
                                     
15 Ibid. 
16 Tridivesh Maini, ‘What the US Gets Wrong about India’s Relationship with China’ (The Diplomat, 
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with the US.23  South Africa (SA) however has a unique relationship with the US given 
its influence in combatting apartheid.24 The US and SA have also maintained bilateral 
trade agreements,25 despite their diplomatic minefield on issues such as SA’s oil trade 
with Iran26 and the recently resolved poultry import duties.27 Additionally, an 
examination of the US-SA relationship reveals that SA depends on the US for aid.28 
Conversely, Brazil has minimal aid dependence but its relationship with the US is 
defined along the lines of trade/investment.29 
 
The BRICS’s political and economic systems vary. China and Russia are authoritarian 
regimes, as opposed to Brazil, India and SA which are democratic.30 It is therefore 
problematic for BRICS to unite on shared political values. Their economic ambitions 
and systems also differ. History reveals that SA’s capitalism, which was racially driven, 
is now dipped in socialist interventions.31 Russia and China share a special economic 
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relationship in their investment as capitalist economies.32  Larry Ong and Lee Edwards, 
however, disagree, arguing that China and Russia run communist economies.33 Recent 
developments and evidence contradict this stance.34 Moreover, undisputedly, Brazil 
and India are capitalist economies.35  The underlining economic structures in the 
BRICS have revealed varying levels of economic development, with China leading the 
other countries in the league.36   
 
Liberalization and the resulting heightened integration of the BRICS in the global 
economy have precipitated discussions on whether economic development can be 
solely attributed to a phase of radical reregulation.37 Holton contends that it can partly 
be attributed to state managed basis of selection and partial regulation.38  Partial 
deregulation has heightened the importance of these markets, especially regarding the 
risk of ML and consequent risks to financial stability. These partial deregulations, in 
the form of relaxed exchange control39 and a move away from current account 
convertibility, pose risks to the financial system, especially through the erosion of the 
foreign exchange reserves and increase volatility. These risks are also present in the 
move towards the privatization of public monopolies.  The deregulation of the financial 
system has been accompanied by a simultaneous reform in the capital market, leading 
to increasing integration and rapid technological changes, which amalgamates markets 
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and increase capital flows within the global arena. This illustrates how the risk of 
ML/TF to EEs are multifaceted and not peculiar to only one financial sector.  
 
Given their historically entrenched differences in economic and political interests,40 
coupled with global integration, scholars have argued that the credibility and longevity 
of a sturdy BRICS union is uncertain.41  The doubt is mainly in the ability of the BRICS 
to bring about lasting change in the global economic and political order.42  This 
perspective highlights the inherent heterogeneity of BRICS and casts doubt on their 
ability to champion change in the global economy and political order. Despite these 
divergences, the BRICS have exhibited a remarkable degree of cohesion, providing a 
peaceful and stable international environment, conducive to economic modernization 
and growth.43  They also share a common aspiration for greater representation in 
international organizations, heightened by their traditional conceptions of state 
sovereignty.44  This has led to improved positioning and voting slots within 
international organizations and network bodies.45  
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6.2 The BRICS Membership of the FATF  
 
Brazil was the first EE to become a FATF member in 2000, 11 years after the FATF’s 
formation. Other countries became members between 2003 and 2006.46 The BRICS 
belated membership of the FATF has raised questions as to whether such positioning 
can foster improved compliance with the AML/CFT recommendations.47 The agency 
engagement approach which may be involuntary or voluntary can unearth a robust 
response to this question. On one hand, the agency-involuntary engagement approach 
advances the public interest perspective. An examination of the membership pattern 
reveals the coercive inclusion of EE’s in exchange for the perceived gains of 
reputational advancements. It would argue that membership facilitates compliance 
regionally, therefore making financial integrity a key aspiration for a majority of 
countries. Additionally, membership places countries on a pedestal that improves their 
compliance drive given the competition that arises between the networked staff. For 
this reason, the BRICS were granted membership on the basis of their economic 
growth, efforts in combatting illicit crimes and regional influence.48  
 
Conversely, the agency-voluntary engagement perspective advances the argument that 
membership can only facilitate compliance when it is voluntary and legitimate. Inherent 
in this viewpoint is the interrogation of the FATF’s membership strategies which are 
deemed coercive. This is based on the acknowledgement that the EEs’ agenda of 
financial growth largely conflicts with the IFIs/TGNs agenda for financial integrity. 
Hence membership through sanctions is considered necessary. Yet, this has proved 
unworkable as it is only when such strategies are perceived as legitimate that they can 
promote the acceptance of transnational norms and convey state change. Such voluntary 
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membership would promote belief in the FATF as a legitimate rule maker to be 
complied with on the basis of appropriateness and not consequence.49 
 
These competing perspectives help in providing explanations regarding the emergence 
of the BRICS as FATF member countries. To further explore this, the section will 
investigate the trigger for membership, whether it was voluntary or coercive and the 
impact of the inclusion strategies on compliance.  
 
A historical review of the FATF’s membership pattern reveals evidence of power-play 
between western countries – the rule makers, and the BRICS as rule-takers. Countries 
classified as rule-takers were often coerced into compliance with the hope of 
accelerated FATF membership. For instance, Russia’s membership accession was due 
to pressure from its placement on the NCCT list.50 Also, the public hearing on SA’s 
Financial Intelligence Centre bill indicated that the country’s compliance and 
subsequent membership was due to fear of being blacklisted.51 Moreover, authors of 
the 1998 Brazilian Law 9613, drafted in response to the FATF’s requirements noted 
that its creation was dependent on their contacts with US representative on drugs, a 
relationship which placed more onerous burden than the influence of the FATF.52 This 
provides insights into the continued hegemony of the US over other countries. Thus, 
the overall membership process reveals that the FATF’s initial members did indeed 
wield authoritarian powers over non-members, indicating an encroachment on their 
sovereignty.   
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The coercive inclusion of the EEs further exposed the two-way bargain between rule-
makers and rule-takers – financial integrity for accountability and reputational benefits. 
Series of financial crises and terror activities, particularly the 9/11 propelled the western 
desire for financial integrity. To achieve this, western states utilized the backing of 
IFIs/TGNs to penalize non-compliant states, an act that tarnished their accountability 
image. Consequently, states aspired to reach the FATF’s requirement for membership 
to evade sanctions. Yang, however, debunks claims that China was coerced into FATF 
membership, arguing instead that the accession to membership was beneficial to the 
Chinese government and its private sector.53 This suggests that China’s inclusion 
served as a momentum to actively combat illicit crimes. Peter Knaack advances a 
stronger argument, that China’s over-compliance and membership were based on the 
need to remain a major player in the global economy, by protecting its reputation.54 
This indicates a subliminal form of coercion.  
 
Arguments that the FATF’s inclusion of the BRICS has resolved democratic deficiency 
and existing legitimacy crisis have been challenged. Kerwer and Hulsee argue that the 
inclusion of  the BRICS enhances the FATF’s geographical balance and remedies 
agitations that the organization lacks accountability and legitimacy.55 Accordingly, the 
OECD-dominated FATF membership56 has grown to accommodate ‘strategically 
important countries’57 including the BRICS. Accommodating the BRICS seemingly 
grants them the privileges of original members – the power to participate in devising 
global standards on AML/CFT.58 Such steps revealed the FATF’s perception of 
                                     
53 Cedric Lam, Liu Yang, ‘China Joins the FATF’ (The Anti-Fraud Network, September 2007) < 
http://antifraudnetwork.com/2007/09/china-joins-the-fatf/ >   accessed 14 January 2016.  
54 Peter Knaack, ‘An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance: Why is China Exceeding International 
Banking Standards? [2017] 46 (2) Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 41, 65. 
55 Dieter Kerwer and Rainer Hulsse, ‘How International Organizations Rule the World: the Case of the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering’ [2011] 1 (2) Journal of International Organization 
Studies 50, 60; Slaughter Anne-Marie, ‘Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability 
of Global Government Networks’ [2004] 39 (2) Government and Opposition 159, 165.  
56 The G7 members, the European Commission, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland – on establishment in 1989. 
57 FATF – IX, ‘Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report, 1997-1998’ (FATF 
– IX) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1997%201998%20ENG.pdf?TSPD_101_R0=be9bbd19c394a0f
96d9bc7e799853062eD90000000000000000d501cd89ffff00000000000000000000000000005a8d916b
00d7bfb32c > accessed 10 January 2017.  
58 Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale and John Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: the 
International Regulation of Systemic Risk (OUP 2006)  
 283 
legitimacy, where democratic inclusion triumphs technical expertise.59 Consequently, 
the FATF sought to enhance its input legitimacy, promoting the belief that its rules are 
decided in an open and fair manner.60 Nevertheless, the extent to which the BRICS 
participate in the standard setting of established recommendations is questionable, 
given their belated inclusion coupled with the backing of IFIs.  
 
6.2.1 The Position of the BRICS Prior to and After their FATF Membership  
 
Prior to their inclusion as core FATF members, the BRICS were part of the FSRBs, 
which are classed as ‘associate members.’61 FSRBs are each regarded as one 
organization representing the interest of all its member countries; hence, the BRICS 
could not individually exert membership of the FATF, without their respective FSRB 
platforms. Interestingly, the relevant FSRBs (covering the BRICS) were created 
between 1997 and 2004. Thus, before their attainment of full FATF membership, the 
BRICS could also be regarded as ‘non-members’.   
 
A gaping disparity existed in voting pattern and treatment between the FATF members 
and its associate/non-member. Resultantly, whilst the initial FATF members were 
entitled to one vote each, the FSRBs were collectively entitled to one vote.62 This 
pragmatically restrictive voting structure was designed to avoid an unwieldy consensus 
driven process. Therefore, membership was restricted to countries with advanced and 
sophisticated financial activities. These countries are perceived to have expert 
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knowledge on AML/CFT, given their interactions with diverse advanced forms of illicit 
crimes over time. The voting consensus from these pool of states is then translated into 
laws and applied globally. Sidelined from the voting process, the BRICS had to contend 
with applying decided recommendations despite their seeming unsuitability to its local 
concerns.  
 
Additionally, prior to the revision of the FATF’s provisions in 2003, reputational 
damage through coercion was achieved through country placement on the NCCT list.63  
Russia was on this list till 2002,64 resulting in reduced investment, cross border trade 
and banking.65 Conversely, members were only subject to a form of peer pressure.66 
However upon the creation of most FSRBs by 2004 , the coercive procedure imposed 
on non-members was made applicable to members also – one of self-assessment and 
peer-pressure.67 This somewhat bridged the gap between FATF members and non-
members. However, the practical effect has not changed, as non-compliant member 
states (not part of the core member countries) are subject to more intensive peer-
pressure as a result of their global standing.68    
 
With the BRICS membership of the FATF, it remains to be seen whether there has been 
any substantial change their treatment by the initial members. Evident changes are 
expected, particularly given that the BRICS now have equal voting powers as the initial 
members. Mochado however contends that although the distribution of voting powers 
                                     
63 The NCCT process started in 2000; see, for example, Alldridge Peter, ‘Money Laundering and 
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Networks’ [2008] 22 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 1, 45; Mugarura Norman, ‘The 
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64 Victoria Lavrentieva, ‘Russia Taken off Financial Blacklist’ (The Moscow Times, 2002) < 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2002/10/article/russia-taken-off-financial-
blacklist/242953.html > accessed 1 December 2015. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Cecily Rose, International Anti-Corruption Norms: their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal 
Systems (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 199. 
67 In 2006, all non-members were de-listed. Some international organizations such as the IMF and the 
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68 Cecily Rose, International Anti-Corruption Norms: their Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal 
Systems (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2015) 199. 
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is relevant in attributing legitimacy to the process, the FATF conceals information 
about the quality of the decision process.69 He argues that the technical capacity and 
number of experts play a crucial role in the political discussions of MERs and adoptions 
of decisions at FATF plenary meetings.70  Evidence however shows that most experts 
sent for in-country evaluations are drawn from the US.71 Besides, there are limits on the 
number of experts sent from different countries. Thus, the reports on countries may 
indeed be distorted by biases, regarding the actual participation of countries. Mochado 
emphasizes that appreciating the procedural fairness regarding actual participation is 
difficult, being largely dependent on the ability to scrutinize documents which detail 
participation processes, direct observation and in-depth interviews.72 Accordingly, it is 
questionable whether legitimacy should rely on representation in IFIs (given 
differences in actual participation), the structuring of global agendas and development 
of global recommendations. 
 
Responding to concerns about lack of legitimacy, the FATF democratized its 
presidency, making it rotational among members.73 Barring India, other BRICS have 
served their presidency tenure.74 It has however been reported that the presidency role 
is undermined by the absence of guidelines for the decision making processes.75 For 
example, the FATF has no strict rules regarding who could overrule its decisions, 
                                     
69 Maira Rocha Machado, ‘Financial Regulation and International Criminal Policy: the Anti-Money 
Laundering System in Brazil and Argentina’ (2007) Law & Society Association Annual Conference 
7/2007, 50 < https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/2777/WP7.pdf > accessed 
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71This was obvious from reading over 40 assessment reports.  
72 Maira Rocha Machado, ‘Financial Regulation and International Criminal Policy: the Anti-Money 
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73 FATF, ‘FATF Presidency’ (FATF) < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/fatfpresidency/ > accessed 1 May 
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74 Presidency of the FATF: China 2001-2002 (Clarie Lo); South Africa 2005 -2006 (Prof. Kader Asmal);  
Brazil 2008-2009 (Antonio Gustavo Rodrigues); Russia 2013-2014 (Vladirmir Nechaev); see FATF, ‘25 
Years and Beyond: the Financial Action Task Force’ (FATF, 2014) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/brochuresannualreports/FATF%2025%20years.pdf?TSPD_101_R0=149
5c41e79bcbd390bbe7629e106108ajF50000000000000000d501cd89ffff0000000000000000000000000
0005a8d95e80048c055d7 > accessed 14 January 2017.  
75 House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‘Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism: 
Evidence’ (19th Report of Session 2008-09 Volume II: Evidence, 22 July 2009) 169. 
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although no two members can hold out the group on a particular decision.76 
Additionally, the hierarchy of the FATF’s internal structure reveals that the president’s 
role is subject to the FATF plenary decisions.77  Furthermore, ascendency to presidency 
is also alleged to be voluntary, countering arguments that it was a reward for the 
proactivity of Brazil’s FIU senior officers.78 The voluntary nature of the presidency 
reveals the limits in influencing decisions or discussions at plenary meetings. Thus, the 
sitting president can only bring his own style in setting the agenda.79  
 
The marginalization of the BRICS is further emphasized by their representation in the 
IMF and the World Bank, IFIs which form the backbone for the FATF’s enforcement 
process. Being late entrants to these institutions, the BRICS are sidelined in decision 
making given their limited quota and voting rights.80 The BRICS voting powers at the 
IMF is not reflective of their tremendous economic growth.81 This is particularly 
because these institutions are driven by the desire of the US to ensure financial stability. 
The marginalization of the BRICS within IFIs is backed by a long history of G7 
supremacy, individually and within the FATF or connected bodies. For instance, the 
Treaty of Nanking ratified by China in 1843, on the free sale of opium between the US 
and China placed onerous obligations on China, with none on the US.82 The result was 
that the US waged war against Chinese ports in order to open them to trade on the 
agreed merchandise.83 Similarly, the G7 excluded India from discussions on counter-
terrorism, although India had had experience in dealing with related issues.84 
Resentment by the BRICS can catalyze some level of non-compliance.85  
                                     
76 Ibid. 
77 The Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012-2013).  
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79 Ibid. 
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81 Ibid. 
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The BRICS desired to form their agenda outside Western control,86 thus potentially 
altering the international order. They seek to undo biased treatments enshrined in 
international bodies or treaties established when they were seemingly toothless. One 
way to cure this is through the review of the treaties and procedures that have 
historically existed within international organizations.87 An alternative is to establish a 
similar organization, for instance, the BRICS development bank. These options indicate 
the BRICS’s aspiration, stemming from a history of political marginalization of the 
south due to colonialism and its legacies, for a multipolar, equitable and democratic 
world order.88 Brazil has called for an end to American dominance,89 whilst China has 
pushed for reform of IMF global currencies.90 Western countries’ advancement has 
placed them in the forefront of global governance, thus culminating in the perspective 
that their actions are laced with good intentions. However, other states perceive these 
actions as a threat to their sovereignty. The perception of marginalization may cause 
countries to resist compliance, or induce sham compliance in a bid to find favor with 
countries that caused the marginalization.  
 
Furthermore, at the national level, membership does not guarantee immunity from 
ML/TF. The BRICS suffer from corruption, which is inextricably linked to ML.91 The 
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absence of sturdy political will obstructs enforcement measures to combat these ills. 
For instance, India’s emerging status as a regional financial center, its access to drugs 
and the prevalence of underground banking has made it an attractive ML hub.92 
Distinguishing between internal and international ML, Vijay argues that India’s strict 
foreign exchange laws restrict cross-border ML.93 This distinction however fails to 
consider how internal ML fosters cross-border ML. For instance, the exploitation of the 
informal remittance system to launder funds abroad,94 or the case of PEPs who launder 
funds internally, but engage in cross-border investments through proxies.  
 
In certain instances, the problem is not the absence of, but rather misguided, political 
will aligned with corrupt practices. Across various countries, the incumbent 
government dismantles opposition by alleging corruption,95 whilst overlooking corrupt 
practices within its ranks. The recent Deutsche Bank laundering probe implicated close 
personal and political associates of Vladimir Putin,96 revealing the public-private sector 
tolerant perception of laundering and corruption within Russia.  
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Remittances also pose compliance problems for the BRICS, especially India and China, 
both of which receive the largest amounts.97The cloak of anonymity and expediency 
usually makes remittances the preferred choice for launderers. Brazil faces similar 
issues, in a typologically different way, through the use of technology to gain 
anonymity and engage in sophisticated laundering activities. ML is prevalent in Brazil’s 
various financial sectors98 and has now come to encompass its sporting sector, 
particularly football.99 Brazil’s location and natural resources also make it vulnerable 
to drug related laundering.100    
 
Increased liberalization, coupled with partial deregulation and misguided political will, 
ensures that the involvement of EEs in formulation of AML/CFT standards does not 
translate to improved AML/CFT regulation within each sovereign state. This is partly 
why international prudential regulation is postulated as an antidote for AML/CFT in 
EEs. 
 
The concern however that is the BRICS union is a marriage of convenience, given their 
conflicting interests and may not have the capacity to shape the dynamic of the 
international system.101 More recently, the slowdown of the BRICS economies has 
                                     
97 The World Bank, International Migration at All-Time High (The World Bank, 18 December 2015 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/18/international-migrants-and-remittances-
continue-to-grow-as-people-search-for-better-opportunities-new-report-finds> accessed 1 February 
2016  
98 Watterson Colin, ‘More Flies with Honey: Encouraging Formal Channel Remittances to Combat 
Money Laundering’ [2013] 91 Texas Law Review 711, 712-717; Ednei Roza, ‘Brazilian Banking 
Institution and Anti-Money Laundering Framework: Compliance with International Standards’ [2005] 
11 Law and Business Review of the Americas 299-319; Roberto Delmanto Junior, ‘The World Cup in 
Brazil: Fighting Against Money Laundering and Corruption’ South-Western Journal of International 
Law’ [2014] 21 SW. J. Int’l L. 143. 
99 Kenneth Korosi, Kristen Brown, Christina Marquez, Mauricio Salazar, Sophia Segura, ‘Sporting 
Events as Sites of International Law, Society and Governance: the 2014 Brazilian World Cup: Forward’ 
[2010] 21 Southwestern Journal of International Law, Sw. J. Int’l L. 1. 
100 Oaula Miraglia, ‘Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies’ [2016] Foreign Policy 
at Brookings.  
101 Eduardo Viola, ‘The BRICS in the International System: Very Relevant Countries, but a Group of 
Limited Importance’ in Ribeiro Lins Gustavo, Dwyer Tom, Antonadia Borgas and Eduardo Viola (eds.) 
Socio, Political and Cultural Challenges of the BRICS (Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG, 2015);  Van Agtmael  
A, ‘Think Again: the BRICS’ (Foreign Policy, 8 October 2012) < 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/08/think-again-the-brics/  > accessed May 2 2016. 
 290 
raised questions as to whether they deserve to sit at ‘the table’.102  Notwithstanding 
these concerns, a new economic order is emerging, 103 which has caused the IMF to 
alter its structure.104 China now has the third largest IMF quota (its currency was 
resolved); also, the BRIC economies were placed among the 10 largest members of the 
IMF.105 Unfortunately, the US Congress only passed the bill amending the IMF quota 
allocation in 2016, 6 years after an agreement was negotiated with the US Congress to 
make the change.106 The extent to which this would occasion improved compliance is 
yet to be seen.  
 
6.3 The Determinants of Compliance to AML/CFT in Emerging Economies  
 
Chapter 3 highlights certain legal factors that are crucial in understanding the 
compliance trajectory of countries. These are supported by non-legal factors such as 
political will, domestic conditions and globalization which are crucial drivers of 
compliance. The extent to which these factors catalyze improved compliance within 
EEs is dependent on their effect on EE and how this aligns with the FATF’s compliance 
methodologies.  
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6.3.1 Legal factors  
 
Chapter 3 shows that law matters. Douglass North accedes to this.107 He argues that law 
is the main source of the formal rules and provides enforcement mechanisms that 
strengthen the credibility of commitments made by economic and political actors.108 
The position of law in setting the foundation for EE’s to comply is however contestable. 
Within this framework, this section examines how law is decisive in determining the 
AML/CFT compliance levels of countries. This is examined in the context of three legal 
factors: law reflecting society, enforcement driven compliance, democracy and rule of 
law.   
 
6.3.1.1 Law Mirroring Society   
 
Scholars have claimed that the dissemination of the AML/CFT regime to EEs was 
‘illegitimate’ given that it involved coercive and persuasive schemes by the G7 
countries that established the FATF.109  Additionally, although the BRICS were 
excluded from decision making processes, there was an expectation that they would 
translate the FATF recommendations to law via national legislation under the scrutiny 
of the FATF. This expectation occasioned the adoption of laws which did not 
necessarily ‘mirror’ society and hence its application and effectiveness has raised 
questions.  
 
What would ‘law mirroring society’ look like within the BRICS? It is difficult to 
predict. However, one can imagine that China might have focused on laws tailored to 
addressing remittances and secrecy in its informal banking sector. This assumption is 
predicated on the slow development of China’s formal banking system, which only 
                                     
107 See Julio Faundez, ‘Douglass North’s Theory of Institutions: Lessons for Law and Development’ 
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became operative in the 20th century.110 To illustrate, although China’s plague with 
extortion and bribery can be traced back to BC 2000, it was combated with limited 
measures.111 In the 19th century, the Piaohao, China’s first traditional banking 
structures which operated as remittances, further escalated the avenues for illicit 
transfers.112 These channels, although properly structured, ran largely unregulated 
despite the currency exchange and ML risk posed. Rather, the informal banking 
structures operated successfully on the culture of trust which promoted secrecy of 
transactional exchanges. Law mirroring the society would have indicated heightened 
focus on the informal sector which might have included lax regulation on remittances 
and laws to promote financial secrecy.113 Such regulations might simply have been a 
reflection of the information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated, 
coupled with the culture of trust.  
.  
SA presents a different perspective. Organized crime escalated in the country given its 
historical transition from apartheid to democracy.114 The apartheid regime thrived on 
proceeds of illicit crimes, and the democratic government was no exception.115  This 
informed the lackadaisical attitude towards combatting illicit crimes. Additionally, the 
weak legal framework at the time would have frustrated attempt to combat such 
crimes.116 SA subsequently introduced criminal laws to combat organized groups that 
profited from crimes.117 Whilst this may allow for launderers to be imprisoned, it would 
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hinder the ability to recover the proceeds of crime through civil confiscation.  Thus, 
law mirroring society would at best strangulate efforts at combatting illicit crimes.  
 
Russia painted a dire picture of absence of specific laws to ensure that illicit crimes 
were effectively combatted, signposting a society where absence or inadequacy of laws 
was symptomatic of ‘law mirroring’ acceptable societal values of corruption and 
organized crime.118 
 
Recognizing that if law is allowed to ‘mirror society’ in the BRICS – there would be a 
risk to the international financial market, particularly given the growing degree of 
integration of the BRICS to the global economy, the discursive power-based 
mechanism came into play.119 Consequently, China adopted the Vienna and Palermo 
Conventions.120  China has put laws in place to ensure convergence with the FATF 
standards,121 in order to maintain foreign policy relationships with the US for trade and 
development, particularly post the 9/11 attack.122 China’s convergence was also 
triggered by the need to remain a competitive player in the global financial market 
through compliance to avoid the risk of reputational damage.123 Whilst China displayed 
some willingness to comply for intrinsic reasons, this is not necessarily the case with 
other countries.  
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Scholars have argued that SA’s convergence was predicated on some level of external 
coercion and mimicry, in addition to intrinsic domestic factors.124 It is arguable that the 
central need to combat illicit crimes driven by the transition from apartheid to 
democracy led SA to enact new democratically-motivated laws. However, Zakhele 
argues that external mimicry was proactively brought to bear, which inspired 
convergence to the FATF’s AML/CFT standards by SA authorities.125 Thus, whilst 
domestic factors created incentives to mimic, actual actions were driven externally 
given threat of the FATF’s enforcement processes. It was not until 1992 that SA 
adopted its first AML legislation which showed sturdy awareness of the Vienna 
convention.126 D’Oliveira agrees that the timing of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 
1992 and the subsequent Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 indicated a desire to accede to 
the Vienna Convention post-apartheid.127 The statement of a representative at the public 
hearing of the Financial Intelligence Centre Bill in 2002 exemplified external pressures 
on SA, thus: ‘[w]e have the sword of the FATF hanging over our heads and the patience 
of the international community is reaching its end.’128 Undoubtedly, the external 
pressures may have coerced compliance with the standards, but the extent of 
compliance this has stimulated is debatable.  
 
Russia’s experience, although largely different from China’s, was slightly similar to 
SA’s. Given its unprecedented ML rate, capital flight and corruption, Russia was 
blacklisted by the FATF.129 Failure to enact laws to curb these illicit crimes, largely 
exacerbated by privatization policies in 1992, exposed Russia’s acquiescence to such 
illicit crimes at every level of government.130 The reports of the possible laundering of 
IMF credits through the Bank of New York in 1999 mounted pressure to blacklist 
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Russia.131 The FATF blacklisted Russia as a direct external coercion to compel her to 
observe the FATF recommendations by legislating on AML/CFT. Russia then enacted 
the ‘Combatting the Laundering of Income Obtained by Criminal Means’ in 2001.132 
This law not only compelled FIs to report suspicious transactions above $20,000, it also 
established a FIU to act on such reports. The law also compelled law enforcement 
agencies to prosecute cases.133 Additionally, after the 9/11, Vladimir Putin tightened 
the illicit crime rules with a decree establishing criminal penalties for bank officials 
who did not report suspicious transactions. In 2002, Russia was delisted and following 
its economic growth and seeming adherence to the FATF’s recommendations, she 
gained the FATF prestigious membership in 2003.  
 
Examining the ‘law mirroring international standards’ across countries illustrates that 
the FATF regime led to tailored laws and, in certain instances, harsher sanctions. It can 
be argued that this may have led to reduced illicit crimes. Shuceng concurs and submits 
that the modification of punishment regimes have contributed to reduced criminal 
offences in China.134  For instance, death penalty for citizens who embezzle funds has 
been largely effective.135 This supports external pressures to facilitate compliance, 
given harsher applicable sanctions.  
 
Given the systemic risk of the BRICS to the global economy, they were invited to 
membership of the FATF, and, barring SA, have been classed as ‘systemically 
important’ by the IMF. Being so categorized comes with mandatory Financial Stability 
Assessments (FSA) under the FSAP, given the importance of their financial sectors and 
the impending risk of contagion they pose. It also signifies a growing relationship 
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between IFIs and EEs, which can ensure that EEs comply with the IFIs’ requirements, 
and avoid agency slack.   
 
Yet, ‘law mirroring international standards’ is not always necessarily ideal, as the 
requirements set by the FATF and backed by the IFIs do not usually indicate concrete 
understanding of the culture of the country within which it is to operate. Indeed, this 
may facilitate, rather than curb illicit crimes. For example, recommendation 14 of the 
FATF requirements mandates registration and licensing of remittances;136 it is usually 
read with the CDD and reporting requirements. Likewise, given the inter-linkages 
established between remittances and terror funding, regulatory bodies have been 
empowered to report, freeze or confiscate terror funding when suspicion is raised or 
ascertained.137  Although aimed at ensuring transparency, examining the FATF’s 
language and purpose reveals the superimposition of existing formal financial sector 
regulatory and supervisory practices onto the informal transfer systems.138 In countries 
like China or India, remittances are built on a culture of trust and operate through a 
complex web of transactions139 which are deemed the safest means of transmitting 
funds.  Therefore, such regulations might only succeed in pushing their services 
underground,140 as evidenced by the growing rate of unregistered remittance 
intermediaries in both countries.141 This medium is considered the largest source of 
financial flows to developing countries, exceeding the foreign direct investment in 
some countries.142  
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This feeds into Legrand’s argument that transplantation must be contextual, taking into 
consideration the cultural, historical and socio-economic sensibilities of the recipient 
country.143 Otherwise, it may be rejected by the recipient state.144 Supporting this 
position, Gonzales asserts that local conditions generate acceptance or resistance to 
crucial policies or practices and hence, lessons should be learned in a manner that 
reinforces, rather than transforms local practices.145 Gonzales argues that this can be 
achieved by empowering local policy makers to investigate and proffer solutions to suit 
their domestic context, rather than applying incompatible international standards to 
local realities.146 These analyses indicate that transplantation effected in developed-
emerging economies is not necessarily suitable, but rather policy responses should be 
designed with recipient countries for proactive compliance.  Whilst this has arguably 
been addressed by BRICS membership of the FATF, it does not solve the pending 
problem, as these countries only have minimal say in the re-formulation of standards.   
 
Given their need for tailored solutions to addressing ML/TF, the BRICS have not only 
worked within regional networks,147 but have also established a BRICS Council on 
AML/CFT. This council serves as a platform for participating countries to consolidate 
BRICS actions on counter terrorist financing and the intensification of training 
programs, especially through the Network AML/CFT.148 These actions indicate 
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increased ownership and accountability by these countries. However, the extent to 
which this can translate to long-term change is to be seen.  
 
6.3.1.2 Enforcement Driven Compliance 
 
Concerns about the possibility of enforcement actions shape behavior.149 At the national 
level, compliance by individuals, regulators and FIs are sometimes focused on evading 
enforcement actions. This is because breach of certain FATF recommendations which 
are enshrined in national legislations are backed by sanctions ranging from fine to 
imprisonment. Such sanctions, when meted on an individual or institution by 
enforcement agencies or the court can lead to reputational damage. For this reason, it 
serves as a key driver of compliance with AML/CFT regulation, particularly in 
countries where legal structures are robust to sanction erring criminals.  
 
At the international level, the FATF enforces its rules through measures put in place to 
ensure the observance of prescribed standards.150 Blacklisting of erring countries is one 
of such measures – which comes with reputational damage and financial isolation. All 
EEs, but Russia, were able to circumvent this enforcement action.151 Whilst the other 
EEs transplanted the FATF recommendations to ensure a conducive environment for 
compliance, Russia did not. Consequently, Russia’s high rate of capital flight, 
corruption and ML went unchecked. The sanction however propelled compliance by 
Russia. As earlier discussed, there is evidence that EEs simply transplanted rules and 
seemingly complied with same to evade sanctions.  
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Strengthened laws and improved implementation measures sometimes signal an 
increasing attempt at compliance by the BRICS. For instance, the 2015 FATF 
compliance statistics indicates that whilst Russia averaged 68% compliance to the 
FATF recommendations, Brazil averaged 63%.152 It can be argued that this results 
following their attainment of core FATF membership position which came with 
attendant compliance responsibilities. Examining the criteria for membership reveals a 
different perspective. A criterion requires that a country should not have 8 or more non-
compliant (NC) or partially compliant (PC) rating for technical compliance.153 
Additionally, countries must not be rated NC/PC on recommendations 2, 5, 10, 11 and 
20.154 Moreover, low effectiveness on 7 or more of the 11 effectiveness outcomes 
would disqualify a country from meeting the membership standards.155 Attaining these 
standards without membership status will definitely ensure improved compliance levels 
of any country. It can therefore be argued that compliance can be attributable to the 
internal financial regulatory dynamics of EEs coupled with external coercion or 
persuasion. Acceding to this, Yepes argues that a strong correlation exists between 
countries’ economic development and their compliance levels, notwithstanding the 
risk-based approach currently adopted.156  
 
That compliance levels are improving may also be suggestive of the success of the 
FATF’s enforcement strategies. However, although countries are complying with 
‘black letter’ requirements, they may indeed remain deficient on the effectiveness 
levels.  Additionally, there is limited evidence that there is significantly improved 
‘actual or proactive’ compliance.157 For instance, Brazil’s technical compliance does 
not parallel its effectiveness.158 This shortfall can be attributed to the absence of 
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ownership in the process of standard making, coupled with the coercive strategies 
employed to facilitate compliance. This counters the argument that the involvement of 
the BRICS in combatting illicit crime was dependent on increased financial 
liberalization and the need to curtail infiltration of illicit funds.159  It rather illustrates 
that in the absence of voluntary compliance backed by ownership, formal or creative 
compliance will thrive, even with sturdy enforcement infrastructure to facilitate 
compliance.  
 
The above argument does not however invalidate the impact of ‘listing’ on a country. 
Given the BRICS membership of the FATF, there is some political impetus to ensure 
continued compliance. Nevertheless, membership provides some shield from the 
consequences of non-compliance which may only be circumvented through de-risking. 
Hence, the member countries may be de-incentivized, given their ‘sacred’ position. To 
curtail this moral hazard, the FATF listed Turkey, a member country, for deficiencies 
in its compliance.160 This rare and singular act has not provided a paradigm shift for 
EEs and developed countries who are resolute in their membership protection from 
financial isolation or reputational damage.  Recognizing this shortcoming, the IMF 
recently identified the BRICs as countries which need a higher level of surveillance 
through FSAP. The reason was to heighten IMF’s interactions with BRICS’s 
representatives to identify and work towards curtailing any likely agency slack, such as  
the materialization of risks in a manner that can occasion systemic risk. This usually 
occurs through an intense monitoring and review of information on compliance levels 
of the BRICS institutions.161 This process of monitoring through evaluations and any 
resulting compliance variable usually explains the behaviors of the BRICS countries. 
Information derived from such exercises usually form the basis for further interactions 
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with countries and inform decisions on sanctions. Thus, active management and 
enforcement sanctions are interrelated. 
 
6.3.1.3 Compliance engineered by Democracy and Rule of Law 
 
The argument that rule of law and stable democracy are pre-requisites for improved 
compliance is challengeable when examined through the BRICS’s perspective.162  This 
challenge can be attributed to the inherent differences amongst the BRICS and their 
perception of the Western values of democracy and rule of law. For instance, whilst 
Brazil,163 India164  and SA follow the Western notion of democracy, China and Russia 
do not.165 Also, whereas China has an authoritarian governmental system,166 Russia has 
a managed democracy.167 Surprisingly, the governance approach of China and Russia, 
has not undermined their compliance to AML/CFT standards.168  
 
China’s compliance position undermines Simmons’s argument which suggests that 
non-liberal democratic governments are less likely to ensure compliance than liberal 
democracies.169  Simmons argues that this is due to their lack of respect for human 
rights, legal processes and democratic political constituencies, coupled with 
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acquiescence to high level of illicit activities occurring in the economic bloc.170   
Undoubtedly, China has these deficiencies as by the 2016 democracy index, China is 
classed as authoritarian and rated 136 of 160 countries.171 This ranking means that 
existing formal institutions have limited substance, non-transparent elections and 
disregard for civil liberties. The 2016 rule of law index ranks China as 80th of 113 
countries, an indication of entrenched corruption, weak criminal justice system and 
fragile regulatory enforcement structures.172 Surprisingly, these shortcomings have not 
hindered China’s compliance with AML/CFT standards.173 
 
Simmons’s argument on democracy as a pre-requisite for compliance to international 
standards is further weakened by the position of Brazil and South Africa. Both 
countries, though with entrenched democracies steeped in political history, have failed 
to attain China’s compliance levels with AML/CFT standards. To illustrate this, 
Brazil’s successful historical protests for democracy for over a period of four years 
(1984–1988)174   instilled a spirit of resilience in its people who demanded for rule of 
law and democratic values. Hence, civil societies unreservedly and strongly combat 
political corruption, particularly as regards wasteful spending. 175Recently, angered by 
corruption allegations against President Dilma Rousseff, over one million Brazilians 
protested for her removal, a move strengthened by the Brazilian Congress.176 SA also 
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evidences such resilience, propelled by Nelson Mandela, which has empowered South 
Africans to fight injustice, occasioned by weak political structures. Most protests have 
been focused on ensuring service delivery for its socially disadvantaged indigent 
citizens.177 Remarkably, these aesthetically high levels of democracy and rule of law in 
Brazil and SA have not necessarily translated to high levels of AML/CFT compliance 
levels in excess of China’s ratings. 
 
It is however arguable that Brazil and SA provide some form of protection that allows 
their citizens’ involvement in the democratic processes, which China does not permit. 
Consequently, it is arguable that China’s compliance with international standards does 
not equate to national translation of global norms in a manner that combats illicit crimes 
whilst also promoting the agenda of the people. For this reason, entrenchment of 
democratic values in other EEs cannot be overlooked, particularly in light of their 
political and historical underpinnings which allow them to thrive and engineer 
compliance from within. 
 
Compared with the other BRICS countries, India is a model country where compliance 
to AML/CFT is reflective of democracy and rule of law.  India ranks 32nd out of 160 
countries on the democracy index; has a robust electoral system and an independent 
civil liberties presence which is arguably propelled by the Gandhi movement. From the 
Gandhi era, Indians, disillusioned by the political class which saw itself as law, would 
campaign against the government to ensure its accountability.178  This intensified in 
2011, when members of a civil society established a political party which won 67 of 
the 70 seats in Delhi State Assembly in 2015.179   Consequently, most protests have 
been focused on ensuring service delivery for its socially disadvantaged indigent 
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citizens. Its high democracy ratings and the improving global ranking on the rule of law 
index,180 has resulted in a steady rise in India’s AML/CFT compliance levels.  
 
Examining the BRICS indicates that China is indeed an exception. Heller argues that 
movement to improved compliance is usually underpinned by an environment with 
consolidated democracies.181 This perception holds that sturdy civil societies are 
essential for a flourishing democracy and an environment where human rights, electoral 
processes and accountability are paramount. Hence, they propel compliance.182  This 
explains Russia’s struggle with compliance, given its weak political and economic 
institutions steeped in corruption and non-transparency or accountability at all 
governmental levels.183  These shortcomings, bolstered by Russia’s weak rule of law, 
have undermined its attempt to realize its economic potential,184 trade liberalization185  
and compliance to international standards despite its transition into a market economy. 
Commenting on this, Rivkin stated that ‘Russia still has considerable work to do when 
it comes to establishing the rule of law… (and) in the creation of a genuinely 
independent and technocratic judiciary…for the enforcement of judgments.’186 The 
compliance limitations marked by external requirements and internal tensions 
challenge the need to monitor the dimensions of rule of law and democracy in relation 
to compliance.187  
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Recognizing the shortcomings in compliance and the inadequacy of sanctions, 
particularly in Russia, IFIs started using management models, including membership. 
Other models include the review of countries’ compliance shortcoming through 
assessments to evaluate compliance. This governance approach is supported by studies 
which emphasize the weak link between democracy and economic prosperity; after all, 
China’s authoritarianist government has created more wealth.188 However, no findings 
have buttressed that BRICS became democratic after making economic progress. 
Russia’s ranking even presents evidence to the contrary.189 The effectiveness of this 
governance alternative is still largely dependent on respect for rule of law and the 
efficacy of democracy within countries.  
 
6.3.2 Non-Legal factors  
 
Legal factors are not independent components, rather they are adjunct to political and 
resources issues. These adjunct issues, which are also compliance drivers in EEs, are 
examined to see how they affect compliance with AML/CFT standards.  An overview 
of internal factors and external pressures, that occasioned FATF membership through 
coercion or subtle pressure, show that the degree to which some of these factors are 
present, determine to a large extent, the compliance levels of countries.  
 
6.3.2.1 Political Will, Domestic Conditions and Policy Priorities 
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The degree of political will and institutional commitments in responding to AML/CFT 
regulations will determine, to a large extent, the varying degrees of compliance and 
accountability.  
 
It was expected that FATF membership would translate to increased political will for 
EEs to comply with FATF standards, thus ensuring improved compliance levels. These 
expectations assumed that having emerged as strong economies, these countries must 
have had strong structures that promoted transparency within the government and 
private sector. Hence, it was hoped that EEs’ FATF membership would provide the 
needed impetus for political will within EEs to pursue refined legislative and regulatory 
reforms. Brazil, however, presents a different picture. It was believed that Brazil’s 
FATF membership would trigger improved compliance and help the FATF coordinate 
AML/CFT efforts of other countries in the region. This expectation, however, failed as 
the country was steeped in corruption, which hindered its compliance efforts. This was 
however short-lived.  
 
In 2007, Brazil enacted the National Strategy to Combat Corruption and Money 
Laundering (ENCCLA), thereby indicating how political will drives accountability.190 
Adopting the ENCCLA demonstrated greater national commitment to combatting ML 
in light of internal corruption concerns. This was different from the US-driven 
transnational legal focus on TF; given that the ENCCLA demonstrated Brazil’s 
response and accountability to national interests and concerns that were not necessarily 
part of transnational priorities. Brazil realized that whilst external demands are relevant, 
they are not the only considerations. The subsequent introduction of TF measures 
indicates that the ENCCLA alongside latter measures mediates between internal and 
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external demands for accountability.191 Consequently, the creation of a FIU192 and a 
central authority,193 combined with the shift of international cooperation 
responsibilities from the judiciary to the executive, and the introduction of specialized 
groups on financial crimes in Brazil’s judiciary and Central Bank marked the move 
towards improved accountability. 
 
The Panama papers incidence highlighted the differences in the reaction of countries in 
addressing allegations of illicit crimes and facilitating accountability. As a result of the 
incidence, Brazil passed a vote of no confidence on its president, China and Russia 
were silent. The silence of China and Russia has not been deafening as, collectively, 
the BRICS have displayed enormous political will through the introduction of the 
BRICS Council on AML/CFT. The BRICS agreed that their collective action on 
counter terrorism financing should be consolidated. There was also a need to intensify 
training programs, especially using the Network AML/CFT.194 The BRICS also 
approved a proposal to permanently establish a secretariat for the BRICS Council on 
AML/CFT in Moscow. It remains to be seen the extent to which this can be translated 
to long term change.  
 
National authorities which perceive compliance with AML/CFT standards as a means 
of combatting un-systemic risk and ensuring security can also propel the political will 
for tackling ML/TF. Although ML/TF may not be the immediate catalyst for bringing 
sectors down, they could be the participatory reason for institutional collapse. Sectors 
that are AML/CFT compliant are better able to withstand risks by eliminating or 
reducing the un-systemic risks that accompany financial integration. A country’s 
compliance level may however be largely dependent on that of its neighbors. For 
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example, in order to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’, countries with bank secrecy rules 
can compete more favorably internationally based on the recent Panama tax scandal 
example. Therefore, the activity of neighboring nations can trigger a country’s 
compliance or negate it.  
 
Hence, although a country may have the political will, it cannot be underestimated that 
domestic conditions may still hinder compliance. One of such conditions is the 
ingrained culture of alternative remittances, such as Hawala, in various EEs, including 
China, Russia and India.195 The culture’s predominance is because the economies of 
these countries are cash-based. Remittances are cheap, largely unregulated and can 
leave no paper trail. This process of transfer is facilitated by the trust existent between 
community members and the remittance operator aided by a long history of use.196 
Consequently, remittance processes have escalated the agency slack between the 
BRICS and the IFIs largely becomes it lacks a formal registration process, which makes 
it attractive to users who prefer privacy or lack the requisite documentation. Regulation 
of Hawala is however significant given its volume197 and vulnerability to ML/TF.198  
That any commodity can be subject of Hawala further demonstrates the porousness of 
the system.199 Various Hawala forms have evolved, including internet and mobile based 
systems.200  
 
Regulating Hawala, for instance, presents an effective way of addressing its societal 
issues and ensuring compliance to FATF recommendations. However, regulatory steps 
must also consider competing reactions. A weak response can embolden launderers to 
exploit any lapses in the Hawala systems, whilst a robust response may lead to 
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Invisible Bank: Regulating the Hawala System in India, Pakistan and the UAE’ [2005] 15 Ind. Int’l & 
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proliferation contrary to reduction of underground services.201 One of the impediments 
to regulation and compliance is the difficulty in detecting operators, who often 
camouflage their activities with legitimate businesses.202 This makes detection, 
investigation and sanctioning of illicit crimes difficult, expensive and time-consuming. 
The ineffective regulatory efforts to register Hawala users demonstrates this difficulty. 
Of the projected 160,000 to 200,000 existing Hawala users in the US, only 38,859 got 
registered by January 2013.203  This suggests that threats of sanctions or fines may in 
fact be unsuitable to compel compliance.  
 
This situation suggests that Hawala banking systems are beyond the reach of regulation 
and raises questions about aligning or reconciling culture with existing regulation. 
Scholars have proposed the introduction of trust within the banking system using 
instruments for financial inclusion such as microfinance banking, mobile money204 or 
internet transfers.205  The extent to which these semi-regulated banking variations 
would be accepted by culture is however debatable. Acceptability would however 
provide investigative leads for law enforcement agencies, because transactions done 
through these means would generate an electronic record, while internet transfers 
generate IP addresses.206  
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In addition to the domestic conditions, policy priorities of the BRICS are crucial in 
determining compliance with FATF recommendations. Compliance is largely 
dependent on states’ perception that FATF recommendations reflect their national 
interests and priorities.207 For instance, countries which sponsor state terrorism are 
unlikely to comply with FATF recommendations which would go against their policy 
priorities and domestic conditions. However, countries faced with high level predicate 
offences, including high crime rates, terror attacks, capital flight, tax evasion and 
diminishing financial stability are more inclined to comply with FATF 
recommendations as a means of combatting these difficulties. For instance, Brazil has 
extraordinary criminal rates;208 as the largest exporter of goods, China tackles trade-
based ML. Their emergence as new market-oriented economies worsens these issues, 
as criminals are enabled to operate on a world-wide scale.209  The large volume of 
legitimate capital moving into the global financial economy, coupled with high 
remittances and insufficient regulatory controls have made it possible for funds to move 
around unregulated. Furthermore, countries which value bank secrecy as a determinant 
of compliance are faced with stiff competition by countries which do not.  
 
The domestic conditions are also indicated in the operative system of government 
within a state. Scholars have argued that the level of democracy of states determine 
their compliance records.210 They argue that internal structures, including budgetary 
allocations, reflect the policy priorities and the domestic conditions of a state.211 
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Furthermore, although debatable, domestic politics has long been understood to 
determine a state’s decision to accept international obligations.212  
 
6.3.2.2 Compliance based on Reputational Concerns 
 
Unlike FIs in ACs, EEs have more to lose in terms of trade and financial integration if 
they are not compliant with the AML/CFT regulations. This is because a tainted 
reputation can adversely affect their businesses. The pressure for compliance may come 
from large banks which are more predisposed to comply for reputational reasons.213 
Large banks are also keen to display their compliance with international standards in 
order to compete globally and establish sturdy banks in developed economies. For this 
reason, benchmarking for performance is valuable, as large banks usually have 
domestic and international competitive advantages. This may occasion positive 
regulatory capture whereby regulators are pressurized to ensure compliance with FATF 
recommendations across sectors so as to attract and ensure continued international 
investments and business.    
 
The interaction between regulators and the regulated industry can occasion increased 
engagement in CDD requirements and other FATF recommendations, especially as 
these actively contribute to combatting fraud.214 Conversely, non-compliance to CDD 
requirements contributes to fraud and operational risk. Given regulatory capture by 
large banks, CDD has increasingly become a concern for boards of directors and senior 
management, who are usually proactive in combatting ML/TF. These steps are taken in 
recognition that non-compliance to even soft law instruments can have reputational 
damage.215 It indicates the FATF’s standard of increased transparency and market 
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pressure, as more domestic banks are now covered by FATF recommendations. The 
efforts of large banks to propel increased regulatory supervision indicate that proficient 
regulatory bodies are crucial in ensuring compliance. 
 
These active steps towards improved compliance within EEs demonstrates limited 
reliance on their FATF membership to salvage them from the effect of non-compliance. 
This was particularly due to the knowledge that de-listing can be triggered in the event 
of dire shortcomings in compliance – a process which has almost similar effect as 
blacklisting.  
 
6.3.2.3 Legitimacy and its effect on Compliance  
 
 
It can be taken for granted that the BRICS membership of the FATF has changed their 
legitimacy perception of the institution. As earlier stated, the treatment faced by the 
BRICS as associate members and non-members has not been relegated to history. For 
this reason, the BRICS do not necessarily view the FATF as wholly legitimate 
irrespective of their positioning as strategically important countries. However, the 
BRICS persistently comply with the FATF standards. Their underlying agenda is to 
ensure their continued integration with the global financial market. For this reason, their 
compliance levels are usually above 50%.216 However, given the internal issues faced 
by the BRICS, such as corruption, it is indeed questionable if their compliance levels 
are a true indication of their efforts to combatting ML/TF. Indeed, compliance levels 
can be ‘window dressed’ and BRICS can strategically engage with its principals (the 
IFIs) to ensure continued integration.  
 
To ensure increased accountability amongst the BRICS, these countries developed a 
BRICS Council for AML/CFT. This move was aimed at facilitating improved 
                                     
216 See Figure 9. 
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AML/CFT structures particularly centered on corruption – a problem faced by all the 
BRICS.217 Additionally, the BRICS sought a collaborative platform, free from bias 
which allowed for secure AML/CFT information exchange and the development of 
international mechanisms for confiscation and recovery of criminal assets within the 
BRICS.218 The BRICS have taken on this additional responsibility because they 
recognize that effective AML/CFT and anti-corruption measures attract foreign direct 
investment and aid their global expansion plans. However, the BRICS Council for 
AML/CFT is recent, given its approval in 2015, and its effect is yet to be known.  
 
6.3.2.4 Globalization and Integration 
 
 
Globalization and integration comes with attendant issues such as political strife 
between countries with varying values or increasing inter-bank relationship between 
countries. To the extent that certain banks establish their physical presence in other 
countries. This section will illustrate how these can have an effect on a country’s 
compliance with AML/CFT standards.  
 
As demonstrated in chapter 3, political interrelationship is a determinant for compliance 
with AML/CFT regulations in the BRICS. Political strife between countries is likely to 
weaken external ties and internal institutions that drive regional or global compliance. 
For instance, the political strife between Russia and the West was arguably designed 
by Western states to weaken Russia geopolitically and reduce her threat to Western 
Europe and the NATO Alliance.219 In pursuance of this objective, Russia was recently 
expelled from the G8 countries. The effect of this is that Russia would be unable to 
enter into memoranda of understanding with Western countries to uncover cross-border 
laundering or terror funding. Interestingly, Russia’s political and economic stability is 
beneficial to the West as it could be a vital factor in international relations, particularly 
                                     
217 Clarence Samuel Joseph, ‘Establishing Comprehensive, Economic and Legal Approach to Risks and 
Threats in Anti-Money Laundering Regime’ [2016] 13 Financial Security 1, 24.  
218 Ibid.  
219 This is in relation to territorial issues with Western allies like Ukraine and Georgia.  
 314 
trade and the economy of the United States. Russia’s expulsion from the G8 indicates 
a lack of diplomacy by the US and other Western countries in dealing with perceived 
allies and working together for a common good. The alternative argument however is 
that there is a balance between condoning Russia’s infringement on Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and protecting trade/finance agreements.  
 
 
China has similar issues with the West, including territorial issues in its attempt to 
redefine its place amongst the West and the South. Furthermore, China is not content 
with Western interpretation of policies, such as the Western stance on human rights 




Yet, global integration has seen BRICS enter into banking relationships with developed 
countries, and even establish subsidiary financial institutions in those countries. 
Stretching the agency theory enumerated in chapter four would indicate that HP 
countries classed as highly integrated (such as China) would be willing to sustain a high 
compliance level with the sole aim of ensuring its continued integration into the global 
economy.  Hence, one may conclude that the propensity for China or India to comply 
to AML/CFT standards is higher. Particularly because, on paper, their procedures 
follow the host country’s AML/CFT policies.220 
 
 
Cases however illustrate the use of Chinese subsidiary banks abroad to facilitate money 
laundering or capital flight.221 The UK regulator (the FCA) has responded to these cases 
against the largest branches of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 
and the China Construction Bank Corp (CBB) by strengthening its inspection on 
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them.222 The UK’s step indicate that the compliance by Chinese overseas bank is 
questionable. Henry Rui, an Ernst and Young partner for China stated that ‘when they 
do funds transfer, they don’t check the source of funds, which is very important in 
KYC…they just do the transactions’.223 An indication that compliance may actually be 
lip service to regulation and these institutions would bypass compliance to win 
businesses. Rui attributes this to the recent history of AML in China which requires 
time for the country to be comfortable in meeting the international standards. Statistics 
however indicate that China’s admirable compliance levels show evidence of the 




This is particularly evident in China’s relationship with ACs where China provides 
private equity for small-medium enterprises. Quite recent was the $60 billion 
commitment to Africa by China between 2000 and 2015 to finance over 3000 
infrastructure projects in Africa.225 The relationship between HP countries (China) and 
MP countries (ACs) may indicate the presence of an agency relationship which is 
particularly disadvantageous to China given its ability to follow – to a larger extent, the 
international AML/CFT standards. This situation may facilitate an agency slack where 
AC’s engage strategically with China on their AML/CFT compliance to ensure 
continued investments. However, China has not always met the global standards itself, 
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6.3.2.5 Technical Capacity and Resources 
 
Technical capacity is crucial in determining a country’s compliance with the AML/CFT 
standards. Most BRICS countries have the technical capacity required to combat illicit 
crimes due to resources at their disposal and their interrelationship with IFIs and the 
FATF. Their resource devotion and availability can be attributed to their need to protect 
their position in the international market. These give the EEs access to external 
technical assistance given the risk they pose to the global economy.  
 
However, the BRICS do not always have all the expertise necessary to combat illicit 
crime. Evidence from various EEs reveal that there is no unified regulatory approach 
for combatting ML/TF, largely due to lack of capacity. Lack of a unified approach 
thrives even when a set of supervisory bodies are made responsible for combatting 
ML/TF. In Brazil, for instance, the responsible agencies are the Central Bank, CVM 
(Securities Commission), SUSEP (Superintendencia de Seguros Privados; Agency of 
Private Insurances), and SPC (Secretaria de Previdencia Complementar; Secretary of 
Complementary Social Security). The FIU (COAF) is responsible for further 
investigation of suspicious transactions received from financial institutions and 
enforcement against same. There is however weak communication among these 
institutions.227 
 
The Brazil 2010 MER stressed the disjointed system of communication in its Criminal 
Justice System.228 It revealed the lack of a centralized database between the police, 
public prosecutors, FIs and the judiciary.229 This resulted in a cumbersome process; 
where the judiciary had to apply to the central bank which received classified 
information. The request was then forwarded to the FIs for notification and 
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documentation prior to submission to the judicial authority. This time-consuming 
process allowed for laundering prior to enforcement. This process has since been 
replaced by the BacenJud, an internet information request system that eliminates the 
middle man (the central bank), whilst permitting information exchange between the FIs 
and the judiciary.230 The advantage of this system is that judges now have easy, fast 
and direct access to banking information. It also recognizes orders for the lifting of 
financial secrecy as well as enforcement orders for the freezing of bank accounts. 
Partnerships are increasingly formed between regulatory institutions and regulators in 
a bid to ensure improved compliance. 
 
Technical capacity can sometimes be undermined by corruption. Evidence from the 
private sector, particularly in light of the recent Panama and Paradise Papers incidences, 
illustrates a complacent approach to combatting illicit crimes.231 In the private sector, a 
new market for lawyers, accountants, auditors, economists, front desk officers and other 
professionals has emerged, bestowing on them a gate-keeper responsibility of ensuring 
that FATF recommendations are adhered to. This responsibility specifically recognizes 
that these professionals should carry out strict CDD. It requires that financial 
transactions are monitored and prompt reports made to the FIU where suspicion arises. 
This responsibility requires that the staff be trained to acquire relevant skills to drive 
the new market.232 This has translated in the BRICS intensifying training programs for 
relevant professionals. Despite this,  Panama still happened233 and involved all BRICS 
countries. The responses were surprising; Russia and China reacted by censoring all 
news items filtering into their countries. It became evident that bank officials were part 
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of the process of securing the Panama deals.  Clearly, technical capacity is hindered by 
corruption as it precipitates operational risk within institutions. The result of corruption 
is disastrous; not only does it undermine staff professionalism; it also threatens effective 
judicial decisions. It appears that the Brazilian judiciary has taken a lax attitude to 
ML/TF cases before. For instance, only 11 cases have culminated in final 
convictions.234    
 
This also extends to the ineffective regulation of increased technological use. To a large 
extent, this is a determinant for compliance in EEs235 given the wealth of the 
countries236 and level of internet penetration. Within EEs, payment methods are 
continually evolving. The FATF has recognized that their vulnerability to ML/TF is 
predicated on the absence of specific regulations237 and the sluggish adaptation of the 
regulators to ensure compliance.238   Turner rejects the position that cyber payment and 
internet banking systems are extensions of the traditional banking system, arguing 
instead that they are game changers.239  His position indicates the challenges that 
regulators are faced with in ensuring swift responses to combatting AML/CFT.  
 
This challenge is further intensified by the pervasive nature of cyber-crime. Like ML 
via wire transfers, it is not subject to any regulator’s jurisdiction. It is however faster 
and possible without paper trails, since programming entities sometimes provide 
services to the exclusion of banks. As the market for cyber criminals is expanding, with 
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experts and social engineers leading the pack, so is the level of damage and 
consequential losses that can accrue. For example, a Brazilian group, ‘Anonymous 
Brasil’, unleashed cyber terror on Brazilian FIs’ websites, including that of Citigroup 
in 2012.240  India is also plagued with similar issues;  statistics reveal that 48% of 
Indians were cybercrime victims in 2015.241  The damage in Russia is unprecedented, 
with hijackers doubling their income from USD 3.7 billion between 2011 and 2013.242 
Although Russian enforcement agencies have increasingly detected more cases, the 
effectiveness cannot be measured. This cyber-attacks have led to stock market 
manipulations.243 
 
Recognizing the challenges posed by technology, Nobel Laureate Michael Spence 
recently stated that the BRICS slowdown is attributable to ‘the disruptive impacts of 
digital technology, which are set to erode developing economies.’244 This statement 
illustrates that technology, although a positive change, comes with challenges which 
hinder compliance to AML/CFT, puts customers at risk and challenges economic 
growth. Regrettably, Spence states that these countries ‘have little or no control’ over 
these obstacles that hinder their ability to achieve sustained high growth.  
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6.4 Cross-Country Analysis of Compliance to AML/CFT Regime: FATF  
 
An assessment of the MER of countries is carried out to determine the level of country 
compliance to AML/CFT. The scoring of assessments is discussed in the previous 
chapter.245 
 
6.4.1 Analysis of AML/CFT by Countries 
 
Figure 9 represents a plot of the percentage score based on the FATF MER. The BRICS 
countries are individually represented on the basis of their MER results. Figure 9 
displays India as the most compliant EE with 66.67%, closely followed by China with 
66.03%. These countries are then followed by South Africa with 58.55%, Russia with 
57.6% and Brazil with 54.49% compliance level. Brazil’s troubling compliance level 
at 54% is however above that of 35 African countries, as 30 countries score below 50%.  
 
This may be indicative that the membership within a club may promote increased 
compliance with its objectives. However, this chapter asserts that economic and legal 
development, not membership, occasions improved compliance. This is so because 
countries like Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey (MINT), who are also classified 
as EEs,246 have been able to achieve almost comparable compliance levels. 
Consequently, these results reflect that blacklisting and other implicit coercive 
measures of compliance induce potential members of the FATF to introduce high levels 
of supervision and enforcement structures which coincidentally is supported by their 
domestic structures. This can be deduced from the FATF membership policy which 
                                     
245 See page 232.  
246BBC News, ‘The Mint Countries: Next Economic Giants?’ (BBC News, 6 January 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25548060> accessed 10 January 2017; Christine Easterfield, 
‘BRIC vs MINT – Comparing Emerging Markets Using Cambashi’s Updated Country Observation’ 
(Cambashi) <http://www.cambashi.com/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/2513/page/3 > accessed 3 
January 2016; Daniel Harari, ‘The MINT Emerging Economies’ (Second Reading: The House of 
Commons Library Blog – UK Parliament, 14 January 2014) <https://secondreading.uk/daniel-harari/the-
mint-emerging-economies/  > accessed 10 January 2016. 
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emphatically states that it considers, amongst other factors: ‘the level of AML/CFT 
risks faced and the efforts to combat such risks... level of commitment to AML/CFT 
efforts.’ 247   
 
The FATF considers these on a qualitative basis which is subjective and based on 
unquantifiable evidence. Although the method employed is questionable, what is 
evident is that the membership requirement is set at a high bar and countries are pushed 
to meet that bar by increased regulatory supervision and enforcement – actions which 
guarantee membership and warrants continuous compliance. This supports the 
argument that domestic factors and embedded coercion ensure compliance, not 
membership.  
 
The question then is why the BRICS, why are these same measures not foisted on ACs? 
The response can be gleaned from the FATF membership requirement, which 
considers:  
 
‘the impact (of the country’s financial system) on the global financial 
system…the degree of openness of the financial sector and its interaction with 
international markets… the level of adherence to financial sector standards and 
participation in international organizations.’248 
 
This demonstrates that developed countries are more likely to have sophisticated 
financial systems and impact on the global market, thus warranting their inclusion. 
Furthermore, they are also more likely to have advanced infrastructure and expertise to 
foster compliance to AML/CFT standards. Thus, it can be argued that the criterion for 
membership in itself fosters improved compliance within countries that aspire to get a 
seat at the FATF table. This explains why mandatory compliance to certain FATF 
                                     
247FATF, ‘FATF Membership Policy’ (FATF) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/fatfmembershippolicy.html > accessed 13 January 2016.  
248 Ibid.  
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recommendations, like recommendations  3, 5, 10, 11 and 20,249  are easily achieved 
by the BRICS given their robust legal, economic and supervisory structure. IMF 
statistics buttresses the increased supervisory quality in the BRICS countries.  These 
requirements indeed make the BRICS regulation more robust and prepared to ensure 
compliance. Thus, when membership is aspired to and supported by domestic 




Figure 9. Technical Compliance Levels of the BRICS to the FATF Recommendations 
(Derived from the FATF MERs of countries)  
 
6.4.2 Analysis by Recommendation and Topics  
 
The clearest deficiency noted regarding country compliance levels is mainly as regards 
recommendation 17 on ‘Reliance on Third Parties’. Third parties are classified as 
financial institutions or Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
(DNFBPs). The FATF believes that when permitted to rely on third parties, the 
financial institution granted that permission has the ultimate responsibility of ensuring 
that the third party is registered and carries out adequate due diligence (CDD)/record 
                                     
249FATF, ‘FATF Membership Policy’ (FATF) < http://www.fatf-




















keeping. This deficiency can be attributed to the high level of unregulated money 
transfer business given the high remittances received by BRICS. Additionally, 
businesses like casinos, real estate agents and dealers in precious stones face minimal 
regulation implementation and lack the expertise to supply adequate CDD/record 
keeping to the permitted institution. Lawyers, trust and service providers are also 
strictly regulated and owe confidentiality obligations to their clients. This explains the 
low level of compliance to recommendation 22 which requires DNFBPs to adhere to 





Figure 10: Analysis by compliance to FATF Recommendations 
 
Conversely, the statistics reveal that the recommendation with the highest level of 
compliance is recommendation 9 on financial secrecy, with a score of 95%, well above 
the average 60.77%. This is followed by recommendation 31 on the powers of 
enforcement and investigative officers. If this is correct, it can be interpreted to mean 






















recommendations. It is however paradoxical that recommendation 17 is low as 
recommendation 31 charges countries to empower their enforcement and investigative 
authorities to carry out their tasks effectively. It could however mean that these 
authorities have narrow focus, which is not inclusive of DNFBPs. This aligns with 
compliance literature on EEs which revealed that EEs’ investigative and enforcement 
structures are sturdy, but lacking in capacity. The absence of capacity has consequently 
occasioned a risk-based approach which, unfortunately, is not holistic.  
 
An evaluation of Figure 10 illustrates improving compliance levels to CFT 
requirements by the BRICS and sturdy compliance to CDD requirements. This is 
different for ACs that although combat heavy terrorism has displayed weak compliance 
to the recommendations. This, again, can be attributed to lack of, or weak, expertise in 
ACs.   
6.4.3 Analysis by Compliance Drivers  
 
Figure 11: Analysis by corruption index 250  
                                     
250 Correlation is done using the Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index 2014: Results’ 
(Transparency International, 2014) < https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results > accessed 10 July 
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The r-value of -1.14686 shows a very weak negative correlation. This reveals that 
higher corruption usually signifies low compliance rates and vice versa. This is 
particularly the case with China, India and Russia. Brazil and South Africa show a 
slightly different picture where higher standards of compliance do not necessarily lead 
to lower levels of corruption.   
 
Figure 12: Analysis by rule of law index 
The r-value of -0.38675 is indicative of a negative correlation between rule of law and 
compliance with AML/CFT standards. So when rule of law improves, compliance 
decreases. This is the case in Brazil and SA, indicating that ‘window dressed’ 
compliance usually shrouds actual compliance levels. China, India and Russia however 
indicate that as rule of law improves, compliance improves. China’s result is surprising 
in the light of the literature concerning its compliance drives which are not necessarily 
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Figure 13: Analysis by Democracy Index 251 
The r-value of -0.52215 indicates a strong negative correlation, illustrating that 
democratic countries do not necessarily have higher compliance levels. This is 
demonstrated by China’s variables, and surprisingly, Brazil also indicates this. India, 
Russia and South Africa show a more positive relationship between democracy and 
compliance, albeit a weak one.  
 
Figure 14: Analysis by ease of doing business
252 
                                     
251 David Campbell, Paul Polzlbauer, Thorsten Barth, Georg Polzlbauer, ‘Democracy Ranking 2015 
(Scores)’ (Democracy Ranking, 2015) < 
http://democracyranking.org/ranking/2015/data/Scores_of_the_Democracy_Ranking_2015_A4.pdf > 
accessed 30 December 2015.  
252 See World Bank Group, ‘Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency’ (World Bank Group, 12 th 



















































































































Compliance to AML/CFT Regulations Ease of doing Business(Distance to frontier)
 327 
 
A weak negative correlation is indicated by the r-value of -0.3661. Countries with 
higher compliance levels create a less conducive environment for doing business and 
vice versa. Surprisingly, this is particularly the case in China and can be attributable to 
the strict regulatory environment.  
 
 
Figure 15: Analysis by human development index (HDI)  
The -0.53287 r-value reveals a strong negative correlation. Where there is weaker 
AML/CFT compliance, there is stronger HDI and vice versa. This is especially the case 
in Russia. In India, with higher AML/CFT compliance, there is lower HDI. This 
indicates that other variables come into play in determining HDI, such as corruption 
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6.5 Conclusion  
 
The BRICS have created newer inequalities of power and influence regionally and 
globally. Although inherently diverse in terms of culture, socio-political structures and 
economic policies, the agreement between these countries is a perceived threat to 
existing IFIs due to their accelerating economic progression. On the basis of their 
intrinsic powers and unprecedented economic growth, the BRICS were selected as 
members to the FATF in a bid to drive improved compliance to AML/CFT 
recommendations, especially amongst regions. 
 
Extending FATF membership to the BRICS was centered on varying jurisdictional 
reasons. Whilst the BRICS and the developing world viewed this membership as a 
means to gain increased representation within the FATF, the agenda of the West was 
to ensure that the financial movement to the Global South is not replete with illicit 
transactions. The power-play involved in negotiations between these ‘North-South 
strategically important countries’ was predicated on the assumption that representation 
would catalyze improved compliance to AML/CFT recommendations. This assumption 
however did not take into consideration pertinent issues peculiar to the BRICS 
economies, such as diverse socio-economic, political and legal developmental levels. 
Furthermore, the FATF continues to exercise some restraint in including EEs as true 
core members and thus shapers of its standards. It had merely treated them as 
regulation-takers. The BRICS coerced and belated membership has created a very 
unbalanced membership between EEs and the developed countries. 
 
Against this background, this chapter argues that membership does not necessarily 
guarantee comparable representation or legitimacy; neither does it guarantee the overtly 
improved compliance of BRICS countries. It presents a contrary argument that 
‘representation’ taints the socio-economic complexities inherent in these countries and 
their ability to comply. Worse still, it conceals the asymmetries occasioned by variances 
in the strength of legal structures reinforced by political and economic differences 
between members of the FATF. For membership to equate to legitimacy, there must be 
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existent changes along existing political and economic global structures, arguing that 
this would ensure improved adherence to FATF recommendations. 
 
It then considers the determinants of compliance to AML/CFT in EEs.  It finds that 
compliance is based on varying factors which may be external or internal to individual 
jurisdictions. More so, external factors influence internal determinants of compliance. 
This is further buttressed by the FATF compliance standards which reveal that the 
standards of compliance are marginally higher in EEs than in African countries. This 
can be attributed to improved supervision in the select countries and stronger legal and 
financial systems which were grounds for membership and not an offshoot of 
membership. This is further buttressed empirically as the five (5) variables employed 


















Diffusing the FATF standards to countries was achieved through a process of coercion 
and persuasion. Yet, ACs/EEs implement the FATF standards, partly to avert any 
compromise to their funding from IFIs. One reason why IFIs can wield such powers in 
relation to AML/CFT standards is because these standards are imbedded in their 
conditionalities. Nevertheless, paradoxes still result from ACs/EEs implementation. 
The introduction of the risk-based approach (RBA) by the FATF to incorporate the 
peculiarities of countries in compliance ratings, with a view to resolving some 
legitimacy issues and agency slack, did not completely resolve the issue.  Rather, 
continued implementation has only occasioned formal or creative compliance. For 
countries to attain proactive or actual compliance to the AML/CFT standards, the 
legitimacy of IFIs/FATF and the resulting standards are crucial. Additionally, a shift 
from RBA to the uncertainty based approach (UBA) which is judgement based and 
forward looking may indeed be advisable. 
 
Section 1 restates the concept and importance of legitimacy in AML/CFT regulation. 
Section 2 examines the FATF’s strategies in rule design, implementation and 
compliance and the extent to which the legitimacy crisis is addressed. Additionally, it 
scrutinizes the RBA and the extent to which it closes compliance differentials in 
ACs/EEs, thereby reducing agency slack and resolving the legitimacy crisis. It also 
appraises the option of the UBA as an alternative to the RBA to ensure that ML/TF is 
combatted effectively. Section 3 scrutinises the attempts aimed at resolving legitimacy 
crisis and their possible feasibility. Section 4 questions why ACs/EEs still comply with 
AML/CFT standards, despite the legitimacy crisis and the regulatory paradoxes. 
Section 5 draws the strands together and concludes. 
 331 
7.1 The Agency Quandary: Restating the Concept and Importance of Legitimacy  
 
The exclusivity of FATF membership which is biased against belated and associate 
members’ reveals complexities in the institution’s processes, which has worsened the 
legitimacy crisis. This crisis, which is evidenced by a lack of representation or input in 
global regulatory standards from these countries, was facilitated by the inherent overlap 
in the FATF’s position as both principal and agent to developed countries. As discussed 
earlier, the FATF is the G7’s agent. The G7, whose member states are core FATF 
members, played an important role in formulating FATF standards. Conversely, the G7 
countries remain bound by the FATF standards, which allows the FATF to evaluate 
their compliance and possibly issue sanctions. This places the FATF in a principal 
position to the G7.  
 
Contrariwise, the BRICS only have some measure of involvement in the FATF’s 
standards re-formulation process, which demonstrates their role as ‘rule-takers’ 
because of their belated membership.  ACs suffer a worse off fate with minimal input 
in standards re-formulation, which restricts them from contributing to the FATF 
standards and adding their peculiarities, yet ACs are still subject to the FATF rules. 
This connotes that the FATF relationship with its members’ is dependent on a hierarchy 
(core members, belated members and associate members). The resulting global 
asymmetry and the influence of G7 national/regulatory laws on international standards 
have raised questions about the legitimacy of the FATF.  
 
Whilst these shortcomings also exist in treaty bodies such as the IFIs, countries have 
nonetheless continued to comply with conditionalities listed by them. This continued 
compliance can be attributable to arguments that treaty bodies derive their legitimacy 
from state consent1 and thus have the power to mandate compliance. Without consent, 
                                     
1 Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP, 
2009) 39; Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’ in 
Lukas H. Meyer, Legitimacy, Justice and Public International Law (CUP, 2009) 36; Daniel M. 
Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?’ [1999] 93 (3) American Journal of International Law 596, 604; Rudiger Wolfrum, 
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clear legal structures to ensure accountability and democratic participation, trans-
governmental institutions have continued to foster compliance to their standard. Hurd 
asserts that ‘legitimacy’ does not equate to ‘legal’, but rather, it is the ‘perception of 
actors on the acceptability of an institution.’2 Such fluid construction of ‘legitimacy’ 
postulates that a soft law regulatory body that is perceived as holding normative right 
to govern by those on whose behalf it seeks to do so is ‘legitimate.’3 Thomas describes 
this ascription to an objective perspective on legitimacy by actors as ‘legitimation’, a 
process by which actors come to believe in the normative legitimacy of an object. 4 This 
extended perception grants decentralised bodies other basis for legitimacy and 
acceptance, rooted in the reasons for acceptance by actors. As discussed, the basis for 
an institution’s legitimacy is rooted in how countries perceive their input, throughput 
and output.  
 
                                     
‘Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Introductory Considerations’ in 
Rudiger Wolfrum and Volker Roben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (Berlin and New York: 
Springer, 2008) 6; cf Nienke Grossman, ‘The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts’ [2012] 86 
Temple Law Review 61,78 which argues that state consent and procedural fairness are insufficient to 
ground the legitimacy of institutions; Mathias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: a 
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ [2004] 15 (5) The European Journal of International Law 907, 
912. 
2 Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’ [1999] 53 (2) International Organization 
379, 381; Alain Pellet, ‘Legitimacy of Legislative and Executive Actions of International Institutions’ in 
in Rudiger Wolfrum and Volker Roben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (Berlin and New York: 
Springer, 2008) 70; Chris A. Thomas, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law’ (2013) LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 12/2013, 14< 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51746/1/__libfile_repository_Content_Law%2C%20society%20and%20econo
mics%20working%20papers_2013_WPS2013-12_Thomas.pdf > accessed 10 November 2017; Julia 
Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ 
(2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 2/2008, 16 < 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23040/1/WPS2008-02_Black.pdf >16 November 2017.  
3 John Jost and Brenda Major, ‘Emerging Perspectives on the Psychology of Legitimacy’ in John Jost 
and Brenda Major, The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and 
Intergroup Relations (CUP, 2001); Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and the United Nations’ (2011) Northwestern 
University and Niehaus Centre for Globalization and Governance at the Woodrow Wilson School, 




27015087029086098069122079110014090121&EXT=pdf > accessed 10 July 2017.  
4 Chris A. Thomas, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law’ (2013) LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 12/2013, 16< 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/51746/1/__libfile_repository_Content_Law%2C%20society%20and%20econo
mics%20working%20papers_2013_WPS2013-12_Thomas.pdf > accessed 10 November 2017. 
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Without legitimacy, the FATF may be unable to inspire acceptance and compliance to 
its regulatory standards.5 This is because a body acknowledged as legitimate forms a 
reservoir of loyalty from which it can govern effectively.6 This invariably means that, 
if for instance, the FATF is considered legitimate by receiving actors, such actors are 
more likely to ensure actual or proactive compliance to set standards, as opposed to 
formal or constructive compliance.7 Formal or constructive (‘sham’) compliance 
usually results from a regulator’s quagmire to engage in ensuring adherence to laws 
that do not necessarily mirror society so as to avoid the compulsion of penalties.  
 
ACs are examples of where the inability of law to reflect society can be problematic. 
For example, a country may be sanctioned if its economy is cash-based and it fails to 
achieve financial inclusion necessary for meeting the FATF’s standards on curbing 
terror funding. Penalties may include restrictions on its credit lines or limitations on its 
involvement in the global financial market. These penalties would further exacerbate 
financial exclusion, worsening the country’s capability to curb terrorist funding in-
country and across borders. Black refers to this situation as a regulatory paradox, 
whereby regulation fails to change behaviour, manage risk or achieve any stated goals, 
but occasions un-intended consequences.8 To avoid this dilemma, legal authorities 
usually prefer that legitimacy is established, so that it facilitates voluntary compliance. 




                                     
5 Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory 
Regimes’ (2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 2/2008, 16 < 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23040/1/WPS2008-02_Black.pdf >16 November 2017.  
6 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (PUP, 2006) 281.  
7 Rainer Hulsse, ‘Even Clubs Can’t Do Without Legitimacy: Why the Anti-Money Laundering Blacklist 
Was Suspended’ [2008] 2 Regulation and Governance 459, 460. 
8 Julia Black, ‘Paradoxes and Failures: ‘New Governance’ Techniques and the Financial Crisis’ [2012] 
75 (6) The Modern Law Review 1037, 1040.  
9 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (PUP, 2006) 4. 
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7.2. Propelling Legitimacy and Ensuring Compliance: The FATF’s Strategies  
 
It is crucial to understand the impact of the legitimacy crisis on the existing hierarchy 
of members within the context of the FATF’s rulemaking and implementation 
processes. Countries’ involvement in the FATF’s processes shows a disparity– which 
is largely dependent on their membership hierarchy. This hierarchy determines the 
degree to which a particular country may engage in agency slack given the inability of 
standards and implementation processes to take cognisance of their historical and socio-
economic peculiarities. It can be argued that this disparity not only encourages a 
regulatory paradox, but sets up a set of countries to fail.  
 
7.2.1 Legitimacy in FATF Rule/Standards Design  
 
Legitimacy in designing rules goes to the root of the FATF’s drafting process. This is 
demonstrable by the exclusive decision making process which guides the design of the 
rules. The restricted membership band which holds developed countries within the 
inner caucus, coupled with the FATF’s location within the OECD, exacerbates the 
exclusivity of this process.10 These are causes for concern when dealing with issues that 
require global convergence, as only a select group of countries are privy to the decision 
making process for the FATF standards.11 
 
Decisions about the content of recommendations are usually made by the secretariat 
and debated on during the plenary sessions.12 This highlights difficulties in the FATF’s 
secretariat location , given that the OECD’s mandate only permits the employment of 
OECD nationals within the secretariat. This implies that ACs/EEs are foreclosed from 
partaking in the development of recommendations and may only offer consultative 
                                     
10 James K. Jackson, ‘The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview’ (Congressional Research Service, 
9 May 2012) < http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21904.pdf > accessed 11 November 2017  
11 Kevin L Shepherd, ‘Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach 
for Transactional Lawyers’ [2009] 43 (3) Real Prop. Tr. & Est. LJ 1. 
12 FATF, ‘FATF Secretariat’ (FATF, 2017) < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/fatfsecretariat/> accessed 
20 January 2017.  
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input.13 This restricts active contribution of non-OECD countries to plenary sessions 
which hold three times a year. As discussions in these sessions mainly centre on ex-
post rule design issues, the input of ‘continuing agents’ are effectively unheard.  
 
The ‘continuing agent’s’ limitations within the FATF can be contrasted with the 
position of ACs/EEs  within the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), 
a soft-law forum for enhancing deposit insurance expertise worldwide.14 This forum, 
which boasts over 100 members, has 85 countries involved in voting a representative 
council responsible for its rulemaking processes.15 The IADI’s platform allows for 
global convergence on issues concerning deposit insurance, which has never been the 
case with the FATF, either at the rules development or guidance formulation stage. 
Without a IADI type umbrella body, the FATF gravitates towards a minority imposition 
of a global agenda. The resulting democratic deficit in rule making is manifested in the 
lack of participation by the majority of countries.16 This can lead to standards that are 
not fairly applicable to ACs/EEs and may occasion unintended consequences. Vibert 
contends that such undemocratic rule making may undermine the authority of the rule-
making body,17 an effect which may curtail the efficiency of the FATF rules.  
 
The absence of democracy in the drafting process can also be gleaned from the intrusion 
of private experts from developed states who dominate the content of the FATF 
recommendations.18 Such experts are involved in the consultation processes which 
                                     
13 OECD: Better Policies for Better Lives, ‘OECD Careers’ (OECD) 
<http://www.oecd.org/careers/whatwelookfor.htm > accessed 20 January 2016. 
14International Association of Deposit Insurers, ‘Message from the Chairman’ (IADI, 2016) < 
http://www.iadi.org/en/about-iadi/message-from-the-chairman/ > accessed 10 November 2017. 
15. Ibid.  
16  Ibid (n 15). 
17 Frank Vibert, ‘Reforming International Rule-Making’ [2012] 3 (3) Global Policy 391, 391.  
18 FATF, ‘Consultation on Proposed Changes to the FATF Standards: Compilation of Responses from 
Designated Non-Financial Business and Professions (DNFBP’s)’ (FATF, 2011) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/publicconsultation/First%20public%20consultation%20document%20re
sponses%20dnfbp.pdf?TSPD_101_R0=692e4d2f674f3e448a6e814befd6d8e6l4W00000000000000007
501cd89ffff00000000000000000000000000005a922327006825de3e > accessed 12 November 2017; 
FATF, ‘Consultation on Proposed Changes to the FATF Standards: Compilation of Responses from the 




serve as a prelude to the re-drafting of the FATF standards. They are usually drawn 
from institutions in developed countries given concerns about the technical capacity of 
FIs/supervisory body experts from ACs/EEs.19 Whilst this also affected the drafting 
process of the Basel II requirements, it was an unfounded fear.20 Cornford argues that 
whereas developed countries focused on risk management due to the new financial 
products and services churned out periodically, developing countries usually have a 
narrower focus on traditional retail, private banking or investment banking.21 This 
specialisation in developing countries means the technical capacity of their expertise 
cannot be underestimated.22 Despite this criticism, the status quo remained. On this 
basis, Gathii characterises the rule making process by soft law bodies as a form of 
‘regulatory imperialism’, where powerful nations dictate the pace, process and content 
of rulemaking.23 
 
The absence of an avenue for democratic consensus on the content of the rules is further 
demonstrated by the private interests and landmark activities that prompted the 
inclusion of certain FATF recommendations. For instance, by 1970, the US banks, 
through laws instituted by the Bank Secrecy Act, were already adherent to regulations 
on cash reporting. In 1988 they beckoned on the G7 to impede illegal drug market24 
through global application of these regulations so as to restrict countries from taking 
advantage of regulatory loopholes. Additionally, FIs in countries such as Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom already had CDD/KYC requirements ingrained in their 
                                     
fcl1100000000000000007501cd89ffff00000000000000000000000000005a92238400b9c8d0d1 > 
accessed 12 November 2017.  
19 See FATF, ‘Consultation on Proposed Changes to the FATF Standards: Compilation of Responses 
from the Financial Sector Part 1 and 2’ (FATF 2011) <  http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/publicconsultation/First%20public%20consultation%20document%20re
sponses%20financial%20sector%20part%202.pdf > accessed 4 June 2017; FATF, ‘Consultation on 
Proposed Changes to the FATF Standards: Compilation of Responses from Designated Non-Financial 
Business and Professions (DNFBP’s)’ (FATF, 2011) http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/publicconsultation/First%20public%20consultation%20document%20re
sponses%20dnfbp.pdf  accessed 4 June 2017.  
20 Andrew Cornford, ‘Basel II and Developing Countries’ [2008] 2 Finance & Bien Commun 69, 69.  
21 Ibid 69, 70. 
22 Ibid (n 20) 69, 69. 
23 James Gathii, The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law [2010] J. Prof. Law 1, 
9; Jose Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited [2003] 97 AM.J.Int.L 873-887.   
24 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘The Private Sector Becomes Active: The Wolfsberg Process’ 
[2003]10.4 Journal of Financial Crime 359, 359. NB: A portion of the FATF standards were also 
borrowed from binding international law, particularly the United Nation’s Vienna Convention of 1988, 
an inclusion which has occasioned the hardening of the FATF soft law.  
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legislations and their regulatory bodies enforced compliance.25 France also mandated 
the inclusion of tax offences in the FATF’s remit as a predicate offence as a requirement 
for its membership in 1989 – a position which although combatted by Switzerland, 
Luxemburg and Austria,26 culminated in a compromise on its  inclusion in 1996.27 With 
the role played by private institutions within member countries in deciding on the 
foremost rules of the FATF, it would appear that it was a springboard for private 
institutions in developed countries to tackle global issues relating to tax, drugs and 
inefficient AML/CFT rules.28  
 
Reacting to landmark activities such as the 9/11 terror attack on one of its originators, 
the FATF expanded its regulatory rules to include recommendations on terrorist 
financing. Whereas evidence indicates that ACs had suffered spates of terror activities 
prior to the 9/11 attack, ACs’ experiences were not considered severe enough to warrant 
alterations to the FATF recommendations. Similarly, in broadening its regulatory 
powers to inoculate the global financial system from exposures, the FATF reacted to 
the global financial crisis and not the Asian financial crisis.29 This indicates a projection 
of the priorities and interests of the FATF founding members, with negligible focus on 
that of developing countries. This fails to recognise the varying nuances of developing 
countries, but holds an unrealistic expectation from these states to improve their laws 
to suit the requirements set by the developed countries.30 This predicament may 
obstruct the distinctive progression of developing countries. This can be typified with 
the snail-like response of developing countries, especially ACs in legislating on issues 
                                     
25 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘The Private Sector Becomes Active: The Wolfsberg Process’ [2003]10 
(4) Journal of Financial Crime 359, 359. 
26 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘Anti-Money Laundering: Levelling the Playing Field’ (2003) 
Governance, Basel Institute on Governance 1, 9 < 
https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/publications/biog_working_paper_01.
pdf > accessed 10 November 2017.  
27 FATF-VII, ‘Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering Annual Report 1995-1996’ (FATF, 
28 June 1996) < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1995%201996%20ENG.pdf  > 
accessed 3 May 2017.  
28 Mark Pieth and Gemma Aiolfi, ‘Anti-Money Laundering: Levelling the Playing Field’ (2003) 
Governance, Basel Institute on Governance 1, 22 < 
https://www.baselgovernance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/publications/biog_working_paper_01.
pdf > accessed 10 November 2017. 
29 James K. Jackson, ‘The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview’ (Congressional Research Service, 
9 May 2012) < https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21904.pdf > accessed 11 November 2017. 
30 James Gathii, The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law [2010] J. Prof. Law 1 
-18; Jose Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited [2003] 97 AM.J.Int.L 873-887.   
 338 
that are perceived to hinder economic progression or go against the demands of their 
people. These include financial secrecy or countries not adhering to market 
economies.31 Without representation, the resulting disproportionate rules applicable to 
all countries indicates an imposition of asymmetrically generated ‘global standards’, 
which is potentially damaging to ACs/EEs.32 Gahtii contends that the FATF’s intended 
policy making agenda may have been overtaken by covenants of agency capture.33 This 
recognises that although the FATF was commissioned to be a global AML/CFT rule 
setter, which warranted the later inclusion and endorsement of a RBA that takes into 
account the unique differences of countries into the FATF’s rules, this is not necessarily 
the case.34 
 
Without an option, ACs/EEs have conceded to transplanting the FATF standards 
through model legislations that are not necessarily fitting to their national terrain. This 
has come with a struggle given that these rules stifle any form of self-interest that 
propels proactive compliance. They also potentially set up ACs to fail on compliance 
levels, which subjects them to financial exclusion from the global market. Scholars 
have attributed this to the lack of moral, pragmatic or cognitively justifiable standards, 
which makes countries unwilling to accept them as legitimate.35 Furthermore, the 
arguments on democratic deficit and legitimacy in rule design reveal that the 
asymmetric negotiation power between developed and developing countries 
continually shape FATF rules and guidance formulation.36 This results in a 
recommended course of action that may not always be consistent with the domestic 
law’s explicit guidance. This asymmetry has a continued effect on the implementation 
                                     
31 An interconnected market that requires open flow of capital may not be ideal for developing countries. 
However, these obligations are imposed on these set of countries by the FATF through its mandated 
compliance to its standards. Compliance by these countries sees a mirroring of the domestic laws of 
ACs/EEs to that of their western counterparts. Consequently, ACs/EEs are usually faced with difficulties 
and roadblocks in the functioning of their economies.  
32 Jose Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited [2003] 97 AM.J.Int.L 873-887.  
33 James Gathii, The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law [2010] J. Prof. Law 
1-18. 
34 Saby Ghoshray, ‘Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict Between Agency 
Capture and Soft Law’ [2014/15] 59 NYL. Sch.L. Rev. 521, 544. 
35 Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory 
Regimes’ (2008) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 2/2008, 16 < 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/23040/1/WPS2008-02_Black.pdf >16 November 2017. 
36 Saby Ghoshray, ‘Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: The Conflict Between Agency 
Capture and Soft Law’ [2014/15] 59 NYL. Sch.L. Rev. 521, 544. 
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and compliance stage of FATF rules. Ghroshay states that the quandary between the 
two conflicting regimes can provide a window through which to view a jurisdiction’s 
compliance deficit.37 
 
7.2.2 Legitimacy in Rule Implementation and Compliance  
 
For implementation and compliance to be effective, principals have to resolve 
information asymmetries so as to understand the ‘personality’ of the agent state, 
respond accordingly and avoid agency slack. As earlier stated, when a country is 
organisationally incompetent, sanctions may prove ineffective, and training would be 
more suited to ensuring compliance. So also, when a country adopts an amoral 
calculator attitude towards AML/CFT regulations, sanctions may prove effective as 
opposed to conditionalities which may be evaded. The information needed to classify 
the agent-states to ensure that an effective response is given can however only be 
garnered during the FATF’s evaluation of its member states, its mutual evaluations in 
partnership with FSRB or the IFI’s FSAP/Art. IV surveillance. Whilst these means of 
fact-finding on implementation and compliance levels are seemingly legitimate, experts 
have argued that in reality it is not.  
 
The FATF mutual evaluation process has been opined to be lacking legitimacy. Firstly, 
the process of selection of evaluators lacks transparency. The FATF, and the relevant 
FSRB, are responsible for choosing assessors with support and confirmation from the 
secretariat.38 This is usually done in exclusion of inputs from the agent-state and results 
in a composition of external experts who although familiar with similar cross-border 
issues, are not necessarily conversant with pertinent issues in a particular country. The 
resulting asymmetry in composition was evident in the Nigerian mutual evaluation 
team which included assessors from the United Kingdom and the United States 
                                     
37 Ibid. 
38 FATF, ‘Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations’ (FATF, October 
2013) < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF-4th-Round-Procedures.pdf 
> accessed 12 December 2017.  
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financial regulatory bodies together with a staff from GIABA.39 Although seemingly 
balanced to produce an objective report, the presence of external experts from 
hegemonic states may tilt the discussions of all representatives in their favour.40 This 
was also the case with Mali’s mutual evaluation which, when carried out by the World 
Bank, consisted mainly of representatives from the IFIs.41 Whilst evaluating institutions 
may attribute the composition of evaluators to the need to guarantee neutrality of the 
assessment process, the absence of in-country input may colour the understanding of 
external experts who may not have a complete grasp of the home-grown situations of 
the country. The composition may thus result in biased reports that may hinder 
implementation and proactive compliance.  
 
Secondly, the process and timing of fact-finding allows room for data manipulation. 
The pre-onsite evaluation visits mandate an export of information to the principal by 
the agent, based on responses to set questions.42 This is usually done within a short time 
frame. As a result of the process and timing of information harvest, EENA2, a staff 
member of the IMF, who had previous experience with the FATF, observed that to a 
large extent, reports by the FSRBs are untrustworthy. 43A country’s real situation is 
either concealed or exaggerated – somewhat to the detriment of international financial 
integrity. This illustrates the existing information asymmetry that hinders the ability of 
the IFIs/FATFs to understand the ‘personality’ of the agent-states.  
 
Thirdly, the manner of evaluation is disconcerting. EENA3 noted that FATF officials 
on mission to developing countries are ‘like policemen who have no respect for state 
                                     
39 GIABA, ‘Mutual Evaluation Report: Nigeria’ (GIABA, 2008) 
<http://www.giaba.org/media/f/299_Mutual%20Evaluation%20Report%20of%20Nigeria.pdf > 
accessed 10 June 2017.  
40 Mushtaq Khan, ‘The Political Economy of Inclusive Growth’ in Luiz de Mello and Mark A Dutz (eds.) 
OECD Promoting Inclusive Growth: Challenges and Policies (OECD, The World Bank, 2012) 37 – Khan 
asserts that a top-down bargain ensues between contending elites; Diane Stone, ‘Knowledge Networks 
and Global Policy’ in Simon Maxwell and Diane Stone (eds) Global Knowledge Networks and 
International Development; Norman Girvan, ‘Power Imbalances and Development Knowledge’ 
(Southern Perspectives on the Reform of the International Development Architecture, 2007). 
41 GIABA, ‘Mutual Evaluation Report: Mali’ (GIABA, 2008) < 
http://www.giaba.org/media/f/252_MALI_word_MER_english[1].pdf > accessed 10 June 2017.  
42 Principal in this case are the IFIs/FATF and FSRB. 
43 EENA2, Senior Counsel, Financial Intergrity Unit, International Monetary Fund, Interview with 
EENA2, ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
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sovereignty,’44 given the manner they barge into countries to seek and publish 
information with varied input from the countries listed. The IFIs however adopt a more 
collaborative relationship with countries during their fact-finding mission, a process 
simplified by the presence of their in-country offices. They also publish their findings 
with permission from the concerned countries. This ensures that the IFIs are better 
placed than FATF to evaluate a country, understand its personality and issue sanction 
or incentives with minimal breach to state sovereignty.  
 
It may however be impossible to categorise a country as having or projecting a single 
personality, given that whilst certain institutions in a particular country may be 
organisationally incompetent – not all are. This difficulty is heightened by the limited 
scope of the evaluation process of each country, which only focuses on a set number of 
FIs and regulatory bodies. This further limits the ability to effectively categorise and 
deal with a country effectively. Thus, a wholesale sanction or incentive aimed at 
improving implementation or ensuring compliance may adversely affect certain 
institutions within a country whilst advancing others.  
 
The trajectory of information asymmetry between countries and the IFIs/FATF reveals 
that the IFIs/FATF are not necessarily ‘personality’ seeking. Rather, they are driven by 
the faulty assumptions held by the hegemony bloc, that all countries have market 
economies with open flow dynamics. This supposition is the basis of the FATF’s 
standards and sanctions – benchmarks which may sometimes have an adverse impact 
on the socio-economic and political fabric of less developed countries. Despite the 
aggregated personality attributable to a country, no sanction or incentive would prove 
effective in ensuring that countries are able to imbibe standards. This is especially so 
where developing countries are not particularly interconnected with the global 
economy, neither do they pose any substantial risk of contagion. Thus, they do not feel 
the impact of sanctions or incentives, which would at best further impose an onerous 
burden on such countries.  
                                     
44 EENA3, Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS), Expert Witness and Former Banking Regulator 
(FDIC), Interview with EENA3, ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
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Sanctions, usually in the form of threats and public listing of non-compliant countries, 
may be imposed on countries alongside conditionalities, with the aim of coercing 
efficient implementation of rules.45 Gahtii asserts that these are incompatible with the 
goal of achieving compliance across all countries.46 This criticism flows from the 
shortcomings of the economic sanctions process, rooted in biased MER which highlight 
compliance variations across countries, thereby pressuring less compliant countries 
(LCCs) to offer implementation concessions even in the absence of a complete 
domestic ratification process.47 LCCs are usually developing countries that are then 
subject to rules and sanctions manufactured by a select few wielding the FATF as a 
weapon to impose same on developing countries. These sanctions are blindsided to the 
fact that the absence of meaningful participation by LCCs in the consultation process 
forecloses their ability to benefit from wider cooperation and information exchange. 
This makes it harder to ensure effective implementation and compliance. Conversely, 
participation would ensure that each country’s peculiarities are taken into consideration 
in measuring implementation and compliance.  
 
This observed course of hegemonic imposition may not only prove counter-productive 
to targeted countries, it is also a slight to their sovereignty.48 Todd condemns economic 
sanctions, stating that historically, they have proved incapable of achieving the desired 
behavioural change which they seek within punished countries, instead, they negatively 
impact the general populace.49 Todd also notes that the FATF’s violation of 
international law in imposing economic sanctions threatens the legitimacy and integrity 
of international efforts in combatting ML/TF, amounting to extraterritorial bullying.50 
This is because the 34-member countries of the FATF make decisions on which 
countries to sanction and how, whereas the member countries, despite their non-
                                     
45 Tim Wu, ‘Agency Threats’ [2010] 60 Duke LJ 1841, 1845. 
46 James T. Gathii, ‘The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law’ [2010], J. Prof. 
Law. 
47 See Ben Hayes, Counter-terrorism, ‘Policy Laundering’ and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, 
Regulating Civil Society 11 (Transnational Institute/Statewatch, Mar. 2012) < 
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-171-fafpreport.pdf > accessed 15 November 2017  (“[A] lack of 
democratic control, oversight and accountability of the FATF has allowed for regulations that circumvent 
concerns about human rights, proportionality and effectiveness”)  
48 Doyle Todd, ‘Cleaning Up Anti-Money Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics Needlessly 
Violate International Law’ [2001] 24 Hous. J. Int’l Law 279, 289. 
49 Ibid 279, 281. 
50 Ibid. 
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compliance, are usually excused from sanctions. Developing countries have fiercely 
contested this phenomenon, arguing that guidelines and sanctions manufactured by a 
select few are imposed on a larger majority, without their freewill, thus curtailing the 
long-term stability and sustainability of the global system.51  
 
7.2.3 Risk based-approach 
 
To address these legitimacy concerns, Ghroshay asserts that the FATF adopted a RBA 
system to ensure that the developmental level and peculiarities of countries are taken 
into consideration in the compliance assessment process.52 The focus of the RBA, 
which is aimed at aiding countries understand and prioritise their ML/TF risks,53 is two-
fold: to strengthen global safeguards to ML/TF and to protect the integrity of the 
financial system by equipping governments with adequate tools against illicit crime.54 
To achieve these, the RBA requires countries, competent authorities and FIs to identify, 
assess and understand the ML/TF risks they are exposed to and take commensurate 
measures to mitigate them effectively.55 Additionally, countries are expected to 
understand the impact of the risk materialisation on their national economy, financial 
and non-financial sectors.56  
 
Explaining the RBA, EENA1 states that  ‘if a country believes that 35% of its economy 
is informal and a substantial sum of money is laundered in cash, real estate or precious 
                                     
51 Saby Ghoshray, ‘Compliance Convergence in FATF Rulemaking: the Conflict Between Agency 
Capture and Soft Law’ [2014/15] 59 NYL. Sch.L. Rev. 521, 543. 
52 Ibid 521, 544.; RBA was originally introduced in 2003 and 2007 but was restricted to certain 
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2012.  
53 FATF, ‘FATF Guidance: National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment’ 
(FATF, 2013) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf > accessed 10 June 2017. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.; Abdullahi Usman Bello and Jackie Harvey, ‘From a Risk-based Approach to an Uncertainty 
Based Approach to Anti-Money Laundering’ [2017] 30 (1) Security Journal 1, 5. 
56 FATF, ‘FATF Guidance: National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment’ 
(FATF, 2013) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf > accessed 10 June 2017. 
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stones, regulators are to allocate resources to those areas and supervise 
effectively…less resources should be allocated to financial institutions and insurance 
bodies.’57 This portrays an individualistic country-by-country approach that injects a 
measure of flexibility into the system, allowing the FATF standards adapt to multiple 
jurisdictional circumstances.58 Acknowledging this, EENA1 states that institutions are 
also mandated to assess their risk, noting that ‘if customs believe that cash couriers are 
utilised through the capital city airport, then they should be about ten people 
monitoring the airport capital and one person monitoring the land entry.’59 This 
ensures the operationalisation of the RBA at the micro level.  Ghroshay argues that 
under the RBA system, soft law evolves into tangible standards that mandate robust 
compliance because assessors consider and contain structural problems that hinder 
compliance in the MER thus giving all countries a level playing ground.  
 
Ghroshay’s position is however not entirely correct and may pass off as somewhat 
idealistic in ensuring that each country’s compliance reflects its peculiarities and risk 
projection. This is based on two factors: firstly, the ambiguity in the definition of risk 
and the conceptualisation of the RBA. Secondly, the literal interpretation of the FATF’s 






                                     
57 EENA1, Consulting Counsel, Financial Integrity Unit, International Monetary Fund, Interview with 
EENA1, ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
58 FATF, FATF Guidance: Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial 
Inclusion (FATF, February 2013) < http://www.fatf-
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 345 
7.2.3.1 The Ambiguity in the Definition of Risk and the Conceptualisation of the RBA  
 
 
Firstly, whilst the FATF’s denotation of a ‘risk-based approach’ as described above 
seemed comprehensible, examining other FATF documents show that there is 
ambiguity regarding the definition of ‘risk’. For instance, the FATF’s National Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment omits the definition of ‘risk’ but 
states that: ‘Risk…(is) a function of three factors: threat, vulnerability and 
consequence.’60 
 
The evasion of a precise definition of risk is an acknowledgment that the concept is 
multidimensional and nuanced.61 Additionally, the absence of a definition within the 
concept of ML/TF may underpin poor implementation of the RBA.62 Hence, Bello and 
Harvey define risk within the context of AML/CFT as ‘a situation where the probability 
of an occurrence of an event is known and the resulting consequences are 
measurable.’63 By this definition, the usage of the term ‘risk’, in application, will raise 
issues. This can be exemplified with the RBA expectations of the FATF which is 
evident in its Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance. The document states 
that ‘assessors should make clear in the mutual evaluation report…factors they have 
taken into account, why and how they have done so.’64 Indicating that, at the country 
                                     
60 FATF, ‘FATF Guidance: National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment’ 
(FATF, 2013) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf > accessed 10 June 2017 -  
Examining these factors however reveals the porosity of the FATF’s description of risk and the potential 
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61 Yacov Y Haimes, ‘On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems-Based Approach’ [2009] 29 (12) 
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level, the FATF assumes that in-country regulators comprehend the likelihood that a 
particular ‘conduit of transfer’ is likely to be used to launder money and the outcome 
of such decision. However, there are uncertainties to this. Firstly, it is difficult to 
ascertain the extent to which one conduit is being utilised by launderers in comparison 
to other porous conduits. Secondly, it is difficult to justify the factors that are taken into 
account to label a sector more risk-prone to illicit transfers. Thirdly, in the event that a 
conduit is categorised as being open to ML/TF risk, the likely response of the regulators 
in terms of risk classification (high risk or low risk) and their resource allocation is 
unclear. Fourthly, how legitimate customers may react to being hindered from 
performing their businesses is unknown.65  
 
However, despite the uncertainties surrounding the RBA, where in-country regulators 
fail to attain accurate risk valuation, it can adversely affect the country’s overall 
compliance levels and the external assessors would be required to make estimations on 
a country’s behalf.66 Therefore, further exacerbating agency slack and a legitimacy 
crisis.  This outcome-focused approach is predicated on the assumption that an 
AML/CFT regulator can foretell the outcome of his decision and hence, should bear the 
responsibilities resulting therefrom. This is not necessarily true given that the 
‘probability of an outcome’ may not be an accurate profiling technique to streamline 
conduits of transfers.  
 
Critics have also argued that the RBA is not easily comprehended or honestly applied. 
EENA3 states ‘I [went] to a country known for marijuana sale on every corner. 
Marijuana fields are within view of the capital city and the authorities never mentioned 
that they grow marijuana in their country.’67 EENA3 attributed this to the fact that the 
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accessed 10 August 2017.   
65 Abdullahi Usman Bello and Jackie Harvey, ‘From a Risk-based Approach to an Uncertainty Based 
Approach to Anti-Money Laundering’ [2017] 30 (1) Security Journal. 
66 FATF, ‘Risk Based Approach for the Banking Sector’ (FATF, October 2014) < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk-Based-Approach-Banking-Sector.pdf > accessed 19 March 
2018.  
67 EENA3, Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS), Expert Witness and Former Banking Regulator 
(FDIC), Interview with EENA3, ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
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RBA is not widely understood, the risk is not identified correctly, properly, or honestly 
by countries.68 Moreover, he argues that this is also a problem with assessors as there 
is a tendency for them to demand the same thing from every country. EENA4 attributes 
this deficiency to a shift in operation and culture as previously ‘regulators were used 
to assessing institutions with a checklist…now they have to do a risk-based supervision 
– it’s something that is not familiar with a lot of people’.69 Indicating the complexity in 
the application of this approach and the struggle countries have to encounter to meet 
the requirements. Noting this EENA5 stated that, ‘conducting a national risk 
assessment is technical and resource intensive…[coupled] with risk profiling and 
profiling at every level…it takes about a year to get the risk status for a small country 
– not even a country like Nigeria.’70 This complexity can indeed put countries under 
pressure to deliver, thereby occasioning agency slack. For this reason, there has been 
limited impact of the RBA on risk allocation or improved strategies.  
 
The deficiency of the RBA can be attributable to various internal factors. These include 
inefficient collection of tax by countries and the reluctance to engage in forfeiture and 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime.71 Related to those are the lack of political will, 
resources and political interference.72 For instance, Angola has some issues with 
corruption, but it will not want to talk about it. Also, the Nigerian President was 
criticised for admitting to the UK government that Nigeria is ‘fantastically corrupt’.73 
Fearing likely listing by the FATF, countries are usually worried about revealing the 
true risk they face. Practitioners have countered the arguments on the deficiency of the 
RBA, arguing instead that when designed and used efficiently, the RBA can indeed 
lead to improved, targeted compliance by countries.74 EENA1 and EENA4 
                                     
68 Ibid.  
69 EENA4, Interview with EENA4 ‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
70 EENA5, Researcher, GIABA, Interview with EENA5‘Telephone Call’ (2017). 
71 Antonio – he argues that legal proceedings against launderers should recover the proceeds laundered 
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72 EENA2, Senior Counsel, Financial Intergrity Unit, International Monetary Fund, Interview with 
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acknowledge this but argue that the issues to implementation further hinder the 
effectiveness of the RBA.75 For this reason, RBA is not leading to reforms yet.  
 
This limitations of the RBA are also demonstrated at the institutional level. The 
regulator’s risk profiling mechanism, which is dependent on the risk assessment of FIs, 
presumes that the higher the suspicion of FIs in AML/CFT, the higher the perceived 
risk. Hence, FIs’ legal departments monitor contracts, whilst the compliance 
departments monitor the products/agreements of FIs, to ensure that any suspicion is 
addressed in accordance with the law. Differentiating suspicious from non-suspicious 
activity is an uphill task, which faults regulatory assumptions, as launderers are not 
easily identified apart from legal activities.76 On this basis, Pellegrina and Masciandaro 
concede that the ‘risk’ terminology might have simply reflected the general movement 
to such approach within the broader regulation of financial markets.77 Bello and Harvey 
however suggest that the ‘uncertainty based approach’(UBA) which focuses not on the 
‘outcome of the decision’ but on the process leading to the decision is a more suitable 
means of addressing ML/TF.78 
 
To understand why the UBA is crucial for AML/CFT regulation, as opposed to the 
RBA, it is critical to distinguish these approaches. The UBA and the RBA are not 
mutually exclusive as they can both be incorporated within the meaning of 
uncertainty.79 Thus, risk is considered as a subcategory of uncertainty, which is defined, 
measurable and predictable. Knight acknowledges this, stating that, whilst risk is also 
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uncertainty, risk is a determinate uncertainty, whilst uncertainty is indeterminate.80 
Therefore, this means that whilst risk is somewhat known and measurable, uncertainty 
is unknown and unknowable.81 Risk is, therefore, the residual outcome of making 
uncertainty manageable by setting appropriate risk limits with defined parameters to 
control exposure. Conversely, with uncertainty, the probability may be known but the 
consequences remain unknown. 
 
Unlike the RBA, decision making within a UBA would provide a more accurate 
reflection of the uncertainties surrounding rationalization of a conduit being more 
susceptible to the risk of ML/TF. This is because, given the nature of illicit transfers, 
regulators usually lack information as to the possible consequences associated with 
their decision making. In such situations where either the probability of the exposure to 
illicit crime is unclear and the precise consequence of the exposure to such crime is 
unknown, the UBA would be fit for purpose.82 No doubt, this varies from the decision-
making process within the RBA where it is expected that the consequence of decisions 
are known with certainty as to the outcome of such decisions.83 Additionally, the RBA 
may result in misalignment of benefits and incentives between country regulators and 
the IFIs/FATF. This is particularly when the countries are aware that unveiling certain 
risk would warrant sanctions or reputational damage. For instance, countries would not 
be too quick to admit that they suffer from CDD deficiencies. Acknowledging this, an 
EENA4 stated that ‘it is difficult to get officials to agree to the risk they face.’84 This 
quagmire can be attributed to the variances in interest, as whilst IFIs/FATF are focused 
on combatting ML/TF, regulators are more inclined to focus on protecting the safety 
and soundness of banks with limited attention to ML/TF risk. For this reason, an agency 
slack arises where countries misinform the international community.  
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The inability of countries to understand or even measure risk and its likely outcome can 
be attributed to the nature of illicit crimes. For instance, till date, studies have been 
unable to quantify the amount of money laundered annually. Barone and Masciandaro 
argue that figures are usually ‘pure speculation....or just invented’.85 This poses a 
serious challenge to the RBA and largely renders its model unsuitable. For this reason, 
the implementation of the RBA has been criticized.86 
 
The shortcomings of the RBA highlight the strengths of the UBA which is a viable 
alternative. With the UBA, countries would not necessarily be sanctioned for not 
properly identifying their risk, but rather, there is an implicit understanding that the 
nature of ML/TF which makes it difficult to quantify risk would be taken into 
consideration. In such situations, there is the recognition that regulators cannot be 
certain of the impact of ML via a particular conduct if the risk materializes.87 Moreover, 
FIs are also uncertain about the nature of transactions given that transactions can be 
potentially financed with laundered funds or for terrorism purposes. Demetis and 
Angell state that although categories of risk are itemized for FIs, in practice, uncertainty 
is transferred to these categories.88 As such, any attempts to fit a square peg in a round 
hole would be futile.  
 
Interestingly, the UBA can be utilized by adopting Hammond et al.’s risk profile 
steps89, where in coming to a conclusion as regards areas that pose AML/CFT issues to 
countries, regulators can ask: 
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1. What are the uncertainties?  
2. What are the possible outcomes of these uncertainties? 
3. What are the chances of occurrences of each possible outcome?  
4.  What are the consequences of each outcome?  
 
The crucial starting point is to identify the objective of each decision, which in this case 
is to prevent illicit transfers.  
 
The first step to this risk profiling approach for regulators is to decide on the available 
alternatives. For regulators, the decision is how to categorize a conduit as replete with 
ML/TF. Identifying an alternative requires the regulator to identify the uncertainties 
related with their decision. For the regulator, there are two significant uncertainties - a 
conduit is either frequently utilized for illicit transfers or it is not frequently used. 
Determining this is difficult, but regulators are to be guided by available statistics – 
which are scarce in ACs/EEs. Upon identification, the likely outcome of each 
uncertainty is outlined. As envisaged, specificity is not feasible in defining the outcome 
of each uncertainty.90 Consequently, what is required is a broad but unique 
categorization that would capture the likely outcomes. This leaves room for decision 
making by the regulator but may also breed mistakes as the regulator can decide that a 
conduit poses ML/TF challenges, whereas it does not. The margin for error can 
however be minimized by dependence on accurate statistics and expert consultation 
which involves the judgment based approach (JBA).91 JBA entails regulators looking-
forward to take account of a wide range of possible risks to the AML/CFT objectives.92 
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The information garnered can be used to decide the quantitative probability, expressed 
in percentages – that a conduit is largely or limitedly used to launder money. This is a 
very subjective approach which differs from the objective approach utilized by the 
RBA.93 Quite unlike the UBA, the RBA does not focus on quantitative and qualitative 
analysis as it refers to such analysis as ‘mere collection of …information’. RBA is 
largely dependent on the categorization of risk through benchmarking as either 
medium-high, medium-low, etc.  
 
An incentive based system incorporated in the UBA may also ensure improved 
technical and effectiveness compliance to AML/CFT standards.94 Therefore, where a 
conduit mainly used for regular transactions is classed as suspect, that conduit may 
experience withdrawal of use caused by regulators mishap. To prevent this, the 
regulator has a variety of choices, to either consider the conduit as suspicious and report 
or consider it as non-suspicious and document his position. Where it is suspicious, two 
uncertainties arise – the IFIs/FATF assessors may reward the regulators for curtailing 
the conduit’s use. Conversely, the conduit may face decline in use due to reputational 
damage. Where classed as non-suspicious, the conduit will not lose customers and may 
even gain laundering customers who believe that they will now be subject to less intense 
supervision. However, this latter classification may indeed be erroneous as the conduit 
may actually be a hub for ML/TF. In such situations, whilst the RBA, in its focus on 
outcome, would mark the country as non-compliance in recommendation 1, which has 
an effect on its effectiveness levels, the UBA would focus on the process of the decision 
making. This indicates that it is imperative for a country to structure a format that would 
allow it detect illicit transfers via various conduits, thereby curbing ML/TF. 
 
Furthermore, an application of the RBA to countries also shows its inadequacies, 
particularly in securing accurate AML/CFT compliance levels. Whilst the RBA allows 
countries to designate resources in accordance with risk, it still categorises countries in 
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Black2 or grey list. This raises questions as to the arbitrary basis upon which countries 
are so classified.95 Although most countries are sanctioned on the basis of the weakness 
of their financial and regulatory structure or the absence of political will, the FATF’s 
mandate aims to ensure financial integrity and stability, a position which should aim at 
sanctioning countries with the most ML/TF activity. Coincidentally, although there are 
no concrete statistics, studies have indicated that the United States has the highest level 
of ML globally,96 along with the United Kingdom, particularly given its porous real 
estate market.97 Yet, these countries are considered low risk and countries which are 
remotely connected to the global financial market, with lower levels of financial crime 
are continually classed as high-risk due to structural issues. Bello and Harvey argue 
that this arbitrary designation contradicts an approach that is truly risk-based, typifying 
this with the case of Habib Bank, fined for not listing Pakistan and Kenya as high risk 
countries.98 Furthermore, although California has been classed as high risk within the 
US,99 suspicious transactions may not be flagged up as ones from Kenya would, given 
the FATF’s asymmetrical risk basis.   
 
7.2.3.2 The Literal Interpretation of the FATF’s Statement on Risk and Compliance in 
its Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance 
 
The FATF methodology for assessing compliance states clearly that: ‘…however, risks, 
materiality and structural or other contextual factors should not be an excuse for poor 
or uneven implementation of the FATF standards....’100 
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Whilst the FATF expects that structural reasons for non-compliance are highlighted in 
the MER document, the above statement illustrates that it does not expect such reasons 
to be a justification for, or a reason to condone non-compliance. EENA4 supports this 
line of argument, stating that ‘you need to have your framework in place…a country 
cannot say “we have no capacity” or “we are slow in legislating” …[or] “we have 
corruption issues – so it is okay that we have not criminalised politically exposed 
persons” …we can understand why they haven’t done so…but certain things cannot be 
excused.’101 This is however a narrow perception of the factors that hinder compliance. 
For instance, should a country be rated lowly for not adequately complying with the 
CDD requirements where it was working to ensure financial inclusion? Such 
punishment would indicate the facilitation of continuously low compliance levels of 
developing countries despite the factors taken into account. Acknowledging this, 
EENA4 stated that ‘The recommendations are very focused on the banks and it 
contravenes and goes against the cash-based economy. There is a huge chunk of money 
that is outside the bank that you cannot really assess. The recommendations hinder 
those countries that are less cash-based. You can say that you need to strengthen the 
banking sector and ensure that wire transfers are completely regulated – but does that 
really capture cash-based transfers. In some countries – people will buy houses with 
cash – it’s only in more developed countries that you have bank transfers, cheques... 
It’s easier on the banking side to do CDD but maybe it’s not easy on the cash that you 
follow. It’s something that is a little bit more difficult.’102 This further illustrates the 
continuous issue of asymmetrical compliance benchmarks which have an effect on the 
compliance level of countries, causing their placement on the grey or black2 list.  
 
Furthermore, the methodology states that: ‘assessors should make clear in the 
MER…factors they have taken into account, why and how they have do so.’103 
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This indicates that even when structural reasons for non-compliance are highlighted in 
the MER, without an impact on the overall compliance level, assessors are mandated 
to comply and explain. This illustrates the onerous burden of ensuring that compliance 
reflect appropriate levels and not ‘excused levels’.  
 
Examining the conception of risk and the FATF’s approach to it reveals that the current 
RBA may not necessarily lead to improved legitimacy or indeed compliance by 
developing countries. EENA1 argues that, whilst theoretically, the RBA can ensure 
improved compliance, practically it is a struggle for countries. Furthermore, the impact 
cannot yet be ascertained because only a few countries are conducting this risk-based 
exercise rightly.104 However, currently, it is not leading to reform yet, particularly in 
Africa.105 
 
7.3 Through the Lens of Legitimacy  
 
As noted, the FATF’s rule design, implementation and compliance processes have 
unearthed a pervasive legitimacy crisis. This has occasioned the argument that 
amending power relationships through membership and inclusiveness would resolve 
legitimacy concerns.106 This perspective assumes that currently excluded countries can 
obtain membership which grants participation in deliberation processes by meeting the 
set FATF membership criteria. This argument is however blindsided to the realities of 
the FATF membership configuration, which is restricted to ‘strategically important’ 
countries.107 This has seen only OECD countries, EEs and a few others become 
members on the basis of an elusive subjective selection process.108  
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Shortly after the accession of select countries, the FATF considered it expedient to close 
its membership doors in 1992 so as to ‘preserve the efficiency of the task force.’109 This 
action foreclosed the participation of all countries in the decision making procedures – 
processes which although would have permitted dissenting viewpoints, it was alleged 
that it would result in bureaucracy and expensive decision-making.110Thus, at this point, 
there was the projection of ownership and legitimacy as secondary to efficiency. This 
raises concerns about whether the FATF acknowledges that its rules are unfavourable 
and may become subject to intense scrutiny, prompting refutation or delayed 
transplantation by developing countries. To achieve expediency, the FATF hastens its 
decision making processes, which is even more detrimental to developing countries 
who are unable to input their perspective.  
 
This closed membership structure poses two risks: firstly, countries excluded from 
‘core’ membership positions may only render formal or creative compliance.111 
Secondly, it exposes the financial system to risk from countries not considered 
‘important’. Although these countries are subject to intense scrutiny, inappropriately 
crafted tools are applied to mandate compliance. This can be attributable to the absence 
of a degree of involvement in rule design which permits agency slack, correctable only 
in the presence of perfect information.  
 
Whilst the FATF has refrained from expanding its membership, the IFIs have 
responded by altering their membership quota, granting EEs more weight in recognition 
of their rising economic powers.112 The G20 has also taken up some coordinating 
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functions of the G7.113 Although seemingly more inclusive, Vibert argues that these 
membership changes do not address two primary weaknesses in rule design, the failing 
abilities of the IFIs/TGNs in problem solving and the undemocratic nature of rule-
making.114  
 
Vibert argues that problem-solving abilities of IFIs/FATF lie not in membership but in 
informed knowledge and expertise.115 He argues further that IFIs/TGNs belong to the 
knowledge world where their decision making skills are dependent on their epistemic 
authority.116 They draw on the procedure of the natural and social sciences to identify 
complications and frame policy responses. This is supported by Kerwer and Hulsse 
who argue that trans-governmental organisations such as the FATF are objectively 
technocratic.117 For this reason, Vibert asserts that changes to membership 
arrangements may confound the problems of input legitimacy, confusing epistemic 
failure and democratic deficit.118 The limitation to this argument is that it fails to 
recognise that improved membership representation may be crucial for a more robust 
knowledge bank at the IFIs/TGNs.  
 
Discounting the possibility of a robust knowledge bank, Vibert advances the argument 
that there is no true democracy in international rule making.119 He postulates that 
changing quotas in IFIs reflect government and not the people. This defeats the 
argument on inclusivity from the start, for if they are democratic, IFIs/TGNs should 
reflect the preferences of the people.120 This recognises the complex high-level 
interactions that precede transplantations, whereby decisions applicable to the entire 
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government are usually made to the exclusion of persons at the grassroots level. This 
illustrates how state and local governments are usually barraged by influences of 
international law. Furthermore, many citizens of countries who are unaware of FATF 
standards are subjected to the existence of the FATF’s disclosure mandate laid out by 
its CDD/ KYC requirements. 
 
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the absence of democracy in IFIs/TGNs may 
trigger hesitation in transplantation of standards by democratic and undemocratic 
countries alike.  This is why these institutions continually declare their neutrality and 
legitimacy by projecting the tenets of democracy through their undertakings. These 
undertakings include ensuring equitable labour or intellectual property rights. However, 
the declaration of legitimacy is not a sufficient ‘ingredient’ for democracy, as without 
a dissenting opinion in governments or IFI/TGNs decision making processes, 
democracy cannot be said to exist. Contrariwise, in undemocratic regimes, opposing 
voices are subdued. 
 
What becomes evident is that hegemonic subservience and agency capture shapes 
FATF policy making – resulting in democratic deficit. Democratic deficit in agency 
rulemaking is born out of the fundamentals of the underlining participatory conflict and 
is manifested in the data regarding the lack of meaningful participation by the majority 
of jurisdictions.121 This in turn impacts countries ability to close the compliance 
differential as they are not part of the process – whilst also foreclosing their ability to 
benefit from the wider cooperation and information exchange of a regulatory 
framework. The result is that affected jurisdictions may be compelled to comply with 
rules with which they have no participatory linkage.122 Conversely, when a country is 
part of the process, its compliance differential is less. This can be typified with the 
BRICS; although their level of participation in the FATF is questionable – their 
compliance differential is less.  
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To ensure that standards and laws by international bodies are respected, every aspect 
of decision making must be democratic, in the sense that an option is provided to allow 
a contestation of the rule design or compliance process. What becomes evident is the 
need for a global platform that permits democracy. Whilst Vibert envisions this to be a 
global platform with a parliament, Mugarura envisages an adjudicatory framework.123 
Vibert concedes that Mugarura’s approach may be a preferred option as an international 
juridical body would safeguard some form of legal pluralism which would allow for 
delegation and fairness. The practicalities are however uncertain. Political elements 
may hinder the ability to rely on judicial structures, for example, when a court in one 
jurisdiction defers to another. Additionally, efforts to combine both political and 
juridical elements may result in ‘cosmopolitan democracy’124 which satisfies neither 
side.  
 
Hence Vibert projects the alternative of an ‘international agreement on international 
administrative procedure’. The idea is that international administrative procedures will 
apply to international rule makers, where each institution would be bound to adhere to 
evidence based procedures that underpin their epistemic authority. Additionally, each 
institution would be subject to external judicial review for recommendations and 
decisions. Finally, any such agreement would not only be subject to executive 
agreement of ministers or senior officials but also to the approval of national legislators 
– the bodies with the greatest claim to democratic legitimacy. Vibert argues that this 
would mark the process of bringing constitutional order into the international level of 
decision making. Apparently, this approach would ensure that all voices are brought to 
the table and expertise is no longer the most crucial factor in decision making. However, 
in practice, the need to ensure the perspectives of various governments are taken into 
account during the review process would slow things down. Additionally, the belated 
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involvement of countries may simply be a replication of the hegemonic agenda within 
these institutions.  
 
This indicates the need to correct ownership, legitimacy and expertise simultaneously. 
A more inclusive platform, such as that of the International Association of Deposit 
Insurers125 would ensure effective combative strategies, rather than an undemocratic 
platform with coercive powers. This would aid in reversing the debilitating financial 
consequences on non-compliant countries that were simply set up to fail, whilst 
enabling them achieve true financial stability and integrity.  
 
7.4 Regulatory Paradox: A Motive for Halting Continued Implementation of the FATF 
Standards by ACs/EEs?  
 
One thing the RBA will not do is permit non-compliance with any of the 
recommendations. ACs have to remain compliant with the FATF’s technical and 
effectiveness recommendations to the same degree, only with narrowed focus on issues 
considered to pose higher AML/CFT risk. The problem with this is that the FATF 
standards, particularly on CDD/KYC, can propel socio-economic exclusion which have 
serious consequences for socio-economic development. This effect is averse to the 
FATF’s financial inclusion objective. For the FATF, this is an unintended consequence, 
as driving an economy ‘underground’ can affect the regulators’ ability to effectively 
monitor the abuse of financial systems and hinder their capability to detect crime. 
Furthermore, this regime which is external to ACs/EEs, can widen the gap between 
social classes whilst degenerating socio-economic exclusion in these countries. This is 
particularly so within ACs given the excesses of colonisation in form of social and 
economic ills which the continent still grapples with.   
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These arguments portray the regulatory paradox that occurs in the absence of legitimacy 
of standards, a situation that weakens the effectiveness of standards and the compliance 
ratings of ACs/EEs. Consequently, it is imperative to ask, why ACs/EEs continue to 
implement the FATF standards. As discussed, ACs/EEs face a case of ‘double 
illegitimacy’126 that hinders their ability to ‘opt out’ of compliance given the inclusion 
of the FATF’s recommendations within the IFIs funding conditionalities. Alexander et 
al find that IFIs use standard setting bodies, including the FATF, to determine and set 
conditionalities that countries have to adhere to.127 The implication of this is that 
compliance with the IFIs’ conditionalities are benchmarks against which decisions can 
be made about a country’s credit worthiness.128 This invariably means that when 
countries receive unfavourable ratings from credit rating agencies, which is highly 
likely with ACs,  their ability to raise or issue debts at affordable rates may be 
compromised. The effect of this is worse for ACs and their private sector institutions, 
which rely largely on foreign investments and IFIs for capital. Going by the ratings 
which offer the international financial markets an estimate of the probability that 
borrowers will meet their debt obligations, it can be argued that ACs will be unable to 
access funding or even when they do, they will be subject to higher interest rates.129 
The IFIs involvement necessitates a form of mandatory compliance, with the possibility 
of sanctions, severer than the FATF’s blacklisting process.   
 
Whilst acknowledging the regulatory paradox inherent in the compliance process that 
occasions unintended consequences, the pros of implementation cannot be undermined. 
ACs/EEs acknowledge that ML/TF pose adverse consequences to their economies and 
compliance can not only engineer, but also institute good governance practices within 
their financial and regulatory institutions. This will ensure that with adequate practices, 
sturdy institutions and resources, regulatory bodies would be able to promote financial 
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integrity whilst enhancing market integrity. There is also the recognition that 
compliance can improve their integration with the global financial market, whilst 
reducing the high interest rates associated with loans. Finally, there is the argument that 
compliance would strengthen the ability of countries to curb financial crime such as 
corruption. Although seemingly logical, this position is not necessarily correct. For 
instance, whilst Zimbabwe has an AML/CFT compliance level of over 50%, it remains 
one of the most corrupt countries in Africa and globally.130 This further indicates that 
compliance may be creative as opposed to actual. There is evidence that even developed 
countries are yet to accurately ascertain how much is laundered yearly, as such, it would 
be difficult to determine whether compliance to AML/CFT standards aids in fighting 
financial crime.  
 
The shortcomings identified in the pros may indicate that countries may not find 
tangible reasons or output to combat AML/CFT, but will continue to comply to ensure 
that their borrowing capabilities are not restrained. Hence, the integration of the FATF 
standards into the FSAP has no doubt aimed to utilise its root in state consent to enhance 
their legitimacy.131 Consequently, the FATF standards have increasingly become 
perceived as legitimate by ACs/EEs. Whilst this would ensure that ACs strive to 
preserve their credit lines, ingraining the FATF standards within the IFIs 
conditionalities may have consequences. Such pessimism is born out of the failings of 
the IFI’s structural reforms, most of which, due to their unsuitability to the terrain – 
facilitated underdevelopment whilst hardly addressing the key issue it aimed to resolve 
– poverty.132 This begs the rhetorical question, would the FATF recommendations 
achieve their intended output given the lack of legitimacy?  
 
Against the backdrop of arguments which illustrate the coercive drive that engineer’s 
compliance in the presence of ‘illegitimacy’, this thesis argues that any further 
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restructuring to include legitimacy must ensure that all actors (states), notwithstanding 
their hierarchy, are ingrained in the process of standard making and implementation. 
Including such fairness in procedures that are devoid of coercion would ensure that 
countries, particularly ACs, are voluntarily proactive towards convergence and meeting 
set goals.133  
 
7.5. Conclusion  
 
Although ACs/EEs’ adopted the FATF’s standards, they have continued to implement 
them particularly due to the instrumentality of the IFIs. Their continued implementation 
has however only resulted in formal or creative compliance. The FATF’s attempts to 
resolve this through the introduction of the RBA which was hoped to address the 
legitimacy crisis and resolve agency slack has proved futile. Scholars have promoted 
other options to resolving this. However, the UBA does hold some promise in resolving 
issues on legitimacy, in addition to ingrained changes within institutions.  
 
This chapter starts by re-emphasizing the existence of a legitimacy crisis in AML/CFT 
regulation processes, as evidenced by the operations and strategy of IFIs/FATF in 
combatting these illicit crimes. It argues that the absence of legitimacy is most notable 
in the application of standards to ‘belated members’ and associate members, which are 
‘rule-takers’, with limited room to contribute to rules making. Hence, resulting laws do 
not necessarily mirror society. This occasions a regulatory paradox, for in certain cases, 
the standards, when translated to laws, achieve unintended consequences.  
 
The legitimacy crisis is then examined in the context of rulemaking and 
implementation. It argues that belated attempts to include later members in rulemaking 
is a façade, a situation which leaves associate members in a worse off position given 
their limited ability to contribute to final decisions. The legitimacy crisis is further 
                                     
133 ibid. 
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exacerbated by the implementation process, which mainly sees ACs penalised for 
compliance shortcomings. This is despite evidence that indicates that most compliance 
issues are within developed countries. 
 
Whilst the RBA recently adopted by the FATF was aimed at resolving AML/CFT 
compliance differentials by taking into consideration the peculiarities of countries, its 
flawed conceptualisation has hindered its ability to achieve this aim. Rather, this has 
aggravated the agency slack between IFIs/FATF and ACs/EEs particularly due to the 
difficulty in implementing the RBA which is outcome focused. Consequently, the 
argument advanced is that a UBA would be more suited to addressing the current 
agency slack as it shifts the focus to the process of decision making as opposed to the 
outcome.  Moreover, it can better incorporate the priorities of ACs/EEs. This would aid 
in resolving the legitimacy crisis which also requires a remodelling at the FATF level 













Explanations and Conclusion 
8. Introduction 
 
This thesis questions empirically, how the evolution of the AML/CFT framework has 
occasioned an agency slack which has an impact on attained FATF compliance levels 
of countries. The aim of this chapter is to pull together the main insights and 
conclusions from the previous chapters. This chapter sets out to explain what 
compliance drivers ACs/EEs respond to, how the agency relationship explains their 
behaviour and how the RBA may indeed not resolve the existing legitimacy crises.  
 
It is imperative to state that the conclusion drawn from findings is that the FATF has a 
significant impact on AML/CFT governance in EEs even though their compliance level 
is still not at the optimum level. Whilst its impact is negligible in ACs. These findings 
confirm the theoretical argument of the thesis that the hierarchy of countries determines 
their compliance levels and communication strategy with IFIs/FATF. One possible 
explanation for this is that the AML/CFT policies are less reflective of the socio-
economic and political terrain of ACs which is below the hierarchy and therefore, are 








8.1. Explanations and Conclusions by Research Questions   
 
At the heart of this thesis are four research questions;  
 
1. Has the evolution of IFIs/FATF facilitated an agency slack between these 
international institutions and ACs/EEs with resulting legitimacy crises?  
2. Do the compliance drivers and level of compliance attained in ACs/EEs indicate 
a misalignment of incentives between these countries and IFIs/FATF? 
3. What factors exacerbate information asymmetry between IFIs/FATF and 
ACs/EEs? Can the agency slack that arises from countries acting in their self-
interest to hinder information sharing with other countries be resolved?  
4. Does the risk-based approach sufficiently take into consideration the 
peculiarities of countries and facilitate increased legitimacy of the FATF? 
 
The first question on the evolution of the IFIs/FATF, its resulting AML/CFT standards 
and the likely impact of this in creating an agency slack between these institutions and 
ACs/EEs was explored extensively through literature in chapter two. This chapter 
examined the evolution of AML/CFT standards, the institutions central to its 
administration and the influences of these on state compliance. It argued strongly that 
these standards were crucial to facilitating financial integrity in cross-border relations. 
However, it found that the AML/CFT standards only inculcated the perspectives of a 
select group of developed countries (the G7), and hence, was better suited at combatting 
illicit crimes within these countries. Given the lack of transparency, accountability and 
legitimacy in the standards creation processes, this chapter asserts that ACs/EEs are 
more inclined to suffer a compliance deficit. This quandary is understood through the 
lens of the agency theory which unearths an agency slack in the relationship between 
IFIs/FATF and ACs/EEs, backed by a legitimacy crisis, showing that although 
ACs/EEs are disproportionately involved, there is a mandate for their compliance – an 
indication of hegemonic subjugation.  
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The second question on whether compliance drivers and the level of compliance 
attained in ACs/EEs indicate a misalignment of incentives between these countries and 
the IFIs/FATF was addressed in chapter three, five and six. The statistics on compliance 
levels in ACs shows far from impressive attainments. Of the 37 ACs are examined, 
only 7 are deemed to be more than 50% compliant, and 30 are less than 50% compliant.  
A slightly improved image is seen with EEs with compliance levels ranging from 54% 
to 66.67%. Literature, however, indicates that these compliance levels may be 
suggestive of the fact that whilst ACs primarily strive for financial inclusion and EEs 
struggle for improved global integration – the FATF’s focus is on integrity which may 
sometimes be tangential to the primary objectives of the bloc of countries. 
Consequently, the FATF’s strive may come at the expense of the socio-economic and 
political peculiarities of these countries (cash-based, remittances, etc.) which not only 
hinders their unique development but may result in a regulatory paradox.  
 
More so, the compliance drives which are expected to be effective in all countries, are 
seen to have different outcomes across ACs/EEs. More precisely, chapter three argues 
that law is crucial when designed properly, and most importantly, when backed with 
confidence. Confidence in financial stability, institutions, governmental and political 
systems, and enforcement structures. The extent to which these factors are instituted 
within ACs/EEs to ensure implementation and compliance is however questionable. 
This serves as an indication that ACs/EEs would be incapable of effectively 
transplanting or complying with the FATF standards. These pre-condition feed into the 
compliance drivers which are categorised as legal and non-legal factors which can be 
internal or external to a country. It is against these ‘drivers’ that the compliance 
probability of ACs/EEs is examined.  
 
In chapter five, the compliance drivers enumerated in chapter three are examined within 
the context of Africa’s socio-economic and political history. The current positioning of 
ACs in the global economy is also considered in determining how the compliance 
drivers actually define ACs compliance with the FATF’s standards. In examining 
compliance as a function of legal factors, the impact of democracy and rule of law, 
enforcement and law mirroring society are considered. On rule of law and democracy, 
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findings indicate a positive correlation between these indexes and compliance with 
AML/CFT recommendations. Signifying that the more advanced a country’s rule of 
law or democracy indexes are, the higher their compliance levels. ACs have low 
indexes on both indicators, one possible explanation for their low compliance levels. 
Irrespective of these shortcomings, ACs face enforcement actions (sanctions) for non-
compliance. Most ACs sanctioned have reacted by projecting formal compliance in 
their engagements with IFIs/FATF so as to evade future sanctions. Such formal or sham 
compliance have seen laws in ACs mirror the FATF standards, some of which are 
antithetical to the ACs agenda on financial inclusion.  
 
Legal compliance drivers are backed by non-legal drivers, such as reputation, political 
will, domestic conditions, resources and capacity deficit. The extent to which reputation 
can drive compliance in ACs is however limited, as most AC’s shamed for non-
compliance resort to formal compliance. More so, politically will which may be 
internally or externally generated can be hindered by factors such as corruption. 
Statistical findings by this thesis indicate that higher corruption in ACs occasions lower 
compliance levels. These countries also lack the necessary resources and capacity to 
check against illicit transactions.  
 
Also crucial are the external compliance drivers of ownership and legitimacy. The 
belated associate membership of the ACs within FSRBs has tinted their perception of 
the FATF’s legitimacy. This is particularly due to the perceived absence of input and 
ownership in standards and processes of the FATF, especially on issues that concern 
them, a situation that leads to coerced or formal compliance, which is nevertheless 
apathetically low. Their low compliance is indicative of two things. Firstly, that 
although ACs are keen on integration and integrity within the global economy, their 
aspirations are hindered by culture and capacity. Secondly, the shortcomings of ACs 
indicate that subjecting these countries to the same standards, methodology and 
sanctions as other developed countries would be to ignore their heritage and socio-
economic challenges whilst facilitating legitimacy issues. It would be setting these 
countries up to fail or permitting them to engage strategically with IFIs/FATF given 
their low integration with the global economy.  
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Chapter six examines the impact of the compliance drivers enumerated in chapter three 
within the socio-economic and political positioning of the BRICS. It starts by 
appraising the impact of legal factors as compliance drivers. On rule of law and 
democracy, it finds that, contrary to the situation in ACs where these are key drivers, it 
is not the case with all the BRICS. Statistically, there is a negative correlation between 
the rule of law and democracy on one hand and compliance with the AML/CFT 
standards on the other hand. Meaning that these indices do not necessarily drive 
compliance. Conversely, these factors may indeed have some impact on compliance – 
but the actual compliance levels would be shrouded in secrecy.  This can be attributed 
to the law mirroring international standards – a situation which has led to the wholesale 
application of non-contextualised policies. For instance, the FATF’s attempts at 
curtailing ML through remittances mirrors the requirements for curtailing ML through 
FIs, a process which is at best fallible. These situations can, however, be remedied by 
enforcement actions which have an impact on EEs, as these countries, keen on retaining 
their position within the international economy – respond positively to enforcement 
actions.  
 
Flowing from enforcement is the non-legal driver – reputation. Evidence shows that 
EEs are keen to protect their reputation to ensure continued business with the West. 
This is strengthened by the resources at their disposal, coupled with their fortified 
technical capacity. Whilst this signals ingrained political will which can propel 
compliance, like ACs, such ‘will’ may be undermined by corruption. This is backed by 
statistics which indicate that where corruption is high, there is low compliance. 
However, as opposed to ACs, globalisation and integration drives compliance in EEs, 
especially those like China that have established physical businesses in developed 
countries.  This is, however, the concern that their procedures may only follow the host 
countries AML/CFT policies on paper. 
 
Crucially important is the external drive of ownership and legitimacy. Unlike ACs who 
are associate members of the FATF, the BRICS have gained membership, hence 
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possibly augmenting their perception of the FATF as legitimate. Whilst the BRICS and 
developing world viewed this as a means to gain increased representation within the 
FATF, the agenda of the West was to ensure that the financial movement to the Global 
South is not replete with illicit transactions. The power-play involved in negotiations 
between these ‘North-South strategically important countries’ was predicated on the 
assumption that representation would be a catalyst for improved compliance with 
AML/CFT recommendations. Conversely, the BRICS coerced and belated membership 
has created a very unbalanced membership between EEs and the developed countries. 
Against this background, this chapter argues that membership does not necessarily 
guarantee comparable representation or legitimacy; neither does it guarantee the overtly 
improved compliance of BRICS countries. It presents a contrary argument that 
‘representation’ taints the socio-economic complexities inherent in these countries and 
their ability to comply. Worse still, it conceals the asymmetries occasioned by variances 
in the strength of legal structures reinforced by political and economic differences 
between members of the FATF. For membership to equate to legitimacy, there must be 
existent changes along existing political and economic global structures, arguing that 
this would ensure improved adherence to FATF recommendations. 
 
The third set of questions are focused on the factors that exacerbate information 
asymmetry between IFIs/FATF and ACs/EEs. Additionally, it examines whether 
agency slack arises from countries acting in their self-interests to hinder information 
sharing. These questions are addressed in chapter four which uncovers the relationship 
between the collective principals and countries. This synergy examined through the 
agency theory unveils the power dynamics between developed countries, the 
institutions they create and lead and ACs/EEs. It reveals that the AML/CFT standards 
reflect the priorities and interests of the global north and is sublimated with covenants 
of agency capture which can hinder the unique development of ACs. Analysing the 
interaction between agent states and the CPs, it argues that two factors are crucial for 
understanding information asymmetry between these actors on ML/TF issues; the level 
of a country’s integration with the global financial system and its perceived compliance 
levels. It finds that the incentive for information sharing is highest when a country is 
‘highly integrated’ with perceived high compliance levels. In opposite situation, the 
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countries would usually engage strategically with the principal in order to evade 
observatory tools or sanctions.  
 
Furthermore, in acknowledgement of the flow of money within countries, the 
interaction between ‘highly integrated’ and ‘mid-integrated’ countries are examined. 
The chapter illustrates that these set of countries share information only when it is in 
their self-interest, particularly when there is a continuous financial business that is of 
systematic importance to both parties. It, however, argues that even when low-
integrated countries are willing to exchange viable information, they may be limited by 
capacity challenges. Where however information asymmetry continually thrives, the 
CPs are privy to tools to rein in the agent-states. The tools utilized are dependent on the 
circumstances in question and the application of the inappropriate tool may indeed lead 
to under-regulation, as the tool would at best be inadequate.  
 
The fourth question on whether the risk-based approach sufficiently takes into 
consideration the peculiarities of countries and facilitate increased legitimacy of the 
FATF? Chapter seven addresses this. It argues that whilst the RBA recently adopted by 
the FATF was aimed at resolving AML/CFT compliance differentials by taking into 
consideration the peculiarities of countries, its flawed conceptualisation has hindered 
its ability to achieve this aim. Rather, this has aggravated the agency slack between 
IFIs/FATF and ACs/EEs particularly due to the difficulty in implementing the RBA 
which is outcome focused. Consequently, the argument advanced is that a UBA would 
be more suited to addressing the current agency slack as it shifts the focus to the process 
of decision making as opposed to the outcome.  Moreover, it can better incorporate the 
priorities of ACs/EEs. This would aid in resolving the legitimacy crisis which also 
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Questionnaire for thesis titled: Compliance with the Global AML/CFT Regulation: 
Parameters and Paradoxes of Regulation in African Countries and Emerging 
Economies.   
 
Background 
The purpose of this study is to understand, through a semi-structured interview, the 
relationship between the legal development of countries and their compliance levels to 
global AML/CTF standards. It examines this within the context of legitimacy in the 
global regulation of AML/CTF. This study is paramount and operationally relevant 
because this is a watershed moment for ML/TF in African Countries and Emerging 
Economies. This qualitative interview is designed to generate richer information across 
a range of issues within the AML/CTF spectrum.  
 
Research Questions:134  
1. Does the current global AML/CTF recommendations and benchmarks adopted 
for assessing technical compliance allow West African Countries/Emerging 
Economies to be adjudged equitably in the compliance ratings?  
2. Does the relationship between the International Standard Setter (FATF) and 
West African/Emerging Economies encourage improved compliance within 
these states? 
3. What are the AML/CTF enforcement challenges within West African States and 
how can these be addressed?  
 
Questionnaire 
Instructions for Interviewees 
                                     
134 These research questions have been modified for interviewees ease of understanding. Refer to Chapter 
1 for thesis research questions.  
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I. Respond to designated questions only  
• Interviewee(s) from international/regional institutions – respond to section 1 
and 2  
• Interviewee(s) from financial institutions – respond to section 1 and 3  
II. Please respond to all questions in your designated sections 
 
Section 1. Legitimacy of institutions and its effect on Compliance in West African 
States and Emerging Economies  
a. Do you have any experience of working with emerging economies and 
African states?  
b. Do you see any difference in the way they comply?  
c. How do states interact with the FATF and does it differ from the way they 
interact with the IMF/WB?  
d. There is a large body of literature critiquing the legitimacy of the 
international AML/CTF regulatory framework, should international bodies 
improve their legitimacy? 135 
e. If yes, how can the legitimacy of the FATF be improved?  
f. Can the IMF and World Bank push for improved legitimacy in soft law 
bodies?  
g. Would improved legitimacy within soft law bodies like the FATF translate 
to improved AML/CTF compliance? 
h. Does the risk-based approach recommendation ensure improved 
compliance ratings within African states/emerging economies? 
Section 2. Legal development and other issues arising in compliance  
a) What factors hinder West African Countries and emerging economies from 
fully assimilating the FATF recommendations?  
                                     
135 Legitimacy here refers to membership, composition of board and decision making process 
within regulatory bodies and its interaction with/effect on developing countries  
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b) To what extent does the current regulatory framework take into 
consideration the level of legal development within countries and its effect 
on their ability to comply?136 
c) Does the ‘soft-law’ enforcement process by the FATF recognise the legal 
development of countries?  
d) Do you think that aspects of investigative, prosecutorial and judicial 
processes in these states hinder ML/TF prosecutions and sanctions?  
Can you give example or instances? 
 
Section 3. Compliance Levels Across Jurisdictions 
a.) Do you have any experience in compliance divisions of financial institutions 
within emerging economies and African states?  
b.) Within the institutions you’ve worked with, what are compliance levels to 
FATF recommendations (particularly on KYC, CDD, CTF 
recommendations and correspondent banking) 
c.) Do you consider such compliance levels adequate?   
(particularly KYC, CDD and CTF recommendations and corresponding 
banking)  
d.) How do you assess the compliance level to these recommendations?  
e.) Are branches in WA/EE hindered in their ability to comply? If so, how?  
f.) Is the KYC requirement conflated with the middle class population given 
the inability of the lower class to meet the requirement to bank?  
g.) Do these financial institutions exchange financial intelligence with 
enforcement agencies in a timely manner? 
h.) Describe the relationship between compliance departments and other 
departments within financial institutions as regards to closing a financial 
deal.  
i.) How can compliance levels in financial institutions within these 
jurisdictions be improved?  
                                     
136 Legal development here refers to the strength of the legislative and judicial arm of 




Please note that the list of interviewees is kept private on request. They comprise of 
staff of the International Monetary Fund, regulatory institutions in Nigeria, financial 
institution in Kenya and the FATF styled regional body, West Africa (GIABA). 
Transcripts can be provided on request – in accordance with the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).  
 
